A common thread: Labor, politics, and capital mobility in the Massachusetts textile industry, 1880-1934 by English, Beth Anne
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
2003 
A common thread: Labor, politics, and capital mobility in the 
Massachusetts textile industry, 1880-1934 
Beth Anne English 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, and the United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
English, Beth Anne, "A common thread: Labor, politics, and capital mobility in the Massachusetts textile 
industry, 1880-1934" (2003). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539623415. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-tsvp-v926 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
A COMMON THREAD 
Labor, Politics, and Capital Mobility in the Massachusetts Textile Industry, 1880-1934
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Beth Anne English 
2003
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
APPROVAL SHEET
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of 


















Chapter I. “The Enormous Increase in the Number of Spindles in the 
Southern States . . .  Is Positively Alarming:” Southern Boosters,
New England Responses, and the Growth of Textile
Manufacturing in the Piedmont South 17
Chapter II. “Manufacturers Surely Cannot Be Expected to Continue
Business:” Labor, Legislation, and Depression 42
Chapter III. “A Model Manufacturing Town:” The Dwight
Manufacturing Company Moves To Alabama City 89
Chapter IV. “Best Not To Give Notice That We Are Working . . .  Small 
Help:” Capital Mobility, Unionization, and the Anti-Child Labor 
Campaign in Alabama 136
Chapter V. “We Have Seen The Armistice Signed and Witnessed a
General Demoralization of Business:” The Dwight Manufacturing
Company, Labor, and Capital Mobility During the Textile
Depression of the 1920s 192
Chapter VI. “There Is More Dissatisfaction Among Labor Now Than I 
Have Ever Seen:” The 1934 General Textile Strike and the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company 242
Chapter VII. “Economic Law Will Undoubtedly Have Its Way:” The 





R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The writer wishes to thank Professor Cindy Hahamovitch for her guidance 
through the course o f this project. She deftly oversaw the process of taking a vague idea 
and turning it into a cogent piece of work. I could always count on her to push me to 
think more critically about my work, and to be available when I needed reassurance that 
there would be a light at the end of the dissertation-writing tunnel. Cindy carefully read 
chapter drafts and offered insightful criticisms from which this project has benefited 
immeasurably and for which I am grateful. I also extend my appreciation to Professors 
Scott Nelson, Leisa Meyer, and Bryant Simon for their suggestions and careful readings 
of the manuscript.
I offer a special thank you to my family for their encouragement o f all my 
endeavors, especially the writing o f this dissertation, which my dad fondly refers to as my 
“big paper.” Finally, to my husband, Steve Barnes, I give my gratitude for his 
unwavering support, for the many times he let me monopolize conversation at suppertime 
with talk related to what I wrote that day, and for faithfully reading and commenting on 
every chapter draft. He is the best partner and friend anyone could want.
iv
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
ABSTRACT
“A Common Thread” is an analysis of the relocation of the New England textile 
industry to the states o f the Piedmont South between 1880 and 1934. Competition from 
cotton textile mills operating in the South became a serious challenge for New England 
textile manufacturers as early as the 1890s. As they watched their profits turn into losses 
while output and sales of southern goods continued apace during the 1893 depression, 
owners o f northern textile corporations felt unfairly constrained by state legislation that 
established age and hours standards for mill employees, and by actual and potential labor 
militancy in their mills. Several New England textile manufacturers, therefore, embraced 
the strategy of opening southern subsidiary factories as a way to effectively meet 
southern competition by expanding their productive capacities to locations where they 
could pay their workers less and run their mills without the limitations imposed upon 
them by state regulations and unionized labor. The Dwight Manufacturing Company of 
Chicopee, Massachusetts was one of the first New England cotton textile companies to 
begin operating a southern branch mill, which it constructed in Alabama City, Alabama 
between 1895 and 1896. Within a thirty-year period, many of the largest textile 
corporations in Massachusetts would move part or all of their operations from the Bay 
State to North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama where textile production took 
place in mills that cost less to fuel, was done by workers whose wages were lower than 
those paid in New England, and occurred in a region where textile unions and state 
regulations were virtually non-existent. Many owners of New England cotton 
manufacturing concerns, including those of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, would 
eventually abandon their northern factories completely for ones they had originally built 
as subsidiary mills during the 1890s and early 1900s.
Through the lens of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, “A Common Thread” 
examines this process of regional transfer within the American textile industry. The 
specific goals of the study are to explain 1) why and how Massachusetts cotton 
manufacturing companies pursued relocation to the South as a key strategy for economic 
survival, 2) why and how southern states attracted this northern textile capital, and 3) 
how textile mill owners, the state, manufacturers’ associations, labor unions, and reform 
groups shaped the North-to-South movement of cotton mill money, machinery, and jobs. 
“A Common Thread” provides a historic reference point for and helps inform on-going 
discussions and debates about capital mobility and corporate responsibility as the 
industrial relocation from region to region that occurred during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries continues from nation to nation within the context o f economic 
globalization.
v
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INTRODUCTION
Buried in the business section of the 14 December 2000 late edition o f the New 
York Times, a one paragraph article announced, “Company News: Cone Mills to Close 
U.S. Plant and Expand in Mexico.” On the same day that the Cone Mills of Greensboro, 
North Carolina announced the closure o f a “money-losing division” located in Marion, 
South Carolina, the company said it planned to spend eighteen million dollars to expand 
production by thirty-five percent at the denim-manufacturing facilities it operated in 
Mexico as part o f a joint venture with Compania Industrial de Parras.1 Within two years, 
Cone recorded the company’s first profitable year since 1994.2 In a statement released 
publicizing Cone’s first-quarter profits in April 2002, Chief Executive Officer John 
Bakane said that he expected the company’s revenues to increase over the remainder of
the year but added that in order to do so, “We must reduce our overall cost structure by
-2
expanding in Mexico.” Extensions into Mexico were part of an ongoing company 
“reinvention plan” which also included cutting nearly 1,000 U.S. jobs from the Cone 
Mills’ payrolls. Cone officials argued, “We’ve got to go there” in order to supply jeans 
makers who had also “moved production south of the border.”4
After years of such textile mill closures throughout the Unites States, stories 
began appearing in the pages of local newspapers with tales of the miraculous
1 New York Times, 14 December 2000.
2 Greensboro News and Record, 23 October 2002.
3 W omen’s Wear Daily, 25 April 2002.
4 Greensboro News and Record, 23 October 2002.
2
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3transformations of old mill complexes into trendy residential lofts and artist studios, 
museums, outlet and antique malls, and NASCAR garages and repair facilities, evidence 
o f “how defunct manufacturing centers of today can become the boom towns of 
tomorrow.”5 But, every permanent mill shutdown has a human cost that cannot be 
measured by the successes of city revitalization projects meant to breathe new life into 
old industrial districts. The process o f capital movement, mill closures, and job loss has 
life-altering consequences. During 2001 alone, over one hundred mills in the U.S. ceased 
production and more than 148,000 workers in the textile and apparel industries lost their 
jobs.6 Federal and state programs create temporary safety nets for “displaced workers” 
in the form of unemployment benefits and vocational training programs, but for many, 
the loss o f a textile mill job means ongoing struggles to “get by” on lower paychecks 
earned in the service sector. For some, like North Carolinian Farrie Holt, the loss is 
permanent. “At 71, she figures no one wants her. She applied at other mills, at retail 
stores. Nothing,” noted Amber Veverka o f the Charlotte Observer. “No one,” Veverka 
added, “apparently has studied what happens to such workers long term.”7 Martinsville, 
Virginia resident and former textile mill worker Mary Lou Ramey spoke for many when 
she said, “It’s like all we’ve ever known is textiles; it’s all we’ve ever done . . . .  I do not 
have a clue as to where I’m gonna go and what I’m gonna do.”8
Plant closings have become endemic in the United States, a phenomena described 
by Steven Greenhouse of the New York Times as “the infection that has hit so much if
5 Augusta Chronicle, 13 April 2002; Boston Globe, 3 March 1980, 9 August 1981, 23 May 1982, 
16 December 1984, 31 January 1987, 22 January 1994, 14 December 2002; Providence Journal, 22 
September and 13 October 2002; Springfield Union News, 1 August 2002; National Post, 1 June 2002.
6 Charleston Gazette, 5 January 2002.
7 Charlotte Observer, 27 October 2002.
8 Charleston Gazette, 5 January 2002.
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4industrial America.”9 The loss of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. and the exodus of 
industrial capital to other parts of the world have spurred debates over whether 
protectionism or working to raise global labor standards is the most effective way to halt 
capital relocation and mitigate the hardships caused by unemployment and 
deindustrialization. While appearing to be a new problem, in reality, capital flight and 
the dialogue about effective strategies to meet it have been ongoing for over a century.
Between the 1890s and 1920s, many of the largest textile corporations in 
Massachusetts moved part or all of their operations from the Bay State to North and 
South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama where textile production took place in mills that 
cost less to fuel, were taxed at lower rates, was done by workers whose wages were lower 
than those paid in New England, and occurred in a region where textile unions and state 
regulations were virtually non-existent. The Dwight Manufacturing Company of 
Chicopee, Massachusetts was one of these New England textile corporations. Founded in 
1841, the Dwight Company opened a southern mill in 1896 and in 1927, the Dwight 
Company abandoned its northern facilities completely. Dwight’s corporate officers were 
very vocal about the conditions in Massachusetts that “pushed” the company to move 
while those in Alabama “pulled.” Its southern operations became a lightening rod for 
both praise and criticism by mill owners, mill village apologists, advocates o f child labor 
reform, and organized labor. The late nineteenth and early twentieth-century discourse 
about Dwight’s decision to open a subsidiary mill in Alabama and its eventual move out 
o f Massachusetts predicts much of the modern dialogue about globalization.10
9 New York Times, 26 December 2002.
10 On the use o f  case studies as a valuable framework for examining capital mobility trends as they 
occur in various industrial settings, see Charles Craypo and Bruce Nissen, eds., G rand Designs: The Impact 
o f  Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions, and Communities (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1993), 7; Jefferson
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5The Dwight Manufacturing Company provides a lens through which one may 
better see the process of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century regional 
relocation of the American textile industry as well as ongoing global migrations of 
capital. Because the Dwight Company generated an inordinate amount o f public 
comment and left a treasure-trove of corporate records, its history reveals the decision­
making that led to the relocation of production facilities from one region to another. Not 
surprisingly, the Dwight story confirms that manufacturing businesses abandon high- 
wage areas for low-wage ones in the ongoing quest for lower production costs and higher 
profits. But while the history of the Dwight Company illustrates that capital relocation 
and its underlying causes are not new, it also shows that plant closures and removals can 
be prevented.
Conventional wisdom dictates that the disparity of northern and southern 
production costs caused by low wages, long hours, limited unionization, and scant 
regulatory legislation, which typified the textile industry in the states of the Piedmont 
South, made the permanent repositioning of the center o f the American textile industry 
southward inevitable. Analysis of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, however, 
reveals points at which the process o f industrial removal from New England to the 
Piedmont South could have gone very differently. For the Dwight Company in the 1890s 
and many other New England textile producers starting in the 1920s, capital mobility was 
the strategy of choice for dealing with southern competition. New England textile 
unionists, although conscious of the disparity of conditions that existed between northern 
and southern mills and the possibility that a union presence in the Piedmont South could
Cowie, Capital Moves: R C A ’s Seventy-Year Quest fo r  Cheap Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1999), 1-4.
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6bring wage and hours standards between North and South closer together, embraced a 
policy whereby they worked to strengthen their union base in the Northeast before 
attempting to organize their southern counterparts. As New England mill relocations to 
the low-wage, open-shop South accelerated in the 1920s, the unionists’ “North first” 
strategy left them without the power, numbers, or resources to effectively combat the 
deindustrialization of textile towns throughout the Northeast. As such, New England 
operatives were in the position of reacting to a process that mill owners had long since set 
in motion. Understanding the choices made by textile operatives locally, regionally, and 
nationally in the process of Dwight’s relocation to Alabama and why textile unionists in 
New England retreated to a local-regional approach to organizing and securing protective 
legislation rather than pursuing a national one, can inform the development o f useful 
strategies for today’s workers and communities so that they might anticipate change and 
be proactive in meeting the challenges presented by mobile capital.
Jefferson Cowie found a similar process of capital relocation at work within radio 
manufacturing giant, RCA. Cowie documented RCA’s relocations from Camden, New 
Jersey to Bloomington, Indiana between the 1930s and 1960s, and, later, to Memphis, 
Tennessee and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico in the company’s perpetual search for cheap and 
“controllable” labor. The stories of RCA and the Dwight Manufacturing Company differ 
significantly because of the periods in which each company relocated, the dissimilarities 
of production in the electronics and textile industries, and the ways each industry 
developed nationally and globally. Both Capital Moves and “A Common Thread,” 
however, point to the need for workers in the manufacturing sector to create broad 
networks of solidarity by, in Jefferson Cowie’s words, creating a “shared sense o f place”
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7that moves beyond local and national priorities. U.S. unions in the twenty-first century, 
as was necessary for New England textile unionists a century ago, need to fundamentally 
alter how they use their financial and political resources and who they organize. Workers 
in highly developed nations like the U.S. must act to bring about a global equalization of 
conditions within individual manufacturing sectors so that runaway companies will have 
no reason to run. The history of the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s relocation 
demonstrates that it was imperative for New England textile operatives to shift their 
outlook from local and regional to national at the turn of the century to respond to the 
implications of “southern competition.” Likewise, it is crucial for twenty-first-century 
workers to reorient their perspective to a global one.11
While “A Common Thread” is a study of capital mobility, it is also a contribution 
to the vast and varied body of scholarly literature dealing with the histories of both the 
New England and Piedmont South textile industries. “A Common Thread” revisits 
numerous issues with which scholars have dealt in the past, places them in the context of 
capital mobility, and adds to the existing textile historiography in three broad ways.
First, it disengages from the social-cultural methodology used by many historians of the 
American textile industry that, with few exceptions, has dominated the writing of textile- 
related history for over twenty years. Beginning in the 1970s, historians who were 
influenced by the analytical approaches of E. P. Thompson and Herbert Gutman began 
using new written and oral sources to document a more inclusive history of the American 
textile industry.12 This new social history moved beyond company studies o f New
11 Cowie, Capital M oves, especially 1-9, 182-201.
12 See E. P. Thompson, The Making o f  the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 
1966); Herbert Gutman, “Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919” American  
H istorical Review  78(June 1973): 531-588.
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England textile corporations reflecting only the view of management, analyses focused 
on the question of who drove the establishment of the early nineteenth-century New 
England textile industry, and the ways in which textile manufacturing facilitated the
i
industrialization of the Northeast and the United States. Shifting the focus to the textile 
industry’s mill hands, these social historians also fundamentally challenged the portrayals 
of the turn-of-the-century cotton mill campaign as a grand movement led by the South’s 
“leading citizens” who intended, first and foremost, to construct textile manufactories as 
a way provide gainful employment to the region’s poor whites.14 Groundbreaking works 
such as Thomas Dublin’s study of Lowell’s mill girls, and the collaborative Like a 
Family described the process of industrialization in New England and the New South 
through the experiences of the textile workers themselves. Dublin and the Chapel Hill 
scholars emphasized the cultures created within the early nineteenth-century Lowell 
boarding house system and late nineteenth and twentieth-century southern mill villages, 
workers’ ongoing negotiations with management as the industry matured in both regions, 
and textile operatives’ participation in labor militancy and unions. Historians began 
focusing not just on the workplace, but also on how individuals acted within a context of
13 Such works include Caroline Ware, Early New England Cotton Manufacture, A Study In 
Industrial Beginnings (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1931); Hannah Josephson, The Golden  
Threads: New E ngland’s M ill Girls and Magnates (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949); Evelyn 
Knowlton, P eppere ll’s Progress: H istory o f  a Cotton Textile Company, 1844-1945 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1948); Melvin Thomas Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry o f  the 
United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1912).
14 These southern-focused analyses include Broadus Mitchell, The Rise o f  Cotton M ills in the 
South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1921); Wilbur J. Cash, The M ind o f  the South (New  
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941); C. Vann Woodward, Origins o f  the New South: 1877-1913  (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1951); Jonathan Wiener, Social Origins o f  the N ew South: Alabama, 
1860-1885  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Dwight Billings, Planters and the 
Making o f  a “New South: ” Class, Politics, and Developm ent in North Carolina, 1865-1900  (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1979); Paul Gaston, The New South Creed: A Study in Southern 
Mythmaking (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970).
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9industrial employment to create distinct attitudes and cultures that permeated the 
boundaries of work and extended into their homes and communities.15
Building on these earlier works, textile industry scholars have gone on to delve 
deeper into issues such as the nature of workers’ power within the system of southern 
mill village paternalism, the ways in which various intersections o f race, gender, 
ethnicity, and religion have shaped working-class politics on local and state levels, and 
the question of why the South and the textile industry as a whole have historically been 
the least unionized region and manufacturing sector in the United States.16 By 
concentrating on individuals and their experiences, attitudes, and actions within various
13 Thomas Dublin, Women at Work: The Transformation o f  Work and Community in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, 1826-1860  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, et al., 
Like a Family: The Making o f  a Southern Cotton M ill World (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1987). Other examples include Thomas Dublin, ed., Farm to Factory: W omen’s Letters, 1830-1860  
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Tamara Hareven, Amoskeag: Life and Work in an 
American Factory-C ity (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), and Family Time and Industrial Time: The 
Relationship Between the Family and Work in a New England Industrial Community (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); John Cumbler, Working-Class Community in Industrial America:
Work, Leisure, and Struggle in Two Industrial Cities, 1880-1930  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979); 
Mary Blewett, The Last Generation: Work and Life in the Textile Mills o f  Lowell, Massachusetts, 1910- 
1960 (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1990); Melton Alonza McLaurin, Paternalism and  
Protest: Southern Cotton M ill Workers and Organized Labor, 1875-1905 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1971); David Carlton, M ill and Town in South Carolina, 1880-1920  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982); Cathy McHugh, M ill Family: The Labor System in the Southern Cotton Textile 
Industry, 1880-1915  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Ronald Eller, Miners, Millhands, and  
Mountaineers: Industrialization o f  the Appalachian South (Knoxville: University o f  Tennessee Press,
1982); Dolores Janiewski, Sisterhood Denied: Race, Gender, and Class in a N ew South Community 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “Disorderly Women: Gender and 
Labor Militancy in the Appalachian South” Journal o f  American H istory 73(September 1986): 354-382; 
Victoria Byerly, H ard Times Cotton M ill Girls: Personal Stories o f  Womanhood and Poverty in the New  
South (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); I. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the N ew South: Social Change 
and Cultural Persistence, 1880-1915  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989); Wayne Flynt, 
Poor But Proud: A labam a’s Poor Whites (Tuscaloosa: University o f  Alabama Press, 1989).
16 See for example, Douglas Flamming, Creating the Modern South: M illhands and M anagers in 
Dalton, Georgia, 1884-1984  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1992); Bryan Simon, A 
Fabric o f  Defeat: The Politics o f  South Carolina Millhands in State and Nation  (Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 1998); Mary Blewett, Constant Turmoil: The Politics o f  Industrial Life in 
Nineteenth-Century N ew England  (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 2000); Gary Gerstle, 
Working-Class Americanism: The Politics o f  Labor in a Textile City, 1914-1960  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); Bryant Simon, “Rethinking Why There Are So Few Unions in the South” Georgia  
H istorical Quarterly 81 (Summer 1997): 465-484; Cletus Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune: An Interpretive 
H istory o f  Textile Unionism in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
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contexts, these studies have allowed a deeper understanding and appreciation of those 
who have labored in the nation’s textile mills.
This emphasis on worker agency and experiences, however, made mill 
management and textile companies, as best, minor characters in textile industry 
historiography.17 It is impossible to fully understand the actions of one group without 
studying the motivations of the other and “A Common Thread,” therefore, seeks to rejoin 
business and labor history. The analysis presented herein reverts to a company-centered 
approach, albeit one that is not one-dimensional or celebratory as many previous 
company studies have been. “A Common Thread” is a labor historian’s business history. 
Through the specific example of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, it investigates 
how textile manufacturers’ organizations, national textile unions, and their lobbying of 
state legislatures in Massachusetts and Alabama shaped the development o f the textile 
industry within the Piedmont South and the movement of New England textile capital 
southward. This institutional focus comes at the expense of an intimate knowledge o f the 
everyday lives o f Dwight’s employees in both Chicopee and Alabama City, and at the 
cost of silencing millhands who were not members o f or in agreement with decisions 
made by the larger organizations. It was through group action, however, that textile 
workers were most visible, most likely to be heard by management and state politicians, 
and most able to influence the overall process of capital relocation.18
17 Notable exceptions are Flamming, Creating the M odem  South and Clifford Kuhn, Contesting  
the New South Order: The 1914-1915 Strike at A tlan ta’s Fulton Mills (Chapel Hill: University o f  North 
Carolina Press, 2001).
18 The process o f  writing in-depth studies o f  workers’ cultures caused a fracturing o f  American 
history into myriad fields and sub-fields. Numerous historians responded to this loss o f  synthesis by 
shifting their focus back to the study o f  institutions, especially trade unions, which had dominated the 
Commons’ school approach to labor history and labor historiography through the 1960s. These “new” 
institutionalists, while seeking synthesis within labor history scholarship, were influenced by the 
community centered analyses o f  social historians as well as by the call, first made by Theda Skocpol in
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
11
Seeing these groups at work within the context of one corporation provides an 
effective framework through which the dynamics of capital movement in the textile 
industry can be explored on local, state, and inter-regional levels simultaneously. As 
such, “A Common Thread” contributes to the existing textile literature by embracing an 
inter-regional focus and incorporating the rise of the southern cotton manufacturing 
industry with the decline of the northern one into a single story. With the exception of 
several location theory-driven “migration” analyses, textile studies are overwhelmingly 
region-specific in their concentration. Economic historians have used location theory to 
explain how cost-of-production related factors like access to raw materials, proximity to 
markets and transportation costs, taxes, technological development, labor supply and 
skill, and prevailing rates of pay, facilitated the investment o f capital in certain locations 
over others. Location theorists' textile industry studies, nevertheless, have not provided 
substantive analyses of the impact that intangible things, such as New England mill 
owners’ beliefs that their home legislatures were “hostile” to capital while those in the 
South were “friendly.” Location-theory economic studies, moreover, lack detailed 
investigations into the various strategies used by New England mill owners and textile
1985, to “bring the state back in” to historical analysis. Historians such as Christopher Tomlins, William  
Forbath, Melvyn Dubofsky, Julie Greene, and Joseph McCartin broadened the economic-driven focus o f  
the Commons school and began looking at labor unions within the context o f  other institutions, especially 
the state, as a means o f  exploring the connections between and dynamics o f  the relationships among these 
various institutions and how they shaped the realities o f  working people. See Theda Skocpol, “Bringing 
the State Back In: Strategies o f  Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and 
Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); 
Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the O rganized Labor 
M ovement in America, 1880-1960  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); William Forbath, Law  
and the Shaping o f  the American Labor Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); 
Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern Am erica  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1994); Julie Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation o f  Labor and Political 
Activism, 1881-1971 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Joseph McCartin, Labor's Great 
War: The Struggle fo r  Industrial Dem ocracy and the Origins o f  Modern American Labor Relations, 1912- 
1921 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1997); Eric Amesen, Julie Greene, and Bruce 
Laurie, eds., Labor Histories: Class, Politics and the Working-Class Experience (Chicago: University o f  
Illinois Press, 1998).
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unions to counteract the manufacturing advantages to be had in the South, their effect, 
and how they changed over time. “A Common Thread” offers a more nuanced 
discussion and explanation of the underlying reasons for the relocation of textile capital 
at the turn of the century than that offered by location-theory analyses.19
Only by transcending narrow regional and local boundaries is it possible to fully 
explore the development of the southern textile industry starting in the 1880s, the growth 
o f competition between North and South beginning in the 1890s, and the precipitous 
decline of the New England industry during the 1920s. The development o f southern 
industrial booster rhetoric, the promotion and fostering o f southern manufacturing 
“advantages,” the increasing presence of southern-made cotton goods in national and 
international textile markets, the passage of state labor legislation, and the activities of 
unionized textile operatives did not occur in regional vacuums. The Dwight 
Manufacturing Company serves as a much needed “common thread” that ties the 
northern and southern stories together.
“Enough words have been uttered in the last two decades about the growth of 
textile manufacturing in the south at the expense o f New England’s long established 
industry” observed American Federation of Labor President William Green in 1929, “to
19 For examples o f  the use o f  location theory in analyses o f  capital mobility within the American 
textile industry, see Chen-Han Chen, “Regional Differences in Costs and Productivity in the American 
Cotton Manufacturing Industry, 1880-1900” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 55(August 1941): 533-566; 
David Doane, “Regional Cost Differentials and Textile Location: A Statistical Analysis” Explorations in 
Economic H istory 9(Fall 1971): 3-34; Leonard Carlson, “Labor Supply, the Acquisition o f  Skills and the 
Location o f  Southern Textile Mills, 1880-1900” Journal o f  Economic H istory 41 (March 1981): 65-73; 
Alice Galenson, The M igration o f  the Cotton Textile Industry From New England to the South: 1880-1930  
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1985); Nancy Frances Kane, Textiles in Transition: Technology, 
Wages, and Industry Relocation in the U.S. Textile Industry, 1880-1930  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1988); Marvin Fischbaum, “An Economic Analysis o f  the Southern Capture o f  the Cotton Textile Industry 
Progressing to 1910” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1965).
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fill many rows o f closely printed books.”20 Indeed, “A Common Thread” scrutinizes this 
pre-1920s period and provides a first chapter of sorts to the body of works dealing with 
the deindustrialization of the New England textile industry. The majority o f these 
studies, while also suffering from intra-regional myopia, begin in the 1920s and analyze 
mill closures and the strategies used by owners, unions, state legislatures, and the federal 
government in their efforts to save the industry through the 1960s. By the 1920s, 
however, capital flight in the American textile industry and its underlying causes had 
been realities for over thirty years. Without a study of this earlier period, it is difficult to 
fully understand the nature of the relationship between the northern and southern 
branches o f the industry and how the issues of wages, hours, and unionization had 
become such key factors in New England’s textile decline between the 1920s and 1960s. 
Consideration of this earlier era also reveals how labor, management, and the state dealt 
with the movement of capital from New England to the New South beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, what succeeded and failed, and how these victories and losses
informed the approaches to capital relocation taken by various groups as
• • 2 1 *deindustrialization accelerated in the twentieth century. Most importantly, “A Common
Thread” looks at a time when New England’s deindustrialization was not a foregone 
conclusion, and therefore, provides the best place to look for lessons to be learned from 
the process of capital mobility as it occurred over a century ago.
20 The Textile Worker, February 1929.
21 See for example, Bruce Saxon, “Fall River and the Decline o f  the N ew  England Textile 
Industry, 1949-1954” The H istorical Journal o f  Massachusetts 16(1988): 54-74; Laurence Gross, The 
Course o f  Industrial Decline: The Boott Cotton Mills o f  Lowell, Massachusetts, 1835-1955  (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); William Hartford, Where Is Our Responsibility?: Unions and  
Economic Change in the New England Textile Industry, 1870-1960  (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts 
Press, 1996); David Koistinen, “Dealing with Deindustrialization: Economics, Politics, and Policy During 
the Decline o f  the N ew  England Textile Industry, 1920-1960” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1999).
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The organization of “A Common Thread” is both chronological and topical. The 
first chapter provides a brief overview of the founding of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company in 1841, its history through the Civil War, and the economic changes that 
facilitated the growth of the textile industry in the post-Civil War South. It also looks at 
southern industrial booster campaigns during the 1880s and 1890s, the expansion of 
southern textile manufacturing, and the initial responses of Massachusetts mill owners to 
it. This chapter explains the origins of the “southern competition” with which 
Massachusetts manufacturers increasingly dealt through the 1890s and into the turn of the 
century. Chapter 2 analyzes why the Dwight Manufacturing Company decided to build a 
southern branch plant in 1894 and how southern competition, Massachusetts labor 
legislation, and labor militancy in the Dwight mills were important factors shaping the 
company’s relocation strategy. This chapter focuses on how events and changes that 
happened on the local level in Chicopee intersected with those that occurred on a 
statewide level in Massachusetts to create the conditions in which the owners o f the 
Dwight Company decided upon capital mobility as the most effective way to combat 
southern competition. Chapter 3 provides a complementary examination to the 
Massachusetts-focused one of the previous chapter, as it examines the reasons why the 
Dwight Company chose Alabama as the state and Alabama City as the town in which it 
would build its branch factory. The analysis follows the construction o f the Alabama 
City mill and mill village through the late 1890s, local reactions to the Dwight Company, 
and the first years of the Alabama City mill’s operation, focusing on the ways in which 
the company transferred but in many cases modified its “northern” managerial style to 
work effectively within a new regional context. Chapter 4 discusses the turn-of-the-
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century campaigns for child labor restriction in Alabama. It investigates how unionists, 
middle-class reformers, and the owners of the Dwight Manufacturing Company 
participated in it, as well as the ways in which the issue of capital mobility became an 
integral part of the debates over the passage o f protective legislation in Alabama.
The fifth chapter of “A Common Thread” moves the story o f the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company into the 1920s and to the closure of Dwight’s Massachusetts 
facilities in 1927. It pays particular attention to changes in the textile industry during 
World War I, the postwar depression in textiles, union organization, and labor militancy 
in Dwight’s Massachusetts and Alabama mills. The final chapter and conclusion of “A 
Common Thread” look at the role played by Dwight’s Alabama City workers in the 1934 
General Textile Strike, the strike’s failure locally, regionally, and nationally, and the 
short and long-term consequences of the strike’s negative outcome for textile operatives 
nationwide in relation to ongoing relocations of New England textile capital to the South. 
The collapse o f the strike cemented the non-union, low-wage status quo that continued to 
attract New England textile capital and was key in the failure of the overwhelming 
majority of textile organizing campaigns initiated by the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations throughout the South in subsequent decades. The CIO-affiliated Textile 
Workers Union of America, however, did eventually claim a textile local at the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company in Alabama City as one of its few post-World War II organizing 
successes. But, eight years after a merger between the Dwight Company and the Cone 
Mills in 1951, Alabama City and the unionized Dwight textile operatives became some of 
the first southerners to experience the closure of their mill as Cone’s management sought 
ways to cut costs in the face of increasing foreign competition. Thus, a new cycle of
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
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movement southward.
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CHAPTER I
“THE ENORMOUS INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SPINDLES IN THE 
SOUTHERN STATES . . .  IS POSITIVELY ALARMING:” SOUTHERN BOOSTERS, 
NEW ENGLAND RESPONSES, AND THE GROWTH OF TEXTILE 
MANUFACTURING IN THE PIEDMONT SOUTH
“The story of the New England cotton industry,” wrote historian Caroline Ware in 
1931, “is the story o f the industrialization o f America.”1 Indeed, during the first decades 
of the nineteenth century, the manufacture o f cotton textile goods drove the 
industrialization of New England. In Massachusetts, Boston merchants invested their 
monies in spinning and weaving mills along the fall-lines of the Merrimack River in 
Lowell and Lawrence in the eastern part o f the state, and in the Connecticut River Valley 
in the Chicopee-Springfield area in the central part of the state. Drawing a largely female 
workforce from an increasing supply o f surplus agricultural labor, these entrepreneurs 
facilitated the creation of the nation’s first full-scale manufactories and entire 
communities designed for the specific purpose of cotton textile production. In Lowell, 
Boston investors established the Merrimack Manufacturing Company in 1822, 
incorporated the Merrimack Lock and Canal Company in 1825, and proceeded to build 
mills, machine shops, and company-owned boarding houses and tenements in the city 
over the next twenty years. The “Boston Associates,” as this groups of investors came to 
be known, eventually organized several of the largest cotton textile manufactories in the
1 Caroline Ware, Early New England Cotton Manufacture: A Study in Industrial Beginnings 
(Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1931), 3.
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United States, including the Boot, Tremont, Lawrence, Appleton, Suffolk, Hamilton, 
Massachusetts, and Prescott Mills.
As was the case with the beginnings of the textile industry in northeastern 
Massachusetts, Boston investors principally financed the establishment of large-scale 
cotton manufactories in the Chicopee-Springfield area. By 1820, Chicopee had a base of 
several small-scale industries, consisting o f a paper mill, iron works, and saw and grist 
mills, but the community remained a predominantly agricultural one. The potential for 
the Connecticut River’s waterpower to drive the turbines needed to operate looms and 
spinning machines, however, attracted potential cotton textile investors to Chicopee in 
the early 1820s. In 1823, the Boston Springfield Manufacturing Company purchased 
property and water privileges from Chicopee locals, and with $500,000 of capital stock, 
began construction o f a damn on the river to harness it for factory use, a cotton mill, and 
workforce housing. The Boston Springfield Manufacturing Company, renamed the 
Chicopee Manufacturing Company in 1828, started work on its second mill in 1825, its 
third in 1826, and its fourth in 1831. By 1835, the Chicopee Manufacturing Company
2 Thomas Dublin, Women at Work: The Transformation o f  Work and Community in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, 1826-1860  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 1-57; Vera Shlakman, 
“Economic History o f  a Factory Town: A Study o f  Chicopee, Massachusetts,” in Smith College Studies in 
History, vol. 20 (Northampton, MA: Department o f  History o f  Smith College, 1935), 15, 36; Jonathan 
Prude, “The Social System o f  Early N ew  England Textile Mills: A Case Study, 1812-40,” in Michael 
Frisch and Daniel Walkowitz, eds., Working-Class America: Essays on Labor, Community, and American  
Society (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1983), 1-36. On the development o f  the Lowell textile 
industry during the early nineteenth century and the Boston Associates, also see Thomas Dublin, ed., Farm  
to Factory: W omen’s Letters, 1830-1860  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Hannah 
Josephson, The Golden Threads: New England's M ill Girls and Magnates (New York: Duell, Sloan, and 
Pearce, 1949); Ware, Early New England Cotton Manufacture; Robert Dalzell, Enterprising Elite: The 
Boston Associates and the World They M ade (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Francois 
Weil, “Capitalism and Industrialization in N ew  England, 1815-1845” Journal o f  American History 
84(March 1998): 1334-1342.
3 Francois Weil notes that members o f  the Dwight family who invested in Chicopee’s original 
cotton mills directed their merchant business from Boston by the 1820s, but that their ancestors had lived in 
and conducted business in the Springfield-Chicopee area as early as the 1750s. Weil, “Capitalism and 
Industrialization in N ew  England, 1815-1845,” 1342-1345.
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was capitalized at $700,000. Boston investors, many with overlapping holdings in the 
Chicopee Manufacturing Company, incorporated the Springfield Canal Company in 
1831, the Cabot Manufacturing Company in 1832, the Perkins Manufacturing Company 
in 1836, and the Dwight Manufacturing Company, capitalized at $500,000, in 1841. The 
Cabot and Perkins Mills merged in 1852, consolidating with the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company and operating under its name in 1856. Within a thirty-year period, the 
interconnected group of Boston investors who established Chicopee’s four original cotton 
textile companies had made the city into one o f the Bay State’s foremost industrial 
centers.4
The owners o f the Chicopee companies, like other New England textile 
manufacturers in the 1820s and 1830s, filled their mills with a workforce o f farm girls 
who had been attracted to the factories by the opportunity to earn cash wages there. 
During the 1840s, mill owners began employing Irish immigrants in the city’s mills, and 
later culled its operatives from successive waves of French-Canadian, Polish, and Greek 
and Portuguese workers as they began arriving in Massachusetts in the 1860s, 1880s, and 
early 1900s. As the ethnic makeup of the workforce of the Chicopee textile mills 
changed through the mid to late nineteenth century, so too did its gender composition.
The workforce shifted from one that consisted almost exclusively o f native, female labor 
to an immigrant one o f both men and women. Local businesses that provided needed 
services for the Chicopee community grew during these years as well, and the Boston-
4 Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory Town,” 24-28; Thaddeus Szetela, H istory o f  
Chicopee (Chicopee, MA: Szetela and Rich Publishing Company, 1948), 52-53; Michele Plourde-Barker, 
Chicopee (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 1998), 9, 15; Weil, “Capitalism and Industrialization in N ew  England, 
1815-1845,” 1342-1352.
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based mill owners invested funds to aid in the establishment of city schools, libraries, 
parks, public services, and utilities.5
The outbreak o f the Civil War accelerated Chicopee’s industrial development. 
Local machine works and facilities that previously made consumer goods operated on 
augmented schedules and expanded for the purposes of manufacturing war materials and 
supplies. Production in the city’s cotton mills, however, nearly ceased. Without regular 
shipments o f southern cotton, the mills could not maintain full operations. The mill 
owners sold most of their raw cotton stocks at huge profits and slashed their workforces 
and outputs. With an eye on more efficient production and higher profits after the war’s 
end, the owners of the Dwight Manufacturing Company and the Chicopee Manufacturing 
Company used the mill shutdowns as an opportunity to update machinery and install 
auxiliary steam engines that would power the factories when the Connecticut River 
waters ran low. As late as 1864, the Dwight Company only employed 400 workers. But 
by 1869, the company had doubled its 1860 productive capacity and reemployed over 
1,500 o f its pre-war workforce of 1,600 operatives.6
While the Dwight Manufacturing Company and other Massachusetts textile firms 
returned to full-time schedules through the late 1860s, southerners looked for ways to 
recover from the devastation wrought by the Civil War and to function within a changing 
economic system based on free labor. As southerners negotiated this new economic 
terrain, voices emerged that urged the region to focus on diversified agriculture and 
industrialization as the means through which the South could rebuild and revitalize itself.
5 Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory Town,” 50-62, 64-88, 91, 138-151; Plourde-Barker, 
Chicopee, 29, 48, 63, 115.
6 Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory Town,” 151-160; Szetela, H istory o f  Chicopee, 87-
88 .
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“All o f you will recall the story that [Henry W.] Grady told on one occasion in setting 
forth what advantage it would be to inaugurate manufactories here,” remarked former 
Southern Cotton Spinners Association President Daniel Augustus Tompkins in 1901, “He 
said that he attended a funeral in North Georgia, where the grave was dug through solid 
marble, and yet the marble slab at the head of the grave came from Vermont, that 
surrounded by a forest of splendid hard wood, yet the coffin came from Cincinnati, that 
on the hillsides was the best grazing for sheep, yet the shroud came from New England, 
that while the iron ore was within hearing distance, yet the pick and tools for digging the 
grave came from Pittsburgh; that all that Georgia furnished for that funeral, was a hole in 
the ground and a corpse.” But, Tompkins declared, “today this condition has so far 
changed.”7 In fact, within a decade of Henry Grady’s 1889 “funeral oration” and his call 
for the development of industries based on regional resources, manufacturing and 
extractive industries had taken root in the states of the Piedmont South.
When the Civil War ended, the southern economy and landscape were in ruins. 
With Dixie’s defeat, many southerners saw industrialization as a necessary step toward 
modernizing and reintegrating the overwhelmingly rural region into an increasingly 
urban-industrial nation. Nowhere was this New South mantra, which tied the region’s 
post-Civil War economic recovery and future prosperity to industrialization, more visible 
than in cotton textile manufacturing. The textile industry and the postwar South proved a 
perfect match. Cotton was abundant in the region, textile mill capitalization and start-up 
costs were relatively low, Piedmont rivers, streams, and coal fields could provide the 
power to run textile machinery, widespread construction of southern railroads would aid
7 Proceedings o f  the Fifth Annual Convention o f  the Southern Cotton Spinners Association, 1901, 
42-43. Hereafter cited as SCSA Proceedings. Henry Grady gave his “funeral oration” during an 1889 
address at the Bay State Club in Boston, Massachusetts.
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in the transportation of raw materials and manufactured goods, and potential mill 
operatives were readily available. By the 1880s, many New South entrepreneurs 
embraced the region’s “cotton mill campaign,” believing in earnest that textiles would be 
the salvation o f the South and, as had happened in New England fifty years earlier, would 
be a seed from which other, diversified industries would grow.
Boosters for this “New South” looked to railroad building, funded in large part by 
northern investors, as the first step in reorienting the region’s economy toward 
commercial agriculture, the development of its mineral and natural resources, and the 
establishment of manufacturing industries based on these. “There are vast mineral, 
timber, and agricultural reserves as yet totally undeveloped—their extent and richness 
being only partly comprehended,” noted one industrial promoter, “As new [rail] roads are 
built, opening up to the world these immense sources of wealth, outside capital will be
o
drawn to the development of the South in even greater abundance than at present.” 
Through the 1870s, railroad construction in the South skyrocketed, linking the region to 
national markets and providing the transportation infrastructure necessary for the success 
of future commercial enterprises.9
Extensive railroad building occurred in the South during the 1870s, but the 
ongoing instability and reordering of the southern political, social, and economic 
structure, as well as the national economic depression that began in 1873, hindered the 
development of other regional industries. New South industrial boosters, nevertheless,
8 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 5, no. 11.
9 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: A m erica’s Unfinished Journey, 1863-1877  (New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers, 1988), 210-211; C. Vann Woodward, Origins o f  the New South: 1877-1913  (1951; reprint, 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 118-121, 134; Douglas Flamming, Creating the 
Modern South: Millhands and M anagers in Dalton, Georgia, 1884-1984 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1992), 17-19; Howard Rabinowitz, The First New South, 1865-1920  (Arlington Heights,
IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1992), 33-37.
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continued to link regional regeneration with the establishment o f local factories that 
would prepare agricultural products and natural resources into unfinished goods. With 
recovery from the depression starting in 1879, increasing numbers o f southerners began 
investing in the development of local cotton textile mills. Building on the small base of 
antebellum mills and cotton manufactories established immediately after the war that had 
survived the 1873 depression, these New South entrepreneurs facilitated a development 
of the southern textile industry through the 1880s on a scale much larger and more 
widespread than the cotton mill construction that had taken place previously. Although 
aided by credit extended through northeastern textile machine companies and 
commission houses in exchange for stock subscriptions in the new mills, local monies 
fueled the establishment of textile mills in the Piedmont South. This was fundamentally 
different from the direct investments of northern and western capital that facilitated the 
expansion of much of the South’s railroad construction and the development of the 
region’s mining and lumber industries. Businessmen and professionals in towns 
throughout the region, merchants, and large landowners looking for steady profits, 
funneled large sums of money into local textile manufactories. “The factory is a good 
specimen o f how things are working for us,” Richard Edmonds, editor of the 
Manufacturers ’ Record asserted, “It is the conception of a Southern brain, built with 
Southern money on Southern soi l . . . .  Such achievements carry their own lesson, they 
speak loudly o f Southern progress.”10 These southern mill owners and the success of
10 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 5, no. 17.
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their enterprises became symbols of the New South, of progress, of regional renewal 
through industry, and of the creation of a new economic order.11
Transformations that occurred in southern agriculture after the Civil War played 
an integral part in the late-nineteenth century development of the South’s textile industry. 
The war brought about a fundamental alteration o f the production of small, white-owned 
farms throughout the Piedmont South. During the antebellum period and through the 
war, upcountry farmers focused their energies on subsistence-based, diversified 
agricultural pursuits. These farming families remained largely self-sufficient by raising a 
wide array o f grains, fruits and vegetables, and livestock, and engaging in local networks 
o f barter and exchange for goods or services needed to meet basic household needs. 
Shortly after war’s end, however, many upcountry farmers found themselves plunged 
into debt and progressively drawn into the cultivation of cash crops like cotton and 
tobacco as they sought credit from local merchants in their attempts to rebuild farms and 
replenish herds o f livestock lost during wartime. Cotton production increased 
dramatically as merchants demanded that farmers plant cash crops as security for loans of 
seed and supplies, which, by the 1870s, resulted in a situation of overproduction and 
falling crop prices. Upcountry farming families often found themselves trapped in a
11 Historians estimate that seventy-five to ninety percent o f  spindles operating in the South during 
the 1880s and 1890s were southern owned. See, Gavin Wright, O ld South, New South: Revolutions in the 
Southern Economy Since the C ivil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 130-131; 
Nancy Frances Kane, Textiles in Transition: Technology, Wages, and Industry Relocation in the U.S. 
Textile Industry, 1880-1930  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 13-21; Jacqueline Dowd Hall, et al., 
Like a Family: The Making o f  a Southern Cotton M ill World (1987; reprint Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 2000), 24-27; Broadus Mitchell, The Rise o f  Cotton M ills in the South (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1921), 57, 62; Patrick Hearden, Independence and Empire: The New  
South’s Cotton M ill Campaign, 1865-1901 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), 41-43; 
Edward Ayers, The Prom ise o f  the New South: Life After Reconstruction  (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 112; David Carlton and Peter Coclanis, “Capital Mobility and Southern Industry, 1880-1905: 
The Case o f  the Carolina Piedmont” Journal o f  Economic H istory 49(1989): 85; Alice Galenson, The 
M igration o f  the Cotton Textile Industry from  New England to the South: 1880-1930  (New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1985), 62-70; Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 19.
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cycle of debt and dependency that forced them to abandon the diversified farming they 
had practiced in the past, and which often led to the loss of land ownership. In 1880, at 
least one-third of the white farmers in the Piedmont South were tenants renting the land 
on which they worked, by 1900 this proportion would increase to one-half.
The growth of the post-Civil War southern textile industry was tied to these white 
southerners who saw in mill work an opportunity for steady employment and economic 
stability. The Piedmont South lacked a skilled workforce upon which it could build an 
industrial base. Nevertheless, the vast supply of cheap labor created by these upcountry 
farmers who were losing money in the cotton market, who sought an outlet for surplus 
household labor, and who needed waged work to generate additional income, did not 
need prior experience or training to be unskilled textile mill operatives. Many Piedmont 
farming families found that their children’s labor, particularly that of their daughters, was 
worth more in a local textile mill than on the land. As one strategy for familial self- 
sufficiency and as an insulation from debt, poverty, tenancy, and destitution in the 
emergent postbellum economy, members of these farming families, especially women 
and children, entered the mills with the intention of earning wages that might keep a farm 
viable or support a household with “public” work when the land no longer could. For 
potential industrialists, the establishment of cotton textile mills made sense precisely 
because they had to find their workforce from among this overwhelmingly rural, 
unskilled labor pool. This ample supply of labor made possible the rapid development of
12 Foner, Reconstruction, 393-408; Wright, O ld South, New South, 19-35, 99-111; Woodward, 
Origins o f  the New South, 179-186; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 3-6; Ayers, The Prom ise o f  the New South, 
13-15, 198-205; Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 19-22; David Carlton, Mill and Town in South 
Carolina, 1880-1920  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 13-19; Steven Hahn, The 
Roots o f  Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation o f  the G eorgia Upcountry, 1850- 
1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 1-11; Gilbert Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern 
Agriculture, 1865-1980  (Lexington: University Press o f  Kentucky, 1984), 18-22.
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the South’s cotton textile industry through the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
The transition of poor whites from farms to factories throughout the Piedmont South 
continued into the 1890s as cotton prices continued to fall and as the organization of
1 Ttextile mills accelerated.
“Employment must be created for those who are willing and anxious to work, but 
have no work to do,” Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers ’ Record argued. “ [T]his 
can in no way be done to better advantage and with more profitable results to the 
capitalist who invests his money . . . and to the many people thus furnished with 
employment,” he continued, “than by building cotton mills.”14 Through the 1880s and 
1890s local and regional industrial boosters like Edmonds extolled the idea of expanding 
the South’s cotton textile industry to revitalize local economies, provide a home-market 
for cotton grown throughout the region, and to offer employment to poor whites. These 
promoters o f the region’s cotton mill campaign touted the construction o f textile 
manufactories as philanthropic endeavors. Bostonian Curtis Guild, Jr. observed that, 
“Southern labor . . .  is good labor, and the scarcity o f money makes any employment paid 
for in cash highly popular. The mill owner in the South is not regarded as an enemy but 
as a benefactor.”15
13 Wright, O ld South, New South, 129-130; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 10-18, 31-40; Foner, 
Reconstruction, 536; Ayers, The Promise o f  the New South, 113-114; Flamming, Creating the Modern 
South, 25-26, 30-35; Delores Janiewski, Sisterhood Denied: Race, Gender, and Class in a New South 
Community (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985), 55-66; I. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the New  
South: Social Change and Cultural Persistence, 1880-1915  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1989), 23-61, 83-86; Melton Alonza McLaurin, Paternalism and Protest: Southern Cotton M ill 
Workers and O rganized Labor, 1875-1905  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971), 17- 
18; Cathy McHugh, M ill Family: The Labor System in the Southern Cotton Textile Industry (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 7-8.
14 M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 12, no. 1.
15 Transactions o f  the New England Cotton Manufacturers ’ Association, Annual Meeting, 1897, 
93. Hereafter cited as NECMA Transactions.
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Part and parcel to the cultivation of the image of southern cotton mill owners as 
altruists, was the creation and maintenance of a social prescription that made textile mill 
work an employment option for whites only. These mill owners tapped into many poor 
whites’ racial fears that the abolition of slavery meant direct competition with free blacks 
in agriculture and industry, potentially leading to a disruption of traditional patterns of 
white supremacy. At the same time that the region’s textile manufacturers and cotton 
mill promoters made maintaining the racial status quo a key element of their booster 
rhetoric and their cultivation of the image of mill owner as philanthropist, they also 
attempted to assuage the fears that the creation of a large industrial population would 
engender class conflict and instability in the region. Manufacturers and boosters argued 
that mill work would not degrade white factory workers and cultivate class hostilities as 
has occurred in northern mills, but instead, would be a means through which the region’s 
“leading citizens” could help the South’s poor whites to reintegrate themselves into the 
regional economy, facilitate their escape from “degrading” competition with black farm 
labor, and mitigate class conflict by hiring only white operatives and cultivating common 
bonds of race between mill owners and their employees. The local and regional press 
characterized southern cotton mill owners as civic-minded businessmen whose primary 
motivation was not making profits, but instead, creating a means of gainful employment 
for dispossessed white farmers through which the southern economy could be rebuilt 
without creating class antagonisms or undermining the region’s prevailing racial norms.16
16 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 29-31; Woodward, Origins o f  the New South, 133-134, 205-222; 
McHugh, M ill Family, 5-7; Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 56-57; Newby, Plain Folk in the New  
South, 436; Broadus Mitchell, The Rise o f  Cotton Mills in the South, 127-132; Mary Oates, The Role o f  the 
Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Developm ent o f  the American Southeast: 1900-1940  (New York: 
Arno Press, 1975), 118-123. A large body o f  scholarly literature exists that engages with the question o f  
who drove the establishment o f  cotton mills in the postbellum South. These studies focus on whether or 
not those who facilitated and funded the construction o f  cotton mills throughout the region were from a
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
28
new class o f  merchants and professionals or whether they were members o f  the planter class that had 
dominated the region through the antebellum period. The crux o f  this debate focuses on issues o f  
continuity and discontinuity between the antebellum South and the postwar South, and on the question o f  
who controlled the economic development o f  the “new” South. In The Rise o f  Cotton M ills in the South 
(1921), Broadus Mitchell argued that the development o f  postwar southern cotton mills was a vast regional 
crusade led by philanthropically-minded men who, while devoted to the industrialization o f  the region, had 
strong ties to the region’s planter class and antebellum leadership. Wilbur J. Cash in M ind o f  the South 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1941), challenged the validity o f  the altruistic motives behind the cotton 
mill campaign attributed to its leaders by Mitchell, but also argued that there was a continuity between the 
social and economic leaders o f  the Old and the N ew  South. For Cash, the building o f  cotton mills 
throughout the Piedmont was a “mighty folk movement” that “flowed from the past.” C. Vann Woodward 
offered the first fundamental revision o f  the Mitchell-Cash continuity argument in Origins o f  the N ew South 
(1951). Woodward rejected the argument that the old members o f  the planter elite led the N ew  South’s 
industrial development, and asserted that the Civil War fundamentally altered the South’s economic 
development by creating the conditions in which a new middle class that had nominal, if  any ties to the 
antebellum planter elite, could come to the fore. In Woodward’s analysis, the leaders o f  the N ew  South’s 
cotton mill campaign had a fundamentally different economic and social outlook than the planter class. 
These southerners embraced industrial capitalism and an ethic o f  individual acquisitiveness that was more 
ideologically in line with the commercial class in the North than with the agrarian elite in the South. Since 
the 1970s, numerous historians have engaged in the continuity vs. discontinuity debate and have extended 
and nuanced the original theses posited by Mitchell, Cash, and Woodward. Dwight Billings in Planters 
and the Making o f  a "New South: ” Class, Politics, and Developm ent in North Carolina  (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1976) and Jonathan Wiener in Social Origins o f  the New South: 
Alabama, 1860-1885  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978) advanced the continuity 
thesis. Billings found that in North Carolina, planters were largely responsible for the initial development 
o f  the state’s industrial base so that they could manipulate the growth to their own purposes. Jonathan 
Wiener contended that in Alabama, planters opposed industrialization at the Civil War’s end, but in the 
face o f  challenges to their political and economic dominance by Birmingham-based industrialists, they 
managed to re-exert their control over the economic development o f  the state by forwarding a m essage that 
included industrial development as a key component but through an agenda that would not fundamentally 
challenge their cultural or economic hegemony. David Carlton in M ill and Town in South Carolina  (1982) 
forwarded a discontinuity argument, enumerating the ways in which a new class o f  urban merchants, 
businessmen, and professionals drove the industrial development o f  South Carolina, while the authors o f  
Like a Fam ily (1987) described how the war fundamentally altered the economic development o f  the 
Piedmont South, wherein a new class o f  business and professional men tied their hopes for personal and 
regional prosperity to the establishment o f  cotton textile mills. Gavin Wright, also writing in the 
discontinuity vein, argued that significant variations existed that belie the use o f  either continuity or 
discontinuity to describe every situation o f  postwar southern economic growth, but that the fundamental 
transition from slave to free labor forced a gradual “ideological capitulation” among planters toward 
industrialization regardless o f  whether or not they drove the New South’s economic agenda. On the 
continuity-discontinuity debate, and challenges to the arguments forwarded by Mitchell, Cash, Woodward, 
Billings, and Wiener, also see Harold Woodman, “Economic Reconstruction and the Rise o f  the N ew  
South, 1865-1900,” in John Boles and Evelyn Thomas Nolen, eds., Interpreting Southern History: 
H istoriographical Essays in Honor o f  Stanford Higginbotham  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1987), 254-307; John Beck, “Building the N ew  South: A Revolution from Above in a Piedmont 
County” Journal o f  Southern H istory 53(August 1987): 441-470; Bess Beatty, “Lowells o f  the South: 
Northern Influences on the Nineteenth-Century North Carolina Textile Industry” Journal o f  Southern 
History 53(February 1987): 37-62; Robert Eugene Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital: 
The Rise o f  the Alabama Cotton Textile Industry, 1865-1900” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1986); 
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “Broadus Mitchell: Economic Historian o f  the South;” Bruce Clayton, “W. J. Cash:
A Native Son Confronts the Past;” and John Herbert Roper, “C. Vann Woodward, Southern Historian,” in 
Glenn Feldman, ed., Reading Southern History: Essays on Interpreters and Interpretations (Tuscaloosa:
The University o f  Alabama Press, 2001), 25-31, 112-122, and 134-150.
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Through their public pronouncements, the southern press and industrial boosters 
were essential in generating interest, support, and excitement for the construction of 
cotton mills, the establishment of an industrial base, and the creation o f jobs for poor 
whites throughout the region. “The wide-awake, progressive people of the South are fast 
realizing that the prosperity of Southern cities depends on manufactures,” announced the 
Manufacturers ’ Record, “They see wherever manufactures flourish all branches o f trade 
are prosperous.”17 These promoters also broadcast to industrialists throughout the 
country the South’s intention to become the leading manufacturing region in the United 
States. “The war destroyed the capital and property of the South . . . and left in its wake a 
grinding poverty, not understandable except by those whose fate it was to have passed 
through it,” argued North Carolinian T. C. Guthrie, “[I]t is not surprising that it has 
developed men of strong characters; it is not surprising that it has developed men of 
ability, and it is not surprising that more or less of them saw the grand opportunity in the
i  o
manufacture of cotton.” Men like Guthrie were integral in the creation of an image of a 
phoenix-like New South rising from the ashes of the old that was meant for northern 
audiences as much as for southern ones. Booster rhetoric suggested that the South had 
seen the error of its ways, was now led by men with an outlook fundamentally different 
from those of the old planter elite, and was ready to embrace an economic plan based on 
industrialization and diversified agriculture. According to southern booster D. A. 
Tompkins, those who clung to “the idea that for a Southern man there is no occupation
17 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 10, no. 3.
18 SCSA Proceedings, 1903, 45-46.
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but raising cotton with negro labor,” would be destined to “grow poorer day by day . . . 
until the most tenacious of them pass out of life.”19
Through the 1880s and into the 1890s, these boosters opined that this New South 
would use the textile industry as an instrument through which the region would return to 
a dominant position in the economy of the United States. “We have served notice that 
the South is not only to be the source of the world’s best cotton supply, but that it must 
wear the double crown of cotton production and cotton manufacture,” noted one
• • 9 0southerner in 1895, “We are in this race for every prize that can be won.” Southern 
industrial spokesmen crafted a message that both threatened and enticed New England 
textile manufacturers. In doing so, they laid down a gauntlet for them. On one hand, the 
boosters aggressively advertised the region’s manufacturing “advantages” and 
emphasized the fact that these would surely undermine New England’s textile 
manufacturing dominance. “The enormous increase in the number of spindles in the 
Southern States . . .  is positively alarming,” contended Richard Edmonds, “the natural 
advantages o f the South for the manufacture of cotton are go great as compared with the 
N ortheast. . . many of the mills in the later district will have to shut down
9 1permanently.” But, on the other hand, southern industrial promoters also made clear 
that they welcomed the investment of northern capital in the development of the cotton 
manufacturing industry below the Mason-Dixon Line. “Nothing can prevent her
19 M anufacturers' Record, vol. 11, no. 17. For an in-depth analysis o f  the roots o f  the southern 
booster m essage and background information on the region’s leading industrial spokesmen, see Paul 
Gaston, The N ew South Creed: A Study in Southern Mythmaking (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970).
20 NECMA Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1895, 69.
21 M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 5, no. 21.
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growth,” the booster press asserted, “but it is for the North alone to determine what share
99or part she will take in Southern development.”
New Englanders’ first comprehensive introduction to the progress o f the South’s 
textile industry, its likelihood of future growth, and the potential for profitable production 
in the region, came in 1881 at the Atlanta International Cotton Exposition. Intended to 
showcase the region’s postwar agricultural and industrial prowess, the exposition proved 
itself a vehicle through which prospective northern textile investors saw for themselves 
the opportunities open to entrepreneurs who invested their money in southern 
manufactories. The exposition also provided a platform to demonstrate that southern- 
made textile goods were of a quality that could compete successfully in the marketplace 
with those produced in New England. “I am willing to say here that I have been 
compelled to change my views very materially on the chance of the Southern 
manufacturer being rather more of a competitor than we are anxious to have,” reported 
one member of the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ Association upon his return 
from the exposition. Although expressing his optimism that “there is room enough” in 
existing markets for the output from New England and the newly established southern 
mills, the NECMA delegate cautioned that “It is from such mills at such points that we
99may expect competition on coarse goods, and at a very early day.” The New England 
industry press observed that the textile mills operating in the Piedmont South “have 
proven very profitable,” and noted that “it is wise for us to take advantage of the new 
conditions.”24
22 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 10, no. 8.
23 NECMA Proceedings, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1881, 29-30.
24 Com mercial Bulletin, 20 August 1881. Historians have noted that the 1881 exposition was an 
important factor in the timing o f  the acceleration o f  the South’s cotton textile industry growth during the
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Southern industrial boosters continued to work through the press and additional 
expositions to advertise the region’s economic progress and attract the attention of 
potential northern textile industry investors.25 In 1895, the Manufacturers ’ Record 
published a special supplement to its paper to promote the advantages of the South with 
the intention of sending a copy of the report to “each director o f every cotton mill in New
OfEngland.” Southern manufacturers and their supporters in the region’s press stressed to 
would-be investors the importance of location as one of the key advantages in the 
manufacture o f cotton textiles in the Piedmont South. Industrial promoters forwarded the 
argument that making cotton goods in the South cost less than in the Northeast because of 
the region’s warm climate, which translated into lower expenditures on heat, and due to 
superior water and local coal resources that meant substantial savings on the costs of 
powering a manufactory’s machinery.
The boosters, likewise, emphasized that it was only logical to establish textile 
mills in the region where the raw cotton was grown, and made “bring the cotton mills to 
the cotton fields” a rallying cry of the South’s industrialization campaign. “Cotton goods 
for Northern mills having to pass through so many hands and be sent over long lines of 
railroads, makes the raw material expensive before it reaches the spindles,” Richard 
Edmonds noted, “which makes a great difference in the cost of manufacturing goods.”27 
In reality, however, the advantages of the proximity of cotton to the mills and lower fuel 
costs were largely canceled out by the fact that the products of southern mills had to be
early 1880s as it generated interest and facilitated investments from within the region and without. 
Woodward, Origins o f  the New South, 124, 131-132; Galenson, The M igration o f  the Cotton Textile 
Industry from  New England to the South, 78-79; Wright, O ld South, New South, 129; Mitchell, The Rise o f  
Cotton M ills in the South, 71, 122-123.
25 These included the Piedmont Exposition in 1887, and the Cotton States and International 
Exposition in 1895. Woodward, Origins o f  the New South, 124.
26 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 27, no. 4.
27 Ibid., vol. 5, no. 4.
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shipped for finishing in northern bleacheries and dyeworks and for sale through New 
York and Boston selling agents. Rhetorically, nonetheless, southern boosters created an 
image that it was inherently “natural,” by virtue of location, resources, and climate, for 
cotton goods to be manufactured in the South and inevitable that the region would 
supplant the textile production in New England where such endowments were lacking.
Southern industrial promoters, by far, paid the most attention to advertising the 
attributes of the region’s labor pool. Boosters characterized southern labor as cheap, 
docile, and native. According to the regional spokespersons, this triumvirate was the 
biggest manufacturing advantage that the South had over New England. “O f the 
advantages o f the South . . .  it is almost needless to speak. Probably the most important 
consideration in the estimation of mill men is the labor,” argued Richard Edmonds to the 
members of the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ Association. “The South has an 
abundant supply o f the very best help from which to secure its operatives,” he continued,
“ . . . and as a class are anxious to find work and willing to accept much lower wages than 
northern operatives are compelled to have in order to live.”29 After the expense of raw 
cotton, labor costs were the single largest expenditure in the manufacture of textile goods, 
constituting an estimated one-quarter of production costs. The lower wages paid to 
southern mill hands, therefore, was not only a significant advantage to southern 
industrialists trying to compete with established New England firms but was also an 
extremely attractive selling point for those attempting to lure northern investments.30
28 Galenson, The Migration o f  the Cotton Textile Industry from  New England to the South, 23, 
156-158; Kane, Textiles in Transition, 9; David Doane, “Regional Cost Differentials and Textile Location: 
A Statistical Analysis” Explorations in Economic H istory 9(Fall 1971), 4, 12-20.
29 NECMA Proceedings, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1895, 199.
30 Galenson, The Migration o f  the Cotton Textile Industry from  New England to the South, 23; 
Oates, The Role o f  the Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Developm ent o f  the American Southeast, 
115.
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In the northeast, textile manufacturers had to pay their operatives more than those 
in the South because of the availability o f other industrial employment in the region. 
While textile workers remained among the lowest paid workers in New England through 
the turn of the century, their wages were forty to fifty percent higher than southern 
operatives whose opportunities for waged factory work were extremely limited. Southern 
manufacturers and the booster press argued that it was possible to pay low wages to 
southern operatives because of the lower costs o f southern living, especially in the areas 
of fuel and housing due to the region’s more mild climate, and because o f the lower skill 
and productivity levels o f the southern mill hands who had been recently recruited into 
the industrial workforce. The effect of warmer weather and skill on the wages paid to 
southern mill hands, however, paled in comparison to the consequences o f the limited 
economic diversification of the region.
As the southern cotton mill campaign continued through the 1880s and early 
1890s, the wages paid to southern textile mill operatives remained closely linked to the 
abundance o f surplus agricultural labor and the prevailing low-levels of pay for those 
who continued to work the land. The textile industry in the Piedmont South did not 
prove to be the engine for diversified development and overall economic growth that 
many New South boosters had predicted. As late as 1900, only six percent of the 
southern labor workforce was employed in manufacturing establishments. Piedmont mill 
owners did not use their textile dividends to fund alternative industrial pursuits but, 
instead, largely reinvested them into cotton textile production, which had proven itself a 
moneymaker. Without the widespread presence of industries in the region, especially 
ones employing skilled workers, there was little competition for workers from among the
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existing labor pool and nothing to force an increase in the wages paid to textile mill 
hands. The South’s economy continued to rely on staple crop cultivation and the 
production of raw materials into simple manufactured goods, like coarse cotton textiles,
T1which worked to keep wages low.
Although mill owners could have employed black operatives at an even lower 
cost than whites, the majority of southern industrialists did not deviate from the regional 
norm dictating that only white labor would be employed in manufacturing positions in 
the South’s cotton mills. Yet, these mill owners were influenced by more than the 
booster rhetoric that characterized the textile industry as an economic haven for the 
South’s poor whites. Antebellum southern mill owners usually used white labor in their 
mills because it was cheaper to employ than buying a slave workforce. This hiring 
practice often simply shifted to mills that operated after the war as transformations in the 
economy of the countryside created a large pool o f cheap, white labor. Mill owners and 
mill hands alike, moreover, embraced the southern social prescriptions which dictated 
that white women and girls, who constituted a majority of the region’s textile workforce 
during the late nineteenth century, could not be employed in the same rooms as black
32men.
Racial prejudices and assumptions about the capabilities of white and black 
workers to perform certain kinds of jobs also played a determining factor in the patterns
31 Wright, O ld South, New South, especially 3-16, 51-80; Kane, Textiles in Transition, 115-117; 
Hall, et al., Like a Family, 80-81; Doane, “Regional Cost Differentials and Textile Location,” 14-16, 20-22; 
Chen-Han Chen, “Regional Differences in Costs and Productivity in the American Cotton Manufacturing 
Industry, 1880-1900” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 55(August 1941): 564-566.
32 Oates, The Role o f  the Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Developm ent o f  the American 
Southeast, 122-123; Wright, O ld South, New South, 13; Newby, Plain Folk in the New South, 436; Tom 
Terrill, “Eager Hands for Southern Textiles, 1850-1860” Journal o f  Economic H istory 36(March 1976): 84- 
90; Allen Heath Stokes, Jr., “Black and White Labor in the Development o f  the Southern Textile Industry, 
1880-1920” (Ph.D. diss., University o f  South Carolina, 1977), 1-12, 98-120, 163-196.
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of postwar textile mill employment. “I do not think that the negro will ever be able to 
work in cotton mills, because . . .  he has not the intelligence,” argued one Alabama mill 
superintendent, “I use them around the yard and driving the teams, and for this they are 
well qualified as they have more physical strength than a white man and can do more 
manual work.” Another southern manufacturer opined, “the cotton mills of the South 
must depend entirely on intelligent, skilled, and well-paid white labor for their future 
prosperity” because “the negro is a natural farmer and in no sense qualified for the
I T
exactions of tending the loom or spinning frame.” Even during times, like in the late 
1890s and into the first years of the twentieth century, when cotton prices increased and 
white labor became more difficult to secure, southern textile manufacturers did little 
more than engage in discussions about the possibility of introducing black labor into their 
factories. Individual mill owners hired black workers as custodians and to load and 
unload goods in the mill yards and warehouses, but they recognized that the likelihood of 
conflict between themselves and their white mill hands should they breach the norm of 
only employing white operatives, meant that any meaningful employment o f black 
workers in the southern textile industry would remain an improbability.34
Cheap, plentiful, white labor was not the only foundation upon which southern 
textile manufacturers built their mills nor the only labor-related selling point used by the
33 M anufacturers' Record, vol. 24, no. 7; Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 2 February
1901.
34 The Manufacturers ’ R ecord  conducted a survey in 1893 on the feasibility o f  employing black 
labor in southern textile mills. The majority o f  the respondents acknowledged that the fundamental issue 
preventing them from tapping into this additional workforce was the fact that their white operatives would 
not work in an integrated factory setting. For detailed analyses o f  black labor and the development o f  the 
late nineteenth-century southern textile industry, see Stokes, “Black and White Labor in the Development 
o f  the Southern Textile Industry, 1880-1920;” Newby, Plain Folk in the N ew South, 462-492; Janiewski, 
Sisterhood Denied, and “Southern Honor, Southern Dishonor: Managerial Ideology and the Construction o f  
Gender, Race and Class Relations in Southern Industry,” in Ava Baron, ed., Work Engendered: Toward a 
New H istory o f  American Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 70-91.
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region’s boosters to attract northern investments to the Piedmont. Industrial promoters 
also characterized this workforce as “docile” and “tractable.” In their portrayals, the 
men, women, and children who flocked to the southern textile mills were members of 
impoverished farming families who were happy to have waged work o f any kind and for 
the pay and housing their altruistic employers offered to them. They were simple, 
hardworking folk who, despite their rural background, could be quickly trained into a 
capable industrial workforce. “They are the healthiest and happiest lot of operatives that 
I have ever seen, and, they go singing to their work,” Richard Edmonds quoted a New 
Yorker as saying, “When I saw this I asked myself what chance a New England mill
•5 c
would have in competition with an institution having such advantages.” Relations 
between labor and capital in the South, industrial spokespersons argued, were not beset 
by the conflicts and tensions found in other industrialized regions. They contended that 
because southern operatives were “contented in their work and pay,” the conditions in 
which labor unionism flourished in other parts of the country were nonexistent. “The 
operatives are docile and obedient so long as they are well treated,” a member o f the 
southern trade press noted, “They may be compared to a proud, mettlesome, and prancing 
young horse, who if rightly trained and treated kindly will prove a valuable and useful 
burden bearer.”
35 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 20, no. 16.
36 Ibid., vol. 9, no. 14; Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 12 November 1898. Through the 
1960s, with the exception o f  George M itchell’s Textile Unionism and the South (Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 1931), historians o f  the southern textile industry reflected such late nineteenth- 
century “docility” booster rhetoric in their characterizations o f  the region’s mill hands, by arguing that this 
docility was a key factor that prevented the establishment o f  unions in the region. Beginning in the 1970s, 
however, historians created a more accurate picture o f  the late nineteenth-century southern textile 
workforce and have shown how the portrayals o f  these operatives made by southern industrial promoters 
did not always mesh with reality. For examples o f  analyses that debunk this booster-created docility myth, 
see Melton Alonza McLaurin, Paternalism and Protest, and The Knights o f  Labor in the South (Westport,
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Southern boosters also gave an inordinate amount of press to the fact that the 
region’s labor pool consisted of non-immigrant workers, emphasizing this as a boon for 
would-be northern investors seeking harmonious relations with their employees. In 
addition to the arguments that commonalities of race, the philanthropic intentions of mill 
owners, and the acceptance of any kind of waged work by members o f poverty-stricken 
farming families mitigated any possibility of labor-capital conflicts, industrial promoters 
stressed that peaceful relations between employer and employees existed because 
southern manufacturers drew their workforce from independent, Anglo-Saxon, yeomen 
families. Southern boosters contended that New England textile operatives were 
primarily immigrants and children of immigrants who, by virtue of their ethnicity, were 
more prone to instigate conflict with management and strike than were these native-born 
southern operatives who descended from “superior stock.” Richard Edmonds noted in 
1889, “No one thing is of greater moment in the progress of the South than the fact that 
all labor is native labor.” A southern manufacturer echoed Edmonds’ sentiments over a 
decade later, adding, “our people are, as a class, native bom, proverbially religious, 
having an inborn inclination to be loyal to their employer, honest and capable.” He 
predicted that “as long as our mills are filled with our own native-born employees, just so
•5 0
long will we be free from labor disturbances.” New England textile manufacturers, 
increasingly beset by labor-management strife during the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, paid 
particular attention to this message that southern manufacturers were free from class 
conflict because of the native-born labor pool from which they drew their workers. “[I]n
CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); Carlton, M ill and Town in South Carolina; Hall, et al., Like a Family,
Newby, Plain Folk in the N ew South.
37 M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 15, no. 25.
38 SCSA Proceedings, 1903, 151-152.
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marked contrast to that of the heterogeneous foreign horde which fills the spinning and 
weave rooms of the Northern mill,” the New England industry press noted, southern 
millhands were “of native American stock, hardy from generations of hill and mountain 
life .. . . The labor agitator is distinctly frowned upon and the independent character o f the
TQ
help is not favorable to the trade union idea.”
Although New Englanders’ received a steady stream of information from 
industrial boosters about the manufacturing advantages to be had in the Piedmont South 
and the significant competitive threat posed by these southern mills, their reactions to the 
southerners’ claims fell along a wide spectrum. Their responses ranged from outright 
denials that the South could successfully produce cotton textiles let alone challenge New 
England’s supremacy in the industry, to acceptance of the fact that southern competition 
was real and an actuality that must be taken seriously. “I think the greatest competition 
that exists between New England and the South is rather in the newspaper than in the 
mill,” one manufacturer asserted to members of the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ 
Association, “I really do not think there is any competition— any serious competition.” 
The Boston Advertiser, however, took a much more pessimistic view, noting that in the 
South, “conditions are exceptionally favorable for the manufacture of cotton goods,” 
creating a situation in which “The North cannot hold out long against Southern 
competition.”40 Most New England manufacturers, nonetheless, rejected such optimistic 
and pessimistic extremes and instead ascribed to the position that southern competition 
was a reality but that the South would never undermine New England’s textile 
preeminence. “The change, if  it comes, will come slowly,” argued one New Englander.
39 Com mercial Bulletin, 19 January 1895.
40 NECMA Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1898, 165; Boston Advertiser quoted in 
M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 23, no. 16.
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A. M. Gooddale of the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ Association concurred, 
admitting that southern “advantages are numerous,” but that “we of New England will 
still stay in business.”41 Yet, even as New England and southern textile manufacturers 
addressed one another in a spirit of friendly competition, a North-South war of words 
continued into the turn of the century among these industrialists, regional trade 
newspapers, and southern boosters over whether or not the South was destined to put an 
end to New England’s reign over the American cotton textile industry.42
The center of the cotton textile manufacturing industry in the United States 
remained firmly entrenched in New England through the 1880s and 1890s in spite of the 
impressive expansion of the industry in North and South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Alabama. The numbers of spindles in the Piedmont South increased from slightly over 
32,000 in 1870 to over four million by 1900, and the number of southern mill hands grew 
nearly ten-fold during the same time period.43 Throughout the South, however, textile 
mills remained smaller than their New England counterparts and little vertical integration 
between the manufacturing and finishing of the products made there occurred. The 
output of the majority of southern mills remained too limited to support on-site finishing 
facilities and these goods continued to be sent to northern finishing plants, bleacheries,
41 NECMA Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1895, 72.
42 In Independence and Empire, Patrick Hearden interpreted the southern cotton mill campaign 
and public pronouncements o f  northern and southern textile manufacturers about the potential for southern 
dominance in the textile industry as fueled by lingering Civil War sectional rivalries. Hearden asserts that 
southern boosters and industrialists shifted the sectional conflict that had occurred on battlefields during 
wartime into the realms o f  economics and politics during peacetime. For alternative views o f  the 
importance o f  sectional rivalry in shaping the development o f  the postwar southern textile industry, see 
Gaston, The N ew South Creed', Bess Beatty, “Lowells o f  the South,” 51-61.
43 Mitchell, The Rise o f  Cotton M ills in the South, 245. Contemporary sources, which usually 
included estimates o f  mills planned and under construction, however, place the 1900 southern figure at a 
much higher six million spindles. See NECMA Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1900, 189-190; 
Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 27 October 1900.
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and dyeworks for final processing well into the 1900s.44 The reality for New England 
textile manufacturers, nonetheless, was that southern cotton textile production was 
growing in leaps and bounds and had begun to be a significant presence in the domestic 
and foreign marketplaces. By the depression years o f 1890s, many New England textile 
manufacturers, like those at the Dwight Manufacturing Company in Chicopee, 
Massachusetts, observed the impact that southern competition had on their profits and 
started looking for ways to effectively counteract the manufacturing advantages to be had 
by those producing textiles below the Mason-Dixon Line.
44 Oates, The Role o f  the Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Developm ent o f  the American  
Southeast, 44-80; Wright, O ld South, New South, 125; Carlton and Coclanis, “Capital M obility and 
Southern Industry, 1880-1905,” 88-90; Gaston, The New South Creed, 194-206; Ayers, The Prom ise o f  the 
New South, 111; Foner, Reconstruction, 597.
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CHAPTER II
“MANUFACTURERS SURELY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE 
BUSINESS:” LABOR, LEGISLATION, AND DEPRESSION
“For some days the newspapers have been filled with accounts o f the investments 
of large sums o f money in the far South by the great cotton mill corporations of New 
England. . . .  And thus the States of the South . . .  will soon witness the greatest activity 
in cotton milling ever known in the history of this country,” wrote Carter Glass, owner 
and editor o f the Lynchburg News in 1895. “They said their object in coming South is to 
get away from the meddlesome and restrictive laws enacted at the instigation o f ‘walking 
delegates’ and lazy agitators. Their hope is to get among conservative people who want 
work and so [do] not hamper and hinder great enterprises.”1 Glass’s short editorial boiled 
down two of the motives behind capital flight in the Massachusetts textile industry at the 
turn o f the century: organized labor in the mills and “restrictive laws,” often passed at the 
behest of unionized operatives, which regulated working hours, employee ages and 
education standards, and workplace safety conditions. In 1880, Massachusetts cotton 
manufacturers looked forward, optimistically, to a long and lucrative future for their New 
England mills. But, as southern competition in the industry became a force with which to 
reckon during the depression of the 1890s, Massachusetts mill owners perceived 
themselves as besieged by burdensome and unfair labor laws and regulations. Organized 
labor in Massachusetts praised pro-reform state politicians for “being fittingly concerned
1 Lynchburg News, 18 January 1895.
42
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with the needs of our factory people” and the ongoing attention paid to regulatory 
legislation. Massachusetts textile manufacturers, however, blasted the state’s system of 
labor laws, saying that it drove textile investments out of the state, and that industrialists 
were “driven to the wall by the hampering restrictions imposed by the Legislature at the 
behest o f labor demagogues.”2 Ultimately, Massachusetts public policy as well as 
conflict between textile manufacturers and organized labor, would be key factors in the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company’s decision to build a cotton textile mill in the Piedmont 
South.
Massachusetts was one of the nation’s first industrialized states, and as such, it 
was also a leader in enacting legislation that regulated working hours, employee ages, 
and factory safety conditions. As early as the 1820s, organized workers in Massachusetts 
spearheaded efforts to convince members o f the Commonwealth’s legislature to pass 
labor laws. Thus, as Massachusetts labor unions grew and matured, so too did the state’s 
regulatory legislation. Massachusetts labor laws did not apply to all wage earners in the 
state equally, and compliance with regulatory statutes varied from place to place and 
industry to industry. Nevertheless, by the turn of the century, the Bay State arguably had 
the most rigorous and detailed system of industrial legislation and enforcement of any 
state in the nation.
Agitation for regulatory legislation began in Massachusetts in the 1820s, and until 
the passage of the state’s 1874 ten-hour law, the chief interest in workplace reform 
focused on the regulation of hours of labor for children and adults. In 1825, Boston 
artisans attempted to secure for themselves the ten-hour day. Also spurred on by calls 
from workingmen’s groups to regulate the employment of children, the Massachusetts
2 Labor Leader, 19 March 1887; Commercial Bulletin, 19 January 1895.
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Senate launched an investigation into child labor in the states’ manufacturing industries 
in order to determine how many children were employed, what their hours of labor were, 
and how work affected their ability to attend school. The Senate investigation found that 
there were large numbers of children employed in the state, overwhelmingly in the textile 
industry, and that they worked from sunup to sunset. Although the inquiry led members 
of the investigating committee to the conclusion that working such long hours from a 
very young age was not conducive to nor did it allow the majority o f factory children to 
get an education, the committee did not recommend legislative action as a solution. For 
another decade, calls for hours and ages legislation continued to be sounded by organized
-j
workers throughout the state.
The General Assembly of Massachusetts revisited the issues o f child labor, 
working hours, and education in 1836, when the Committee on Education in the House of 
Representatives conducted another study of child labor and education. The report issued 
at the conclusion o f the investigation argued that because of the rapidly changing nature 
of employment in Massachusetts from agricultural to industrial labor, it became, “the 
solemn and indispensable duty of the representatives of the people to provide . . . that 
those institutions which have given New England her peculiar character for general
3 Thomas Dublin, Women at Work: The Transformation o f  Work and Community in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, 1826-1860  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 112; Sarah Whittelsey, 
Massachusetts Labor Legislation: An H istorical and Critical Study (1901; reprint N ew  York: Kraus 
Reprint, 1970), 9, first published as a supplement to Annals o f  the American Academ y o f  Political and  
Social Science, vol. 15, no. 1; Charles Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory Legislation in Massachusetts, 
From 1825 to the Passage o f  the Ten-Hour Law in 1874,” in Susan Kingsbury, ed., Labor Laws and Their 
Enforcement With Special Reference to Massachusetts (New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 1911), 4-13. 
Persons noted that three groups were responsible for keeping the issues o f  hours and child labor alive 
between 1825 and 1835: the Workingman’s Party, the N ew  England Association o f  Farmers, Mechanics 
and other Workingmen, and the Boston Trades Union.
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intelligence and virtue be not changed with the changing employment of her people.”4 
The members o f the committee attached a bill to their report requiring that, under penalty 
of a fifty dollar fine, no child under fourteen years old could be employed in a 
manufacturing establishment without attending school for at least three months o f the 
preceding year so that “no class be allowed to remain uneducated.”5 During the 1836 
legislative session though, the child labor bill passed in amended form, raising the 
proposed age requirement to fifteen years. The 1836 law did not include any 
enforcement mechanisms. In 1838, the legislature would add a provision to this 1836 
statute releasing employers from liability if  they could show that they were provided with 
a sworn certificate of school attendance. The 1836 law, described as “faulty, hastily 
constructed, and unenforceable as placed upon the statute books . . .  intended to still the 
clamor of labor agitators” was, nevertheless, the first labor law passed in Massachusetts.6
Despite the calls for state action on the matter of restricting working hours, the 
1836 child employment and education law did not address the hours issue as it related to 
children or adults. By the 1840s, however, the largest segment of industrial workers in 
Massachusetts were operatives employed in the state’s textile industry, and they became 
the most vocal proponents of the limitation of working hours by state law. Workers in 
Massachusetts textile mill centers, a majority o f whom were women, engaged in sporadic 
turnouts during the 1820s and 1830s to protest increased workloads and the speeding-up 
of machinery. Yet, these demonstrations of worker solidarity failed to wrest concessions
4 From R eport on the Education o f  Children Em ployed in Manufacturing Establishments, 
M assachusetts House Committee on Education , 1836, quoted in Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory 
Legislation in Massachusetts,” 17-18.
5 Ibid., 18-19.
6 Whittelsey, Massachusetts Labor Legislation, 9; Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory 
Legislation in Massachusetts,” 17-19. The 1836 law was amended in 1855, omitting the 1838 school 
certificate provision, and again in 1858, increasing the school requirement to eighteen weeks.
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from employers regarding working conditions and hours, and led textile operatives to 
seek state legislated relief. Throughout the 1840s, mill workers from large and small 
textile towns throughout the state sent petitions to the Massachusetts legislature calling 
for a law limiting the working hours in the state’s mills to ten per day. “Unable to halt 
what they perceived as the degradation of work,” observed historian Thomas Dublin, 
“operatives sought at least to mitigate its ill effects by limiting the hours of labor.”7
The first formal legislative action on the issue of hours regulation for 
Massachusetts manufactories occurred in 1842. In response to increased agitation from 
textile centers on the issue of hours limitation, and to a petition received from Fall River 
operatives calling for more stringent regulations concerning the employment o f children, 
the state legislature added an hours amendment to the 1836 child employment and 
education law. The modification attached a provision to the 1836 statute making illegal 
the employment o f children under twelve years old in manufacturing establishments for 
more than ten hours a day. Bay State industrial workers, however, continued to rally 
around the cause of securing a universal ten-hour day for factory operatives regardless of 
age. Reacting to the thousands of signatures on “ten hour petitions” received by state 
representatives, the Massachusetts legislature appointed a committee in 1845 to collect 
evidence relating to the issue of reducing hours for adults.8
In their testimony before the 1845 hours committee, mill hands from throughout 
Massachusetts told o f the conditions o f work and the quality o f life for those laboring in
7 Dublin, Women at Work, 112; David Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical 
Republicans, 1862-1872  (1967; reprint Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1981), 117; Robert R. R. 
Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1935), 1-15. For 
background information on the economic conditions facilitating 1830s workplace changes in Massachusetts 
textile mills and how they affected Lowell mill operatives see Dublin, Women and Work, 108-112.
8 Dublin, Women at Work, 113-114; Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory Legislation in 
Massachusetts,” 19-22.
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the textile industry, noting the ill-effects, both physical and intellectual, of working 
eleven to thirteen hours a day in dimly lit, poorly ventilated mills. A group of Lowell 
petitioners declared to the hours committee that mill work was taking them “through 
pain, disease and privation, down to a premature grave,” while an employee o f the Boott 
Mills attributed her “ill health to the long hours of labor, the shortness of time for meals, 
and the bad air o f the mills.”9 Members of the legislative committee visited several 
textile mill towns in the Commonwealth, observing at each the environment to be found 
there and hearing input from mill managers on the hours issue. Upon the conclusion of 
its investigation, the committee argued that regulatory legislation was not warranted as 
the inquiry revealed no evidence to convince the committee members that operatives’ 
working conditions harmed either their health or their “morals.” The committee 
determined that mill operatives were capable of making their own bargains with their 
employers and should, therefore, seek redress o f their grievances not from the state, but 
from those for whom they worked.
A committee convened the following year to reinvestigate the ten-hour issue 
admitted that a “problem” existed but that the remedy was not to be had through state 
intervention. The committee asserted that it was neither fair nor within the bounds of the 
legislature’s authority to regulate the workday for factory operatives but not for all who 
labored, especially those in agriculture, throughout the state. Foreshadowing arguments 
that would be used by textile manufacturers in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, members of 
the 1846 committee also noted that the result of passing a ten-hour law applicable to 
Massachusetts factories in advance of any other state would unduly burden textile
9 Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts, House Document, no. 50, March 1845, in John Commons, et 
al., Docum entary H istory o f  American Industrial Society, vol. 8 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 
1910), 131-151.
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concerns trying to compete with mills elsewhere. In the wake of the 1845 and 1846 
investigations, it would be nearly two decades until Massachusetts legislators would pass 
meaningful hours restriction legislation.10
The ten-hour movement and agitation for state mandated workplace reforms 
continued through the 1850s but came of age during and after the Civil War. Discussions 
over hours and child labor continued among members of labor organizations throughout 
Massachusetts during the early 1860s. These workers found new allies in the anti-slavery 
ranks and discovered a common cause with the Commonwealth’s Radical Republicans. 
Throughout the war, anti-slavery advocates and Radical Republicans became increasingly 
vocal about the state’s responsibility to guarantee individual equality before the law, 
while labor organizations stressed the importance of considering individual equality and 
economic inequality together, and the implications of this relationship not only for 
workers but also for a free, democratic society as a whole. Radical Republicans and 
labor in Massachusetts, moreover, both embraced the notion that it was the duty of the 
government to mediate between competing interests in society and use its authority to 
ensure the common good. This conception of the state, coupled with labor’s insistence 
that the state act as a conduit for economic equality, fueled the passage of regulatory 
legislation in Massachusetts as Radical Republicans in the state legislature sought to
10 Dublin, Women at Work, 108-131, especially 113-116; Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory 
Legislation in Massachusetts,” 27-50, especially 42-50. According to Persons, the groups spearheading the 
Ten Hour Movement from 1844-1846, in addition to local organizations o f  textile operatives from Fall 
River and Waltham, were the N ew  England Workingmen’s Association, the Lowell Mechanics and 
Laborers Association that included Lowell “factory girls,” and the Female Labor Reform Association, 
renamed the N ew  England Labor Reform League in 1846.
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mediate between capital and labor by adjusting and protecting the interests of individual 
workers with those of “collected capital.”11
The first post-Civil War regulatory law in Massachusetts was a new child 
employment and education act. A majority of representatives o f both political parties in 
the Massachusetts legislature hesitated to support labor’s calls for state mandated hours 
regulation for adult workers through the 1860s, but Republican reformers did champion 
the cause o f child labor restriction and more stringent education requirements. Arguing 
that the future good o f the Commonwealth depended on protecting the health and 
facilitating the intellectual development of children, the legislature enacted a law in 1867 
applicable to manufacturing and mechanical establishments that outlawed the 
employment of children under ten years old, required that children ages ten to fifteen 
years attend school at least three months in the year prior to employment if  having lived 
within the state during the preceding six months, and restricted the employment of 
children under fifteen years old to sixty hours per week. Violators o f the law faced a fine 
of fifty dollars. Unlike the virtually useless 1832 law, the 1867 statute did include 
enforcement provisions. Yet, the 1867 law was also largely ineffective. Only one state- 
appointed deputy was responsible for factory inspection and enforcement o f the child 
labor statutes and, according to the wording of the act, penalties could only be levied 
against those who “knowingly” employed persons covered by the law.12
The 1867 law, however, set two important precedents for proponents of 
regulatory labor legislation in the United States: the right of the state to establish age,
11 Montgomery, Beyond Equality, 230-233; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: A m erica’s Unfinished 
Revolution, 1863-1877  (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), 482-484; Whittelsey, 
M assachusetts Labor Legislation, 80-83.
12 Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory Legislation in Massachusetts,” 93-97; Montgomery, 
Beyond Equality, 293-294.
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hours, and education requirements for manufacturers hiring children, and to create and 
manage an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with regulatory statutes. By 
the turn of the century, additions to the Massachusetts child labor act outlawed the 
employment of youths under the age of fourteen years in factories, workshops, and 
mercantile establishments; mandated thirty-weeks of school attendance each year for 
employees fourteen to sixteen years old; required school certificates, as evidence of 
compliance with the education requirement, and age certificates filed with an employer 
for all workers under sixteen years old; required proof of literacy for all one-year 
residents of the state, ages fourteen to sixteen, and evidence o f regular day or evening 
school attendance for those deemed unable to read or write simple English. Enforcement 
o f the law rested with a team of ten state factory inspectors and local truant officers. 
Employers violating any stipulation of the child employment and education laws and 
parents who falsified age or school certificates faced fifty dollar fines.13 The passage of 
the 1867 child employment and education act met with little resistance from owners of 
Massachusetts manufactories because of the loophole provided by the inclusion o f the 
word “knowingly” in the penalty clause. For the state to set maximum hours for children 
with little possibility of meaningful enforcement was one thing, to enact a compulsory 
law for adults was quite another.
According to Massachusetts businessman Edward Atkinson, state mandated hours 
limitations would take from adult operatives “the right to dispose freely of the only thing 
they have to sell, that is to say, their tim e”14 The movement to establish a maximum
13 For a complete list o f  Massachusetts statutes relating to child employment and education from 
1838-1898, see Whittelsey, M assachusetts Labor Legislation, 107-111.
14 Testimony o f  Edward Atkinson before the joint Special Committee o f  the Massachusetts 
Legislature, Upon the Hours o f  Labor, 1871, quoted in Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory Legislation
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workweek for adults faced a great deal of opposition, especially from textile interests 
throughout the Bay State. The ten-hour day and sixty-hour workweek was an unofficial 
standard for carpenters, masons, and craftsmen throughout Massachusetts, but operatives 
in the textile industry continued to work an average of twelve hours a day, six days a 
week. The Massachusetts legislature considered the question of shorter hours in 1865 
and again in 1866 as workers throughout the state, especially those affiliated with the 
Boston Trades Union, began agitating for the eight-hour day. An investigatory 
commission named by Governor John Andrews in 1865 to study the issue o f hours 
regulation came to the conclusion that legislation on the matter was neither warranted nor 
wise. The commission appointed to study the matter agreed in its 1866 report that the 
long hours and poor working conditions found principally throughout the state’s textile 
mills did merit concern but, because universal hours restriction would interfere with 
freedom of contract and because hours provisions would not be law outside of 
Massachusetts, the overall welfare o f communities with manufacturing establishments 
would be hurt more than helped by the enactment of hours restrictions. The failure o f the 
eight-hour movement, however, reenergized the movement for the establishment o f the 
ten-hour day in textile centers throughout Massachusetts during the late 1860s.15
Textile workers organized into craft-based unions led this revived movement for 
labor legislation. These textile workers were overwhelmingly male and came mostly 
from the ranks of mulespinners, loomfixers, and weavers. Mulespinners and loomfixers 
were typically the highest paid, most skilled, and best organized segments o f the textile
in Massachusetts,” 116. Italics original. Edward Atkinson had interests in numerous N ew  England cotton 
mills and was one o f  the most outspoken Massachusetts manufacturers on the subject o f  labor legislation.
15 Montgomery, Beyond Equality, 262-267; Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory Legislation in 
Massachusetts,” 98-101.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
52
labor force by virtue of their skills and because mulespinners and loomfixers controlled 
access to their trades by deciding who would or would not be taught the crafts. Weavers 
were semi-skilled operatives and the only organized trade with a large number o f women 
in the line o f work. They gained their on the job power not through their skills per se, but 
through their numbers. Weavers usually constituted one-third of the workforce o f a 
cotton textile mill. By removing themselves from the production process, weavers could 
effectively shutdown an entire mill.16
The craft system of organization limited the numbers of workers who were 
official members o f textile unions during the late nineteenth century. Despite rare 
moments o f mill-wide collective actions during times of industrial strife, craft solidarity 
and the largely male constituency of the weavers’ unions, limited formal organization of 
unskilled workers, immigrants and women, as well as the economic benefits and 
autonomy mill hands with a union affiliation could demand from their employers. Yet 
these textile unions provided the leaders and the organizational backing necessary to 
make known to Massachusetts politicians the need for shorter hours and better working 
conditions in mills throughout the state. The lobbying activities of textile union 
members, especially mulespinners in Lowell, Fall River, Taunton, Holyoke, and 
Chicopee, were fundamental in the securing of state mandated industrial regulations and 
in setting standards for factory safety, touching skilled and unskilled alike throughout the
1 7Massachusetts textile industry.
16 Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America,” 8-21.
17 This interpretation differs significantly from the argument made by textile union historian 
Cletus Daniel, who asserted that craft based unions in N ew  England textile centers “provided only 
temporary advantages to skilled workers and nothing at all to the growing number o f  machine operatives 
whose lack o f  skills rendered them ineligible for membership.” See Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune: An 
Interpretive H istory o f  Textile Unionism in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 14- 
15.
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Organized textile labor in Massachusetts embraced political action as one of the 
most effective ways to improve workplace conditions throughout the 1870s, lobbying in 
the legislature and using their votes as the means of achieving this end. As they made use 
o f strikes to challenge management’s economic power in the mills, skilled male textile 
workers rallied around the ten-hour issue, using the ballot and group pressure tactics to 
elect labor-friendly politicians and challenge mill owners’ political power at the 
statehouse. Organized textile labor, however, shifted its objective from ten-hour 
legislation for all Bay State manufacturing workers to one calling for the state regulation 
o f working hours for women and children only. Knowing that a majority o f politicians in 
the Massachusetts legislature objected to any use of state action that would infringe on an 
individual’s freedom of contract, male textile operatives crafted a persuasive message 
that the state had not only a right, but a duty, to protect those, like the women and 
children facing physical and social degradation by working long hours in textile mills, 
who could not protect themselves. Ignoring the activism of female operatives who had 
been integral in short-hour movements since the 1830s, male operatives pointed to the 
fact that women and children could not effectively participate in the political process or 
make their needs known through the vote and, therefore, were dependent on men to do it 
for them. For many legislators on Beacon Hill, the dependency argument was one they 
could support without betraying their belief in a man's right to sell or buy labor as he saw 
fit. The lobbying textile operatives, meanwhile, well understood that even by changing 
their focus to women and children only, the effect of any hours legislation would 
essentially be the same. Because of the preponderance of women and young people 
working in the textile industry, no mills could function without them. Any law regulating
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their working hours would by necessity, operatives and manufacturers alike realized,
1 Rextend to all textile mill employees.
Massachusetts textile union members focused on three points to forward their 
case as to why the state should limit the hours of labor in textile mills. The first argument 
focused on the impact that the environment found in the mills had on workers. Laboring 
eleven, twelve, and thirteen hours a day in crowded, noisy, hot, poorly ventilated rooms, 
the unionists and allies they found in the medical profession reasoned, damaged the 
health of mill operatives, especially of women and children who were by their nature, 
physically more vulnerable to these conditions than men. The ten-hour law was, 
therefore, not about the state regulating the individual’s right of contract, it was about 
protecting the health and welfare o f the Commonwealth’s weakest members. The effect 
of long hours o f work on women “exhausts their vitality and destroys their womanhood 
almost, from the very conditions of labor and the . .  . unsanitary conditions under which it 
is performed,” argued long-time Massachusetts labor reformer Frank Foster, “as long as 
that condition o f things exists and the hours of labor remain as they are . . . there is a
18 M. F. Dickinson, Jr., Shall We Legislate Upon the Hours o f  Labor?, Argument o f  M. F. 
Dickinson Before the Joint Special Committee o f  the M assachusetts Legislature, Upon the Hours o f  Labor 
in B ehalf o f  the Remonstrant, 15 March 1871 (Boston: J. B. Batcheleder, 1871), 4; Persons, “The Early 
History o f  Factory Legislation in Massachusetts,” 116-118; Mary Blewett, Constant Turmoil: The Politics 
o f  Industrial Life in Nineteenth-Century New England  (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 2000), 
102-140, especially 102-104. Blewett places the post-Civil War agitation for the ten-hour day within the 
context o f  definitions o f  masculinity held by native-born and British skilled male textile operatives who 
worked in Fall River. According to Blewett, the gendering o f  the ten-hour agitation undermined the 
possibility o f  a strong labor movement in the N ew  England textile industry because skilled male operatives 
distanced themselves from all those who they saw as “dependent,” fracturing the textile workforce along 
gender and ethnic lines. By undercutting labor solidarity with other textile operatives, these skilled, male 
workers damaged their own organizational strength, as they constituted a smaller and smaller proportion o f  
the textile workforce from the 1890s forward. For an overview o f  the gendering o f  protective legislation  
from the Civil War to World War I, see Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A H istory o f  Wage-Earning 
Women in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 180-214.
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growing element of danger in our social condition.”19 Because women gave birth to and 
children were the next generation of Massachusetts citizens, safeguarding them meant 
safeguarding the future of society itself.
Textile unionists bolstered their hours restriction argument by also contending 
that shortening the workday would make all mill hands better, more productive 
employees. They pointed to the fact that since the 1830s and 1840s, the machinery used 
throughout the textile industry had undergone significant labor-saving improvements 
with a corresponding increase in the amount o f goods that could be produced within a 
single workday. But, according to the unionists, manufacturers lost the potential profits 
that should have come with this increase in production because by the eleventh hour of 
work, operatives were so tired that they made frequent mistakes and a preponderance of 
irregular, unsellable goods. “The confinement for twelve hours to that kind of labor in 
itself makes a man become dull and apathetic,” according to Robert Howard, future 
member of the Massachusetts legislature and mulespinner active in the ten-hour 
campaign. Shorter hours, Howard continued, “imparts increased energy to his system
• • • 70and enables him to stick closer to his work while he is at it.”
Massachusetts textile unionists also pointed to the age and hours regulations that 
were already in effect in England, claiming that no harm had been done to the
19 Testimony o f  Frank Foster, 8-9 and 12 February 1883, in United States Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, Report o f  the Committee o f  the Senate Upon the Relations Between Labor and  
Capital, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1885), 59; Dickinson, Shall We Legislate 
Upon the Hours o f  Labor?, 21. Frank Foster’s roots in the labor community ran deep. He was a printer by 
trade and elected president o f  the Boston Typographical Union in 1882. He was also a prominent member 
o f  the Boston Central Labor Union, the Knights o f  Labor, and the Massachusetts Federation o f  Trades. He 
began publication o f  the Labor Leader in 1887, serving as both editor and publisher.
20 Testimony o f  Robert Howard, 25 August 1883, in United States Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, Report o f  the Committee o f  the Senate Upon the Relations Between Labor and  
Capital, vol. 1, 651; Dickinson, Shall We Legislate Upon the Hours o f  Labor?, 12-13; Persons, “The Early 
History o f  Factory Legislation in Massachusetts,” 117, 121.
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competitiveness o f British-made textiles in the marketplace. Massachusetts textile 
manufacturers, however, disagreed. They countered the arguments made by labor 
lobbyists as to why a ten-hour law was prudent, point by point. The industrialists 
articulated a position and voiced opinions against the passage o f hours restriction 
legislation that they would come back to time and again throughout the 1880s and 1890s. 
On the issue o f the healthfulness of textile manufacturing work, Bay State mill owners 
made the case that while conditions in the mills were not as ideal as laboring outdoors, 
the health and welfare o f textile operatives would be far worse if they did not have the 
food, clothing, and shelter that wages earned in textile mills provided them. Rather than 
directly addressing the contention that the physical condition of women and children 
were in need of protection, Massachusetts manufacturers instead attacked and challenged 
the manhood of the lobbying unionists by reiterating the fact that a reduction in hours for 
women and children would, because mills could not be run without them, be applied to 
men as well. “Let us not believe,” sniped one mill owner, “that in America, labor has 
become so weak and helpless that it must be protected against the encroachments o f this 
tyrant, capital.”21 In addition, these manufacturers found the argument that a reduction in 
hours would make operatives more productive specious because they perceived labor 
done in textile factories as easy and light, requiring mill hands to do nothing more than 
tend machinery that did all the actual work, noting that their employees would not be able
to earn as much in ten hours as in eleven making the practical result o f a reduction of
22hours the same as a wage cut.
21 Dickinson, Shall We Legislate Upon the Hours o f  Labor?, 8, 23.
22 Ibid., 18-19.
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It was the issue of competitiveness, however, that elicited the strongest reaction 
from the anti-restriction textile manufacturers. They saw the movement for hours 
restrictions in Massachusetts as originating with British operatives who migrated to work 
in New England mills, arguing that governmental intervention in the conditions of work 
was inherently un-American. “Let us encourage no such governmental interference here 
in America,” argued one manufacturer who saw state labor regulations as an infringement 
on individual liberty, “This is not France, or Prussia, or Austria or England . . . .  we ought
23 • •to shrink from taking such a step.” Likewise, any presumed outcome of hours 
restriction based on the example of regulatory legislation in England, according to the 
industrialists, was fundamentally flawed. Legislation in England, manufacturers pointed 
out, covered the nation as a whole while regulatory laws in Massachusetts would place 
the Commonwealth’s mills at a competitive disadvantage due to the fact that they would 
have no bearing on any state but Massachusetts. Textile companies in other New 
England states would have the advantage of running longer hours, producing more and, 
because Massachusetts mill owners assumed operatives would want an increase in hourly 
and piecework pay so that they would make as much in ten hours as they had for eleven, 
o f paying their employees lower hourly wages. The presumption o f many pro-regulation 
activists that Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Maine would follow the lead of 
Massachusetts in passing hours legislation was, according to the textile lobby, without 
foundation because “all selfish interests” would guarantee that textile manufacturers 
outside of Massachusetts would resist anything that would take away competitive 
advantages they had over the mills located in the Bay State.24
23 Dickinson, Shall We Legislate Upon the Hours o f  Labor?, 29-30.
24 Ibid., 20.
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Numerous state legislators were responsive to labor’s call for the ten-hour day and 
they introduced bills into the Massachusetts House and Senate in 1871, 1872, and 1873 
that would limit the hours of work to ten per day and sixty per week for women and all 
persons under the age o f eighteen employed by manufacturing establishments that made 
cotton, woolen, jute, or silk fabrics. Massachusetts textile interests complained of a 
“growing tendency of our state to discriminate against capital,” and warned the 
politicians supporting ten-hour restriction that “there was a growing feeling among 
capitalists in Massachusetts that their rights no longer commanded that full respect which 
was once accorded them,” leading manufacturers to “withdraw money from our corporate
• 25 •institutions and send it elsewhere for investment.” The bills passed the House each year 
but were regularly defeated in the industry-friendly Senate. A majority o f Senators 
called, instead, for voluntary hours restrictions throughout the New England industry so 
as to prevent placing Massachusetts mills at a competitive disadvantage. Ten-hour 
agitators blamed the consistent failure of the bills on agents hired by the largest textile 
concerns in Massachusetts and charged that these lobbyists secured the defeat of the bills 
“not by argument, not by facts, but by treachery, by bribery, by intimidation, and by 
corruption.”26 With the support of Republican Governor William Washburn, the 
provisions of the previous ten-hour bills were changed in 1874 to include workers in all 
manufacturing establishments and to allow readjustments of the daily hour maximums so 
that a half-day could be worked on Saturdays. Opposition to the ten-hour law continued, 
however, until the addition of a compromise amendment, including the word “willful” in
25 Dickinson, Shall We Legislate Upon the Hours o f  Labor?, 8-9.
26 “Address to the Workingmen o f Lowell,” 24 August 1870, quoted in Dickinson, Shall We 
Legislate Upon the Hours o f  Labor?, 27.
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the penalty clause o f the 1874 bill.27 As was the case with the word “knowingly” in the 
1867 child employment and education act, the amendment was a loophole intended to 
make enforcement of the law virtually impossible. Nevertheless, the 1874 Massachusetts 
ten-hour bill passed “for the protection of the health of a large class of women of the 
State, and for the advancement of education among the children o f . . . manufacturing
98communities,” and despite its flaws, was the first sixty-hour law in the nation.
The 1874 ten-hour act reiterated the supposition, first seen in Massachusetts with 
the 1867 child employment and education act, that the state had a right to regulate 
working conditions in the interest of “dependent” citizens. Massachusetts textile mill 
owners, however, largely ignored the provisions of the ten-hour statute until an 1879 
amendment to the act struck the word “willful” from the law. Regardless of intent, 
manufacturers were now liable for prosecution and a fine of up to fifty dollars if  women 
or anyone under eighteen years old worked more than sixty hours a week. Increased 
enforcement by state factory inspectors and the ability to more easily prosecute offenders 
forced growing numbers of Massachusetts textile mill owners to comply with the sixty-
90hour provisions from 1879 onward.
27 The penalty clause for the 1874 act read: “The person, firm or corporation, superintendent, 
overseer or agen t. . .  are fined $50 for ‘w illful’ violation, upon prosecution within one year.” From Acts o f  
the General Assem bly o f  the Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts, 1874. The provisions o f  the 1874 ten-hour 
act are quoted in their entirety in Whittelsey, Massachusetts Labor Legislation, 113.
28 Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory Legislation in Massachusetts,” 123-125; Whittelsey, 
Massachusetts Labor Legislation, 12-13. For an overview o f child labor legislation in the U.S. through the 
Civil War see Walter Trattner, Crusade fo r  the Children: A History o f  the N ational C hild Labor Committee 
and Child Labor Reform in America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 21-31.
29 In addition to the 1879 amendment, a series o f  changes were made to the 1874 ten-hour act 
including the required posting o f  notices at manufactories stating the daily schedule o f  work (1880) and 
stating machinery start and stop times and meal times (1886 and 1887); the extension o f  the law’s 
provisions to mechanical and mercantile establishments (1883); the outlawing o f  work by children under 
fourteen years old between 7pm and 6am (1888); and the outlawing o f  work by women and all workers 
under eighteen years old between 10pm and 6am (1890). For a complete list o f  changes made to the 1874 
ten-hour law between 1874 and 1898, see Whittelsey, Massachusetts Labor Legislation, 113-116.
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After passage of the 1874 act, a lull occurred in the agitation for additional labor 
legislation. The nationwide economic crisis which began in 1873 undercut the strength 
of many workers’ organizations throughout Massachusetts, while the labor strife 
occurring during this depression pushed many Republicans on Beacon Hill, who had 
previously supported the Radicals and labor friendly initiatives, into an alliance with pro­
business Republicans who conceived of the state not as a mediator of competing interests
*3 A
but as responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of capital. 
Between the passage of the 1874 ten-hour law and the turn of the century, calls for 
regulatory laws in Massachusetts increasingly focused on ensuring adequate enforcement 
of age, education, and hours statutes already enacted, and concentrated on securing 
protections from the dangers of industrial employment through factory safety and 
sanitation regulations. Massachusetts passed the nation’s first general factory safety act 
in 1877, establishing requirements for fire escapes, the covering of dangerous machine 
parts, and the use and operation of elevators, and creating a state factory safety inspection 
force.
The often overlapping constituencies of textile craft unions, skilled trades unions, 
and the emergent Knights of Labor and American Federation of Labor continued to be 
driving forces through the 1880s and 1890s in the movement for more and better 
enforced regulatory legislation in Massachusetts. “The object of all these organizations is 
o f course much the same, to obtain the advancement of wage workers . . .  in financial and 
social condition,” noted Massachusetts unionist Frank Foster. “In order to attain these 
ends,” he continued, “we have to direct our attention toward securing such legislation as
30 Persons, “The Early History o f  Factory Legislation in Massachusetts,” 125; Whittelsey, 
M assachusetts Labor Legislation, 13; Montgomery, B eyond Equality, 379-386; Foner, Reconstruction, 
517-524.
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w ill. . . obtain for the individual laborer a fair opportunity to compete with associated 
capital.”31
The Knights of Labor was the first labor organization in the United States that 
spearheaded a nationwide lobbying effort to secure laws that would advance the needs of 
the “producing classes.”32 For industrial workers affiliated with the Knights in 
Massachusetts, this call to use the state to forward workers’ interests resulted in 
movements seeking further reductions of hours for manufacturing establishments, the 
creation of a state board of arbitration, the passage of an employer liability act, and the 
abolition o f the fining system used in textile mills throughout the state. “The fact that our 
jurisdiction extends over our whole State is an advantage,” argued Knights o f Labor, 
District 30 Master Workman, Albert Carlton, “as it makes it possible to exert a more 
powerful influence upon legislative action . . . .  [W]e appear a body whose jurisdiction is 
equal to that of the Legislature itself.” Starting in 1884, the legislative committee of the
Knights of Labor, District 30 made regular appearances before various committees o f the 
Massachusetts legislature to argue in favor o f pro-labor bills and endorsed candidates for 
state office who supported the Knights’ legislative agenda. The Knights’ regular 
attendance at legislative sessions succeeded in convincing many politicians on Beacon 
Hill that an organization existed “for the purpose of making, watching, and if  necessary, 
unmaking those delegated to frame . . . laws.”34
31 Testimony o f  Frank Foster, 8-9 and 12 February 1883, in United States Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor, Report o f  the Committee o f  the Senate Upon the Relations Between Labor and  
Capital, vol. 1, 79.
32 Leon Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy: The Knights o f  Labor and American Politics  (1983; 
reprint Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1985), especially xii-xvi, 3-37, 219-233.
33 Knights o f  Labor, District 30, R ecord o f  Proceedings fo r  the Quarterly Session o f  D istrict 
Assembly 30, January 1884, 7. Hereafter cited as Quarterly Proceedings.
34 Ibid., April 1884, 8.
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In 1885, the Knights of Labor, with support from local textile unionists, 
succeeded in electing Fall River mulespinner and District 30 legislative committee 
chairperson Robert Howard to the state Senate as representative o f Bristol County. The 
Massachusetts Democratic Party endorsed a platform in 1886 including the reforms 
called for by members of District 30 of the Knights of Labor. To the chagrin of 
businessmen throughout the state, Democrats in the legislature were successful in getting
•2 c
many labor statutes passed by 1887. “The Massachusetts legislature o f 1886 is a radical 
body as regards labor enactments,” noted the Commercial Bulletin, “The Senate and 
House vie with each other in this respect.” At the height of its success, the Knights of 
Labor claimed a membership in Massachusetts of over 26,000 men and more than 4,000 
women, including over 5,000 workers employed in textile mills throughout the state.37 “I 
tell you here and now,” Edward Atkinson chastised the audience at an address given at 
Boston’s Central Labor Lyceum, “that by the Acts of the Legislature which you have 
tried for, and some o f which have been passed, and by way of by-laws o f your Knights of 
Labor, your clubs, and your associations which you have tried to force people to adopt,
n o
you are driving capital out of the State.” Atkinson explicitly blamed the Knights for 
creating the perception among Massachusetts businessmen, especially owners of textile
35 Tom Juravich, William Hartford, and James Green, Commonwealth o f  Toil: Chapters in the 
H istory o f  M assachusetts Workers and Their Unions (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1996), 
51-52; Paul Buhle, “The Knights o f  Labor in Rhode Island” Radical H istory Review  17(1978): 66-73. 
Juravich, et al., noted that the Democratic party in Massachusetts “acted . . .  as a kind o f  labor party” from 
1885-1886.
36 Com mercial Bulletin, 1 May 1886.
37 Knights o f  Labor, District 30, Quarterly Proceedings, 1887, 24. In Chicopee, Massachusetts, 
where the Dwight Manufacturing Company was located, the Knights o f  Labor had two local assemblies o f  
several hundred members from 1884-1887. Vera Shlakman, however, noted that local workers used the 
Chicopee assemblies “more for social clubs than for labor agitation.” Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a 
Factory Town: A Study o f  Chicopee, Massachusetts,” in Smith College Studies in History, vol. 20 
(Northampton, MA: Department o f  History o f  Smith College, 1935), 193. See also, Knights o f  Labor, 
District Assembly 30, Quarterly Proceedings, July 1886, 22.
38 Address reprinted in Transactions o f  the New England Cotton M anufacturers' Association, 
Annual Meeting, 1887, 58-89; quoted selection, 88. Cited hereafter as NECMA Transactions.
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mills, that the Bay State was friendly to labor’s interests, as exhibited through the passage 
of reform legislation, but was hostile to those of capital, an opinion that Massachusetts 
manufacturers would echo time and again in the decades to come.
The Knights of Labor’s 1886 nationwide movement for the eight-hour day 
swelled the ranks o f the local assemblies that comprised District 30, but following a 
failed general strike by members of the building trades in Boston that year, the Knights 
began a slow decline in Massachusetts. Knights of Labor members in the textile industry 
gradually withdrew from the body and affiliated with various national organizations of
- IQ
independent craft unions. The Knights of Labor, however, left an indelible mark on 
legislation passed in Massachusetts during the 1880s. “[A]s in the case o f the ten-hour 
law, and many recent enactments intended to further the interests o f wage workers, the 
Bay State is a conspicuous and daring leader,” lamented the editor of the Commercial 
Bulletin, attributing this to the fact that, “ . . . the Knights of Labor have a very strong 
hold there.”40 During the years in which the Knights of Labor played an active part in 
shaping the political landscape of Massachusetts, the legislature created a state Board of 
Conciliation and Arbitration (1886), passed an employer liability act (1887), limited the 
use of the fining system for imperfect weaving (1887), enacted a law allowing labor 
unions to become incorporated entities (1888), established state requirements for the 
cleaning of machinery, ventilation, uniform meal hours for women and minors, and fire 
prevention in manufacturing establishments (1887), progressively increased the age and
39 Juravich, et al., Commonwealth o f  Toil, 52; George Sinclair Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the 
South (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1931), 6-7.
40 Com mercial Bulletin, 27 February 1886.
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education requirements for the employment of minors (1883, 1885, 1887, 1888, 1889), 
and outlawed night work in manufactories by minors (1888) and women (1890).41
As the power o f the Knights o f Labor waned in Massachusetts during the late 
1880s and early 1890s, the Massachusetts State Federation of Labor, organized in 1887 
as a state body representing Massachusetts unions affiliated with the American 
Federation o f Labor, continued to promote a pro-labor agenda at the statehouse. While 
the national AFL leadership, especially Samuel Gompers, often shied away from the 
union’s endorsement of candidates or a specific political party at the turn o f the century, 
state federations of labor led reform campaigns, gave backing to labor-friendly 
candidates, lobbied legislatures, testified before committees, sometimes wrote and 
sponsored specific labor bills, and formed alliances with other reform groups active in 
seeking protective or regulatory legislation. “State legislatures form the most favorable 
point o f attack and most of the legislative reforms we advocate must be obtained through 
this medium,” argued Frank Foster, future AFL Legislative Committee chairperson, “If 
possible, some special committee should be had in each State, whose duty it should be to 
formulate and advocate such laws as are deemed practicable to present.”42 In this 
capacity, the Massachusetts State Federation of Labor carried the political agitation of the 
Knights of Labor into the twentieth century.43
41 For a complete digest o f  the acts and their provisions passed during these years see Whittelsey, 
M assachusetts Labor Legislation, 107-143.
42 Organized Trades and Labor Unions o f  the United States and Canada, Report o f  Proceedings o f  
the Fourth Annual Session o f  the Federation, 1884, 26.
43 Massachusetts State Federation o f  Labor, H istory o f  the M assachusetts State Federation o f  
Labor (Boston: The Federation, 1935), 14-15; Gary Fink, ed., State Labor Proceedings: A Bibliography o f  
the AFL, CIO and AFL-CIO Proceedings 1885-1874, H eld in the AFL-CIO Library  (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1975), x-xii. For an analysis o f  the Gompers-AFL political strategy in the 1880s and
1890s see Julie Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation o f  Labor and Political 
Activism, 1881-1917  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 48-70.
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The Massachusetts State Federation of Labor established a legislative committee 
at its 1891 convention and adopted several legislative resolutions, including one calling 
for a fifty-eight-hour law for women and children and one that provided the funding for a 
permanent, paid lobbyist to the Massachusetts legislature. Upon the introduction o f a 
fifty-eight-hour bill during the 1891 Massachusetts legislative session, representatives of 
the State Federation of Labor and men appearing on behalf of the Arkwright Club and 
individual textile mills throughout the state, lobbied aggressively at the statehouse to see 
that their respective positions on the bill would be known.44 Indeed, throughout the 
1890s and continuing through the first decades o f the twentieth century, Massachusetts 
textile mill owners attempted to check the ability of labor organizations to influence 
public policy through group action and lobbying efforts of their own. “The millions of 
the Arkwright club are massed against [the fifty-eight-hour bill]. Its agents are turning 
heaven and earth to secure its defeat,” announced the editor of the Massachusetts State 
Federation o f Labor’s official newspaper. “Two trained counsel are button-holing each 
senator,” he continued, “and pulling all conceivable wires to prevent the passage of the 
measure.”45 The efforts of the textile industry lobby, nevertheless, were unsuccessful.
By promising to make use of a blacklist of legislators who voted against the fifty-eight- 
hour bill, ably cultivating support among House and Senate Democrats, and relentlessly 
petitioning House and Senate committees for favorable reports on the fifty-eight-hour 
bill, the Massachusetts State Federation of Labor helped enact the law reducing the hours
44 Massachusetts State Federation o f  Labor, History o f  the Massachusetts State Federation o f  
Labor, 23. The Arkwright Club’s members were corporate officers and senior-most management o f  textile 
mills located throughout N ew  England. The club’s headquarters were in Boston. For a complete listing o f  
paid lobbyists to the Massachusetts legislature beginning in 1891, see Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts, 
Lobbyist Section, Dockets o f  Legislative Agents, 1891-1986. Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, MA.
45 Labor Leader, 23 April 1892.
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of labor for women and children in the state’s manufacturing establishments from sixty to 
fifty-eight per week.46
Many New England legislatures eventually passed laws regulating working hours, 
factory conditions, and ages of employment. As early as 1894, every northeastern state 
had factory regulations in place that mandated basic safety and sanitation measures. In 
1900, the sixty-hour week was standard throughout the industrialized Northeast, with 
numerous states having child labor laws that established minimum ages for employment, 
mandated educational requirements, and prohibited night work.47 The actual compliance 
with regulatory laws by factory owners and workers alike, varied from community to 
community and state to state. By the turn o f the century though, Massachusetts’ 
inspection and enforcement mechanisms for its labor legislation were the most 
sophisticated in the nation. “Massachusetts enjoys the unique distinction . . .  of 
possessing a large staff o f factory inspectors,” Florence Kelley of the National 
Consumers’ League noted, “Massachusetts is, accordingly the only state o f which it may 
be confidently asserted that its child labor law is uniformly and effectively enforced.”48 
Some industrialists continued to completely ignore state labor laws, preferring to pay the 
nominal penalties when caught, while adult industrial workers often falsified age and 
schooling certificates so that their children could find gainful employment and contribute 
to the family economy even if legally underage. According to historian Daniel Nelson,
46 Labor Leader, 23 April 1892.
47 Daniel Nelson, M anagers and Workers: Origins o f  the Twentieth-Century Factory System in the 
United States, 1880-1920, second edition (Madison: University o f  Wisconsin Press, 1995), 138, 140; Alice 
Galenson, The M igration o f  the Cotton Textile Industry from  New England to the South, 1880-1930  (New  
York: Garland Publishing Company, 1985), 39-40, 101-102; Patrick Hearden, Independence and Empire: 
The New S ou th ’s Cotton M ill Campaign, 1865-1901 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), 
99-100; Andrea Tone, The Business o f  Benevolence: Industrial Paternalism in Progressive Am erica  
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 24-25.
48 Florence Kelley, “Child Labor Legislation,” in Annals o f  the American Academ y o f  Political 
and Social Science, vol. 20, no. 1, 163.
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however, the threat of prosecution was usually enough to force compliance with most 
workplace regulations and “the impact of regulatory legislation in most states was 
substantial.”49
Despite the labor legislation passed during the decade, the late 1880s were 
profitable years for New England mills. “And yet, with all their disadvantages,” Richard 
Edmonds of the Manufacturers ’ Record noted, “Northern mills are earning large profits. 
The reports from New England mills . . . .  during 1888 were very large . . . .  the Dwight 
[paid dividends of] 10 per cent.”50 For mills throughout New England, the dividends of 
the late 1880s, however, often turned into losses during the 1890s. Throughout the 
decade, Massachusetts textile concerns found themselves beset by problems. Increasing 
southern competition in markets at home and abroad only intensified the impact that a 
drop in the demand for cotton goods, which began in the fall of 1890, had on New 
England manufacturers. Coarse goods were the mainstay of the majority of 
Massachusetts cotton textile mills and southern encroachment on coarse goods markets 
was of particular concern to them. “Severe competition is now experienced from the 
Southern mills,” noted the Commercial Bulletin, “and the pressure from this quarter is 
constantly increasing.”51 During the depression years of 1893 to 1897, southern 
competition and poor economic conditions forced companies throughout New England to 
significantly curtail operations or close completely and forego paying dividends, while 
southern mill building and textile production continued unabated. Warehouses full of 
unsold fabric, the hours restrictions recently imposed by the state legislature, and growing
49 Nelson, M anagers and Workers, 149.
50 M anufacturers' Record, vol. 14, no. 15.
51 Com mercial Bulletin, 4 April 1891.
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labor unrest, engendered a sense of crisis among the owners of cotton textile mills
9^throughout Massachusetts.
During the depression years of the 1890s, the New England textile industry press 
and manufacturers’ organizations focused their attentions on devising solutions to the 
question o f what to do about southern competition. One possible answer was for 
Massachusetts mills to avoid the challenge of southern manufacturers entirely by 
switching their production from coarse and medium goods to fine goods. As early as 
1882, the Boston Journal o f  Commerce argued that the only way New England mills 
would be able to continue operating profitably as more and more southern mills were 
constructed, was to diversify and “get into finer goods.” By the 1890s, diversification 
made sense to increasing numbers of Massachusetts coarse goods manufacturers. 
According to Arthur Lowe, president of the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ 
Association, a conversion to the making of fine goods was a pathway to future profits, 
not only because there was no southern competition in the markets for the highest thread- 
count cotton goods, but also since most fine goods sold in the United States were 
imported from England and mainland Europe. New England had a competitive 
advantage over southern mills in the production of fine goods, Lowe added, because of 
the overall lack of skill among operatives in the southern textile workforce.54
The problem with the fine goods strategy, noted the Commercial Bulletin, was 
that “the process of turning over into a finer line . . .  can only gradually be
52 Hearden, Independence and Empire, 97-98; Melvin Thomas Copeland, The Cotton  
Manufacturing Industry o f  the United States (1912; reprint New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers,
1966), 221-224.
53 Boston Journal o f  Commerce, 23 December 1882, quoted in Hearden, Independence and  
Empire, 136.
54 NECMA Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1896, 129-153.
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accomplished.”55 Installing new machinery and retraining a workforce necessitated a 
substantial outlay of money and the investment of a significant amount of time. Breaking 
into the domestic fine goods market, which was dominated by overseas producers, 
furthermore, would not be easy. Massachusetts manufacturers saw tariff protections as 
the way this could successfully be accomplished but they were not guaranteed and the 
effects o f tariff revisions, in any case, would not be felt immediately. The issues of time, 
money, and markets, when taken together with the fact that southern mill operatives 
would undoubtedly gain the skills necessary to produce fine goods as the South’s textile 
industry matured, meant that the fine goods strategy would be, at best, a stop-gap solution 
for Massachusetts textile companies.56
The replacement of old machinery with the latest spinning and weaving 
technology was another way proposed by textile manufacturers interested in forwarding 
the competitive position of Massachusetts-made cotton goods in the marketplace. The 
“salvation [of the Massachusetts textile industry] depends on . . . recognition of the 
demands o f the market, the possibility of changing her product from coarse to fine and 
from fine to finer goods, and the introduction of new and up-to-date machinery,” argued 
Charles Pidgin, Chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor, noting in 1905
cn
that “No half-way measures can be tolerated.” Much of the discussion related to 
updating Massachusetts textile mill machinery focused on the fact that the majority of
55 Com mercial Bulletin, 19 January 1895.
56 NECMA Transactions, Annual Meeting, 1900, 167-168. Regarding the importance o f  skill in 
creating a N ew  England advantage over the South in fine goods production during the 1890s see David 
Doane, “Regional Cost Differentials and Textile Location: A Statistical Analysis,” Explorations in 
Economic H istory 9(Fall 1971): 3-34, especially 22; and Marvin Fischbaum, “An Economic Analysis o f  the 
Southern Capture o f  the Cotton Textile Industry Progressing to 1910” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 
1965), 116-118.
57 Massachusetts Bureau o f  Statistics and Labor, Cotton Manufactures in M assachusetts and the 
Southern States (Boston: Wright and Potter Printing Company, 1905), 102-103.
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Piedmont mills were decades younger than New England mills and when they were built, 
southern mill owners installed automatic looms and ring spinning machines, or if  they
C O
initially used older machinery, rapidly replaced it.
The introduction of the Northrop automatic loom in the 1880s made weaving 
more efficient and cost-effective. Before the Northrop loom, weaving took place on 
looms, which stopped and required the weaver to put into place a new bobbin o f yarn 
every time the shuttle supplying yarn to the machine ran out. The Northrop loom made 
this constant stoppage and replacement of bobbins unnecessary, as it was designed so that 
a weaver could install numerous bobbins at one time, which would rotate and 
automatically resupply the loom with yarn when needed. Not only did the Northrop loom 
make weaving operations more efficient, it also increased the amount of looms one 
worker could capably tend. Although the Northrop loom was an expensive investment, 
piece rates for weavers working on this machinery in southern mills were about half those 
paid to weavers working on the plain looms used more extensively in New England. 
Because weavers were the most numerous and among the highest paid workers in cotton 
textile manufacturing, the implementation of this newest weaving technology gave 
southern mills a distinct cost advantage.59
The use of ring spinning machinery also benefited southern mill owners in their 
competition with Massachusetts textile manufacturers. Before the introduction o f the 
ring spindle in 1870, the spinning of cotton took place on mule spindles, which entailed a
58 Massachusetts Bureau o f  Statistics and Labor, Cotton Manufactures in M assachusetts and the 
Southern States, 102-103; NECMA Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1904, 84-85.
59 Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, et al., Like a Family: The Making o f  a Southern Cotton M ill World  (1987; 
reprint Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2000), 46, 51; Galenson, The M igration o f  the 
Cotton Textile Industry from  New England to the South, 39-40; Mary Oates, The Role o f  the Cotton Textile 
Industry in the Economic Developm ent o f  the American Southeast: 1900-1940  (New York: Arno Press, 
1975), 6-7; Chen-Han Chen, “Regional Differences in Costs and Productivity in the American Cotton 
Manufacturing Industry, 1880-1900” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 55(August 1941): 566.
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long period of training for those learning to use the machinery and required skilled 
craftsmen to successfully maneuver. The ring spindle, however, was automatic. Ring 
spinning increased the speed of yam production and lowered the level of strength and 
skill required by operatives tending the machinery, allowing southern manufacturers to 
employ large numbers o f low-skill and low-wage women and children as spinners. An 
important consideration for Massachusetts textile manufacturers in their decisions about 
whether or not to invest the capital necessary to overhaul the mule spinning machinery in 
a mill, was the fact that mulespinners typically received the highest wages and were the 
best organized segment o f the labor force in any New England mill. Ridding one’s mill 
o f mulespinners would also eradicate the mulespinners’ union.60
As was the case with switching from coarse to fine goods production, the proposal 
for replacing outdated machinery as the solution for effectively meeting southern 
competition in the short-term, foundered on the issues of time and money. Although 
southern mills were better equipped and were able to use ring spindles and Northrop 
looms to gain a competitive advantage over goods made in New England, Massachusetts 
mill owners often found it too costly to immediately put aside their old machinery. 
Completely retooling mills with thousands of looms and hundreds of thousands of 
spindles would not happen overnight, and while some Massachusetts mills began 
replacing worn-out mule spindles and plain looms with ring spindles and Northrop looms 
as early as the 1880s, it was a gradual process. Mulespinners, moreover, balked at 
management’s attempts to replace mule spindles with rings. “[CJertain manufacturers
60 Galenson, The M igration o f  the Cotton Textile Industry from  New England to the South, 39-42; 
Hall, et al., Like a Family, 46; Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry o f  the United States, 70-73; 
Melton Alonza McLaurin, Paternalism and Protest: Southern Cotton M ill Workers and O rganized Labor, 
1875-1905  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1971), 14-15; Steven Diner, A Very Different 
Age: Am ericans o f  the Progressive Era  (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 52-54.
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openly charge the operatives with obstructing progress by opposing the use of improved 
machinery by resorting to agitation and strikes,” asserted Herbert Walmsley of New 
Bedford, Massachusetts, “forcing manufacturers to abandon the use o f improved 
machinery . . .  designed to . . .  decrease the cost of production.”61 Mulespinners resisted 
the implementation of ring spindles as much as possible as this would undermine the 
control the spinners exerted in the mills over wages, working conditions, and entrance 
into their craft. By the turn of the century, however, manufacturers had replaced mule 
spindles in New England mills to such an extent that the trade was becoming obsolete.
At the time it affiliated with the United Textile Workers of America in 1901, the National
fOSpinners’ Union, at most, had 2,500 mulespinners as members.
While Massachusetts textile manufacturers debated the relative merits of fine 
goods production and the installation of new machinery, the labor legislation that had 
been passed in the Commonwealth became a lightening rod for criticism. “The long 
predicted has come,” wrote the editor of the Commercial Bulletin in 1897, “There is 
stress . . . .  Too much machinery has been installed. Too many mills have been built. 
Massachusetts has led the way on reducing hours of labor and suffers from her 
liberality.”63 Regulatory labor laws were already in place throughout the Northeast 
before southern competition had grown acute for Massachusetts cotton manufacturers but 
in the 1890s, Massachusetts mill owners increasingly sought to shape public policies that 
would help them remain competitive with southern manufacturers in the production of
61 NECMA Transactions, Annual Meeting, 1905, 88.
62 Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America,” 22-23; David Montgomery, The Fall o f  the 
House o f  Labor: The Workplace, the State and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925  (1987; reprint N ew  
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 157,169; Galenson, The Migration o f  the Cotton Textile Industry 
From New England to the South, 105. On the subject o f  skilled workers’ control over the production 
process, see David Montgomery, “Workers’ Control o f  Machine Production in the Nineteenth Century,” in 
Workers Control In America  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 9-31.
63 Com mercial Bulletin, 13 November 1897.
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coarse cotton goods. According to the leading mill men of Massachusetts, the state’s 
hours and ages regulations, when coupled with the low wages paid to southern 
operatives, made it impossible for Massachusetts-made goods to compete successfully 
with those manufactured in southern cotton mills. Massachusetts manufacturers extended 
the argument, which they made during the 1870s and 1880s, that regulatory legislation 
made it more difficult for them to compete with mills in other New England states, to 
include the impact that the laws had on competition with mills in the Piedmont South as 
well. The issue of the ability of Massachusetts textile mills to remain viable businesses 
despite state mandated age and hours standards shifted from being one o f intra-regional 
significance to one o f inter-regional concern.
Restrictive laws in Massachusetts “have been piling up . . . touching cotton 
manufacturers until they cannot stand it much longer,” noted T. Jefferson Coolidge, 
President o f the Dwight Manufacturing Company in 1894. “The restrictions so imposed 
have tended to make production unprofitable,” he continued, “and manufacturers surely 
cannot be expected to continue business in that case.”64 As early as 1874, when 
Massachusetts enacted the ten-hour law for women and children, textile mills in the state 
were effectively restricted to a maximum workweek of sixty hours. By 1892, this 
workweek had been further reduced to fifty-eight-hours while other New England mills 
ran sixty hours a week and mills in the Piedmont South typically ran eleven to twelve 
hours a day, with workweeks ranging from sixty-six to seventy-two hours. The 
Arkwright Club estimated that when the long hours run and the low wages paid in 
southern cotton mills were taken together, they made the cost of labor in the South about 
forty percent less than in Massachusetts. According to the club, labor costs alone were
64 From Boston Journal o f  Commerce, quoted in M anufacturers' Record, vol. 26, no. 8.
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“sufficient to account fully for the difference between the prosperity o f southern 
manufacturing and the adversity of northern mills; between the activity in the 
construction of new mills at the South and the stagnation of a similar industry” in 
Massachusetts.65
Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers ’ Record viewed “the hours of labor in 
Massachusetts . . .  with undisguised delight,” but the editor o f the Commercial Bulletin 
came to the conclusion that “the time has come when intelligent people must say to the 
Legislature when restrictive labor laws are proposed, Hands off our industries!”66 As the 
1893 depression wore on, some Massachusetts textile manufacturers went one step 
beyond simply calling for a moratorium on the passage of any new regulatory legislation 
in the Commonwealth. Understanding that it was low-cost labor in combination with 
long hours gave the South its greatest competitive advantage, Massachusetts textile 
manufacturers’ associations began lobbying for the reversal of existing regulatory laws. 
“Manufacturers must act for themselves,” argued the Arkwright Club in 1897, “and 
endeavor to introduce in their own mills conditions more nearly resembling those o f their 
southern competitors.” The strategy the Arkwright Club proposed for effecting this 
change was to lower wages, while at the same time working for the complete repeal of 
ages and hours legislation already functioning in Massachusetts. The Arkwright Club 
called on Massachusetts textile manufacturers to “act all together for the common 
defence [s/c]” and with the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ Association,
65 Arkwright Club, Report o f  the Committee on Southern Competition, 1897, 3. Sarah Whittelsey 
estimated that southern labor costs at the turn o f  the century were thirty to forty percent less than those in 
Massachusetts. See Whittelsey, Massachusetts Labor Legislation , 54-55. While the hours worked and 
wages paid varied from m ill to mill and state to state, Mary Oates described the overall differences in 
wages and hours between Massachusetts mills and mills in the Piedmont South as “striking.” See Oates, 
The Role o f  the Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Developm ent o f  the American Southeast, 116.
66 M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 23, no, 16; Commercial Bulletin, 19 January 1895.
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spearheaded a lobbying effort at the state legislature, “to give expression in the strongest 
terms to the importance o f seeking a reversal of the policy which has handicapped New
fs 7England, and which has placed a double burden upon Massachusetts.”
The turn-of-the-century repeal campaigns o f the Massachusetts manufacturers’ 
groups were unsuccessful. The Massachusetts State Federation of Labor took the lead in 
opposing the Arkwright Club’s attempts to have the state’s regulatory legislation 
nullified. The unionists pursued a “vigorous policy o f education,” sending Massachusetts 
State Federation of Labor representatives to seventy-eight state legislative hearings on the 
matter o f rescinding regulatory statutes, and having one member present at every regular 
legislative session so that, “the schemes of the Arkwright club were defeated.”68 With 
their repeal strategy stymied, arguments began surfacing from among manufacturers’ 
groups that the solution to the problem of southern competition was not to be found in 
lowering standards in Massachusetts mills, but in raising those prevalent in southern 
mills.
Massachusetts textile unionists had long advocated better standards for southern 
textile workers as a means of protecting the gains they had already achieved. The effect 
of cutting wages in New England mills and undoing the labor legislation in 
Massachusetts “would simply be to press downward the condition o f all” argued the 
American Federation of Labor, “the mill owners might well turn abou t. . . and, instead of 
antagonizing the efforts of organized labor . . .  co-operate with them and the great labor
67 Arkwright Club, Report o f  the Committee on Southern Competition, 8, 6-7; Andrea Tone also 
discusses employer associations, such as the National Association o f  Manufacturers, and their challenges to 
federal and state regulatory initiatives at the turn o f  the century. See Tone, The Business o f  Benevolence, 
21-29.
68 American Federation o f  Labor, Massachusetts State Branch, Proceedings o f  the Thirteenth 
Annual Convention, 1898, 13-14.
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movement of the country in the effort to equalize, not to tear down . . .  the textile workers 
of the South.”69 Some Massachusetts industrialists, as well as many Bay State 
politicians, agreed with the logic of the AFL. “Let the labor unions raise the other States 
up,” asserted the Commercial Bulletin, while Senator Henry Cabot Lodge noted “The 
cotton mills [of Massachusetts] are suffering from Southern competition . . . .  The 
southern operatives must be brought up to our standard . . . .  To this important work I
• 70hope our labor unions will address themselves.” Indeed, labor organizations would be 
key players in the turn-of-the-century agitation for the passage o f regulatory legislation in 
the textile states of the Piedmont South and in lobbying Congress for national hours
71legislation.
A minority of Massachusetts textile manufacturers adopted a stance during the 
1890s that if  factory regulation was a necessary evil with which they had to deal, then 
restrictions on hours and child labor should be imposed equally throughout the entire 
industry. These manufacturers rejected the repeal strategy first put forth by the 
Arkwright Club’s Committee on Southern Competition and refocused their efforts and 
energies toward agitating for national legislation as the best way to equalize the disparity 
of conditions between Massachusetts and southern textile mills. After an 1895 meeting at 
which Massachusetts textile manufacturers discussed the pros and cons o f the
69 American Federationist, vol. 4, no. 12.
70 Com mercial Bulletin, 18 December 1897; Lodge quoted in Hearden, Independence and Empire,
101 .
71 At the 1899 AFL annual convention, delegates adopted a resolution proposed by Massachusetts 
mulespinner Thomas O’Donnell stating, “Whereas, The people employed in the textile industries o f  N ew  
England, having carried on an agitation for the reduction o f  hours o f  labor for several years; and . . . 
Although many bills have been presented in the various State legislatures for the reduction o f  said hours, 
but have all been defeated; Resolved, That the American Federation o f  Labor pledge itself to do all that is 
in its power to bring about the passage o f  a national law for the reduction o f  the hours o f  labor.” See 
American Federation o f  Labor, Report o f  the Nineteenth Annual Convention, 1899, 107. For an overview  
o f  AFL political activities at the national level before World War I, see Greene, Pure and Simple Politics.
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implementation o f national labor standards as a means of neutralizing southern 
competition, Richard Edmonds wryly noted, “This very kind and generous proposition of
77our New England friend, will hardly come to pass in his day.” The issue of federal 
regulation o f working hours in textile mills remained a hotly contested issue for the next 
three years. The southern industry press described the efforts of New England 
manufacturers to have a law passed in Congress that would limit every mill in the United 
States to running ten hours a day, “a direct blow at the South” with “the animus of the 
m ovem ent. . .  to inflict upon the South the same labor trouble[s] that are such a menace 
to Northern manufacturers.” Southern mill owners, however, were confident that their 
representatives in Congress would not allow a national hours law to pass, noting that 
“what the laboring people of the South want is not shorter hours of labor but more 
factories where they can obtain steady employment, knowing that work and plenty o f it is 
the salvation o f every country and every people.”73 In 1897, members of the Labor 
Committee of the Massachusetts Senate endorsed the passage o f federal legislation that 
would create uniform hours of work for the employees of industries throughout the 
United States.74 William Covering of Massachusetts introduced a resolution into the U.S. 
House the following year, calling for a Constitutional amendment to authorize Congress 
to establish national labor standards. The Lovering resolution found support from some 
New England textile manufacturers and their strange bedfellow, the AFL, but was 
defeated in committee after prominent industrialists, including southern textile
7c
manufacturers, lobbied aggressively against it.
72 M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 27, no. 2.
73 Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 29 February 1896.
74 NECMA Transactions, Annual Meeting, 1897; Hearden, Independence and Empire, 88.
75 Hearden, Independence and Empire, 385-387.
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As manufacturers, politicians, and unionists debated solutions that might mitigate 
the effects of southern competition on the Massachusetts textile industry, the city of 
Chicopee felt the full brunt of the 1893 economic depression. The city’s two largest 
employers, the Dwight Manufacturing Company and the Chicopee Manufacturing 
Company, were cotton textile concerns, and in 1890, when the population o f Chicopee 
numbered 14,050, the Dwight Manufacturing Company was the largest manufactory in 
the city, employing over 2,000 operatives. Despite the growth of other industries since 
the 1860s, the city o f Chicopee remained primarily a mill town. The cotton 
manufacturing industry was the foundation of the local economy, with entire families 
dependent on the wages they earned in textile manufacturing, and with businesses 
throughout the city reliant on a steady income from the thousands o f operatives who 
earned their livelihoods in the mills. The announcement made by the Dwight Company 
in August o f 1893 that it would institute either a ten percent wage reduction or a complete 
mill shutdown in September, however, did not come as a complete surprise to the 
community. “In view of the business troubles,” according to the local press, “the
77announcement was not unexpected.” The paper reported that the news of the wage cut 
or curtailment “was taken for the most part quietly by the men,” but the Dwight 
Company’s notice precipitated a local labor crisis which intersected with the ages and 
hours standards established by state labor legislation and the inter-regional fight for 
control of the coarse goods market to create the conditions that marked a turning-point in
78the history of the Dwight Manufacturing Company.
76 Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory Town,” 160, 168, 175; “The Blue B ook” Textile 
D irectory o f  the United States and Canada  (New York: Davidson Publishing Company, 1891), 78.
77 Springfield (MA) Republican, 22 August 1893.
78 Ibid.
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As was the case throughout Massachusetts, the management o f the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company had been engaged in an ongoing struggle with organized labor 
in its mills throughout the 1870s and 1880s. During these years, Dwight employees took 
part in collective actions intended primarily to prevent wage reductions or to demand 
wage increases. Dwight management, meanwhile, attempted to keep organized labor 
from becoming firmly entrenched in its mills. The owners of the Dwight Company 
perceived their ability to have complete managerial control over the production process 
undermined by the progression of labor laws passed by the state legislature as well as by 
their battles with striking workers in the mills. In the minds of the Dwight Company’s 
owners, their dealings with legislators and with labor reached the breaking point in the 
1890s.
The small, sporadic, departmental walk-outs that the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company experienced during the 1850s and 1860s became large-scale protests during the 
1873 and 1893 economic depressions. The Dwight Company’s first union-led strike 
occurred in April 1874, lasted five weeks and, according to the local press, was “one of 
the most remarkable strikes which has ever occurred in this region.”79 Several months 
after management instituted a fifteen percent wage reduction in December 1873, Dwight 
mulespinners petitioned the company for a return to the old schedule of wages noting that 
“ever since [the December wage cut] we have faithfully continued to work for the 
reduced rates— But that there has been no corresponding reduction in the cost of living, 
rents and provisions being high as ever, and every day sinking us more and more into
79 Springfield (MA) Republican, 9 May 1874.
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debt.” George Bedlow, Agent of the Chicopee mill, refused the mulespinners’ request, 
which led them to leave the Dwight mills, en masse, on 3 April 1874.80
The mulespinners’ strike forced the closure of two of Dwight’s seven mills and 
idled weavers in the remaining five mills as they had no materials with which to work. 
The Chicopee strikers prepared for a protracted battle, supported by contributions from 
mulespinners in Lowell, Fall River, and Lawrence to help support them and their families 
during the struggle with the Dwight Company. Because of the depressed condition o f the 
economy, the Dwight Company felt no need to negotiate with the mulespinners, 
assuming that their places could be filled by mulespinners from other textile centers who 
were looking for work. The Dwight spinners, however, successfully deterred scab 
workers from taking their places by picketing at the mill and at Chicopee railroad stations
O 1
“warning away spinners from other villages, who are desirous of obtaining work.” Of 
the fifteen mulespinners that Agent Bedlow was able to engage during the first two weeks 
o f the strike, all but one left the company’s employ days after being hired. The company
was able to keep this one mulespinner at work as he was “furnished a home in one of the
82company’s blocks, and . . . kept ‘under guard.’”
80 Signed Petition for Old Rate o f  Wages to George Bedlow, Chicopee Agent, April 1874, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MO-2, Folder 13. Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard 
University, Boston, MA; Springfield (MA) Republican, 6 April 1874. The textile industry utilized 
corporate titles that were used among merchant capitalists during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Within the management o f  textile corporations, the “Treasurer” was one o f  the ch ief executives 
o f  the company, the “Agent” was the person in charge o f  the operation o f  the m ill(s), the “Superintendent” 
was an assistant to the Agent, was often in charge o f  coordinating day-to-day operations at the mill, and 
was the person to whom department heads and overseers reported. Evelyn Knowlton, Pepperell 's 
Progress: H istory o f  a Cotton Textile Company, 1844-1945  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1948), 29.
81 Springfield (MA) Republican, 13 April 1874 and 30 April 1874. Laurence Gross discussed the 
financial support that Lowell mulespinners gave to the Dwight strikers in The Course o f  Industrial Decline: 
The Boott Cotton Mills o f  Lowell, Massachusetts, 1835-1955  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993), 89.
82 Springfield (MA) Republican, 16 April 1874.
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Still, the unemployment and underemployment caused by the 1873 depression 
gave the Dwight Company an advantage in its attempts to replace the striking 
mulespinners. The strike began to fail when the company succeeded in hiring enough 
replacement workers to run nearly three-fourths of the company’s mules, when company 
boardinghouse keepers were instructed to evict strikers and their families, and when the 
local business community began to “thoroughly condemn [the strikers’] course, as their 
obstinacy” caused “a general and increasing depression in business.” This lack of 
support from the wider community handicapped the mulespinners, but, more importantly, 
the spinners were unable to secure the backing of Dwight’s weavers who went back to 
work when the strikebreakers restarted the idled mules, undermining the ability o f the 
mulespinners to use the disruption o f production to force the company to negotiate with 
them. Agent Bedlow announced on 4 May 1874 that the company would not recognize 
the mulespinners as a group and that “the strikers will not be taken back as a body, but 
will be re-engaged, if at all, singly.” When faced with certain loss of their jobs, the 
Dwight mulespinners ended the strike, and those who were rehired, returned to work at
04 t
the reduced pay scale. The Dwight mulespinners, who officially organized a local 
branch o f the National Mulespinners’ Union during this 1874 conflict, began what proved 
to be an extended period of rebuilding.
Another series o f wage cuts followed the mulespinners’ strike, and even though 
Dwight operatives were, according to the local press, barely able “to keep body and soul 
together, even with the strictest economy,” no other walkouts occurred during the
83 Springfield (MA) Republican, 23 April 1874 and 4 May 1874; Shlakman, “Economic History o f  
a Factory Town,” 188. On the back o f  the April 1874 mulespinners’ petition to Agent Bedlow, next to 
thirty-eight o f  the mulespinners’ signatures were notations in pencil including the names o f  women, 
presumably company boardinghouse keepers, and the addresses o f  where the men lived.
84 Springfield (MA) Republican, 4 May 1874 and 9 May 1874.
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1870s.85 Shortly after the 1874 strike and continuing into 1880s, the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company began employing strategies meant to mitigate the possibility of 
a strong union presence establishing itself throughout the Dwight workforce. In 1878, 
the company instituted a policy whereby each family renting a company-owned tenement 
was required to have three members working in Dwight’s mills. The threat o f eviction, 
used successfully by the company in the 1874 strike, was a constant risk and the “three 
employee” rule made more families directly dependent on the mill as the sole source of 
income than ever before.
The Dwight Manufacturing Company also began using yellow-dog contracts, 
giving employment only to those who signed statements agreeing to refrain from joining 
a union or participating in union led activities. In an 1881 version of the Dwight yellow- 
dog contract, potential operatives agreed to “abstain from aiding, encouraging or abetting 
any strike among the help . .  . and refrain from encouragement and counseling the help in 
any disturbance and shall use their efforts to maintain pleasant relations between the help 
and said Company.” After a short-lived mulespinners’ walkout in May 1883, all 
employees wishing to return to work had to sign a statement agreeing to “conduct himself 
properly and refrain from interfering with the rest of the employees of said company and 
also from instigating or from being interested in instigating any strikes or other 
movement among said employees by which said employees shall cease work.”87 The 
Dwight Company, likewise, blacklisted employees who engaged in collective action,
85 Springfield (MA) Republican, 12 January 1876.
86 Ibid., 6 November 1878 and 14 November 1878. See also Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a 
Factory Town,” 181; Thaddeus Szetela, History o f  Chicopee (Chicopee, MA: Szetela and Rich Publishing 
Company, 1948), 100.
87 Signed Contracts, 1 December 1881 and 11 May 1883, Dwight Manufacturing Company 
Collection, MO-2, Folder 13.
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guaranteeing that they would have a difficult time finding work in any mill in the area. In 
1885, for example, James Cumnock, Agent o f the Chicopee mill, corresponded with 
George Hills, Agent o f the Lymann Mills in nearby Holyoke, about Dwight employees 
who had given Cumnock “some trouble.” Hills assured Cumnock, “I will see that they 
do not get in our Mill, and shall be very happy to concede with you as has been done 
heretofore.”88 By 1887, Frank Foster, publisher o f the Labor Leader noted, “The Dwight 
manufacturing company virtually has [Chicopee] under its thumbs and controls it in
5589many ways.
Labor-management conflict flared at the Dwight Manufacturing Company again 
during the depression of 1893. In the weeks between the announced intention of the 
company to cut wages or completely curtail production in August of 1893, “the better 
educated and better paid class of workmen” in the Dwight mills made it known to Agent 
Cumnock that they thought a “short shut-down would be the more preferable o f the two 
evils” rather than a reduction of wages which could last indefinitely.90 Debate within the 
workforce continued, however, as organized mulespinners and loomfixers supported a 
shutdown while many Dwight workers, especially the Polish weavers in the company’s 
employ, took the stance that even if  the mills were closed, there was no guarantee that the 
company would not institute lower wages upon its reopening. “A heavy reduction means 
‘hard times’ in earnest,” the local press, speaking for the wider community, opined,
88 George Hills, Lymann M ills Agent, to James Cumnock, Dwight Manufacturing Company 
Chicopee Agent, 10 September 1885, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, ML-A, Folder 11. In 
his testimony before the Blair Committee, Frank Foster discussed the practice o f  using threats o f  eviction  
from company-owned tenements and blacklisting as two key things preventing unionization among 
industrial workers in Massachusetts. See Testimony o f  Frank Foster, 8-9 and 12 February 1883, in United 
States Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Report o f  the Committee o f  the Senate Upon the 
Relations Between Labor and Capital, vol. 1, 60-61, 79.
89 Labor Leader, 19 March 1887.
90 Springfield (MA) Republican, 23 August 1893.
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noting that “the want which would be occasioned by the throwing of over 2,000 hands 
entirely out o f employment must be avoided at any cost.”91
On 4 September 1893, Agent Cumnock instituted a reduction ranging from seven 
to eight percent on all of Dwight’s departmental schedules of wages. Although not 
members of any formally organized union body, two hundred weavers from Dwight mills 
5 and 6 responded to the wage cut by walking out in protest. By day’s end an estimated 
600 weavers from mills 5, 6, and 7 were on strike. “The majority [of the strikers] are 
Poles,” the local press reported. They left the mill because “their wages are regulated by
09piece work, not by time . . . and the reduction will cut them down about 10 per cent.”
The company threw an additional 650 operatives out of work when it closed the three of 
Dwight’s seven mills from which the greater part of the striking workers came. In light 
o f the depression and the lessons learned from the 1874 mulespinners’ strike, however, 
other Dwight workers, especially the unionized mulespinners and loomfixers, did not 
think that conditions were favorable for winning concessions from the company and did 
not support the weavers’ actions with voluntary walkouts of their own.93
The management of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, as was their practice in 
dealing with workers during previous periods of labor strife, not only refused to bargain 
with the striking weavers but also used the strike to purge its mills o f militant operatives. 
The company announced that it would reemploy any worker who would return at the 
reduced wage scales but that the “instigators” of the strike would be “refused 
employment should they seek it.” The weavers also received warning that “the
91 Springfield (MA) Republican, 5 September 1893.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 5 September 1893 and 6 September 1893.
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company’s boarding-house keepers have received orders to give such persons notice.”94 
Indeed, four days into the walkout, Agent Cumnock, showing that he would not even 
engage in a dialogue with the striking workers, left Chicopee for a two-week trip to 
Chicago. Given the build-up of goods in its warehouses, the limited demand for cotton 
textiles, and the continued production in mills 1, 2, 3, and 4, the company felt no 
compunction to quickly settle the strike. The Dwight Company’s intensified focus on 
labor costs in the face of southern competition, moreover, dictated that it would not let 
workers prescribe wages through collective action that could put the company at an even 
greater disadvantage in the coarse goods markets. For Cumnock and the Boston officers 
of the Dwight Company, any bargaining with the strikers would only encourage workers 
to use militancy as a negotiating tactic in the future. Less than two weeks after the 
weavers’ walkout, the near impossibility o f finding work elsewhere in a depression- 
plagued industry, the intransigence o f the company, and the lack of support from Dwight 
operatives in the remaining four mills, forced the majority of the strikers back to work at 
the reduced scale of wages.95
“The cotton mills have not been running full time,” observed the local press four 
years after the weavers’ strike ended, “. . .  . if  the city is to depend on these alone for the 
future, the prospect is gloomy.”96 In the wake o f the weavers’ strike and while Chicopee 
remained mired in economic depression, the owners of the Dwight Manufacturing
94 Springfield (MA) Republican, 6 September 1893.
95 Ibid., 9 September 1893 and 18 September 1893.
96 Ibid., 1 August 1897. The Dwight Company continued to make small profits during 1893 and 
1894. The Chicopee m ills’ gross profits for six months ending November 1893 were $91,558.91; for six 
months ending May 1894 mills 1, 2, 5, and 7 generated a gross profit o f  $92,061.09 but mills 3 and 4 saw a 
gross loss o f  $11,059.62; for six months ending November 1895, mills 1, 2, 5, and 7 generated a gross 
profit o f  $115,507.49 while mills 3 and 4 saw a gross loss o f  $26,462.56. Extant sources do not tell 
whether or not the company paid its investors dividends over these years, but in all likelihood a sizeable 
amount o f  these gross profits were used to fund the construction o f  Dwight’s southern branch mill. 
Journals, December 1891-November 1899, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, DB-9.
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Company embraced a new strategy for company success. Because southern-made coarse 
goods continued to undersell those made in Massachusetts, Dwight decided to build a 
branch plant in the South so that it could remain competitive and profitable without 
having to convert its production to fine goods. “They are going South determined . . .  to 
control the coarse goods trade,” noted the Manufacturers ’ Record, “They are looking for 
locations and will build during this period o f depression in order to be ready for the return
0*7of good times.” The Dwight Manufacturing Company banked its future on the 
company’s ability to compete successfully in the coarse goods market by supplementing 
the production of its Chicopee mill with textiles manufactured in the Piedmont South at a 
lower price. In spite of calls throughout the New England industry for northern mills to 
focus their production on fine goods or face inevitable ruin, the Dwight Company had not 
given up on the possibility that coarse goods manufacture could still be viable for 
Massachusetts corporations. For the owners o f the Dwight Company, the new southern 
mill would be an extension of, not a replacement for, the Chicopee facilities.
“A reason why some of our mills are planning extensions in the South,” argued 
the Commercial Bulletin, “is to save the value in their trade mark [sic] on certain lines of 
cheap fabrics in which they have made a reputation. They see the time coming when 
Southern production will displace these fabrics unless they can be made under as
QO
favorable auspices.” After more than fifty years in business, the Dwight name and 
trademarks were known worldwide. In fact, the company had found a way to couple its 
name recognition with the “advantages” that southern mills had by virtue o f their regional
97 M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 25, no. 8.
98 Com mercial Bulletin, 19 January 1895.
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The Dwight Manufacturing Company produced two major lines o f  coarse goods, trademarked as “anchor” 
and “white star.” Anchor trademark o f  the Dwight Manufacturing Company (left). Entrance to the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company in Chicopee, Massachusetts with the Dwight star and anchor flanking the main 
m ill gate (right). (Courtesy Edward Bellamy Memorial Association, Chicopee, Massachusetts).
location." Dwight wanted to bolster its share of the coarse goods market without having 
to abandon the millions of dollars invested in mills, manpower, and machinery in 
Chicopee. Dwight Company directors believed this could be achieved by expanding the 
company’s productive capacity to a location where it could pay its workers less and could 
operate without the restrictions imposed upon it in Massachusetts by striking workers and 
state regulations.
Actual and potential labor militancy at the Dwight mill, the restrictive legislation 
passed in the Commonwealth, due in large part to lobbying efforts o f Massachusetts 
unions, and the production advantages that could be had in a new mill with updated 
machinery in the South were key factors facilitating the Dwight Company’s 1893 
decision to open a southern branch factory. The Dwight move to build in the South 
illustrated, according to the Commercial Bulletin, the “disposition of manufacturers . . .  to
99 Marvin Fischbaum argues that by World War I many northern textile mills that did not have 
southern branch plants had given up the manufacture o f  goods which competed directly with those made in 
the South unless “a trademark or superior finish” added a small amount to the value o f  the cloth on the 
market. See Fischbaum, “An Economic Analysis o f  the Southern Capture o f  the Cotton Textile Industry 
Progressing to 1910,” 107-108.
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make no important additions or extensions of their enterprises in Massachusetts, but to go 
outside her borders . . . where the labor agitator is not such a power, and where the 
manufacturers are not constantly harassed by new and nagging restrictions.”100 Rejecting 
the ideas o f switching to fine goods production, completely retooling its Chicopee mill, 
and actively seeking to lower hours in southern mills through national legislation, the 
Dwight Company was one o f a handful o f Massachusetts mills that chose not to try to 
undo the competitive advantages that production in the Piedmont South offered textile 
manufacturers, but to capitalize on them instead.
To the owners o f the Dwight Manufacturing Company, the South was the land of 
low wages, laissez-faire, and high profits. For these industrialists, the South was a region 
overflowing with “docile” labor. It was a place where state and local governments were 
amenable to the will o f manufacturers as a way to revive the economic pulse of a war- 
devastated region. The South was to be a means of escape for the Dwight Company 
from the regulations forced on them by the state and from the demands o f organized 
workers in their mills and in the halls of the legislature. After the General Assembly of 
Massachusetts passed an act in February of 1894 allowing the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company to increase its capital stock and to “carry on the business o f manufacturing 
cotton and woolen goods in any part o f the United States of America,” the question for 
the Dwight Company was not if  it would build a new mill in the South, but exactly 
where.101 By the winter o f 1894, the Dwight Company had decided that its new mill 
would be located in Alabama.
100 Com mercial Bulletin, 28 September 1894.
101 From Acts and Resolves o f  the General Assembly o f  the Commonwealth o f  M assachusetts in 
Registration Statements, Dwight Manufacturing Company, Industrial #3, M iscellaneous Corporate Items. 
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard University, Boston, MA.
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CHAPTER III
“A MODEL MANUFACTURING TOWN:” THE DWIGHT MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY MOVES TO ALABAMA CITY
“No nation ever became wealthy by raising the raw material and then exchanging 
it for the manufactured article,” wrote William Gregg o f South Carolina in 1844, “The 
manufacturing people always have the advantage.”1 Three years after Boston investors 
established the Dwight Manufacturing Company in Chicopee, Massachusetts, Gregg was 
one of a small number o f southerners calling for broad regional industrialization of the 
South. Throughout the antebellum South, however, industrialization occurred only to the 
extent that it served the interests o f the region’s slave-based agricultural economy. 
Railroads, iron works, and cotton, grist, and saw mills served as offshoots of the southern 
plantation. Most investments in antebellum southern industry were directly related to 
fluctuations in the cotton market. When cotton prices were high, land and slaves were 
the outlets for surplus capital. Some manufactories operated in southern cities and were 
scattered throughout the countryside by the 1820s and 1830s, but the downward spiral of 
cotton prices in the 1840s caused many in the South to reconsider the issue of pursuing 
regional industrialization, especially the development of an indigenous textile industry, 
within the context of overall southern economic diversification. Industrial boosters like 
William Gregg argued that expanding the South’s manufacturing capacity would help
1 William Gregg, Essays on Domestic Industry, 230, quoted in Patrick Hearden, Independence and  
Empire: The N ew South's Cotton M ill Campaign, 1865-1901 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
1982), 11.
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break the region’s dependence on the North for basic manufactured goods. At times of 
low crop prices, moreover, investment in manufactories would yield higher returns than 
those made in cotton cultivation.
Although proponents of southern industrialization received a great deal of press 
during the 1840s and early 1850s, according to historian Randall Miller, the commitment 
made by wealthy planters and merchants to the development of southern industry during 
these years was limited as economic boosterism was “a child o f the agricultural 
depression.”2 Because planters and wealthy merchants tied to King Cotton held the 
capital resources necessary to underwrite any meaningful manufacturing pursuits, 
southern industry remained small and localized. Once cotton prices rebounded in the 
1850s, investments returned to land and slaves.
The first fully integrated cotton textile mill in the state o f Alabama began 
operations in 1832. During the antebellum “cotton mill boom” of the 1840s, two more 
mills were constructed in the state. By 1860, the cotton manufacturing industry was the 
second largest industrial employer in Alabama. When the Civil War began, Alabama had 
fourteen cotton mills, over half of which were spinning mills with few or no looms. Only 
six of Alabama’s mills were factories that carried on the entire process of textile 
production from raw cotton to unfinished cloth. As was the case in all southern states, 
Alabama’s textile industry did not reach a size or levels o f managerial and technical 
maturity achieved in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states during the antebellum 
period. In 1860, when the Dwight Manufacturing Company alone was capitalized at $1.2
2 Randall Miller, The Cotton M ill M ovement in Antebellum Alabama  (New York: Arno Press, 
1978), 106-107.
3 Ibid., 2-4, 9-24; Jonathan Wiener, Social Origins o f  the New South: Alabama, 1860-1885  (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 138-145.
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million and employed 1,600 workers, cotton mills in the entire state of Alabama 
represented $1.3 million in invested capital and had a textile workforce numbering just 
slightly over 1,300. Through the 1870s and into the first decades of the early twentieth 
century, however, Alabama experienced a “mini-industrial revolution,” within which the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company’s mobile capital played an important part.4
“Be it known I am no enthusiast, nor am I a citizen of Gadsden or even Alabama,” 
a “traveling man” informed the readers o f the Manufacturers ’ Record in 1887. “Accident 
located some towns, but nature located Gadsden. I . .  . can state within the bounds of 
absolute truth that I have visited more than twenty States and at least 1,200 incorporated 
towns; yet I have never seen iron, coal, tim ber,. .  . river transportation, health, food, 
water and topographical beauty combined in one range of landscape before I came here.”5 
Sentiments similar to those of the “traveling man” could be read in myriad forms, in 
hundreds of newspapers and pamphlets, about scores of towns and localities throughout 
Alabama beginning in the 1880s. In published materials and in the halls of the state 
legislature, Alabama, like other states of the Piedmont South during the 1880s and 1890s, 
embarked on an increasingly aggressive booster campaign meant to facilitate 
industrialization within its boarders. Eager to attract investments in textiles, mining, and 
metals manufacturing which could jumpstart a statewide economic reconstruction, state 
legislators and local civic groups worked in tandem to create an image of Alabama as a
4 Phillip Taft, Organizing Dixie: Alabama Workers in the Industrial Era (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1981), 3, 5; Robert Eugene Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital: The 
Rise o f  the Alabama Cotton Textile Industry, 1865-1900” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1986), 27; 
Wiener, Social Origins o f  the New South, 139; Wayne Flynt, Poor But Proud: A labam a’s Poor Whites 
(Tuscaloosa: University o f  Alabama Press, 1989), 19; Vera Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory 
Town: A  Study o f  Chicopee, Massachusetts,” in Smith College Studies in History, vol. 20 (Northampton, 
MA: Department o f  History o f  Smith College, 1935), 157.
5 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 12, no. 17.
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place where natural resources abounded, invested money would bear fruitful returns, and 
where entrepreneurs would not be harassed by state regulations.
During the 1886-1887 session, Alabama state representatives passed legislation 
intended to advertise the state to would-be investors. Although an attempt to establish a 
state industrial and immigration bureau failed in 1884, state sanctioned action “to 
encourage immigration and investment o f capital in the State of Alabama” became law in 
February of 1887. The statute appropriated $2,000 to purchase the copywrite o f Dr. 
Benjamin Franklin Riley’s text, Alabama as it Is; or The Immigrant’s and Capitalist’s 
Guide Book to Alabama, as well as an additional $1,500 to publish and distribute 5,000 
copies of the book.6 Originally published in 1887, Alabama as it Is was written, 
according to Dr. Riley, to describe each county in the state and “whatever facilities they 
possess for future development” in order to “meet a demand which has long existed” for 
information about Alabama’s resources “written in the language common to the people.”7 
The book became the state endorsed instrument intended to not only to exhibit the 
diversity of and potentialities for Alabama’s natural resources, but also to demonstrate 
why these resources placed Alabama “in advance of any other State o f the American 
Union.” The goal was to show why one should invest in Alabama but, more importantly,
o
why one should choose it over other southern states.
In Alabama Like It Is, B. F. Riley divided the state into four sections and 
systematically analyzed county-by-county data on each. The text included information
6 Alabama, Secretary o f  State, Administrative Division, House and Senate Journals o f  the General 
Assembly o f  Alabama, 1884-1885. Hereafter cited as Journals o f . . . Alabama', Alabama, Secretary o f  
State, Administrative Division, Acts o f  the Fifty-Fourth General Assembly o f  Alabama, 1886-1887. 
Hereafter cited as Acts of. . .  Alabama.
1 Benjamin Franklin Riley, Alabama as it Is; or the Imm igrant’s and C apita list’s Guide Book to 
Alabama, second edition (Atlanta: Constitution Publishing Company, 1888), iii-iv.
& Ibid., 218.
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on the date o f the county’s formation, its populations in 1870 and 1880, the racial 
composition of the population, land area and prices, the number o f acres o f government- 
owned land, the number of acres of tilled land, the products grown, the types of minerals 
and timbers available, as well as the waterways, chief towns, and the finished and 
projected railroads, schools, and churches in each.9 Riley, speaking directly to possible 
northern investors, also made the point of mentioning that “Northern people will meet 
with no jealousies or indignities. The animosities of the war are all buried and forgotten .
. .  man is esteemed according to his moral, intellectual and industrial worth—not for his 
political sentiments.”10 Alabama as it Is, however, was much more than an assurance for 
skittish Yankee capitalists or a simple compendium of facts and figures. It was also, 
indirectly, a summary of the overall goals and objectives of Alabama’s post-Civil War 
boosters.
B. F. Riley’s study illustrated how establishing industries which could 
manufacture the state’s cotton crop and its timber and mineral resources would generate 
economic growth, but in it the author also made a point of stressing the fact that Alabama 
was a predominantly agricultural state and that long-term prosperity also depended on 
using the state’s agricultural resources to grow more than cotton. “ [Wjhat would 
minerals be to a region without agriculture?” he queried, “Every interest is more or less 
dependent upon agriculture, and must rise or fall with the increase or decrease of the 
products of the field.”11 Riley noted that industrialization would break the South’s 
economic dependence on cotton by facilitating diversified agriculture. The growth of 
industrial and urban populations, he argued, would create a need for foodstuffs. This
9 Riley, Alabam a as it Is, 11-215.
10 Ibid., 19.
11 Ibid., 119.
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would generate local markets for those who raised livestock and farmers who grew fruits, 
vegetables, and grains. The amount of land used to grow cotton, therefore, would 
decrease, and an increase in the market value o f cotton would be the result. This process, 
Riley informed his readers, “will lead to the restoration of our agricultural system under a 
new regime.”12 In line with New South spokesmen throughout Alabama and the entire 
region, Riley embraced diversified farming as an absolute necessity and as the means 
through which those who worked the land, in addition to those who found jobs in 
industry, would share in the promise of a reborn South.
Promotional campaigns conducted at the local level supplied information and 
reflected objectives similar to those found in Alabama as it Is. In towns and cities 
throughout Alabama, leading community members produced a body of booster literature 
targeting outside investors, especially northern manufacturers. Civic boosters, like those 
in Gadsden, used editorials and advertisements in regional and national newspapers to 
inform readers of the “advantages to capital” found within a particular locale. Beginning 
in 1887, full-page advertisements placed by “young progressive towns of Alabama” 
appeared in the Manufacturers ’ Record, each listing the reasons why intelligent and 
astute entrepreneurs should invest and build manufacturing establishments there.13
Community boosters also prepared and published brochures and detailed 
pamphlets meant to generate interest in their towns. The “Citizens of Gadsden” 
distributed a pamphlet intended to make Gadsden and the surrounding countryside stand
12 Riley, Alabam a as it Is, 117-119. Italics original.
13 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 12, no. 2. Other Alabama towns placing advertisements include 
Bessemer, Tuscaloosa, Anniston, Decatur, and Florence. These advertisements continued intermittently in 
the paper through the early 1890s. On the importance o f  publicity generated by civic boosters, see Gavin 
Wright, O ld South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the C ivil War (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 43; Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital,” 4; 
Paul Gaston, The N ew South Creed: A Study in Southern Mythmaking (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 
73.
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out as having the greatest potential for industrial and agricultural development o f any 
area in Alabama.14 The publication called attention to the transportation networks 
available and the advantages to be had by investors who wanted easy access to markets 
that three lines of railroad (the Anniston and Cincinnati, the Tennessee and Coosa Valley, 
and the Rome and Decatur), with an additional two “assured” offered. It also advertised 
the town’s location on the Coosa River as another transportation bonus for potential 
investors. Furthermore, the boosters pointed out, Gadsden was located only a short fifty- 
four miles northeast of Birmingham and ninety-two miles south of Chattanooga. The 
pamphlet touted the iron, clay, stone, and coal deposits along the Coosa, the stands of 
timber on nearby Lookout Mountain, the fertile farmland nearby where farmers grew 
“some o f the best grades o f cotton and which will grow anything,” a healthful location, 
mild climate, good schools, and numerous churches.15 Howard Gardner Nichols o f the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company would later note that the transportation facilities, the 
city’s proximity to major urban areas, the grades o f cotton available from farms in the 
valley, and the “fairly good” sources o f coal located in the Gadsden area helped persuade 
the company to choose adjacent Alabama City as the location for their southern cotton 
textile mill.16
14 It is unclear whether or not the founders o f  Alabama City, incorporated in 1891 and located on 
the outskirts o f  Gadsden, ever published a pamphlet like that distributed by the civic boosters in Gadsden. 
The author, therefore, offers the Gadsden pamphlet as an example o f  the booster literature describing the 
Alabama City vicinity.
13 Citizens o f  Gadsden, Gadsden, Alabama: Its Climate, Its Agricultural and M ineral Resources;
A Handbook o f  Useful Information fo r  the Settler and Investor (New York: The South Publishing 
Company, 1887), 1-6.
16 Gadsden Times-News, 3 May 1895. David Carlton disputes the validity o f  the “bring the cotton 
mills to the cotton fields” booster rhetoric, stressing the economic reasons, including access to 
transportation, why southern textile mills often located in and around towns. See Carlton, M ill and Town in 
South Carolina, 1880-1920  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 46-49. For an 
additional analysis o f  economic motives behind the location o f  southern textile mills, see Wright, O ld  
South, N ew South, 43-44.
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Through the 1870s and 1880s, much of the industrial growth in Alabama occurred 
in the iron industry. Due to losses sustained during the Civil War and in addition to the 
fact that, unlike elsewhere in the Piedmont South, local industrialists were more likely to 
invest in iron and mineral concerns rather than cotton manufacture, the textile industry in 
Alabama was virtually the same size in 1880 as it had been in I860.17 “The iron 
industries and kindred interests have attracted so much attention in Alabama for several 
years that the business men of that State have failed to appreciate the importance of 
cotton manufacturing,” wrote Richard Edmonds in 1887. Citing figures showing that 
Alabama had 90,834 spindles compared to Georgia with 390,288 spindles, North 
Carolina with an estimated 275,000 spindles, and South Carolina with over 225,000 
spindles, he continued, “These mills, almost without exception, appear to be enjoying 
great prosperity . . . .  They are not only making money for their owners but they are 
furnishing employment for thousands of hands . . .  and also creating a home demand for 
diversified agricultural products.” Alabama, Edmonds argued, “needs to build such 
mills.”18
Many in Alabama came to agree with Edmonds and through the late 1880s and 
1890s, state legislators and civic boosters increasingly focused their attention on 
attracting outside investments to aid in the expansion o f the state’s cotton manufacturing 
industry.19 It would take more than the favorable climate, natural resources, and railroad
17 In 1860 the Alabama textile industry consisted o f  fourteen mills with a total capitalization $ 1.3 
million and 1,312 workers. By 1880 Alabama had sixteen mills representing $ 1.3 million in invested 
capital and 1,400 workers. Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital,” 57-61; Taft, 
Organizing Dixie, 3-4.
18 M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 12, no. 1.
19 Several historians point to the importance o f  agrarian protest movements, especially Populism, 
in pushing the members o f  Alabama’s legislature as well as wealthy planters, to encourage development o f  
the textile industry during the 1890s as a means o f  relieving economic distress and diffusing tensions in the 
countryside. See Sheldon Hackney, Populism to Progressivism  in Alabama  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
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lines described in promotional literature, however, to persuade northern textile 
manufacturers that investing hundreds o f thousands of dollars in the state o f Alabama 
made good business sense. But in the 1890s, a confluence of events occurred which led 
some New England textile manufacturers, including the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company, to make the decision to establish southern branch factories there.
Poor business conditions, northern mill curtailments and closures, labor unrest, 
and state regulations, and mounting competition from southern mills, coupled with 
aggressive southern campaigns to attract northern investments, improved transportation 
networks, the availability o f cheap and abundant southern labor, and inducements offered 
by the state government, facilitated a wave of New England textile investments in 
Alabama. According to Gavin Wright, the 1890s were “a demoralizing time in New 
England” and the first time before the 1920s in which northern investments in southern
90textiles were significant. Between 1890 and the turn o f the century, Alabama had the 
largest increase in textile capacity o f any state in the South, and northern investments in 
establishing the state’s textile industry during these years were crucial. Non-southern 
entrepreneurs and corporations, as well as commission houses and machine 
manufacturers located in the North provided fifty-two percent of the capital spent on new
textile mills being built in the state between 1880 and 1895, and seventy-one percent of
21the capital between 1895 and 1900. New England firms constructed three branch
University Press, 1969), 138-139; Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital,” 170; Wiener, 
Social Origins o f  the New South, 226-227; Dewey Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation  
o f  Progress and Tradition (Knoxville: University o f  Tennessee Press, 1983), 46-47.
20 Wright, O ld South, New South, 135.
21 Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital,” 1, 140-148, 188.
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factories in the state by 1900, representing over 100,000 spindles and a total 
capitalization of more than $4 million.22
As in the case o f the publication and distribution of promotional literature in the 
1880s, inducements at both the state and local levels worked in concert to secure the 
investment of textile dollars, particularly northern ones, in Alabama. Tax exemptions for 
new textile investments were one kind o f state-sponsored incentive offered there. In 
February 1893, the Alabama legislature enacted a law “for the purposes o f encouraging 
the building and operating of factories for the spinning of thread, yarns, and the weaving 
of cloth and other fabrics o f cotton and wool in the State.” This statute authorized 
counties, cities and towns to free property, buildings, and machinery used in textile 
manufacturing from taxation for five years. The following year, Governor Thomas 
Jones called on the state legislature to enact additional exemptions which would allow 
investors to “act with confidence,” noting that lenient tax laws elsewhere in the South 
caused a significant amount of capital “to go to neighboring states, when otherwise they 
would come to Alabama.”24 No additional legislative action on the taxation matter 
occurred until February 1897 when the General Assembly passed a law exempting from 
state taxation “any person, copartnership [sic\, association of individuals, or corporations 
incorporated under the laws of the State o f Alabama” that within five years o f the passage
22 In addition to the Dwight Manufacturing Company, other Massachusetts firms operating in 
Alabama included the American Net and Twine Company o f  East Cambridge, which opened a branch 
factory in Anniston in 1896 with 5,000 spindles, and the Merrimack Manufacturing Company o f  Lowell 
locating its branch m ill on the outskirts o f  Huntsville in 1899. By 1902 the Merrimack represented $2.5 
million in investments and 100,000 spindles. It was Alabama’s largest branch plant. The Avondale Mills, 
Indian Head Mill, Lowe Mill, and Barker Cotton Mill were established in Alabama by northern investors 
but were not branch plants o f  existing firms. See Marvin Eischbaum, “An Economic Analysis o f  the 
Southern Capture o f  the Cotton Textile Industry Progressing to 1910” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 
1965), 106-107; Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital,” 165-168; 182-188. Articles 
discussing these movements o f  Massachusetts textile money to Alabama can be found in M anufacturers’ 
Record, vol. 35, no. 19 and vol. 37, no. 1.
23 Acts o f. . . Alabama, 1892-1893.
24 Journals o f. . . Alabama, 1894-1895.
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of the law “invest, expend, lay out and pay at least fifty thousand dollars in money in the 
erection, building and construction of cotton mills or factories” in the state. The 
legislature amended this law in March 1901, extending the five-year provision to ten 
years as long as the construction or expansion o f the factory took place by February 
1902.25
Although the Dwight Manufacturing Company began construction on its Alabama 
mill two years prior to the passage of the 1897 tax exemption act, R. A. Mitchell, Agent 
of the Alabama City Mill, assured Dwight Treasurer J. Howard Nichols that expansions 
of the mill and new construction on mill property which began in 1898 would not be 
subject to state taxation. Despite the fact that the Alabama City mill was incorporated 
under the laws o f Massachusetts and not of Alabama, “It is clearly the policy o f our state 
to encourage cotton manufacturing enterprises” the Agent wrote, adding that there 
“would be no difficulty . . .  in having the Legislature include our mill in the benefits of 
this statute.”26 The 1897 law, had played no part in Dwight’s earlier decision to build its 
branch factory in Alabama, but the 1893 statute allowing counties, towns, and cities to 
forego taxing textile manufactories was important. Acting on the prerogatives allowed 
them by the state, Etowah County and Alabama City officials assured the Dwight 
Company that they would not tax a new mill constructed there. In the opinion of a 
“prominent citizen,” the tax exemption granted by Etowah County was “one of the best
25 Acts of. . . Alabama, 1896-1897; 1901. See also Hackney, Populism to Progressivism  in 
Alabama, 138-139. For an in-depth discussion o f  tax exemptions granted to industries in N ew  England 
from the eighteenth century through the Civil War and their similarities to those passed in southern states 
after the war see Fischbaum, “An Economic Analysis o f  the Southern Capture o f  the Cotton Textile 
Industry,” 134-168.
26 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 4 August 1898, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2. Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard University, 
Boston, MA. See also Mitchell to Nichols, 27 June 1898, 17 December 1898, 25 January 1898, and 3 April 
1899.
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97things that ever happened in the county.” The Alabama City Land and Development 
Company also gave land to Dwight free o f charge, which, according to Howard Gardner 
Nichols, son of Treasurer J. Howard Nichols was, “liberal and . . .  o f course a large 
consideration.” The combination of free land and no taxes “had much to do” with the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company locating in Alabama.28
The issue o f state labor regulation in Alabama played an even more important role 
in Dwight’s decision-making about constructing its branch factory there. Massachusetts 
had a long history of using state legislation as a way to keep children from working in 
manufacturing establishments, especially in textile mills, and to limit working hours. In 
1887, Alabama became the first southern state to enact an hours regulation and child 
labor law which prohibited the “compelling” o f women to work for more than eight hours 
in “mechanical and manufacturing businesses,” established an eight-hour day for children 
under the age of fourteen employed “in any factory, workshop or other place used for 
mechanical or manufacturing purposes,” and made illegal the employment o f children 
under the age of fifteen “in a coal or iron mine, or mines.” Punishment for violation of 
this law was a fine o f five to fifteen dollars. The language of the law, nevertheless, was 
open to interpretation and no enforcement mechanisms were written into the statute.29
The 1887 Alabama hours law passed principally because of the small number of 
cotton manufacturers in Alabama and due to the presence of the Knights o f Labor in the
27 Gadsden Times-News, 11 August 1899.
28 Ibid., 3 May 1895. The Alabama legislature issued a charter o f  incorporation for the Alabama 
City Land and Development Company in 1891 to the same people and at the same time that Alabama City 
received its charter. According to Robert Eugene Perry, land development companies were important in 
bringing northern capital to Alabama as they were a means through which local citizens could pool 
resources to pay for advertising and promotional publications and to buy and sell large tracts o f  land to 
outside investors. See Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital,” 134-140.
29 Acts o f. . . Alabama, 1886-1887.
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state.30 In 1887, there were relatively few textile manufacturers and no significant 
lobbying bloc of textile interests in Alabama able to marshal their resources to prevent 
the enactment o f regulatory legislation. On the other hand, between 1882 and 1883, the 
Knights o f Labor entered Alabama, creating a strong base of support in urban areas like 
Mobile, Birmingham, and Montgomery, where the union drew its members primarily 
from the iron industry and skilled trades. By 1888, the Knights had an estimated 112 
local assemblies throughout the South, many including or exclusively made up of textile 
workers in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. As the Knights did in New 
England, they lobbied in southern statehouses for the creation of bureaus of labor, hours
- j i
restriction laws, child labor acts, and provisions for the inspection of factories.
The calls for reform made by the Knights of Labor in Alabama reached the ears of 
State Senator Daniel Smith and Representative T. G. Bush who introduced hours 
restriction bills into their respective houses. Both men represented Mobile, which had 
active Knights of Labor assemblies made up of workers from the skilled trades and 
construction. While legislators enacted the law to encourage industrial investment 
through the purchase and distribution of B. F. Riley’s Alabama as it Is during the same 
session, the overwhelming majority of the state’s legislators represented non-urban or 
non-manufacturing districts, and they viewed the potential passage of the regulatory law 
with indifference. The probable lack of enforcement mechanisms, moreover, calmed the 
fears o f most owners of manufacturing and mining interests. The Mobile-sponsored
30 Elizabeth Davidson, C hild Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1939), 18; Melton Alonza McLaurin, The Knights o f  Labor in the South 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 80-106, and Paternalism and Protest: Southern Cotton M ill 
Workers and O rganized Labor, 1875-1905 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971), 68- 
82.
31 McLaurin, The Knights o f  Labor in the South, 39-50; 59-74; 106-112, and Paternalism and  
Protest, 68-82; George Sinclair Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the South (Chapel Hill: University o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1931), 23-25.
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hours bill which, in amended form, would become the 1887 law, passed the Alabama 
Senate by a vote of 19 to 1 and passed the House without a single opposing vote. The 
only dissenting vote came from the representative from Elmore County, home to a textile 
mill since 1866. In February 1889, the state representatives of Elmore County and the 
representatives Autuga County, where a cotton mill was established in 1887, successfully 
pushed legislation through both houses which repealed the 1887 hours law as it related to 
Elmore and Autuga but nowhere else in the state.33
The strength of the Knights of Labor in the South began to wane by 1888 and 
although pockets of organized workers based mostly in urban areas existed, the region’s 
textile mills were virtually union free for a decade.34 It was during this lull in union 
activity that Alabama stepped-up its cotton mill campaign. When the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company announced in 1894 that it would build a southern mill,
Treasurer J. Howard Nichols “received numerous letters pressing the claims and setting 
forth the advantages of various sites.” One of these letters came from Alabama City 
businessmen Robert Kyle and James Elliot, and Gadsden Mayor R. A. Mitchell. In 
addition to the advantages of railroad lines, quality cotton, and readily available labor that 
the three men brought to the attention of Nichols, the possibilities of tax breaks and free
32 McLaurin, The Knights o f  Labor in the South, 44-45; Davidson, C hild Labor Legislation in the 
Southern Textile States, 18-19; Debbie Pendleton, “New Deal Labor Policy and Alabama Textile 
Unionism” (M.A. thesis, Auburn University, 1988), 2-3. Pendleton notes that the first recorded labor 
organization in Alabama was the Mobile Typographical Society founded in 1836 and that Mobile, 
Alabama’s largest city before the Civil War, had a strong union presence which included printers, 
blacksmiths, and carpenters. Members o f  these trades were important in establishing Knights o f  Labor 
assemblies there in the early 1880s.
33 Acts of. . . Alabama, 1888-1889. Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile 
States, 18-20.
34 McLaurin, Paternalism and Protest, 120; I. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the New South: Social 
Change and Cultural Persistence, 1880-1915  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 547; 
Pendleton, “N ew  Deal Labor Policy and Alabama Textile Unionism,” 3.
35 In Memoriam, H ow ard Gardner Nichols (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1897), 17. 
Announcements that the Dwight Company would build a mill somewhere in the South appeared in 
Manufacturers ’ R ecord  in July o f  1894 and in Commercial Bulletin in September 1894.
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land in Alabama City piqued the interest of the Dwight Company’s owners. After a visit 
to the town, J. Howard Nichols urged the directors of the Dwight Company to seriously 
consider locating its new mill there.
The Dwight Company’s corporate officials, however, perceived Alabama’s hours 
restriction law, regardless of the laxity in its enforcement, as a major deterrent. What the 
owners o f Dwight wanted, even more so than free land and tax incentives, was the 
guarantee that it would be located in a state where, unlike in Massachusetts, there would 
be no “interference” with its management in determining who would work and for how 
long. “Labor agitation was directly the cause which induced us to come south,” noted 
Howard Gardner Nichols, “For the past ten years labor agitators . .  . have been weaving a 
web of oppressive laws around cotton manufacturing industries in Massachusetts till they 
are almost strangled in its meshes. People here, unacquainted with professional agitation
-1*7
little realize how dangerous it is to the prosperity and welfare of a state.”
Why, then, did the Dwight Company build its branch factory in Alabama, the only 
southern state with recently passed hours restriction legislation rather than North 
Carolina, South Carolina, or Georgia? Dwight officials dismissed North Carolina as an 
option because they believed there were too many mills already located there and not 
enough cotton grown locally to supply them all. They rejected South Carolina because of 
“oppressive taxation.” The decision came down to one between Alabama and Georgia 
where a Dwight official admitted, “the difference in their advantages was not great.” 38
36 In Memoriam, H ow ard Gardner Nichols, 17; Unidentified Newspaper Clipping, in Gadsden 
Industries (Textiles) Vertical File. Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, AL; Steven Howard, “Alabama 
City’s Industrial Roots Run Deep,” Gadsden Times, 20 June 1988, in Gadsden-Alabama City Vertical File. 
Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, AL.
37 Gadsden Times-News, 3 May 1895.
38 Ibid.
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What swayed the Dwight Company’s decision to choose Alabama over Georgia were 
actions taken by the Alabama legislature in 1894.
In November 1894, House Representative Milner of the legislative district 
covering Gadsden and Alabama City, introduced a bill “on request” from Governor 
William Oates, that would repeal the 1887 hours law “so far as the same related to 
Etowah county.” With approval from the governor, the legislature went one step further 
and on 5 December 1894, passed a law repealing the 1887 statute entirely.39 “Alabama 
had been the first state to regulate child labor in 1887,” child labor reformer Irene Ashby 
would later remark, “and the first to repeal restrictions . . .  at the urging of Dwight mill 
officials from Chicopee, Massachusetts.”40 Governor Oates supported this change in 
state law, seeing it as a guarantee that the Dwight Company would begin building a new 
mill immediately in Alabama City. He accepted statewide nullification of the law, 
moreover, to show other New England textile concerns that Alabama was not only 
willing to pass legislation in the interest of capital invested in textile manufacturing but 
that it would also revoke old laws and prevent the passage o f new ones that were not. 
After the repeal o f the 1887 statute, Howard Gardner Nichols was confident that he and 
the Dwight Company had the ear of the Governor and the support of a pro-business 
legislature, acknowledging that the nullification o f the hours law proved to the Dwight 
Company “that Alabama was governed in a common sense and economical way, and that 
we had less to fear here from hostile legislation . . .  than in any other southern state.”41
39 Journals . . . o f  Alabama, 1894-1895; Acts o f  Alabama, 1894-1895. See also Davidson, Child  
Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 20; Hackney, Populism to Progressivism  in Alabama, 74- 
75; Perry, “Middle-Class Townsmen and Northern Capital,” 171-173.
40 Quoted in Flynt, Poor But Proud, 270.
41 Gadsden Times-News, 3 May 1895. R. A. Mitchell, the mayor o f  Gadsden in 1894, later 
referred to a trip he and Howard Gardner Nichols took to Montgomery in 1894 during which Mitchell 
introduced Nichols to “my friends, Governor [Tomas] Jones and Governor [William] Oates.” Jones was
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
105
The citizens o f Alabama City and Gadsden looked upon the construction of the 
Dwight mill not just as a corporate endeavor but as evidence of the “great progressive 
movement for this region of Alabama,” a “conspicuous signal o f the faith o f capital that 
is keen and cautions to the last degree to the advantages of the cotton belt for the 
manufacture of cotton.”42 The Dwight mill was, in short, evidence o f the success o f local 
boosters and their state representatives in bringing large-scale manufacturing to the area. 
The community, however, perceived this triumph not as an end point, but as a beginning.
Even while the Dwight mills were under construction, an editorial in the Gadsden 
Times-News reminded readers that “Gadsden wants another one before the Dwight mills 
are completed and she is going to make the effort.”43 The local newspaper continued an 
industrialization campaign within its pages through the turn of the century, trying to keep 
locals’ interests focused on attracting investments of textile dollars. The paper’s editor 
used the Dwight mill as an example of the good that industry did for the area. It “has 
been a blessing to the people of this county, opening up a market all through the year for 
any produce our farmers have to sell,” he proclaimed, “and . . .  infused new and fresh life 
into all the commercial and business interests of the county, causing existing enterprises 
to enlarge their capacities and creating a demand for other industries.” The message 
conveyed was that industrial development and local and regional progress went hand-in- 
hand and that since Dwight had helped to create prosperity, more manufacturing growth
Governor from 1890-1894 and Oates served in the position from 1894-1896. Although the author has not 
been able to locate a source explicitly stating it, it is presumed that a topic o f  conversation between 
Nichols, Mitchell, and Oates during this 1894 trip was the repeal o f  the hours restriction and child labor 
law. For the reference to the Montgomery trip, see In Memoriam, H oward Gardner Nichols, 66.
42 Gadsden-Times News, 7 January 1896.
43 Ibid., 26 March 1895.
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would presumably create more prosperity.44 As late as 1903, the Times-News called upon 
Gadsden’s “commercial club, business men and property owners” to “distribute a few 
more cotton factories about Gadsden.”45 The Gadsden-Alabama City area would, by 
1910, be home to numerous medium and large industrial concerns, but the Dwight 
Company would own the only cotton textile mill in either town.46
Howard Gardner Nichols spearheaded the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s 
construction and initial operation of its Alabama City branch plant and mill village. After 
graduating from Harvard University in 1893 Nichols decided to “connect himself with 
the cotton manufacturing interest in which his father was engaged,” and became 
acquainted with the operation and management of the textile industry through informal 
training received at the Great Falls Manufacturing Company in Somersworth, New 
Hampshire and, starting in the spring o f 1894, at the Dwight Company’s Chicopee, 
Massachusetts mill. Nichols was integral in choosing the location for Dwight’s southern 
branch, visiting Alabama and Georgia with his father, Dwight Treasurer J. Howard 
Nichols, in 1893 and returning to Alabama in September 1894 to secure land and water 
rights for the company’s possible move there. After the company made its decision to 
locate in Alabama City, T. Jefferson Coolidge, President of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company made Howard Gardner Nichols Agent o f the Alabama City operations. As
44 Gadsden Times-News, 11 August 1899. Douglas Flamming identified a similar view  o f  town 
and regional progress in Dalton, GA during the 1880s. See Flamming, Creating the M odern South: 
Millhands and M anagers in Dalton, Georgia, 1884-1984  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 
1992), 37, 46-49. See Carlton, M ill and Town in South Carolina, 32-34, for a discussion on the role o f  
town and city newspapers in creating a local “booster ethos” in South Carolina.
45 Gadsden Times-News, 10 April 1903.
46 Steven Howard, “Alabama City’s Industrial Roots Run Deep,” Gadsden Times, 20 June 1988. 
The largest o f  these industrial concerns included the Birmingham Slag Company, Alabama City Lumber 
and Supply Company, Jefferson Lumber Company, the Etowah Packing Company, the Gadsden Car Works 
o f  the Southern Railroad, and the Alabama Steel and Wire Company which was organized by Ohio 
capitalists in 1905, sold in 1913 and renamed the Gulf States Steel Company, then acquired by Republic 
Steel in 1937.
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Agent, Nichols directed the construction of the mill complex and managed the company’s 
southern production schedules when the Alabama City mill opened in February 1896.47
Work on the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill began in the 
spring o f 1895. The initial capitalization for the southern mill was $1.2 million dollars.48 
The main mill building measured 130 feet wide, 500 feet long and three stories high.
The Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill, under construction during the summer o f  1895. 
(Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
47 In Memoriam, H ow ard Gardner Nichols, 3-17. The Dwight Company received a deed to 168 
acres from the Alabama City Land and Development Company in November o f  1894. Regarding the land 
transaction, see James Hoffman, “A Study o f  the United Textile Workers o f  America in a Cotton Mill in a 
Medium-Sized Southern Industrial City: Labor Revolt in Alabama, 1934” (Ed.D. diss., University o f  
Alabama, 1986), 69.
48 “The Blue Book" Textile D irectory o f  the United States and Canada, 1895-1896  (New York: 
Davidson Publishing Company, 1896), 47. Hereafter the series is cited as Blue Book.
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The Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill, as seen across the water reservoir, spring 1896. 
(Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
This building housed 27,000 spindles and 800 looms making it one o f the largest textile 
mills in Alabama at that time. The Alabama City mill complex included a cotton 
warehouse, water reservoir holding five million gallons of water and covering two acres, 
a boiler house and engine rooms, and a brick smokestack 200 feet in height. The Dwight 
Company also constructed a mill village of 150 homes to house its initial workforce of 
500 employees. The size of the Alabama City mill, however, paled in comparison to the 
Dwight mill in Chicopee, Massachusetts. When construction began on the southern 
branch, the Chicopee complex included seven mills, housed 130,000 spindles and 3,400
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss io n  of th e  copyright ow ner .  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
109
DWtOHTMKJ^O,
Aerial view o f  the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Chicopee, Massachusetts m ill com plex and tenement 
houses from a 1900 survey drawing. (Courtesy Jeffrey Sagalyn, Cabotville Industrial Park, Chicopee, 
Massachusetts).
looms, and the Chicopee mill workforce numbered 1,600.49 The Dwight Company, 
nevertheless, planned to expand the Alabama City mill if  it proved profitable. “We 
anticipate the surplus earnings o f the Dwight Manufacturing Co. will very likely be 
expended here,” declared Agent Nichols, “and not in Massachusetts.”50
The Alabama City mill showed a profit for the Dwight Manufacturing Company 
slightly over a year and a half after the start of production in February 1896, and it
49 Gadsden Times-News, 16 April 1895; Blue Book, 1895-1896, 47, 69. Updates about the 
progress o f  the construction o f  Dwight’s Alabama City mill appeared in Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 26, 
no. 24; vol. 26, no. 26; and vol. 28, no. 23.
50 Gadsden Times-News, 3 May 1895. After rebuilding mills 3 and 4 in 1871, mills 1 and 2 in 
1882, and mills 5, 6, and 7 in 1889, the Dwight Company made no fundamental changes or additions to the 
buildings o f  its Chicopee mill complex for the next twenty years.
R e p ro d u c e d  with pe rm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
110
continued to do so in the following years.51 In December 1897, L. A. Aumann, Agent for 
the Dwight mills in Chicopee told Treasurer J. Howard Nichols that he was “pleased to 
see the showing” o f the Alabama City mill, adding that he was “Very glad to see that we 
are not as badly off as some of the other [Massachusetts] Co[mpanie]s.”52 In his 
testimony before the Massachusetts Legislative Labor Committee, William Lovering, 
Treasurer of the Whittenton Mills of Taunton, Massachusetts referred to the Dwight 
Company’s ability to make profits during the depression years of the 1890s due to the 
fact that it had a branch plant in Alabama. “Southern mills opened by Northern capital, 
in several cases as ‘dependencies’ of Massachusetts corporations,” he pointed out,
“earned dividends upon their capital stock during 1897, while the Northern ones failed to 
do so.” True to Howard Gardner Nichols’ prediction in 1895, the Dwight Company did 
not expand its operations in Chicopee for over a decade but it more than doubled the 
productive capacity o f the Alabama City mill. By 1905, Dwight’s southern mill housed 
1,800 looms and 60,000 spindles and employed 1,000 workers.54
While the citizens o f the Gadsden area initially welcomed the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company to the area with open arms, company managers knew that a pro­
business atmosphere which welcomed new industrial enterprises was one thing, but 
recruiting a workforce and keeping the goodwill of the townspeople was quite another.
51 Profits for the six months ending November 1897 were $32,123.15 for the Alabama City mill 
and $38,839.09 for the Chicopee mill; profits for the six months ending May 1898 for the Alabama City 
m ill were $54,072.29 and $47,297.95 for the Chicopee mill; profits for the six months ending November 
1898 for the Alabama City mill were $58,181.90 and $48,202.95 for the Chicopee mill. Journals,
December 1891-November 1899, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, DB-9.
52 L. A. Aumann, Chicopee Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 28 December 1897, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MK-3.
53 Testimony quoted in Sarah Wittelsey, M assachusetts Labor Legislation: An H istorical and  
Critical Study (1901; reprint N ew  York: Kraus Reprint, 1970), 41, first published as a supplement to the 
Annals o f  the American Academ y o f  Political and Social Science, vol. 15, no. 1.
54 Blue Book, 1904-1905, 59, 93; 1906-1907, 53, 89-91.
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Practicality led the Dwight Manufacturing Company to build homes in Alabama City that 
employees could rent from the company. In 1891, less than fifty people lived within the 
city limits o f Alabama City. Construction of the Dwight-owned houses occurred, 
because “four houses represented the size of the territory . .  . occupied by the Dwight 
Co.” when the company began the factory’s construction in 1895.55 There was nowhere 
nearby to accommodate the arrival of hundreds of mill workers and their families. Yet, 
in order to maintain favor within the locale, the Dwight Company needed not only to 
provide gainful employment and housing for the Coosa Valley’s “mountain farmers” who 
came to work in the mill but to attend to their “welfare” as well. To many residing in the 
Gadsden area, this welfare was not limited to “good wages” but also referred to the 
“social and intellectual welfare o f the community at large.”56 The leading citizens of the 
community expected the Dwight Company to mold their operatives, who, by far, 
constituted the largest single population of industrial workers in the county, not only into 
efficient mill hands but also into “respectable” members of society. They wanted 
reassurance that their town would not be tainted by class strife and social
cn
demoralization.
The Dwight Manufacturing Company used a twofold strategy in its attempt to 
reassure the greater Gadsden community that they had nothing to fear when it came to the 
issue o f class strife. First, the company represented itself in the local press as 
exceptional, one that, unlike most New England textile corporations, had a long history of 
labor peace. The Dwight Company fraudulently told the readers of the Gadsden Times-
55 Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 14 October 1899; Hoffman, “A Study o f  the United 
Textile Workers o f  America in a Cotton Mill in a Medium-Sized Southern Industrial City,” 64.
56 Gadsden Times-News, 16 April 1895.
57 David Carlton discussed the efforts o f  southern industrial advocates to ally fears about disorder 
that could stem from concentrations o f  wage earners in M ill and Town in South Carolina, 88-89.
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“Dwight City,” Alabama City, Alabama, ca. 1896. (Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
News that any trepidation was unnecessary because labor-management conflict “does not 
cut much of a figure with us, for the Dwight Co., at least during the past twenty years, has 
never had a strike.”58 In addition to public pronouncements such as this, the Dwight 
Company constructed a “model mill village” in Alabama City. Often referred to by 
locals as “Dwight City,” the village became the centerpiece o f an on-going public 
relations campaign with the residents o f the greater Gadsden area. The Dwight Company 
touted Dwight City as a credible safety valve for the kind of class divisions and discord 
endemic throughout the industrialized North and West. Management contended that
58 Gadsden Times-News, 3 May 1895.
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Dwight City would endear the company to its workers as a benefactor, the provider not 
only o f jobs and shelter, but also of recreation, education, and religion. Dwight City 
created the perception within the wider community that the Dwight Company was 
interested in more than profit, that “unlike most corporations it has a soul.”59
Because of his day-to-day presence in Alabama City and the greater Gadsden 
area, Howard Gardner Nichols, Agent o f the mill, became the “face” o f the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company there. Community members and his employees came to equate 
the Dwight Manufacturing Company and the offerings it provided in the mill village with 
him, not with an impersonal New England corporate entity. While the association of a 
single individual with a corporation was, and continues to be, a common phenomenon, it
59Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 14 May 1898. There is a vast amount o f  scholarship 
that analyzes the subjects o f  southern mill villages and paternalism. Much o f  the literature focuses on two 
broad questions. 1) What were the motivating factors behind the construction and maintenance o f  mill 
villages in the N ew  South? 2) What was the nature o f  southern mill villages vis-a-vis managerial control 
and worker agency? Before the rise o f  the “new” labor history in the 1980s, the debate about southern mill 
villages focused on the issues o f  motives and the benevolence or malevolence o f  managerial control in the 
villages. For an interpretation representing the “benevolence” argument, see Broadus Mitchell, Rise o f  the 
Cotton M ills in the South (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1921). Mitchell viewed mill village 
paternalism as benign and stemming from a sense o f  noblesse oblige on the part o f  mill owners. According 
to Mitchell, workers embraced mill owners as compassionate benefactors. For an interpretation 
representing the “m alevolence” argument see Wilbur J. Cash, M ind o f  the South (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 1941). Cash viewed the mill village as a total institution, a N ew  South version o f  the Old 
South plantation in which managerial control was absolute and worker agency effectively stifled. Melton 
Alonza McLaurin’s Paternalism and Protest (1971) was the first in the body o f  mill village paternalism 
scholarship which challenged the notion that southern mill workers passively accepted managerial authority 
and paternalism, whether benign or not, in southern mill villages. McLaurin documented the ways in 
which southern mill workers were willing and able to organize and challenge managerial authority and the 
ways in which the mill village was a tool o f  social control. For additional arguments that engage with the 
issue o f  worker agency within the context o f  paternalism and southern mill village culture see David 
Carlton, M ill and Town in South Carolina', Douglas Flamming, Creating the M odern South', Jacquelyn 
Dowd Hall, et al., Like a Family: The Making o f  a Southern Cotton M ill World (Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 1987); Cathy McHugh, M ill Family: The Labor System in the Southern Cotton 
Textile Industry, 1880-1915 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); I. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the 
N ew South. In O ld South, New South, Gavin Wright views economic factors as the primary motivation in 
the creation o f  southern mill villages. For historiographic overviews see David Carlton, “Paternalism and 
Southern Textile Labor: A Historiographical Review,” in Gary Fink and Merl Reed, eds., Race, Class, and 
Community in Southern Labor H istory (Tuscaloosa: University o f  Alabama Press, 1994); Jacquelyn Dowd 
Hall, et al., “Afterword,” in Hall, et. al, Like a Family (2000 reprint); Robert Zieger, “Textile Workers and 
Historians,” in Robert Zieger, ed., Organized Labor in the Twentieth-Century South (Knoxville: University 
o f  Tennessee Press, 1991).
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had special significance for the Dwight Company.60 The senior-most management of the 
Dwight Company arrived in the Gadsden area as outsiders; they were welcomed but were 
outsiders to the community nonetheless. This, coupled with the fact that the Agent o f the 
mill was a New Englander, undoubtedly introduced an element o f skepticism into the 
attitudes o f some locals about the future o f cordial relations with the owners o f their new 
cotton mill. According to M. F. Foster of the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ 
Association, “The New England man when he went South often made himself generally 
obnoxious by telling the operatives and others how they did things up North.”61 Howard 
Gardner Nichols, however, quickly ingratiated himself to the community through his 
personal planning and direction of the construction of Dwight’s mill village. “Mr. 
Nichols’ Yankee notions,” quipped the editor of the local newspaper, coupled with “the 
sweet influences o f his happy southern environments” guaranteed that the Dwight 
Company would “come to the front and be an exemplar o f urban thrift and comeliness.”62 
Using Dwight City as a tool, Nichols successfully cultivated an image of himself as a 
prudent businessman and as a community benefactor, as an enterprising northerner and  a 
paternalistic southerner.
Historians have established that company paternalism was not something 
uniquely southern, even though southern mill village paternalism often distinguished 
itself by the degree of its personalism and noblesse oblige. While the Dwight Company
60 This trend, as found in managerial relations at the turn o f  the century in North and South 
Carolina m ills, is discussed in Hall, et al., Like a Family, 91-92.
61 Transactions o f  the N ew England Cotton Manufacturers ’ Association, Annual Meeting, 1900, 
170. Cited hereafter as NECMA Transactions.
62 Gadsden Times-News, 7 January 1896.
63 In Creating the M odern South, 360-361, fir. 10, Douglas Flamming defined company 
paternalism, which he used interchangeably with corporate paternalism, industrial paternalism, and welfare 
capitalism, as “institutionalized company policies intended to extend non-wage benefits to workers, to 
create an identifiable corporate culture, or to regulate the living environment o f  the workers.” This is the
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did not have an established system o f corporate paternalism at its Chicopee mill, it did, 
however, utilize paternalism, in the form of the mill village at its Alabama City site, as an 
integral part o f an overall corporate strategy. In a context of capital mobility, the Dwight 
Company embraced corporate paternalism at its Alabama City mill, not because there 
was something particularly “southern” about the nature of Dwight’s corporate practices 
or o f its owners, but because it was a useful tool for labor recruitment, a means through 
which it hoped to maintain stable labor-management relations, and, most importantly, for 
maintaining positive community relations. These were all necessary elements in the 
successful operation of its southern branch plant, the profits o f which were vital to 
sustaining the economic health of the entire company. Dwight City owed its existence, in 
large part, to the fact that it was fiscally prudent.64
“I could not be happier, “ Howard Gardner Nichols wrote to his sister in April 
1896, “for it would not be possible to find an equally interesting and absorbing 
occupation.” Referring to his mill village, he continued, “It gives a chance for business 
and philanthropy . . .  I shall not want to come away until my ideal is reached.”65 
Dwight’s village, within which Nichols served as Mayor and where he saw himself as
definition o f  company paternalism that is employed here. For examples o f  corporate paternalism found 
throughout the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Stuart Brandes, 
American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); David Brody, “The 
Rise and Decline o f  Welfare Capitalism,” in Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth 
Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 48-81; Daniel Nelson, M anagers and  
Workers: Origins o f  the New Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920, second edition (Madison: 
University o f  W isconsin Press, 1995); Andrea Tone, The Business o f  Benevolence: Industrial Paternalism  
in Progressive Am erica  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
64 This interpretation o f  motivating factors behind the use o f  company paternalism differs 
significantly from Douglas Flamming’s argument in Creating a Modern South, 121-124. Flamming posits 
that the Crown M ill village in Dalton, Georgia was initially constructed simply as a means to house Crown 
Mill employees. Only later, growing out o f  changing labor market conditions in the region, did the 
company embrace a system o f  corporate paternalism. I contend that paternalism was evident at Dwight’s 
Alabama City site from the very beginning o f  its southern operations within a context o f  capital mobility. 
The nexus o f  the Dwight Company’s corporate paternalism is found in the need to house workers and  in 
the company’s strategy to cultivate positive community relations. See Flamming, 121-124.
65 Letter quoted in In Memoriam, H ow ard Gardner Nichols, 32.
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both master and protector, would have “ample” public schools, a “handsome” church, a 
public library, and “cottages” for the operatives, each painted different colors and with 
garden spaces so that there would be an “absence of monotony that is often characteristic 
o f the homes of operatives about cotton factories.” Nichols also banned concealed 
weapons and saloons from the village.66 His goal was to create “a model manufacturing 
town where not only the manufacture of cotton goods would be carried out in the most 
advanced manner but where the people would find work with pleasant surroundings in 
the day and comfort and rest in their homes at night.”67 Nichols, however, would not see 
the completion of his model village or the impact it would have on the lives o f Dwight’s 
Alabama City operatives. On 20 May 1896, while supervising the installation of an 
electric generator at the mill, the scaffolding holding the generator collapsed, all o f which 
fell on Nichols. After what appeared to be a successful surgery to repair his severe 
internal injuries, Nichols was taken to Atlanta to recuperate a week after the accident. He
co
died, however, on 23 June 1896 at the age of twenty-five.
“All Gadsden was thrown into a state o f sorrow,” reported the Gadsden Times- 
News upon learning of Nichols’ death, as he “was a young man who had endeared 
himself to the people of this city . . . .  Gadsden feels that she has lost one of her best and 
most honored citizens whose loss the city mourns.”69 The outpouring of emotion, which 
appeared in the pages of the local press after the death of Howard Gardner Nichols, 
illustrates how the civic leaders of Gadsden and Alabama City regarded Nichols as a
66 Gadsden Times-News, 7 January 1896.
67 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 27 June 1898, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2.
68 In Memoriam, H ow ard Gardner Nichols, 32-36; Gadsden Times-News, 22 May 1896, 25 May 
1896, 26 June 1896; Springfield (MA) Republican, 22 May 1896 and 27 June 1896.
69 Gadsden Times-News, 26 June 1896.
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businessman and a person. Business leaders in the community regarded him “as a young 
man o f high character, earnestness, and great capacity for affairs” while the Mayor of 
Gadsden remembered Nichols as “a leader in his chosen line o f business . . . .  one o f  
us.”70 To the business elite and political officials of the community, Nichols had proven 
himself. At the time of his death, he was not a stranger or a New Englander, he was one 
o f them. Ele was an essential participant in the ongoing crusade to generate local and 
regional prosperity through industrial enterprises.
Public pronouncements about Howard Gardner Nichols’ death also provide a 
glimpse of the values held by the civic leaders of Gadsden and Alabama City, especially 
concerning what they saw as duties and responsibilities to those they envisioned below 
them in the social hierarchy. Reflecting their own sense of mission, noblesse oblige, and 
ideals o f social order, these community members did not find the part that Nichols played 
in the repeal of the 1887 hours restriction law objectionable. They embraced the notion 
that an individual was responsible for improving one’s own station in life through hard 
work. The leading citizens of Gadsden found it acceptable for those who had achieved 
personal success, like Howard Gardner Nichols, to give help via moral platitudes and 
rigorous industrial discipline to those “below” them. It was, however, intolerable for the 
state to be an active participant in helping to regulate working conditions because this 
was interpreted as an infringement on a worker’s right o f contract, the means through 
which the individual could negotiate to raise his or her own standards as he or she saw fit. 
“I believe the Lord called Gardner to the wonderful work he has achieved in the South,” 
wrote a friend of Nichols, “to be the helper of hundreds of toiling men . . .  to manifest to 
them how rich, deep, and full an earthly life can be through earnest, faithfu l. . . work.”
70 Quoted in In Memoriam, H ow ard Gardner Nichols, 66. Italics added.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
118
His efforts in Alabama City, wrote another, “far more revealed the Christ of divine love 
than the master o f capital and the executor of plans for manufacture and money-
71making.” Nichols was, in these views, a benevolent paternalist, a man who strove to 
improve the lives of those who came to live and labor in Dwight City. The civic elite of 
the Gadsden area did not question what they saw as their social and moral superiority to 
those who found employment in Dwight’s Alabama City mill. They praised Nichols for 
the fact that he awakened “higher aspirations” in his workers and “taught them how to 
live.” Community leaders mourned him because his death interrupted the work of 
“elevating . . .  to a higher plane” the “thousand souls who looked to him as employer and 
protector.”72
In the years following Howard Gardner Nichols’ death, mill officials at the 
Dwight Company’s Alabama City mill continued expansion of his “model” village. “I 
feel like I want to see everything carried out like Gardner had planned,” C. H. Moody, 
Superintendent o f the Alabama City mill wrote to Nichols’ father, “I am willing to work 
hard and long to see this mill become a grand success because he had so planned to have 
it.” Commenting on a proposal to enlarge Dwight City and the mill in 1898, R. A. 
Mitchell noted, “I am glad because Gardner wished to increase the size o f the mill.” The 
Dwight mill village, and “the benefits Gardner planned for his help,” according to
71 In Memoriam, H ow ard Gardner Nichols, 45, 50.
72 Ibid., 57, 63-64. Extant sources do not reveal the opinions o f  Dwight’s Alabama City workers 
toward Howard Gardner Nichols and life in Dwight City. Numerous studies, however, reject the notion 
that southern textile operatives at the turn o f  the century accepted company philanthropy unquestioningly 
and felt total deference toward their employers. These studies show that southern cotton m ill workers often 
negotiated the bestowal and meaning o f  company philanthropy, using the system o f  mill village paternalism 
to their own ends. See Hall, et al., Like a Family, Newby, Plain Folk in the New South', Carlton, M ill and  
Town in South Carolina', Flamming, Creating the M odern South.
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In 1999, the Etowah County Historical Society placed a historical marker on the property o f  the Howard 
Gardner Nichols Memorial Library describing Nichols as “Scholar, Engineer, Industrialist, Naturalist, 
Humanitarian.” The library is located at the corner o f  Winona Avenue and Coolidge Circle in Gadsden, 
Alabama. (Photograph by the author).
■7-1
Mitchell, would “stand as a m onum ent. . .  o f which any man should feel proud.” In 
addition to the mill and four hundred houses for Dwight’s operatives, by 1910 the mill 
village included six stores, two school buildings, a church, the Howard Gardner Nichols 
Memorial Library, an emergency first-aid station, bowling alley, bathhouse, baseball field 
where the “Dwights” played home games, and a bandstand where the “R. A. Mitchell 
Brass Band” gave free weekly concerts.74
Following Howard Gardner Nichols’ death, local newspapers and the textile 
industry press continued to extol the greatness of the village in Alabama City and the
73 C. H. Moody, Alabama City Superintendent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 3 July 1896, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-1; R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard 
Nichols, Treasurer, 27 June 1898, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2.
74 The Gadsden D aily Times-News published an article describing the Dwight mill village on 16 
June 1906. The paper published photographs o f  the village on 12, 13, 14, 26, and 27 June 1906, and 7 July 
1906.
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beatifying influences of work and life in Dwight City on the company’s employees.
After Nichols’ passing, however, Dwight’s Alabama City management showed less and 
less zeal for using the village as a tool of social uplift as he had envisioned. This 
modification reflected the differing personalities of Nichols and his successors as well as 
the fact that after Howard Gardner Nichols’ death, the senior managers at the Alabama 
City mill were native Alabamians with long-existing ties to the Gadsden area. These men 
were already well known and respected within the community. R. A. Mitchell, former 
mayor o f Gadsden and Agent for the Alabama City mill beginning in 1897, for example, 
took a less personal approach to the administering of the mill village than did Nichols. In 
keeping with the idea that it was the individual’s duty to better oneself but with little of 
the sense of ministry Nichols expressed about his mill village duties, Mitchell explained 
that his strategy for “making the mill village attractive” was to encourage “the people to 
use their personal efforts to improve their condition.”75 Much of this change, however, 
also had to do with the evolution of the relationship between the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company and the community of the greater Gadsden area.
By the turn o f the century, the Dwight Company no longer needed the Alabama 
City village as a tool to assuage community members’ fears about the problems that 
might arise from the existence of a new and large factory population in their midst. The 
necessity of using the mill village as a means of ingratiating the company to the 
community diminished each year that the Dwight Company ran a profitable 
manufacturing enterprise that was free from labor strife. Indeed, while the local press 
lauded the virtues of Howard Gardner Nichols and his personal interest in the care and
75 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 16 January 1897, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, M H-1. Italics added.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
121
betterment of the operatives who worked at the Dwight mill, within ten years o f his 
death, the same newspaper praised R. A. Mitchell not for the munificence he bestowed on 
the operatives but for his “interest in the advancement o f the business, the betterment of 
the village and the general growth and prosperity of the community.”76 Dwight’s 
management initially used Dwight City as a corporate tool meant to provide houses for its 
workforce while also facilitating good relations with the wider community. By 1898, 
however, Dwight’s mill village assumed a new significance for the company as a way to 
of recruit and maintain a stable, experienced workforce.
From the beginning o f the southern cotton mill boom in the 1880s until the late 
1890s, white labor was readily available to managers of the region’s textile mills. At the 
end of the Civil War and through the remainder o f the 1860s, demand for cotton was 
high, especially by the cotton textile mills o f the Northeast, and southern cotton farmers 
received high prices for their crops. This would change when the numbers of farmers 
engaged in cotton cultivation steadily rose through the 1870s and 1880s, increasing the 
amount o f the staple on the market and driving down prices. Nevertheless, cotton 
remained one o f the few commodities southern farmers could raise to secure credit in the 
cash poor post-Civil War South. Cotton prices continued to fall steadily through the 
early 1890s. In 1894, cotton sold for five cents a pound when ten-cent prices were 
needed for farmers to breakeven. It would be a decade before cotton prices returned to
» 77the levels seen in the early 1880s.
Many mountain farmers o f Alabama’s Coosa Valley, like small land-owning and 
tenant farmers throughout the Piedmont, were caught in a cycle of debt during these
76 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 16 June 1906.
77 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 6; Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 27-29.
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years. The Dwight Manufacturing Company began operations at its Alabama City 
branch plant at a point when working in nearby manufactories was a strategy that local 
farming families increasingly embraced as a means through which they might find escape 
from their economic woes. As late as December 1897, the textile industry press reported 
“4 and 5 cent cotton has run the small tenants off the farms, like rats leaving a sinking 
ship.” Exacerbated by the overall economic depression that lingered throughout the 
nation, “the result is that the cotton mills at North Alabama are glutted with help.”78
Cotton prices rebounded by the turn o f the century and, despite intermittent bad 
years, they remained stable at around ten cents a pound. Many potential mill workers 
continued to farm while some mill families returned to the land during these “fairly flush 
times” for cotton cultivation during the first two decades of the twentieth century.79 “The 
South needs operatives and needs them badly,” noted a 1905 report, “they have been 
forced to draw operatives from the farms but now that these farmers are returning to 
agriculture in considerable numbers, the scarcity is growing every day.”80 Although 
plentiful labor continued to be a selling point for boosters trying to secure investments of 
northern textile money, the reality was that the boom of southern textile mill building 
during the 1890s, the expansion of existing mills by the turn o f the century, and the 
rebounding o f cotton prices caused a labor crunch which, by 1900, forced southern mill 
owners to actively seek-out and recruit workers from as far as 250 miles away.81 The 
Dwight Manufacturing Company blended labor recruitment practices honed at its
78 Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 11 December 1897; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 3-13.
79 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 10; Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 108-109.
80 Massachusetts Bureau o f  Statistics and Labor, Cotton Manufactures in M assachusetts and the 
Southern States (Boston: Wright and Potter Printing Company, 1905), 44-45.
81 Edward Ayers, The Promise o f  the New South: Life After Reconstruction  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 115.
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Massachusetts mill with the strategies used by managers of textile mills throughout the 
South to find operatives for the Alabama City mill.
The regional practice of not hiring black workers to fill manufacturing positions 
in textile mills further aggravated the southern labor supply problem at the turn o f the 
century. Even before a shortage of available workers became a serious issue at Dwight’s 
southern mill, Alabama City Agent O. B. Tilton made clear to the company’s corporate 
officers in Boston that they should not even consider hiring black operatives. According 
to Tilton, doing so would only “cause problems” by conflicting with “certain ‘color 
ideas’ liable to be brought out when colored help are employed permanently in a mill.” 
The trade press depicted white southerners’ potential reactions to the widespread use of 
black labor in southern textile mills as “a fire . . .  that all the waters in the Mississippi will 
never be able to put out.” Tilton acknowledged “the disgust of any northern man when 
he first comes into contact with these features,” but would not be swayed from his 
opinion. The Dwight Company followed regional patterns and only hired white
89operatives. Even when labor shortages at Dwight became problematic during the first 
decade o f the twentieth century, the company, wanting to avoid conflict with its workers 
and the wider community, did not hire black operatives even though they could have 
been, according to the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ Association, “an important 
factor in solving the labor question” for mills throughout the Piedmont South.83
82 The Dwight Company employed a very small number o f  African-Americans at its Alabama City 
mill. Tilton referred to “periodical washing” o f  the mill that was done by black em ployees but not needing 
to “arrange any special accommodations” within the mill village for black workers because “the number we 
employ here will be limited to one or two families.” O. B. Tilton, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard 
Nichols, Treasurer, 31 October 1896 and 1 August 1896, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH- 
1; Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 12 February 1898.
83 NECMA Transactions, Annual Meeting, 1900, 171.
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Although the Dwight Manufacturing Company did not employ African-Americans as operatives at its 
Alabama City mill, nearly all o f  the men who constructed the mill between 1895 and 1896, pictured above 
on a lunch break, were black. (Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
The practice of “stealing help,” once referred to by the trade press as “about the 
worst evil existing among the cotton mills o f the South” became a much maligned but
• « • 84also much used strategy by managers seeking to recruit white workers for their mills.
The Dwight Manufacturing Company was both participant and victim o f the practice of 
enticing help from competing mills. With the goal of not only finding workers but 
acquiring trained operatives, as early as the spring of 1896, a labor agent for the Dwight 
Company’s Alabama City mill attempted to recruit 450 operatives from those on strike at
84 Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 1 April 1899. The use o f  the term “stealing” in 
describing the enticement o f  labor from one mill to another, implies a sense o f  company ownership over 
m ill operatives.
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the Eagle and Phenix Mills located across the state boarder in Columbus, Georgia. The 
agent, F. C. Foy, was marginally successful and the Dwight Company paid the
o r
transportation costs for at least 100 operatives to Alabama City. Labor shortages 
periodically beset textile mills in New England as well, leading some corporations, 
including the Dwight Manufacturing Company, to employ labor recruiters to find 
workers in other New England mill towns. The Dwight Company also paid 
transportation costs for the workers it brought to Chicopee. Company policy for the 
Chicopee mill, and presumably for the Alabama City mill too, was for the operatives to 
repay the company for the expenses it incurred in bringing them and their families to the 
mill.86
R. A. Mitchell found himself “constantly annoyed” by the efforts made by 
competing mills to steal help from the Alabama City mill, especially those of the 
Avondale Mill in Birmingham, which took “the heads o f departments in our mill” and
87provided “transportation to our people whenever they can get them to move.”
Preventing the Avondale Mill and other mills from doing this was of particular interest to 
the managers o f the Dwight Company. Reflective of the amount o f control it exerted 
within Alabama City, the company was one o f several southern mills that kept “an officer 
on the premises who has the full power to arrest any person found ‘tampering’ with the
85 The incident was reported in the Atlanta Constitution. See Newby, Plain Folk in the N ew South,
102 .
86 Memo o f  Trips for Mill Help, 1913-1920, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, HC-4; 
M iscellaneous Letters Regarding Labor, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, ML-A, Folder 6; 
Labor Letters, 1857-1884, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, M O -12, Folder 13. Shortages o f  
labor in N ew  England mills are also discussed in Nelson, Managers and Workers, 82-89.
87 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to Edward P. Nichols, Assistant Treasurer, 5 June 1898, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2.
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o o
help.” Mill towns throughout the South, moreover, passed laws banning the enticement 
o f labor and imposing stiff penalties on those convicted of breaking them. When J. M. 
Howard of Meridian, Mississippi attempted to convince workers at the Alabama City mill 
to leave the employ of the Dwight Company in 1906, he was arrested, fined one hundred 
dollars, and sent to the city chain gang to work off his charges. The treatment o f labor 
agents like Howard was meant to ensure that “one such experience is sufficient to deter
OQ
others from following in the same footsteps.” By 1911, Alabama, as was the case in 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, had a state law requiring agents who 
solicited laborers for employment to be licensed. The cost to procure a license in 
Alabama was $500 for each county in which the labor agent intended to work. Alabama 
City charged an extra $100 fee for any labor agent who wished to be licensed there.90
In addition to the labor shortages that southern textile mill management dealt with 
beginning in the late 1890s, they also faced the problem of the “roving disposition” of 
southern mill operatives. Many Piedmont cotton mill workers frequently left a mill to 
make a brief return to the land or quit in search o f higher wages, better housing, and 
improved working conditions elsewhere. In Alabama City, there was “a systematic 
exodus . . .  in the summertime,” according to R. A. Mitchell, as “the mill population in 
this section seem very much given to changing base frequently.” By autumn, Mitchell
88 Massachusetts Bureau o f  Statistics o f  Labor, Cotton Manufactures in M assachusetts and the 
Southern S tates, 55. Douglas Flamming noted that 1905-1914 were the years o f  the severest labor 
shortages in the textile South before World War I. See Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 108.
89 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 12 April 1906; Massachusetts Bureau o f  Statistics and Labor, 
Cotton Manufactures in Massachusetts and the Southern States, 55. The Report o f  the U.S. Commissioner 
o f  Labor: Wage Earners in the Cotton Textile Industry (1911) discussed the practice o f  stealing help. 
Extensive excerpts o f  the report appeared in the Southern Textile Bulletin, 1, 14, and 21 September 1911. 
For additional literature engaging with the issue o f  the enticement o f  southern textile mill labor as a 
recruitment strategy in periods o f  labor shortages, see Flamming, Creating the M odern South, 108-109; 
Hall, et al., Like a Family, 105-113; Newby, Plain Folk in the New South, 101-105.
90 Report o f  the U.S. Commissioner o f  Labor: Wage Earners in the Cotton Textile Industry (1911), 
excerpted in Southern Textile Bulletin, 7 September 1911.
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answered “on an average of ten to twenty letters a week from people” who wanted work 
at the Dwight Company.91 Quitting a mill was an effective means for southern textile 
workers to show disapproval of their current living or working situation. In the absence 
o f union organization, protesting with one’s feet was a viable strategy o f resistance.92
The workforce at the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill, in 
keeping with the employment pattern that dominated southern textiles, consisted 
overwhelmingly not only of white but also of native-born southerners. But, unlike most 
southern textile companies, Dwight recruited and hired immigrant workers. Few 
immigrants made southern mill villages their destinations upon arrival in the United 
States. The low wages paid in southern mills offered little monetary incentive to foreign- 
born workers to locate in the Piedmont. Ethnic and familial networks throughout the 
industrialized Northeast and West, furthermore, served as channels that often directed 
immigrants into particular towns and industries there. The Massachusetts Bureau of 
Statistics and Labor found that of the 156 workers who arrived in the United States in 
1904 seeking work in the textile industry, the destination of one of them was Georgia
• • • Q 2with the remaining 155 going to Massachusetts. The Dwight Company, however, used 
its Chicopee mill as a conduit to bring immigrant labor to its southern plant.
In August 1906, the Gadsden-Times News reported the arrival o f twenty-two 
Greeks in Alabama City, “brought here to work in the cotton mills.” Gadsden had Polish,
91 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 19 August 1898 and 21 
November 1898, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2
92 The R eport o f  the U.S. Commissioner o f  Labor: Wage Earners in the Cotton Textile Industry 
(1911) estimated that twenty-five to thirty percent o f  southern textile workers were “itinerant.” Quoted in 
Southern Textile Bulletin, 14 September 1911. Hall, et al., in Like a Family, 107, cited mill estimates that 
placed the “floating population” o f  all Piedmont textile m ill workers at twenty to forty percent. On moving 
as a resistance strategy for southern textile workers see Newby, Plain Folk in the N ew South, 172-176;
Hall, et al., 105-109.
93 Wright, O ld South, New South, 74-77; Massachusetts Bureau o f  Statistics and Labor, Cotton  
Manufactures in M assachusetts and the Southern States, 50.
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German, Italian, and Mexican workers “scattered among the industrial plants,” so the 
community was accustomed to immigrant workers living in the area. The appearance of 
immigrant textile operatives, however, was “something that has never happened before . .
. something extraordinary.”94 Historians have noted the reticence of southern mill owners 
to hire immigrant workers because of the potentially negative reaction from native 
operatives about working with foreign labor, but this was not the case with the Dwight 
operatives at Alabama City. No organized walkouts and no mass exodus of factory hands 
occurred at the mill when the Greek workers arrived.95 Although the Dwight Company 
exerted a high level o f influence over its operatives and their lives in Alabama City, the 
town was not a completely isolated or insular community because of its location on the 
outskirts of an established industrial city. Employees in other Gadsden area industries 
accepted the practice o f employing native-born and immigrant labor together, which 
appears to have had an impact on how Dwight's southern operatives reacted to the 
introduction of a small number of Greek workers at their mill. For the Dwight Company, 
having mills in both Massachusetts and Alabama proved an advantage in the operation of 
its southern branch, giving it the flexibility to tap into an additional labor market. It 
could obtain workers from recruiting networks it used for its Chicopee mills when 
southern labor shortages became especially acute.96
94 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 13 August 1906. This importation o f  labor was in violation o f  the 
federal Foran Act. Passed in 1885, the Foran Act established penalties for employers who brought labor to 
the U.S. under the expectation that the workers would repay transportation costs to the company through 
their employment there.
95 See Hall, et al., Like a Family, 109-110; Flamming, Creating the M odern South, 97.
96 The U.S. District Attorney brought a case against the Dwight Manufacturing Company, alleging 
a violation o f  federal contract labor law. The suit charged the Dwight Company with illegally importing a 
total o f  ninety-seven Greeks from Turkey to work in their Alabama City and Chicopee mills. If found 
guilty, the company would have had to pay fines o f  $97,000; $1,000 for each o f  the ninety-seven counts 
against them. The company settled the suit out o f  court in June o f  1914 for $50,000. Gadsden D aily 
Times-News, 21 March 1912; Springfield (ALA) Republican, 22 May 1914 and 23 June 1914.
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From the beginning of its operations in Alabama City, however, the company 
rejected the idea o f hiring workers for the southern mill who had experience working at 
its Chicopee facility. While the company transported newly arrived immigrants to 
Alabama City they would not bring workers who were accustomed to the shorter hours 
worked in the Massachusetts mills. The Superintendent of the Alabama City mill 
admitted that “northern men would be better,” but the reality was that the Dwight 
Company “would have to pay them considerably more” than southerners or immigrants
07with no work history in New England mills. Skilled New England textile workers also 
had a long history of union affiliation. By 1903, the city of Chicopee had textile unions 
representing an estimated 2,000 mulespinners, loomfixers, weavers, carders, slasher- 
tenders, nappers, and drawing-in hands. In addition to the twenty-two Greek immigrants 
that Dwight brought to the United States to work in its Alabama City Mill in 1906, the 
company also transported Greek workers to its Chicopee mill to “take the places of the
• • Q R  • •striking Poles” there. Dwight did not want the labor organizations and activism found 
in New England that it moved its capital to escape, to migrate to its southern branch if 
experienced workers came from Chicopee to Alabama City. Dwight management wanted 
“nothing of this kind” as it saw unionization as something that would “seriously retard 
Cotton Mill progress,” threaten their managerial prerogatives at the mill, and might 
disrupt Alabama’s laissez-faire, pro-business status quo."
It was within this context o f ongoing labor recruitment for the Alabama City mill 
that the Dwight Company began to use Dwight City as a means of attracting and
97 C. H. Moody, Alabama City Superintendent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 14 December 
1896, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-1.
98 Springfield (MA) Republican , 3 May 1903 and 2 May 1906.
99 C. H. Moody, Alabama City Superintendent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 24 December 
1896, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-1.
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maintaining its southern workforce. “A mill manager wonders why the best class of 
operatives will not stay, while other mills have no trouble keeping them,” observed the 
editor of the Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, “We cannot expect our people to 
live contented in hovels. . . .  A hundred dollars spent on the mill village every few years .
. .  will prove a profitable investment.”100 The message to the owners o f southern textile 
mills was that a poorly kept mill village contributed to discontent among one’s workforce 
and labor turnover. This, in turn, created a day-to-day shortage o f operatives that meant 
idle spindles and looms. Additionally, constantly having to train new workers and retrain 
those from other mills was a time-consuming and costly proposition. With an eye on the 
bottom line, the Dwight Company tried to create the perception that work and life in 
Dwight City was the best o f any mill village in the South.
The Dwight Company hired W. T. McCord, a Gadsden area judge, to aid in the 
labor recruitment for the Alabama City mill. Charged with seeking “the most promising 
prospective employees,” McCord regularly traveled through the rural sections around 
Gadsden trying to attract workers to Dwight City. One o f McCord’s tried and true 
methods to inform locals about Alabama City was to initiate a marble game and “inspire 
listeners with stories about Alabama City, Dwight, and the future o f the textile industry.” 
Dwight village was a key selling point described by McCord as “a modern . . . housing 
development built by the company.”101
Around 1905, the Dwight Manufacturing Company also published Alabama City: 
Its Location and the Advantages it Offers the Workingman. The brochure was very 
similar to the booster literature published by local civic groups during the 1880s in their
100 Southern and Western Textile Excelsior, 4 May 1901.
101 Gadsden Times, “84-Year-Old Dwight M ills Coming Down,” 3 June 1979 in Gadsden 
Industries (Textiles) Vertical File, Gadsden Public Library.
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A recently constructed company-owned home in Dwight City, described as “elegant and attractive . . . 
renting for one dollar per room per month.” (Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
attempts to attract investments. The purpose of the booklet, according to the company, 
was to show that “The Dwight Manufacturing Company pays the best wages, has the best 
mill village, a splendid mill, and everything for the convenience and comfort o f its 
employees.” The author of the pamphlet noted that Dwight City’s houses were “elegant 
and attractive . . . renting for one dollar per room per month,” wages were “paid in cash,” 
wood and coal were available “at lowest current prices,” the climate was “crisp, 
invigorating, and health giving,” and schools, library and recreational facilities were 
second to none. Prospective workers were guaranteed that the mill had “the best 
machinery obtainable.” They “would find employment. ..  pleasant” because of the
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“latest construction” o f the mill buildings, the constant supply of “free ice water in the 
mill” and because “department heads are competent and reasonable men.”102
The pamphlet, presumably, was a successful labor recruitment tool as the Dwight 
Company published a brochure similar to Alabama City for its Chicopee mill around 
1915. Chicopee, Massachusetts: A Description o f  Working Conditions informed 
potential employees that Chicopee was located within a short trolley ride from 
Springfield and Holyoke, and was a town with “well-paved and sewered streets,” a “well- 
organized Police and Fire Department,” a “model” free public library, public 
playgrounds, schools “unequalled in the State,” and “many handsome churches” where 
“every one can worship in his or her own way with his or her own country folks.” The
“Comfortable . . .  frame houses” owned by the Dwight Manufacturing Company in Chicopee, 
Massachusetts on “Dwight Terrace,” a hillside overlooking the mill complex. The majority o f  the Dwight 
Company houses were brick row houses located across the street from the mill. (Courtesy Edward Bellamy 
Memorial Association, Chicopee, Massachusetts).
102 Dwight Manufacturing Company, Alabam a City: Its Location and the Advantages it Offers the 
Workingman, n.p., n.d. Pictures that appeared in the pamphlet also appeared in the Gadsden D aily Times- 
News intermittently through June and July 1906.
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pamphlet boasted that employment at the Dwight Manufacturing Company meant a 
workweek o f only fifty-four hours with a “half-holiday” on Saturday afternoons, and 
work in mills o f “the very latest style o f construction,” looms “of the latest designs,” free 
medical care at the company dispensary, and “comfortable brick and frame houses”
• i mlocated near the mill.
The reality of life in the employ of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, 
nevertheless, was often very different than that depicted in its promotional literature. The 
Alabama City labor recruitment pamphlet, in particular, did not tell interested readers that 
the Dwight Company dominated the village and expected its employees to conform to 
standards which the company determined were necessary for “right thinking and right 
living.”104 The company banned the sale of alcohol and gambling from the town and 
sponsored recreational activities not for the workers’ enjoyment but with the intention “to 
provide for them before any mischief can be introduced by outside influences.” With a 
focus on shaping the next generation of Dwight operatives, the company also hired the 
teacher and contributed liberally to the maintenance of the city school. The Dwight 
Company paid the salaries of the church ministers, sponsored lyceum lecture series, and 
determined what books and newspapers would be allowed at the library and reading room 
so that its employees would hear and read company-friendly messages.105 Dwight also 
made sure that men associated with company management were in charge of Alabama 
City’s government. When a group of Dwight workers attempted to organize an 
opposition ticket in the local elections of 1899, R. A. Mitchell warned them that the
103 Dwight Manufacturing Company, Chicopee, Massachusetts: A Description o f  Working 
Conditions, n.p., n.d.
104 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 16 June 1906.
105 O. B. Tilton, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 1 and 8 August 1896, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-1.
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“local representatives of the company” as well as the corporate officers in Boston were 
“bitterly opposed” to their endeavor. Bearing out American Federation o f Labor 
President Samuel Gompers’ observation that “A corporation who controls the stomachs 
o f its working men comes mighty near to controlling their votes,” R. A. Mitchell 
squelched the opposition by “letting the advocates go.”106 In Dwight City, the company 
attempted to rein-in its Alabama City workforce both inside of the mill and out. This was
The Dwight Manufacturing Company’s cotton textile mill and village in Alabama City, ca. 1900. 
(Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, Alabama.)
106 M obile D aily Register, 18 May 1895, quoted in Stuart Kaufman, et al., The Samuel Gompers 
Papers, vol. 4 (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 1986), 27; R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. 
Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 11 March 1899, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2. The 
governing body o f  Alabama City consisted o f  the mayor and a council made up o f  four aldermen 
representing each o f  the city’s four wards. See Hoffman, “A Study o f  the United Textile Workers o f  
America in a Cotton Mill in a Medium-Sized Southern Industrial City,” 64.
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something Dwight managers had had limited success doing at its Chicopee mill.
The Alabama City mill village was crucially important for the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company as it faced the challenges of successfully starting and profitably 
operating its new southern mill. It initially helped forge positive relations between the 
community and the company. It evolved into a tool to attract and maintain a steady, well- 
trained workforce through promises of favorable working and living conditions, with the 
company expecting loyal service from its help in return. Dwight City provided the 
company with a means of keeping workers from participating in activities, such as 
political dissent or union organizing, that might upset Alabama City’s company- 
determined status quo. Maintaining such managerial control became a keenly discussed 
issue within southern textiles during the first decade of the twentieth century when 
progressive reformers and organized labor began to assail the institution o f the southern 
mill village and the family labor system that characterized employment within the 
industry. The Dwight Company built its branch plant in Alabama specifically because 
worker militancy and state regulations did not impose restrictions on its production 
schedules or infringe upon potential profits, and it would engage in a protracted battle to 
make certain that it did not lose the advantages it built the Alabama City mill to gain.
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CHAPTER IV
“BEST NOT TO GIVE NOTICE THAT WE ARE WORKING . . . SMALL HELP:” 
CAPITAL MOBILITY, UNIONIZATION, AND THE ANTI-CHILD LABOR
CAMPAIGN IN ALABAMA
“There have been a number of good families applied to us for work . . . and we 
have made a practice not to turn away any first class family who wished to come here,” 
0 . B. Tilton, the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City Agent wrote to 
Dwight Treasurer J. Howard Nichols. “We have made it a point to employ such settled 
families,” Tilton added, “as we know from experience would make . . . good mill 
hands.”1 As was the case with their operations in Chicopee, the Dwight Company hired 
entire families to work in various capacities in their Alabama City mill. Unlike in 
Massachusetts, however, in Alabama no state laws mandated minimum ages for the 
hiring of children. Managers of the Dwight Company in Alabama City, therefore, could 
and did employ children who, oftentimes, were under ten years old. Whether officially 
on the payroll or simply listed as “helpers” to parents or older siblings, child textile 
operatives working in the Dwight mills in Alabama and in manufactories throughout the 
South was a key issue that turn-of-the-century labor unions and, eventually, middle-class 
reformers, sought to regulate through state legislation. In the debates that ensued over 
state child labor regulation, manufacturers, state politicians, unionists, and reformers
1 O. B. Tilton, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 10 October 1896, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-1. Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard University, 
Boston, MA.
136
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
137
praised and maligned the textile mill village, the family labor system, unionization, and 
capital mobility. Alabama industrialists fought to keep the “advantages” that the 
manufacturing of cotton cloth in the South offered them. New England textile unionists, 
meanwhile, called for the organization of southern operatives, and in concert with 
middle-class reformers, looked to the state to alter Alabama’s laissez-faire status quo.
Throughout the 1890s, skilled New England textile operatives, affiliated with the 
region’s craft unions, sought ways through which they could effectively meet the 
challenges presented by southern competition. In 1890, with the organization of all 
textile workers in one union on a national scale as their objective, Lowell mulespinners, 
weavers, loomfixers, and carders formed the National Union of Textile Workers. The 
NUTW received a charter from the American Federation of Labor in 1891. The NUTW 
realized that the strength of New England labor unions and the continued advancement of 
labor standards in northern textile mills were inexorably tied to the conditions of work 
that prevailed throughout the southern textile industry. “Wages are low and hours long in 
the South. They were continually told in Massachusetts their wages must conform,” 
mulespinner Robert Howard told AFL convention delegates in 1895. Seeking AFL funds 
for a southern organizing campaign he added, “No more progress can be made in New 
England until the Southern situation is improved.” The purpose of the NUTW, 
therefore, was to raise southern conditions up to northern standards before northern 
conditions declined to match southern norms. Organizational infighting and a preference 
for local autonomy, however, led numerous New England craft unions to withdraw from
2 American Federation o f  Labor, Report o f  Proceedings o f  the Fifteenth A nnual Convention, 1895, 
74. Hereafter cited as AFL, Convention Proceedings. In 1896 the AFL named Robert Howard o f  
Massachusetts and Fred Estes o f  the Columbus, Georgia typographical union as organizers for the 
campaign to unionize southern textile operatives. See AFL, Convention Proceedings, 1896, 21.
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the NUTW in the mid and late 1890s. During 1896 and 1897, the process o f organizing 
southern textile unions was slow, constantly short of money, and hampered by a lack of 
support from the New England craft locals that had funds in their treasuries and 
experienced organizers within their ranks. Between 1898 and 1901, nevertheless, the 
NUTW spearheaded an organizing drive throughout the Piedmont South and in doing so, 
belied the proclamations made by southern industrial boosters that southern textile 
operatives were “docile.” These cotton mill workers organized strikes and walkouts to 
protest wages and working conditions, challenging managerial control in textile villages 
throughout the region.
The southern industry press urged manufacturers to resist the National Union of 
Textile Workers’ organizing campaign. “Trade unionism does not flourish in the 
Southern states. The soil has never proven a fertile one . . . .  Now comes news that the 
New England textile union federation are about to send missionaries through the 
Southern states,” one editor noted, “Their work fell on stony ground before, will it 
again?”4 The NUTW did successfully organize locals in the four leading southern textile 
states of North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama with an estimated 5,000 
members in these states, representing about six percent of southern textile operatives, at
3 For overviews o f  the founding and history o f  the National Union o f  Textile Workers through 
1901, see Melton Alonza McLaurin, Paternalism  and Protest: Southern Cotton M ill Workers and  
O rganized Labor, 1875-1905  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971), 120-177; Robert 
R. R. Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1935), 36-51; 
Cletus Daniel, Culture o f  M isfortune: A n Interpretive H istory o f  Textile Unionism in the U nited States 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 16-18; David Montgomery, The Fall o f  the H ouse o f  Labor: The 
Workplace, The State and  Am erican Labor Activism, 1865-1925  (1987; reprint N ew  York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 164-165; George Sinclair Mitchell, Textile Unionism and  the South  (Chapel Hill: 
University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1931), 7-9, 26-29.
4 Southern and  Western Textile Excelsior, 12 November 1898.
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the height of its strength in the fall of 1900.5 But, the answer to the question posed by the 
editor of the Southern and Western Textile Excelsior would prove to be a definitive “no,” 
as southern manufacturer resistance and anti-union sentiment in textile towns throughout 
the region were strong.
Southern textile mill managers balked at any attempts made by employees and 
labor union organizers to interfere with their prerogatives to set wages and working hours 
as they deemed fit. To thwart NUTW attempts to organize union locals throughout the 
South, mill agents and department supervisors regularly discharged union members and 
sympathizers, and capitalized on the control they could exert within company owned 
villages by threatening to replace white operatives with black workers, locking-out 
unions, and intimidating, evicting from company housing, and blacklisting union 
sympathizers. Unless this state of affairs could be altered, argued one NUTW organizer, 
“we will Never be able to Organise [Tic] the South.”6 Indeed, lacking the skilled 
membership that gave strength to New England craft unions, especially those of 
mulespinners and loomfixers, the overwhelmingly unskilled southern operatives who 
joined NUTW-led strikes found that they had little bargaining power and few financial 
resources to sustain protracted walkouts. The NUTW, without any substantial support 
from textile unions north of the Mason-Dixon Line, went on to oversee large-scale, but 
ultimately unsuccessful strikes in the Horse Creek Valley of South Carolina, in Danville,
5 McLaurin, Paternalism  and  Protest, 140, 150; Janet Irons, Testing the New  Deal: The G eneral 
Textile Strike o f  1934 in the Am erican South  (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2000), 16-17.
6 G. B. McCrackan to Sadie Middleton, Augusta Federation o f  Labor Secretary, 14 April 1900, 
M ssll7 a , Series 11, File A, Box 47, Folder 21, American Federation o f Labor Papers, 1888-1955, National 
(International) Union o f  Textile Workers. State Historical Society o f  Wisconsin, Madison, WI.
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Virginia, Durham and Alamance, North Carolina, and in Atlanta, Augusta, and 
Columbus, Georgia.7
The issue of stronger inter-regional cooperation surfaced again in 1900 among the 
NUTW unionists of the South and unions representing New England weavers, 
mulespinners, carders, and loomfixers, which had consolidated themselves into the 
American Federation of Textile Operatives in the spring of 1900. Fearing that an 
ongoing conflict between the southern-based NUTW and northern-based AFTO would 
undermine the strength of all unionized textile operatives, the American Federation of 
Labor’s national leadership urged the two unions to amalgamate into one. Throughout 
1900 and 1901, the two textile unions entered into protracted negotiations with one 
another and the AFL’s executive committee to establish the terms under which they could 
merge. Despite unresolved questions of union jurisdiction, dues assessments, and 
whether the NUTW or the AFTO would dominate the leadership of the proposed mutual 
organization, at a November 1901 conference held in Washington, D.C., they officially 
joined their constituencies and formed the United Textile Workers of America. The 
NUTW, in the wake of its southern defeats, hoped to use the newly created UTWA as a 
vehicle through which it could finally have the finances and experienced organizers 
necessary to support a successful southern unionization drive. This, NUTW leadership 
anticipated, would create a union base in the Piedmont necessary to establish national
7 McLaurin, Paternalism  and  Protest, 50, 149-151. McLaurin argues that southern textile mill 
managers learned and honed their union-busting techniques during the Knights o f  Labor organizing drives 
o f  the late 1880s. See McLaurin, The Knights o f  Labor in the South  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1978), especially 68-79, and Paternalism  and Protest, xvii, 68-119.
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standards of hours, wages, ages, and working conditions throughout the U.S. textile 
industry.8
Aggressive inter-region cooperation within the UTWA, however, did not occur. 
After the failure of a bitterly fought strike in Augusta, Georgia in 1902 which was led by 
the UTWA and financed in large part by northern locals, the UTWA’s mostly New 
England constituency looked at any future organizing drive in the South as a waste of 
time and money. The UTWA leadership, based in Fall River, Massachusetts, decided to 
pursue the strategy of building strong locals of skilled operatives in the textile centers of 
the Northeast before engaging in any broad organizing campaign of unskilled southern 
operatives. “In order to help them at all,” argued UTWA Secretary Albert Hibbert, “we 
must proceed with some assurance of permanency by securing the cream of the skilled 
labor.”9 The full-scale retreat of northern unionists from future participation in southern 
organizing drives meant that southern unionists would have to carry-on alone and without 
the vital financial support of the New England locals. The UTWA sent union Vice- 
President, John Golden, through the textile districts of the Piedmont South in 1903 to 
survey conditions and assess the potential for successful organizing there. Upon
8 AFL, Convention Proceedings, 1899, 107-108; Prince Greene, NUTW  General Secretary to 
Samuel Gompers, AFL President, 31 December 1900; Greene to Frank Morrison, AFL Secretary, 12 
February 1901 and 15 February 1901; and James Duncan, NUTW  Vice-President to Gompers, 23 April 
1901, 26 April 1901, and 17 May 1901, M ssl 17a, Series 11, File A, Box 47, Folder 21, American 
Federation o f  Labor Papers, 1888-1955, National (International) Union o f  Textile Workers; McLaurin, 
Paternalism  and  Protest, 178-185; Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America,” 41-50; Daniel, 
Culture o f  M isfortune, 17-18.
9 Albert Hibbert, UTWA Secretary to Samuel Gompers, AFL President, 24 March 1903, in Stuart 
Kaufman, et al., The Sam uel Gompers Papers, vol. 6 (Urbana: University o f  Illinois Press, 1986), 119.
From its founding, the organizing strategy o f  the AFL focused on craft workers and the power they could 
exert within the workplace by virtue o f  their skills. This approach meant that the AFL would largely ignore 
the vast numbers o f  unskilled workers in U.S. industries. See David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: 
Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Montgomery, The 
F all o f  the H ouse o f  Labor, Ileen DeVault, ‘“To Sit Among Men:’ Skill, Gender, and Craft Unionism in the 
Early American Federation o f  Labor,” in Eric Arnesen, Julie Greene, and Bruce Laurie, eds., Labor
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Golden’s return, discussions about the feasibility of organizing southern locals continued 
at UTWA annual conventions, but the union would not send an organizer to the South for 
nearly a decade.10 When placed within the context of ongoing employer hostility and the 
regional rhetoric that tied southern industrial development to the maintenance of a union- 
free status quo, regional nearsightedness of New England textile unions and their 
withdrawal of support from southern organizing efforts, guaranteed that southern textile 
workers would, in both the short and long term, remain unorganized.
The policy of organizing only skilled workers and shoring up established craft 
union affiliates meant that the membership of the UTWA would remain small and 
centered in the northeast instead of in the South, the site of the most dynamic growth in 
the textile industry. The focus of New England textile craft unions remained local and, at 
best intra-regional. Unionized weavers at the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s 
Chicopee mill, for example, protested the hiring of Portuguese workers in 1903, believing 
that “it was an attempt to drive them out through the importation of cheaper 
workingmen,” but did not link the strength of their union to the competition they faced 
from the company’s Alabama City operatives who were paid significantly less and who 
labored longer hours than their Massachusetts counterparts.11
Technological changes also undermined the ability of craft unions, especially the 
mulespinners, to represent a large number of workers in any mill, north or south. The 
steady stream of French-Canadian, Polish, Portuguese, and Greek workers into New 
England mill towns, and the impoverished farming families moving into mill villages
Histories: Class, Politics, and  the Working-Class Experience (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1998), 
259-283.
10 Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America,” 131-137; Mitchell, Textile Unionism and  the 
South, 31-32.
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throughout the Piedmont South, provided textile mill managers with the majority of the 
operatives they needed to produce coarse and medium-count cotton goods. The large 
numbers of unskilled and semiskilled immigrants and women who dominated this textile 
workforce often proved themselves militant unionists during times of labor unrest in 
individual mills, still they found the UTWA unresponsive to them and remained largely 
outside the purview of formal organizational activities during times of labor peace. 
Throughout the first decade of its existence, the UTWA claimed as members only one to 
two percent o f the textile workers nationwide.12
11 Springfield  (AM) Republican, 28 September 1903.
12 Robert Brooks and Cletus Daniel estimated that UTW A membership in 1902 represented one 
and one-half percent o f  textile workers in the United States. Daniel also cited figures indicating that after 
1902 UTWA membership remained under two percent until World War I. See Brooks, “The United 
Textile Workers o f  America,” 52-53; and Daniel, Culture o f  M isfortune, 21. On the UTW A’s craft focus 
and the operatives that the union did not aggressively organize, see Brooks, 52-81; Daniel, 19-21; Mitchell, 
Textile Unionism and  the South, 1 -5; Montgomery, The Fall o f  the House o f  Labor, 169-170. Historians 
have cited the decentralized nature o f  the textile industry, the prevalence o f craft organization and 
conservatism, the low skill levels required o f  operatives, and the large proportion o f  immigrants, women, 
and children in the textile workforce as factors that undermined the possibility o f  successful unionization in 
the textile industry. The question o f why there were so few unions among textile workers in the South has 
largely dominated the historiography o f  southern labor and southern textile history. In answering this 
question, numerous historians have built their arguments on a foundation o f  southern exceptionalism, 
emphasizing the part that paternalism in mill villages played in undermining unionization and labor strikes, 
and focusing on differences in the “character” o f  southern workers versus their northern counterparts. In 
these analyses, southern mill village paternalism served alternately as a surrogate for the benefits that 
unions could have provided workers and as a tool used by management to crush any movement for union 
organization, while operatives’ rural backgrounds, a fierce sense o f individualism, pervasive racism, and 
hostility to outside influences undercut any possibility o f  successful unionization. Beginning with the rise 
o f  the “new” labor history in the 1980s, scholars have complicated the paradigm o f  southern 
exceptionalism or have done away with it completely by asking new questions, by expanding their analyses 
o f  operatives’ militancy beyond their participation and membership in national unions, and by looking at 
the history o f  southern unionism through multiple lenses o f  class, race, and gender. These historians, 
likewise, have found that southern mill village paternalism was not simply a system dominated entirely by 
mill owners but instead, was characterized by ongoing labor-management negotiations. For the best recent 
treatment o f  the historiography o f  southern unionism, see Bryan Simon, “Rethinking Why There Are So 
Few Unions in the South” G eorgia H istorical Quarterly 81(Summer 1997): 465-484. See also Jacquelyn 
Dowd Hall, et al., “Afterword,” in Hall, et al, Like a Family: The M aking o f  a Southern Cotton M ill W orld  
(1987; reprint Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2000); Robert Zieger, “Textile Workers and 
Historians,” in Robert Zieger, ed., O rganized Labor in the Twentieth-Century South  (Knoxville: University 
o f  Tennessee Press, 1991); Zieger in Gary Fink and Merl Reed, eds., Race, Class, and  Com m unity in 
Southern Labor H istory  (Tuscaloosa: University o f  Alabama Press, 1994), 3-8. Additionally, when 
answering the questions o f  why southern textile workers historically have not joined unions in large 
numbers and why northern attempts to organize them have historically failed, it is important to remember, 
as seen herein, the short and long-term implications that the withdrawal o f  northern unionists’ support from
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Because New England textile unionists concerned themselves with the issue of 
organizing southern workers primarily because of the competitive disadvantage in which 
they found themselves through competition with lower-waged southern labor, the failed 
attempts to organize the southern portion of the industry led many unions affiliated with 
the American Federation of Labor to try to equalize regional conditions, instead, through 
the enactment of protective labor laws in the South. In Alabama, organized labor was the 
most outspoken critic of the December 1894 nullification of the statute, originally passed 
in 1887, that had prohibited the employment of children under fourteen years old in any 
factory or manufacturing business for more than sixty hours per week. The argument 
supporting the repeal o f the act, forwarded by pro-business politicians and manufacturers, 
was that doing so would entice industrial concerns like the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company to build textile mills in the state, which would then provide gainful 
employment for poor farming families. “I was . . . horrified by this outrageous piece of 
legislation,” Samuel Gompers wrote to Jere Dennis, publisher of Alabama’s Labor 
Advocate, “. . . this crime that had been committed by that legislature in sacrificing young 
and innocent children to the greed and rapacity of the profit mongers.”13
The reversal of the 1887 Alabama child labor statute became a rallying cry for 
AFL unionists in their attempt to lead a successful lobbying campaign for the passage of 
state age and hours laws.14 So too did critiques of the family labor system on which the
southern  o rgan iz ing  efforts had. A t the tu rn -o f-the-cen tu ry , this created  a situation  in w hich  sou thern  
textile workers were left without the financial and moral support necessary for them to have had a 
meaningful chance o f  overcoming the challenges they faced from the anti-union status quo that dominated 
the region.
13 Samuel Gompers to Jere Dennis, 23 September 1896, in Kaufman, et al., The Sam uel Gompers 
Papers, vol. 4, 232. An editorial in the February 1898 edition o f  the Am erican Federationist (vol. 4, no. 
12), called the repeal o f  the Alabama law the “crime o f  ’94-5.”
14 AFL, Convention Proceedings, 1896, 21.
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textile industry was based and the role of the southern mill village in perpetuating it 
become focal points for unionists seeking legislation that would regulate the employment 
of children. “I find little, pale, pinched faced children laboring long hours,” noted Prince 
Greene o f the National Union of Textile Workers about his travels through southern mill 
towns in the 1890s, . every member of a family is compelled to give the first and
best end of their lives to the manufacturer.”15 For Greene and his fellow unionists, child 
labor was not only a social abomination but also an economic one. “A man cannot earn 
high wages from it,” a Massachusetts resident remarked about work in the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company’s mills, “his wife must work to support the family, and at an 
early age the children must join the ranks.”16 Competition from low-cost child labor, the 
AFL argued, drove down the wages for adult textile operatives, and the low wages paid 
to adult mill workers meant that most families who were reliant on the textile industry for 
their income had to send their children to work at a young age to contribute to the family 
economy.17
According to textile manufacturers throughout the Piedmont South, however, 
children were not always attentive or cost-effective operatives. The Dwight 
Manufacturing Company instituted a plan at its Alabama City mill by 1897 of “weeding 
out the very young.” Agent R. A. Mitchell noted that seventeen of the one hundred and 
sixty-two employees in the Alabama City mill spinning department in May of 1897 were 
ten and under. Mitchell instructed overseers “to take no one under ten if it can be
15 American Federationist, vol. 6, no. 6.
16 Springfield (AAA) Republican, 1 August 1897.
17 I. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the New South: Social Change and Cultural Persistence, 1880-1915  
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 496; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 56-57; Cathy 
McHugh, M ill Family: The Labor System in the Southern Cotton Textile Industry (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 38, 48.
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avoided,” yet Dwight management tolerated the inefficiencies of young operatives 
because the employment of children provided the company a means through which they 
could train and maintain their workforce.18 “Many points of training must extend through 
more than one generation,” Alabama City Agent O. B. Tilton reminded Dwight’s 
corporate officers, “before we can reproduce neat and skilfull \sic\ employees.” Mill
Employees, including several children, who worked in the carding room at the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company’s Alabama City mill, ca. 1896. The majority o f  children employed by Dwight at the Alabama 
City mill d u ring  the 1890s and early 1900s w orked  in the sp inn ing  department. (C ourtesy  G adsden  Public 
Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
18 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 11 May 1897, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, M H-1. On the use o f  the family labor system as a way create a stable 
core o f  operatives and to perpetuate a m ill’s workforce, see McHugh, Mill Family, especially 14-16, 24-29, 
47-48; Douglas Flamming, Creating the M odem  South: Millhands and M anagers in Dalton, Georgia, 
1884-1984  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1992), 98-102; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 56- 
57.
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managers hoped that when these children matured, they would remain in the employ of 
the company, reside and marry within the company-owned village, and rear the next 
generation o f children who would enter the Dwight mill as their parents had before 
them.19
Southern industrial boosters and textile manufacturers alike, therefore, saw the 
family labor system and the training of textile operatives from childhood as a foundation 
for the long-term stability of mill workforces and for the industry as a whole. Any 
attempts made by unionists to challenge the family labor system or the employment of 
children, mill owners and boosters reasoned, had to be resisted. “The South, in 
maintaining its advantages as a manufacturer . . .  in handling its labor question 
judiciously should seek to reduce to the minimum the influence of the politician in labor 
legislation,” asserted Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers ’ Record, “He is a curse . . .
. He should be suppressed as far as possible, and along with him . . .  the agitator from 
outside, who seeks to save himself by creating artificial conditions in the South.”20 
Organized labor would face the same kind of opposition it encountered in its attempts to 
unionize southern textile workers as it tried to promote and secure labor legislation in the 
states o f the Piedmont South. Seen as agents of northern mills, attempting to hamper the 
success of the southern textile industry, labor organizers and their critique o f the family 
labor system and the overall depression of wages that child labor caused, were not 
welcomed in mill villages or in southern statehouses. “ [Tjhere is more consideration 
shown and liberty given to the operatives in the South than is given to their Northern
19 O. B. Tilton, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 31 October 1896, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-1.
20 M anufacturers ’ Record, vol. 38, no. 20.
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brothers and sisters. The operatives of the South are contented,” opined the southern 
textile industry press, . we ask that our Northern friends attend to their own state of
9 1affairs and we will attend to ours.”
Alabama unionists, battling the concerted opposition o f textile manufacturers, 
lacked the strong base of organized workers found in heavily industrialized states like 
Massachusetts. During the late 1890s, they were thus unable to secure the reenactment of 
an hours and age law for those working in textile mills throughout the state. A bill 
entered into the Alabama House of Representatives in November 1896 to prohibit the 
employment of “females or girl children under the age of fifteen years” in cotton or 
woolen mills, received scant attention from the public, press, and politicians, and died in 
committee. A similar bill entered into the Senate in 1897 met the same fate, as did a 
series of bills proposing to outlaw the employment of children under thirteen years old in 
mechanical, mercantile, or manufacturing establishments.22 “There is a decided 
opposition on the part of manufacturers in the South to any restrictive labor legislation,” 
the Massachusetts-based Arkwright Club observed, “and the alertness with which they
99combine to oppose and discourage it is worthy of attention.”
During the 1898-1899 session, labor-friendly politicians introduced more bills 
into the Alabama legislature, intended to regulate the employment and working hours of 
children. While Alabama unionists championed them, the state’s textile manufacturers, 
including representatives of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, aggressively fought to
21 Southern and  Western Textile Excelsior, 29 February 1896.
22 Alabama, Secretary o f  State, Administrative Division, House and  Senate Journals o f  the 
G eneral Assem bly o f  Alabama, 1896-1897. Hereafter cited as Journals o f. . . A labam a. See also Elizabeth 
Davidson, C hild  Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States (Chapel Hill: University o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1939), 22-23.
23 Arkwright Club, Report o f  the Committee on Southern Competition, 1897, 3.
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prevent their passage. Alabama House representative Luther Jones, a trade unionist from 
Lee County, introduced bills during the session to limit the hours worked and establish 
legal ages for employment in the state’s manufacturing and mining industries. In 
conjunction with Jones’ hours and ages bill in the House, Representative J. A. Hurst from 
Etowah County, simultaneously introduced a Senate bill to prohibit the employment of 
children under twelve years old and to set ten hours as the maximum workday in the 
state’s mines and factories. Despite strong opposition, this bill passed the Senate.24 
Confident that the bill would ultimately be defeated, R. A. Mitchell, nonetheless, reported 
to Dwight Company corporate officers that he expected manufacturers to encounter a 
“real fight.”25
Mill managers, representing ten cotton manufactories in Alabama and one in 
Georgia, appointed a two-person committee, of which Dwight’s R. A. Mitchell was one 
member, to “handle the matter” of the proposed hours and ages restrictions before the 
Alabama House Committee on Immigration and Labor. Mitchell discovered that the 
“young man named Jones” who introduced the legislation had recently conducted an 
investigation of the conditions of textile mills in Alabama and Georgia, “that he was in 
company with Mr. Sam[uel]l Ross of New Bedford . . . studying the labor question,” and 
that he had been in conversation with a man “named Howard, an eastern man and . . . was 
very intimate with a Mr. Stanley . . .  the head of the labor organization in Birmingham.” 
Concluding that Representative Jones was “a district organizer of some labor union” or 
“perhaps an anarchist in embryo,” Mitchell reported to the Alabama manufacturers for
24Journals of. . . Alabama, 1898-1899. See also, Elizabeth Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in 
the Southern Textile States, 23.
25 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 5 December 1898,
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2.
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whom he lobbied at the statehouse that unflinching opposition to all proposed regulatory
26legislation was necessary in order to halt “agitation of this character.”
The “man named Howard” referred to by R. A. Mitchell was Robert Howard, the 
mulespinner from Fall River, Massachusetts who the AFL appointed as an organizer in 
1896 for its southern textile unionization campaign. “Mr. Stanley” was a member of and 
paid lobbyist for the Birmingham Trades Council, sent to Montgomery to campaign for 
the pending child labor legislation. Indeed, organized labor in Alabama, in line with the 
overall goals of AFL textile unionists of stopping the depression of adult wages by child 
workers and creating an equality of standards between workers in the Northeast and those 
in the South, sought to cultivate support within the statehouse and among the wider 
public for the pending labor bills in the Alabama legislature. Samuel Gompers reminded 
Alabama unionists that “We have a friend and union member in the Alabama Legislature 
by the name of Luther C. Jones . . . .  and it is possible that some good may be 
accomplished, if you will do your duty,” urging them to “adopt resolutions and send them 
to members of the Legislature,” a tactic that had worked well in campaigns to enact
27protective legislation in the Northeast. The state’s labor press, meanwhile, couched the 
proposed child labor legislation in terms of “human advancement,” imploring politicians 
and the public to “do justice for the poor, helpless children who are not able to help 
themselves.”28
26 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 10 December 1898, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2. The Alabama mills represented by Mitchell at the 
state legislature on the matter o f  the 1898 hours and ages bill were the Dwight Manufacturing Company, 
Anniston Manufacturing Company, Eufaula Cotton Mills, Montgomery Cotton Mills, Tallahassee Falls 
Manufacturing Company, Coosa Manufacturing Company, Prattville Cotton Mills, Hawthorne Cotton 
Company, Selma Cotton Mill Company, and the Talladega Cotton Factory Company. The Lannett Mills, 
located across the Alabama border in West Point, Georgia also participated in this lobbying campaign.
27 Circular, 23 January 1899, in Kaufman, et al., The Sam uel Gompers Papers, vol. 5, 70.
28 Labor Advocate, 28 January 1899.
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Between December 1898 and February 1899, however, the Alabama textile lobby 
succeeded in preventing any action from being taken in the state House of 
Representatives on the Jones hours and age bill. R. A. Mitchell noted that the majority of 
representatives in both the House and Senate were “all pretty well advised . . . that the 
cotton manufacturers want no legislation at all along this line,” and were convinced by 
the manufacturers’ argument that age and hours statutes would stifle Alabama’s industrial 
growth and lead textile interests to invest in other southern states where such laws were 
not in effect. The leading cotton mill owners in Alabama, nonetheless, decided to 
employ a full-time lobbyist to watch after their interests at the statehouse, “a suitable 
person to remain in Montgomery . . . especially to defeat any legislation similar to the ten 
hour bill” with the Dwight Manufacturing Company agreeing to “bear its proper part of 
this expense.” Mitchell, in addition to the lobbyist, remained a presence at the 
legislature for the Dwight Company. “I was in Montgomery Monday and Tuesday of this 
week,” he told J. Howard Nichols in a December 1898 report about a committee hearing 
on a bill proposed to prohibit the employment of children under the age o f twelve years in 
mines and factories. “I have four or five . . . personal friends on this committee,” he 
assured Nichols, “including in this number the chairman.” Mitchell and the textile 
lobby used their influence to stop this bill and another introduced in February 1899 
proposing to outlaw the working of children “of certain ages” in cotton factories before 
sun-up and after sun-down. R. A. Mitchell and the owners of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company breathed a collective sigh of relief that their anti-regulation lobbying efforts at
29 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 10 December 1898, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2.
30 Ibid., 17 December 1898.
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the Alabama statehouse had been successful. “[T]he Legislature . . . having adjourned,” 
Mitchell reminded the corporate officers in Boston, . . will not convene again, thank 
goodness, for two years.”31
During the two years that the Alabama legislature was in recess, Alabama unions 
affiliated with the AFL, as well as the AFL’s national leadership, worked to continue the 
movement for mill, mine, and factory age and hours restrictions. The defeats of child 
labor bills in Alabama during 1898 and 1899 led members of the AFL legislative 
committee to urge fellow unionists to embrace their “duty to undertake an agitation for 
the creation of a healthier public opinion—to arouse the conscience of the people.”32 
Samuel Gompers, meanwhile, hired Irene Ashby, a British union activist and seasoned 
veteran o f England’s ongoing anti-child labor campaigns, to conduct a fact-finding 
investigation of child labor conditions in the textile mills of Alabama and to cultivate 
support for regulatory legislation among reform-minded individuals and groups 
throughout the state. Textile mill owners disparaged Ashby as a tool of both organized 
labor and northern manufacturers, and as an ill-informed sentimentalist. She succeeded, 
nonetheless, in creating a public awareness of and support for state mandated child labor 
regulations by groups outside of the working-class, which the AFL realized would be 
necessary for any alteration of the pro-business, anti-union status quo in Alabama. 
Ashby’s study was the first extensive inquiry into the conditions of child labor in
31 R. A. M itchell, A labam a C ity  A gen t to  J. H ow ard N ichols , T reasu rer, 24 F ebruary  1899,
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2; Journals o f. . . A labama, 1898-1899.
32 AFL, Convention Proceedings, 1900, 67, 28.
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southern textile mills and was integral in jumpstarting an inter-class crusade in Alabama
33that sought the eradication of the employment of children throughout the state.
Irene Ashby’s investigation took her to six cities and twenty-four out of forty- 
three cotton textile mills in Alabama. At these mills, she asked superintendents, 
managers, operatives and “persons living in close contact with mill life” dozens of 
questions. Her goal was to collect information on the conditions of work and the number 
of children under twelve years old employed at each mill, as well as manufacturers’ 
attitudes regarding state regulation of child labor. From the answers she received and her 
own personal observations, the report Ashby submitted to the AFL verified that the 
average workday in Alabama mills was over eleven hours per day. She also cited figures 
showing that of the twenty-three mills she visited, northern capital controlled ten, 
employing 215 children under twelve years old out of a total of 4,400 operatives. 
Southern capital operated thirteen of the mills visited by Ashby and 115 out of 1,968 of 
the operatives at these establishments were under twelve years old. Ashby estimated that 
the number of children ages ten to fifteen years in all the mills of the state comprised 
thirty percent of the entire textile workforce.34
Irene Ashby’s report and her experiences researching it, confirmed for the 
leadership of the American Federation of Labor the intransigence of southern textile
33 In a letter to Samuel Gompers, Prince Greene, General Secretary o f  the National Union o f  
Textile Workers, argued that the AFL’s best chances for securing child labor legislation would be in 
Georgia or Alabama, despite previous legislative failures. See Prince Greene to Samuel Gompers, 31 
December 1900, American Federation o f  Labor Papers, 1888-1955, National (International) Union o f  
Textile Workers, Mss 117a, Series 11, File A, Box 47, Folder 21. On Irene Ashby and the overall goals o f  
her study, see Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 24-26; and Dewey  
Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation o f  Progress and Tradition (Knoxville: University 
ofTennessee Press, 1983), 181.
34 Irene Ashby, Report to the Executive Committee o f  the State, on the H istory o f  Child Labor 
Legislation in Alabama  (Montgomery: n.p., 1901); American Federationist, vol. 8, no. 5; Davidson, Child  
Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 27-28; Grantham, Southern Progressivism , 181; Walter
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manufacturers toward proposed regulatory legislation and toward organized labor’s 
attempts to secure such laws. Ashby noted that the mill owners who declared themselves 
strongly against child labor legislation argued that any attempt made by the state to set 
limits of when and for how long children could be gainfully employed in manufacturing 
pursuits was an infringement on parental rights. Industrialists continued this line of 
reasoning, pointing out that many families, especially poor widows, depended on the 
contributions to the familial purse of wages that their children earned in textile mills. “It 
is not a question of mill owners desiring to employ the children,” the industry press 
noted, “but one resting with their parents and involving the possible loss of the means of 
livelihood of whole families who are passing from penury to comfort.” Southern 
manufacturers used the destitute conditions in which many mill families had lived on 
mountain farms as a touchstone to bolster this argument, saying that although southern 
textile operatives did not have as high a standard of living as those working in New 
England mills, they were better off than before. “The whole influence of the cotton mill 
in the South has been beneficial to the population as a whole,” asserted industrialist 
Edward Sanborn, “It is distinctly a marked civilizing agency as it has given comfortable 
living and an elevating influence to thousands of families who never before knew 
anything better than a cabin in the backwoods.”
Trattner, Crusade fo r  the Children: A H istory o f  the National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor 
Reform in America  (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 52.
35 Manufacturers ’ Record , vol. 39, no. 5.
36 Edward Sanborn, “Factory Life in the South,” quoted in Manufacturers ’ R ecord , vol. 39, no. 5. 
During the first decade o f  the twentieth century, southern textile manufacturers emphasized their images as 
local and regional philanthropists in order to deflect growing criticisms about the conditions o f  work and 
life in southern textile mill villages. They used the mill village as a defense against reformers by 
publicizing all o f  the “benefits” that southern textile concerns provided for their employees free o f  charge, 
and by forwarding the argument that mill owners took care o f  their workers and, therefore, state 
intervention was unnecessary. For examples see Leonora Beck, “A Model Factory Town” Forum 
32(September 1901): 60-65; William Few, “The Constructive Philanthropy o f  a Southern Cotton Mill”
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Numerous Alabama textile managers said they favored child labor restrictions but 
only if other southern states passed similar regulations so as to not undermine their 
competitive position. Samuel Gompers reminded Irene Ashby that when Massachusetts 
mill men had used this same argument in their fight against the Commonwealth’s 1892 
fifty-eight-hour law, Bay State unionists took the position that they “preferred to take the 
heart out of the industry than to take the hearts out of children,” and won.37 Many 
southern textile manufacturers said that they did not necessarily want to hire children but 
that parents threatened to move to other mills and, they argued, without an adequate 
public school system, restrictions on the employment of child labor would do more harm 
than good. “ [W]hat is to become of the children until they reach the age when they may 
find places in the mills?” asked Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers ’ Record. 
“ [PJroper facilities are offered hardly in any of the Southern States . . . .  the education 
which the child is receiving in the mill may be better than that which it might derive from 
attendance . . . [in] poorly-conducted schools,” he noted, “The problem is to be settled by
o o
reason, not by hysterics.” Arguments such as these, forwarded by southern textile 
interests and publicized in the regional industry press, had limited value for the 
manufacturers’ anti-regulation campaign alone. Their persuasiveness, however, 
increased substantially when coupled with claims that Ashby was “acting in the interests 
of several northern mill owners and corporations . . . jealous of southern development”
South A tlantic Quarterly  8(January 1909): 82-90; Thomas Parker, “The South Carolina Cotton Mill: A 
Manufacturers V iew ” South A tlantic Quarterly 8(October 1909): 328-337.
37 Samuel Gompers to Irene Ashby, 3 January 1901, in Kaufman, et al., The Sam uel Gompers 
Papers , vol. 5, 315.
38 M anufacturers ’ Record, vol. 39, no. 1.
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and that she was an outsider “telling the people of Alabama things about their own state
39that they should have known.”
Since the late 1890s, organized labor focused on the issue o f protective labor 
legislation, but it was during Irene Ashby’s 1901 investigation of Alabama mills that the 
base of support for child labor restrictions grew substantially. Through her inquiry, the 
union came into contact with religious leaders, clubwomen, and civic leaders who 
expressed interest in the movement for child labor regulation. These middle-class 
reformers helped transform state action on child labor from being of interest only to 
unionists into an issue that had an inter-class, humanitarian appeal. They made possible 
an effective pro-regulation campaign in Alabama, even as a majority o f southerners 
remained hostile to the legislative agenda of organized labor.40
This new source of assistance and support for the anti-child labor movement 
became known during the debates over a new child labor and compulsory education bill 
introduced in 1901 into the Alabama legislature. The 1901 child labor and education bill, 
which Irene Ashby helped to prepare and that state representatives A. J. Reilly in the 
House and Hugh Morrow in the Senate sponsored, set the bottom-most age at which 
children working in non-agricultural enterprises in Alabama could be employed at twelve 
years, with exceptions made for newspaper carriers and for the children of widowed
39 Samuel Gompers to Irene Ashby, 3 January 1901, in Kaufman, et al., The Samuel Gompers 
Papers, vol. 5, 314; American Federationist, vol. 8, no. 5; Ashby, Report to the Executive Committee o f  the 
State', Davidson, C hild Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 28-29, 31.
40 For an overview o f  the rise o f  progressive reform in the early twentieth-century South, southern 
middle-class reformers, and their roles in and agendas for regional change see Grantham, Southern 
Progressivism', Edward Ayers, The Promise o f  the New South: Life After Reconstruction  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 409-437; George Brown Tindall, The Emergence o f  the N ew South, 1913- 
1945 (1967; reprint Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 1-32; C. Vann Woodward, 
Origins o f  the New South: 1877-1913  (1951; reprint Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 
369-428; Steven Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans o f  the Progressive Era (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1998), 200-232.
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mothers or disabled fathers who could work in textile mills at the age of ten. The Reilly- 
Morrow bill also outlawed children under sixteen years old from working between 7pm 
and 6am and for more than eleven hours per day or sixty hours per week. The bill, 
furthermore, mandated that after 1 March 1902 all employed children between twelve 
and sixteen years old must be able to read and have a schooling certificate filed with their 
employer confirming the completion of twelve consecutive weeks of school during the 
year. Enforcement provisions of the bill included the requirement that parents must 
provide sworn affidavits of a child’s age to an employer and the appointment by the 
Governor of a factory inspector with an annual salary of $ 1500. Violations of the 
proposed laws would result in fines from five to one hundred dollars or three months in 
prison for parents, and fines of not more than five hundred dollars for employers.41
The debates over the Reilly-Morrow bill pitted the state’s textile manufacturers 
not only against representatives of organized labor, as had been the case in the past, but 
also in opposition to the newly formed legislative committee of the Alabama State 
Federation of Women’s Clubs, members of the state’s Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union and other urban-based reform associations, and the Alabama Ministers’ Union led 
by Edgar Gardner Murphy of Montgomery. At a 5 February 1901 joint hearing by 
Alabama House and Senate committees, Irene Ashby and Edgar Gardner Murphy argued 
for the passage of the bill, facing off against R. A. Mitchell of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company, the “chief railroad attorney” of the state, and a corporation clergyman. Ashby 
noted that R. A. Mitchell discussed, at length, the condition of the Dwight mill operatives 
before they came to Alabama City, the positive influence that the Dwight Company’s
4i Journals o f. . . A labama, 1900-1901; Davidson, C hild Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile 
States, 30; Grantham, Southern Progressivism , 181.
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mill village had on the workers, “the beauties of the village, the library and the church 
built by the company,” and the fact that child labor regulation would be a bane to the 
lives of the families who worked in Dwight’s Alabama City mill since “the whole family 
had to work in order to get a decent living.” Mitchell also reminded the legislative 
committees that the repeal of the state’s 1887 hours and ages law was a determining 
factor in the Dwight Company’s decision to build its branch plant in Alabama City. He 
said the reversal of the law was done in “fairness to capital,” and “from which he trusted 
they would not go back.” Thinly veiled threats that the Dwight Manufacturing Company 
and other northern-owned mills could easily relocate to states without child labor 
legislation doomed the 1901 bill and it died in committee.42
Public pronouncements attributed the defeat of the Reilly-Morrow bill to the 
combination of “persuasive” arguments, forwarded by industry representatives, that 
regulation would be a violation of parental rights, that the legislation would unfairly 
burden Alabama textile manufacturers in comparison with those in Georgia and North 
and South Carolina, that it would inhibit future investments in and growth of Alabama’s 
manufacturing sector, and to manufacturers’ insinuations that Murphy and Ashby were 
simply tools of northeastern capital.43 In the wake of the 1901 failure o f the child labor 
and education bill, the southern industry press praised the Alabama legislature for 
thwarting the attempts of the individuals they saw as New England emissaries and 
“philanthropists for labor” to force “Southern labor to sacrifice itself in buttressing their
42 American Federationist, vol. 8, no. 5; R. A. M itchell’s testimony before the committee was also 
discussed in an editorial by Irene Ashby in the New York H erald , reprinted in Labor Advocate , 30 
November 1901.
43 Journals of. . . A labam a , 1900-1901; Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile 
States, 31-33; Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 182.
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decaying fortunes” through regulatory legislation.44 Proponents of the Reilly-Morrow 
bill, on the other hand, came to a fuller understanding of the weight that the 
manufacturers’ arguments carried with state politicians and the role that the personal ties 
between corporation lobbyists, including Dwight’s R. A. Mitchell, and state 
representatives played in the loss of the measures. Edgar Gardner Murphy organized the 
Alabama Child Labor Committee after witnessing, first hand, the strength o f the 
opposition to child labor reform from manufacturers throughout the state. Murphy’s 
experiences at the Alabama statehouse during the 1901 session convinced him that the 
key to putting an end to the use of child labor in Alabama’s industries, especially in 
textiles, depended on the cultivation of a widespread, pro-reform public opinion that 
would pressure legislators into action.45 In conjunction with the ongoing efforts of 
organized labor, the members of the Alabama Child Labor Committee embarked on a 
campaign to secure the support necessary to ensure that the state legislature would enact a 
child labor law when it reconvened for the 1902-1903 legislative session.
Although the New England industry press would later call the employment of 
child labor by Massachusetts manufacturers in their southern mills “a red herring” and 
chastised southerners for “declaring them, not the States themselves, guilty for laws 
permitting labor conditions that compare unfavorably with those o f . . . Massachusetts,” 
the Dwight Manufacturing Company was truly embroiled in Alabama’s decades-long 
child labor controversy from the start46 With the return to healthy business conditions
44 Manufacturers ’ Record, vol. 39, no. 22.
45 For a detailed discussion o f  Edgar Gardner Murphy’s role in the founding o f  the Alabama Child 
Labor Committee, see Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, especially 31; and 
Grantham, Southern Progressivism, especially 182.
46 Com mercial Bulletin, 26 February 1910.
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after the 1893 depression, the majority of New England manufacturers, while continuing 
to discuss the disparity of conditions between North and South as a challenge that must 
be addressed, did little to facilitate the equalization of regional wage, age, or hour 
standards that they sought. Those that did take action continued to lobby their state 
legislatures for the repeal of existing labor legislation or worked to secure the passage of 
federal regulations. During the 1893 depression, however, the Dwight Company chose 
capital mobility as its strategy to deal with southern competition. In the years that 
followed, it focused its efforts, therefore, on maintaining the “advantages” that textile 
manufacture in the South offered.
Dwight officials stated explicitly, numerous times, that the reason it constructed 
its Alabama City mill was so that the company could continue to successfully produce 
and market coarse goods despite the regulatory legislation secured by Massachusetts 
labor unions that had imposed restrictions on the operations at Dwight’s Chicopee mill 
and placed the company at a competitive disadvantage in comparison with southern 
textile manufacturers.47 The Dwight Company wanted to build its southern branch 
factory in a state dominated by manufacturer-friendly politicians and which was free 
from industrial regulation. For sure, Dwight officials were key participants in the repeal 
of Alabama’s 1887 child labor and hours law. With R. A. Mitchell acting on their behalf 
through the turn of the century, Dwight’s company leaders continued an ongoing 
campaign against the passage of regulatory legislation in Alabama so that their strategy 
of operating a southern branch to bolster the profitability of Dwight’s parent mill in 
Chicopee, Massachusetts would work. As the interest given to the issue of child labor in
47 For examples, see M anufacturers’ Record, vol. 25, no. 8 and vol. 26, no. 8; Com m ercial 
Bulletin , 28 September 1894 and 19 January 1895; Gadsden Times-News, 3 May 1895.
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Operatives outside o f  the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill, ca. 1900. Note the large 
group o f  children in the foreground on the left, and the boys by the door on the right. (Courtesy Gadsden 
Public Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
southern textiles increased, Alabama City Agent R. A. Mitchell thought it “best not to 
give notice to the fact that we are working . . . small help” so that the company could 
avoid criticism from anti-child labor advocates.48 Nevertheless, he aggressively lobbied 
and openly gave testimony before state legislative committees and was integral in the 
defeats of child labor measures during Alabama’s 1897-1898 and the 1900-1901 state 
legislative sessions.
During these years, likewise, state politicians and industrial boosters continued to 
argue that Alabama’s future economic success was inextricably tied to the state’s ability 
to draw investments of northern textile capital there. State politicians and boosters used
48 R. A. Mitchell, Alabama City Agent to J. Howard Nichols, Treasurer, 11 May 1897, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-1.
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the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s decision to build its southern branch plant in 
Alabama City after the repeal of Alabama’s single piece of industrial regulatory 
legislation as proof that the attraction of New England textile dollars to Alabama would 
come about only if  the state and its citizens protected the “advantages” o f cheap labor and 
unregulated working hours. This corporate strategy of escaping both regulatory 
legislation and a union presence through capital mobility, informed and drove the defense 
of the employment of children made by owners of Massachusetts corporations with 
southern branch factories. Pro-child labor reform activists, however, targeted the Dwight 
Company’s involvement in perpetuating Alabama’s laissez-faire status quo as an example 
of how the success of the state’s textile industry, so strongly linked to the ability to attract 
mobile capital there, rested on a foundation that was inherently exploitative.
The purposes and implications of capital mobility vis-a-vis the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company’s employment of children in the operation o f its Alabama City 
mill were important elements in the 1902-1903 campaign for child labor regulation in 
Alabama.49 By targeting a northern company, Alabama reformers were able to articulate
49 Historians o f  early twentieth-century anti-child labor movements have extensively discussed the 
criticisms made by organized labor and child labor reformers against the employment o f  children in textile 
mills, including northern-owned ones, in the South. This early historiography o f  child labor reform is 
dominated by a good versus evil paradigm. Elizabeth Davidson in Child Labor Legislation in the Southern 
Textile States and Walter Trattner in Crusade fo r  the Children forward arguments that humanitarian 
interests motivated reformers to seek protective labor legislation for children employed in industries, while 
corporate greed and desires for high profits drove manufacturers to block the passage o f  effective 
legislation. Recent studies, however, have drawn a more complicated picture o f  the early-twentieth century 
child labor debates in the South. Whereas Davidson and Trattner glossed over the issue o f  how southern 
mill operatives themselves thought about child labor and proposals for reform legislation prior to World 
War I, historians such as David Carlton, the authors o f  Like a Family, Cathy McHugh, Wayne Flynt, and I. 
A. Newby, among others, have ably shown how working as a child to help one’s family was normative on 
southern farms, and that this often simply shifted to the factory when families moved into textile villages. 
These scholars have also described how parents o f  cotton mill children regularly expressed their wishes that 
their sons and daughters could attend school, but poverty and a desire to be able to choose for themselves 
when to allow children to begin working, led many cotton mill operatives to reject reformers’ attempts to 
eradicate child labor through regulatory legislation. See David Carlton, M ill and Town in South Carolina, 
1880-1920  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982); Hall, et al., Like a Family, Cathy
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their pro-regulation message in sectional terms. They criticized Dwight’s employment of 
children as a key element of the company’s strategy of tapping into the South’s 
manufacturing advantages to keep its Massachusetts mills viable. In doing so, child labor 
reformers critiqued Alabama’s overall industrial development tactic of attracting 
investments from manufacturing interests that were seeking to escape stringent labor 
regulations elsewhere. The goal of the Alabama child labor reformers was not to stifle 
investments of northern firms in the state’s industries. They hoped, instead, to make a 
case for state mandated child labor regulations by cultivating a public opinion whereby it 
would be considered irresponsible and unacceptable for the owners of New England 
textile companies and the state’s political leadership to build Alabama’s industrial base, 
in the words of Irene Ashby, “on the ruin of little children.”50
Edgar Gardner Murphy, as leader of the Alabama Child Labor Committee, and 
Ashby, speaking for the American Federation of Labor, knew that they had to be careful 
in their criticisms of the use of child labor in southern textile mills. In order to secure 
legislation that would regulate the working conditions in the state’s textile industry, a 
strong pro-reform public opinion would be required to effectively check the power that 
manufacturers exerted at the statehouse. But, many Alabamians, poor and wealthy alike, 
embraced owners of textile mills as public benefactors and saw the textile industry as a 
positive good by providing jobs and forwarding the economic development of the state. 
Indeed, for the overwhelming majority o f textile operatives, the labor o f their children 
was essential for familial economic stability and, therefore, they saw mill owners who
McHugh, M ill Fam ily, Wayne Flynt, Poor But Proud: A labam a's Poor Whites (Tuscaloosa: University o f  
Alabama Press, 1989); I. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the New South.
50 A m erican Federationist, vol. 8, no. 5.
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gave work to all family members in a favorable light. To cultivate widespread support 
for regulatory legislation it became necessary, therefore, for the reformers to avoid 
disparaging all southern mill owners, but instead, to attack those seen as the most flagrant 
abusers of the state’s industrial system. For Alabama’s child labor reformers, the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company’s operations in Alabama City, by virtue of being a 
Massachusetts-owned business that located in the South expressly to avoid the regulatory 
laws in New England, was a perfect target.51
Edgar Gardner Murphy openly blamed the Dwight Manufacturing Company and 
the lobbying efforts o f Alabama City Agent, R. A. Mitchell for the 1894 repeal of 
Alabama’s 1887 hours and education law and the failure of the 1901 child labor bill. 
Hoping to begin a public discussion about the Dwight Company’s role in squelching 
child labor reform in Alabama, as well as to make use of reform-minded New 
Englanders’ ire against the unregulated working conditions found throughout the 
southern textile industry, in October 1901 Murphy and supporters of the Alabama Child 
Labor Committee brought their case against the Dwight Company to the “people and 
press” of New England. In an editorial penned by Edgar Gardner Murphy, Alabama 
child labor reformers publicly singled out and rebuked the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company and its corporate strategy of building and operating a mill in the South to avoid 
Massachusetts labor regulations. Murphy shrewdly played upon sectional sentiments as a 
way to generate inter-regional support for the passage of child labor legislation in 
Alabama. He called into question the “reputation of Massachusetts and New England as
51 Dewey Grantham notes that reformers were careful to attack child labor, not the southern textile 
industrialists themselves who employed child labor, as a way to cultivate support for regulatory laws 
without directly challenging the perceptions o f  those who viewed southern mill owners as generous 
regional developers. See Grantham, Southern Progressivism , 185.
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a center of enlightenment and of humanity in industrial legislations,” arguing that the 
dearth of active support for the efforts of the Alabama Child Labor Committee implied 
New Englanders’ consent for the Dwight Company’s use of child labor in its Alabama 
City mill. At the same time, however, he anticipated that editors of Alabama newspapers 
would comment on this appeal to New Englanders and, by doing so, would force 
Alabamians to engage with the question of why they should continue to allow northern- 
owned textile concerns to exploit southern children. “This capital,” Murphy pointed out 
to his New England and southern audiences, “is doing here what it dare not do at 
home.”52
Dwight Manufacturing Company Treasurer J. Howard Nichols responded to the 
Murphy editorial with one of his own. Nichols attempted to assuage public opinion in 
both Massachusetts and Alabama regarding Dwight’s operation of a southern branch 
plant and its use of child labor there. Nichols said that he and the corporate officers of 
the Dwight Company were personally against the employment of children under twelve 
years old in the Alabama City mill because they “were not intelligent enough to do good 
work” and were ultimately unprofitable. Nevertheless, he noted, the company did hire 
children because their parents forced the company to do so, as they would leave Alabama 
City to find work in other mills where the entire family could find gainful employment. 
The Dwight Company, according to Nichols, made the best of a bad situation created by 
southern operatives themselves who forced the company to hire children, not by 
Dwight’s own policy of employing children at young ages as a way to tie them to the 
company and help to perpetuate the workforce. “There is nothing within the mill or out,” 
Nichols argued, “of which any citizen of Massachusetts need be ashamed,” pointing out
52 Boston Evening Transcript, 23 October 1901.
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the fact that the company supported the local school and built and maintained a library 
and church for the Alabama City mill operatives. Nichols contended that the Dwight 
Company did not build a branch factory in the South as a means of capitalizing on the 
unregulated state of the textile industry there but as a way to help raise the standards of 
living for the downtrodden mountain farmers who had “hitherto been deprived of needed 
comforts and largely of elementary advantages.” Dwight City again became a public 
relations tool. “From the inception of this enterprise,” Nichols asserted, “the purpose has 
been to build up a model town that should be an object lesson to the South, and we are 
assured that its influences have been helpful.” In Nichols’ portrayal of the situation, the 
owners and managers of the Dwight Manufacturing Company were not the profit-hungry, 
child-exploiting, carpet-bagging industrialists that Edgar Gardner Murphy described, but 
entrepreneurial philanthropists and regional benefactors who just happened to be from 
Massachusetts.53
J. Howard Nichols, likewise, couched the Dwight Company’s opposition to child 
labor legislation in Alabama as an attempt to protect the state from labor unions and 
restrictions destined to undermine Alabama’s competitiveness with other southern textile 
states. According to Nichols, the Dwight Company and other New England 
manufacturers operating mills in Alabama were not against child labor legislation per se, 
but were opposed to legislation initiated by organized labor and were against regulations 
in Alabama without the enactment of similar restrictions in Georgia and North and South
53 Boston Evening Transcript, 30 October 1901. The Alabama Child Labor Committee published 
and distributed the Murphy editorial and the ensuing debate between Murphy, Nichols, and Horace Sears in 
pamphlet form as C hild Labor in Alabama, A Correspondence: A Discussion o f  New  E n g la n d ’s Part in the 
Common Responsibility fo r  the Child-Labor Conditions o f  the South  (Montgomery: Alabama Child Labor 
Committee, 1902) and reprinted in Edgar Gardner Murphy, Problems o f  the Present South: A D iscussion o f  
Certain o f  the Educational, Industrial and  Political Issues in the Southern States  (New York: MacMillan
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Carolina. Using Irene Ashby as an example and playing on the hostility many 
southerners felt toward labor unions, Nichols tried to discredit the child labor reform 
campaign as non-southern in origin and made the case that northern interests 
unconcerned with the welfare of southern operatives but focused on inciting “labor 
troubles” in the region started the movement.54
The Dwight Manufacturing Company, Nichols emphasized, was in a unique 
position to know, first hand, the damage that unions and union-initiated legislation could 
do to companies competing with unregulated mills. But, Nichols was careful to point 
out, the Dwight Company was not the initiator of the campaign against the 1901 child 
labor bill but only a supporter of the opposition begun by native Alabamians. “As they 
recognized that this bill was only the entering wedge,” Nichols wrote, “they determined 
that action must come from within the State, and not outside. . . . [T]he manufacturers 
selected among others our agent, a native Alabamian, to appear before the legislative 
committee, with the result that the bill was defeated.” Nichols attempted to disarm Edgar 
Gardner Murphy’s sectional argument that New Englanders were to blame for the child 
labor situation in Alabama, by stigmatizing the child labor reform movement, not the 
manufacturers’ anti-reform campaign as caused by “outside interference.”55
In a rejoinder, Edgar Gardner Murphy rejected the arguments made by J. Howard 
Nichols, especially those that attempted to shift the blame for the failure of Alabama 
child labor reform away from the Dwight Company and onto parents who forced mills to 
hire their children, and onto union agitators seeking to maliciously disrupt Alabama’s
Company, 1904), 309-329. On the Murphy-Nichols-Sears correspondences, also see Davidson, Child  
Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 33-36; Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 182-183.
54 Boston Evening Transcript, 30 October 1901.
55 Ibid.
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laissez-faire status quo. Murphy again stressed the fact that it was the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company which was truly the outsider, and that while the Dwight 
Company had a native Alabamian as the Agent of its Alabama City mill, it was first and 
foremost a Massachusetts corporation managed at its highest echelons by New 
Englanders. Murphy called into question the argument made by J. Howard Nichols that 
he felt child labor was economically and socially unwise, asking, “Who, then, is the 
responsible representative of the actual policy of the Alabama City Mill— its Treasurer or 
its representative before The Legislature? . . . [W]hy should the paid and delegated agent 
of that mill labor here for weeks to thwart a simple legislative remedy for the abuses he 
deplores?” Noting that Massachusetts laws outlawed the employment of children under 
fourteen years old, Murphy argued that it was not too much to ask the Dwight Company 
to allow Alabama to protect its children at twelve. “Is this too drastic a demand,” he 
queried, “upon the exceptional philanthropy of the mill at Alabama City?” Murphy 
astutely downplayed the role that organized labor played in the reform agitation, saying 
that although he and the Alabama Child Labor Committee were thankful for the support 
of the American Federation of Labor and Irene Ashby, they, not non-southern labor 
agitators, bore primary responsibility for the movement for regulatory legislation. 
“Nothing could be more baseless,” Murphy contended, “than the assumption that our 
local effort for reforms is due to outside forces.”56
Horace Sears, Treasurer of the Massachusetts owned West Point Manufacturing 
Company located in Langdale, Alabama joined the Murphy-Nichols debate, arguing that 
any child labor legislation in Alabama would be premature without a compulsory 
education law being enacted first and without the passage of similar legislation in the
56 Boston Evening Transcript, 2 November 1901.
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other textile states. Sears underscored Nichols’ position that child labor was a necessary 
evil with which Alabama textile manufacturers had to deal if they did not want to lose 
their labor force to mills that would hire children and parents together. Alabama 
industrialists, noted Sears, did not want to employ young children but did so in a spirit of 
philanthropy, “simply rendering willing service in our turn to those who are faithfully 
serving us.” He further contended that the outrage of the child labor reformers was 
misplaced. “I rub my eyes and wonder,” Sears proclaimed, “whether the animus of this 
appeal . . .  is that o f ignorance, or of mischievous labor agitation, or of sectional hatred, 
which we had hoped was long since deservedly laid away in its grave-clothes.”57
As was the case with those of J. Howard Nichols, Edgar Gardner Murphy 
countered Horace Sears’ arguments as to why Alabama should not pass child labor 
regulations point by point, emphasizing the importance of seeing Nichols and Sears not 
as public benefactors but as representatives of northern capital making their profits from 
the degradation of southern children. “I would respectfully ask, who are the more likely 
to make accurate report of the results,” Murphy remarked, positioning himself and child 
labor reformers in the state as the real humanitarians, “Mr. Sears and Mr. Nichols, living 
in Boston and directly interested in the system they defend, or a representative of the 
committee . . . who are passing their lives in Alabama and who have no financial 
connection whatever . . . with the system they attack?” Sectional hatred, Murphy added, 
was not to be found within the ranks of the Alabama Child Labor Committee but would 
eventually be aroused in Alabama against Massachusetts capitalists like Nichols and 
Sears. Ending his editorial campaign in the pages of the New England press, Murphy
57 Alabama Child Labor Committee, C hild  Labor in Alabama, A Correspondence  reprinted in 
Murphy, Problem s o f  the Present South, 319-322.
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returned to his initial observation that neither Alabamians nor Bay State residents should 
allow Massachusetts textile concerns to build branch factories or make profits from ones 
already operating that capitalized on the absence of regulatory legislation. “Our 
elementary contention is, simply,” Murphy concluded, “that the common conscience will 
hold, and should hold, the capital of Massachusetts to the moral and economic standards 
of Massachusetts.”58
The Murphy-Nichols-Sears debate and the publication of numerous Alabama 
Child Labor Committee pamphlets thereafter, catapulted the issue of child labor reform 
into the public discourse in Alabama in a way that previous reform agitation had not.59 
The debate and pamphlets generated widespread interest in child labor reform and made 
the public familiar with the arguments that reformers and manufacturers would use 
during the child labor agitation at the statehouse throughout the 1902-1903 legislative 
session. Murphy and child labor activists in Alabama continued to stress that they, not 
outside forces with the intention of harming the state’s textile industry, were responsible 
for the anti-child labor reform agitation, and that they did so to safeguard the future of 
Alabama and to protect the white children who labored in its textile mills. “The attention 
of the public was turned by lectures and press notices to the fact that this was not merely 
a state or even a southern question,” Irene Ashby, now Irene Ashby-MacFadyen, noted. 
“[T]he obstruction offered by these northern capitalists to the protection of children in the
58 Alabama Child Labor Committee, Child  Labor in Alabama, A Correspondence reprinted in 
Murphy, Problem s o f  the Present South, 326-328.
59 Pamphlets written by Edgar Gardner Murphy and published by the Alabama Child Labor 
Committee in 1902 included Pictures fro m  the Mills', The South and Her Children', C hild  Labor  
Legislation', and A Child-Labor Law, Why Legislation Is Better Than “Voluntary A greem en t” o f  M ills. For 
an overview o f  the arguments forwarded in each, see Davidson, C hild Labor Legislation in the Southern  
Textile States, 38-40.
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“Three boys, aged respectively 9, 8, and 7 years” (left) and “A little girl 6 years old” (right), from Pictures 
From Life: M ill Children in Alabama, a pamphlet produced by Alabama child labor reformers at the turn o f  
the century. (Courtesy Alabama Department o f  Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama).
South was a national scandal.”60 Richard Edmonds, responded by lambasting the 
Alabama public and press for “being played for suckers” and for supporting the 
movement for legislation instigated by northerners and labor agitators, and which would 
“cripple the textile industry in the South, [so] that a small factor o f that industry in New 
England might profit temporarily.”61
While Edgar Gardner Murphy and middle-class reformers throughout Alabama 
carried on their campaign to move public opinion to the side of child labor restriction, 
unionists continued their efforts to secure passage of effective regulatory legislation as 
well. Edgar Gardner Murphy, however, tried to restrain the American Federation of 
Labor from taking as active a role in the agitation as it had during the 1900-1901 
legislative session. Realizing that the passage of any child labor law in Alabama
60 American Federationist, vol. 9, no. 1.
61 Manufacturers Record, vol. 42, no. 6.
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depended on convincing the public that it was not being done at the behest of organized 
labor, Murphy urged Samuel Gompers and local union leaders to take a secondary, 
supporting role in the 1902-1903 agitation. Under the auspices of the Alabama State 
Federation of Labor which was established in 1901, unionists nevertheless, continued to 
actively participate in the reform movement. “Organized labor will take a hand in 
pressing the fight,” the editor of the Labor Advocate told the paper’s readers, “The State 
branch will act in conjunction with the National body in pushing the fight in Alabama 
and also with the Central Committee of citizens of which Rev. Edgar Gardener Murphy 
of Montgomery, is chairman.”62
As was the case with the Massachusetts State Federation of Labor, a primary 
objective of the Alabama organization was to secure the passage of legislation that would 
be beneficial to the workers of the state, and sought to do so through lobbying and 
endorsing labor-friendly candidates for the state legislature. The membership of the 
Alabama State Federation of Labor came mostly from the ranks of the skilled trades and 
from the United Mine Workers. Even without a large presence of workers from textile 
manufacturing, the Alabama State Federation of Labor lobbied aggressively for the 
passage of bills that would raise the labor standards in the industry, including the one 
introduced into the state legislature on 24 January 1903, designed to regulate the 
employment of children under twelve years old in the state’s factories and manufacturing 
industries and to create a system of factory inspection to monitor compliance with the 
law.63
62 Labor Advocate, 13 December 1902.
63 Journals . . . o f  Alabama, 1902-1903; Philip Taft, Organizing Dixie: Alabama Workers in the 
Industrial Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 31-33; Sheldon Hackney, Populism to 
Progressivism  in Alabama  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 239-247.
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This proposed child labor bill faced strong opposition from textile manufacturers 
throughout the state who sent representatives, like during the 1900-1901 session, to lobby 
against the legislation. The bill received a significant amount of attention in the press 
statewide. Favorable public opinion, cultivated during the intervening months made an 
outright defeat of the bill by the state’s textile lobby much more difficult than had been 
the case two years before. The manufacturers’ position, however, continued to hold sway 
with many politicians at the statehouse. The textile lobby countered Murphy’s 
humanitarian argument that child labor degraded the health and welfare of mill children, 
and the Alabama State Federation of Labor’s economic case that the use of cheap child 
labor forced a lowering of wages for all, with assertions of their own that the state’s 
textile industry would be crippled by the passage of such legislation, that the law would 
dissuade future investments in the state’s industry, and that the law would only open the 
floodgates to unions and more regulations.64
Facing the possibility of another defeat with the legislature not scheduled to 
reconvene until 1907, Edgar Gardner Murphy facilitated the introduction of a 
compromise bill. Murphy’s proposal received mixed reactions from reformers, unionists, 
and manufacturers alike. Child labor reformers throughout the country applauded the 
move, calling the compromise that could secure the passage of a child labor law “most 
satisfactory”65 The Alabama State Federation of Labor argued that the compromise
64 D avidson , Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 47 -50; G ran tham , Southern 
Progressivism, 185.
65 Annals o f  the American Academy o f  Political and Social Science, vol. 21, no. 2. Hereafter cited 
as Annals. Dewey Grantham argued that southern progressives, like Murphy and those associated with the 
Alabama Child Labor Committee, made compromises such as the one for the passage o f  the 1903 Alabama 
child labor law because they sought “accommodation and agreement” as the basis for “innovation and 
reform,” and due to an overriding attitude that while change was needed “extremism should be avoided in 
favor o f  change that was ‘gradual and slow ,’” so as to not fundamentally undermine southern social and 
political traditions. See Grantham, Southern Progressivism, xvi, 34.
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might “better conditions materially” and help manufacturing workers throughout the 
state, but asserted that it was “not the bill that should be passed.” The Alabama State 
Federation o f Labor conceded, however, that “the struggle to gain this much has been 
hard enough, in fact the task has been almost Herculean” and that its passage would be 
better than nothing.66 The southern industry press railed against the proposed statute. No 
matter how restrained the regulations or how lax the enforcement might prove to be, 
“There is no reason . . . why opposition to the law should be relaxed one whit,” Richard 
Edmonds o f the Manufacturers ’ Record claimed. “In the case of Alabama” he explained, 
“it is particularly important that no mistake be made at this time, for . . . if  the mistake be 
made o f committing Alabama to socialism, though ever so mild, the State will suffer 
from the mistake for four years.”
The compromise bill, nevertheless, became law in Alabama on 25 February 1903. 
The new child labor statue outlawed the employment of children under the age of twelve 
years in manufacturing establishments and factories, “unless a widowed mother or aged 
or disabled father is dependent on the labor of such child, or in case a child is an orphan 
and has no other means o f support.” It made illegal the employment of any child younger 
than ten years old entirely, limited the workweek for children under twelve years old to 
sixty-six hours, banned anyone younger than thirteen years old from working in factories 
and manufacturing establishments between 7pm and 6am, and limited the work of anyone 
between the ages of thirteen and sixteen years during these nighttime hours to forty-eight 
per week. The law required that employers of minors keep affidavits signed by parents or 
guardians on file certifying ages and dates of birth. Parents and guardians supplying false
66 Labor Advocate, 24 January 1903.
67 M anufacturers ’ Record, vol. 43, no. 3.
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age certificates were subject to fines of five to one hundred dollars or three months in jail, 
while employers “willfully or knowingly” violating the law would be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and fined up to two hundred dollars. As was the case with the first child 
labor law in Massachusetts in the 1830s, the Alabama statute was virtually unenforceable 
because o f the “willfully or knowingly” clause in the penalty provisions, and due to the 
fact that the law did not provide for the establishment or maintenance of a department to 
implement and force compliance with the act’s measures.68
After the passage of Alabama’s 1903 child labor law, unions and reformers in the 
state and nationwide continued to push for more strict and better enforced child labor 
regulations. The issue of New England textile manufacturers using child labor in their 
southern mills continued to be a predominant subject in the child labor discourse. “There 
is a wide difference in the standard of child labor legislation in the different States,” 
noted the Massachusetts State Federation of Labor, blaming the situation on “attorneys of 
the Northern capitalists who have large investments in the Southern mills— these same 
attorneys who in the Northern legislatures have raised the argument of Southern 
competition against more progressive legislation in Northern States.”69 The most 
“conspicuous opponents” of improved child labor legislation in Alabama, according to 
child labor reformer Alexander McKelway were “The New England companies that own 
mills in both New England and the South” who found “their dividends twice or thrice as 
great from their Southern mills.”70 Anti-child labor forces throughout the South,
68 Alabama, Secretary o f  State, Administrative Division, Acts o f  the Sixty-Second General 
Assembly o f  Alabama, 1902-1903. Hereafter cited as Acts of. . . Alabama', United States Bureau o f  Labor, 
Laws o f  the United States with Decisions o f  Courts Relating Thereto (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1904), 110-111.
69 The Liberator (formerly Labor Leader), September 1904.
70 Alexander McKelway, “Child Labor in the Southern Cotton M ills,” in Annals, vol. 27, no. 2,
265.
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however, found themselves battling not only corporations, like the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company who wanted to keep the unregulated industrial status quo in tact. There was 
also a substantial portion of the population that continued to see the owners of southern 
textile mills as local and regional benefactors, and those who supported the position that 
legislation was unwise until the industry matured to a point where regulation would not 
be detrimental to it. McKelway underscored the hurdles faced by southern reform 
advocates noting, “It is difficult for any one not reared in the South, to understand the 
interest and pride that this expansion of the cotton mill industry has caused among us.”71
With such regional factors in mind, the American Federation of Labor, state child 
labor committees and reform groups, and the recently formed National Child Labor 
Committee, sought uniform standards of child labor regulation for every state in the 
nation. These reformers based their model plan on Massachusetts legislation which, by 
1902, established fourteen years old as the minimum age for manufactory workers, 
banned night work, limited the workweek to fifty-eight hours for women and minors, set 
compulsory education and literacy standards, and provided for a state financed factory 
inspection force. Massachusetts statutes, however, were extremely advanced when 
compared with labor and education regulations found in the South. In 1902, no southern 
textile state had a child labor law. A year later, Alabama was the first Piedmont state to 
pass twentieth-century child labor legislation with its 1903 compromise law. By 1905, 
Georgia still had no child labor regulations. South Carolina had a twelve-year age limit
71 Alexander McKelway, “Child Labor in the Southern Cotton M ills,” in Annals, vol. 27, no. 2,
265.
72 Edith Reeves, “The Labor Laws o f  Massachusetts, 1902-1910: A Digest,” in Susan Kingsbury, 
ed., Labor Laws and Their Enforcement With Special Reference to Massachusetts (New York: Longman, 
Green, and Company, 1911), 311-314, 323-325; Trattner, Crusade fo r  the Children, 10, 47.
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for textile workers, no age limits for children of widowed or dependent parents, banned 
work from 8pm to 6am for any child under twelve years old, but had no enforcement 
provisions beyond sworn statements by parents or guardians attesting to a child’s age and 
four months o f school attendance. In North Carolina, state regulations outlawed the 
employment of children under twelve years old in textile manufactories and set a sixty- 
six hour week for all workers under the age of eighteen years. As was the case in 
Alabama and South Carolina, the North Carolina law did not include any mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with the regulations. “So far no textile state in the South has been 
able to secure legal provision . . .  to inspect factories and enforce the law,” Neal 
Anderson o f Montgomery lamented in 1905, “and until this is secured all legislation on 
the subject must be practically inoperative.”73
It was toward the end of securing effective inspection, and age and education 
regulations closer to those found in Massachusetts, that anti-child labor advocates in 
Alabama turned their attention with the approach of state elections in 1906 and the 
scheduled start of the new legislative session in January 1907. The Dwight 
Manufacturing Company remained a target for child labor reformers during these years, 
despite the fact that the Gadsden press declared at the time of the enactment of the 1903 
child labor law that “the Big Dwight mills at Alabama City were not affected . . . .  no 
child is employed below the age of twelve and in all the discussions about the 
employment of children the Dwight mills were pointed out as models.” Ignoring the fact 
that he had aggressively lobbied among state politicians in Montgomery to prevent 
passage of the child labor law, the paper noted that Dwight’s Alabama City Agent R. A.
73 Neal Anderson, “Child Labor Legislation in the South,” in Annals, vol. 25, no. 3, 494-495, 497- 
498; Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 275; Trattner, Crusade fo r  the
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Mitchell “was given a large share of the credit for the condition.”74 Dwight’s Alabama 
City mill, nonetheless, continued to receive substantial negative press from elsewhere.
In a series of 1906 articles that were later published in book form, Bessie Van 
Vorst conveyed her impressions of employment and life in textile mill towns throughout 
Alabama, including the Dwight Company’s operations in Alabama City. Van Vorst 
attempted to forward the child labor reform agendas of securing better education 
requirements, more effective enforcement of laws, and the cultivation of public support 
for Alabama’s child labor reformers even in the face of industrialists’ “philanthropy” in 
the mill villages. Van Vorst described how children under the legal working age of 
twelve years old were not only employed in the Dwight mill but had also quit going to 
school. “The system of ‘liberty’ in the matter of education precludes all question of 
regularity in school attendance . . . out of sixty-five children between the ages of seven 
and eleven, ten had to ‘quit’ to go into the mills,” Van Vorst wrote. “No child attends 
school more than three winters,” she continued, “and many of them come in for a month 
or two and at a time just to ‘rest up’ from work.”75
She expounded upon discussions she had with children who worked in the Dwight 
mill to show her readers how easily textile manufacturers could circumvent the 1903 
child labor law. An eleven-year-old girl who worked in the mill described to Van Vorst 
working twelve hour days in the spinning room with “piles” of other children who were 
ten and eleven years old. “They used to go in when they wuz five,” Van Vorst recorded 
the girl as stating, “Now they say they’re tweaulve, but they ain’t.” Questioning another
Children, 80.
74 Gadsden Times-News, 17 April 1903.
75 Bessie Van Vorst, The Cry o f  the Children: A Study o f  Child Labor (New York: Moffat, Yard 
and Company, 1908), 50.
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girl, a fourteen-year-old who had been working as a spinner since age eleven, on how the 
company could evade the child labor regulations in place, Van Vorst learned of the 
practice o f “hiding” small help from visitors such as herself, to the Dwight mill. “[W]e’d 
run out those tiniest ones,” the girl told Van Vorst, “Yes, hide ’em in the closets or 
anywhere . . . ,”76
Van Vorst went on to describe how the Dwight Manufacturing Company made 
the Alabama City mill village “as attractive as possible,” but chastised those who praised 
southern textile manufacturers and assumed that this meant that the company was “run
"'mM'
Three children in Dwight City, Alabama City, Alabama, ca. 1905. (Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, 
Gadsden, Alabama).
16 Van Vorst, The Cry o f  the Children, 53, 60.
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77almost on philanthropic principles.” Indeed, Van Vorst stressed that the Dwight 
Company provided their operatives with company-owned houses, a school, library, and 
recreational activities, not because the owners had a vested interest in the welfare of the 
mill hands, but instead, because an attractive mill village was one of the best ways to 
acquire and maintain a stable workforce. “[T]he difficulty o f procuring operatives and of 
keeping them is so great that it is an investment to make the surroundings as alluring as 
possible,” Van Vorst chided, “and it is cheaper . . . than it is to raise the wages o f two 
thousand operatives . . . .  where he makes ‘just too much to die and not enough to live.’” 
Van Vorst contended that textile manufacturers shrewdly used mill towns like Dwight 
City as business tools by draping them in a mantle of social benevolence. Therefore, Van 
Vorst concluded, the villages should not be an acceptable excuse for refusing to enact 
adequate and enforceable child labor legislation. Continuing to see textile mill owners as 
socially-conscious, Van Vorst asserted, was proof that Alabama’s citizens were willing to 
“have a generation of girls and boys among the poor, the future mothers and fathers, 
sacrificed, crippled, deteriorated, starved slowly to death, in order that the cotton-mill
70
industry in a single state shall prosper.”
Remaining a faithful supporter of the Dwight Manufacturing Company and its 
southern operations, the Gadsden press attempted to discredit the Van Vorst expose of 
Alabama City, calling the information “grossly overdrawn” and “full of 
misrepresentation gathered in a hurried trip.”79 While exaggeration played a part in 
reformers’ illustrations child labor abuses in southern textile mills, their portrayals of
77 Van Vorst, Cry o f  the Children, 56.
78 Ibid., 56-57, 102-103.
79 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 13 April 1906.
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children workers, the lack of educational opportunities, illiteracy, and low standards of 
health and safety to be found in textile mills rested on, what historian I. A. Newby called 
“elements of truth.”80 The facts remained that Alabama’s child labor provisions were 
wantonly and regularly disregarded by factory owners and managers, and that mill 
operatives often did not complain because economic necessity dictated that children, 
sometimes in violation of state laws, had to work in order for a family to financially 
survive. When the state legislature met again in 1907, reformers and unionists working 
for the passage of additional legislation raised the question of whether Alabama’s textile 
manufacturers should be allowed to trap the children of “lazy” mill parents in a cycle of 
illiteracy, poverty, and poor working and living conditions so that they could hold on to 
the “advantages” of cheap labor and long hours that the South had over mills in New 
England.81
Child labor regulation was a particularly important issue in Alabama’s 1906 
gubernatorial race. The front-running candidate, Braxton Bragg Comer, had been the 
owner of the Avondale Mills, a cotton manufacturing company located near Birmingham. 
Comer portrayed himself as a reformer, calling for better funding for roads, uniform 
standards for the regulation of local liquor laws, railroad reforms, and further limitations
801. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the New South, 496. On the practice o f  concealing under-age 
children in mills see Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 12-13; Grantham, 
Southern Progressivism , 190.
8i Reformers often blamed the perpetuation o f  child labor on the parents o f  child operatives as well 
as on manufacturers. They accused mill parents o f  preventing their children from attending school so that 
the child could earn an income at the mill as a way to pad the family bank account, questioning whether it 
was actually poverty or greed that pushed children into the mills. In a 1928 publication, the Alabama State 
Child Welfare Department cited two factors as the chief causes o f  children leaving school for work in the 
state’s textile mills: “(1) Some parents claim they are actually unable to support their families without the 
earnings o f  their children. (2) Many parents are ignorant or indifferent to the advantages which education 
and training would give their children.” Alabama State Child Welfare Department, Child Welfare 
Department Records, SP 165. Alabama Department o f  Archives and History, Montgomery, AL. See also 
Newby, Plain Folk in the New South, 493-516; Carlton, M ill and Town in South Carolina, 173-209; Hall, et 
al., Like a Family, 62-63; Flynt, Poor But Proud, 191.
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on child labor. His opponent, Russell Cunningham, as well as the Alabama State 
Federation of Labor and the Alabama Child Labor Committee, challenged Comer’s 
reformer image. Comer, Cunningham and the anti-child labor forces pointed out, 
employed children in his textile mills, contributed funds to the Alabama textile 
manufacturers’ lobbying efforts against proposed child labor legislation in 1900, was an 
outspoken opponent of the child labor bill introduced during the 1903 legislative session,
and was a key player in negotiating the virtually unenforceable provisions of the
82compromise act passed that year. Comer was, in the words of Edgar Gardner Murphy, 
“the most bitter opponent of child labor legislation I have ever known,” while the 
Alabama State Federation of Labor urged its members to carefully scrutinize the 
candidates’ positions on labor-related issues before voting, noting that Alabama’s 
ineffective child labor regulation “is one of the problems that MUST be solved by the 
people at the polls.”83
Braxton Bragg Comer, nevertheless, won Alabama’s 1906 governor’s race with
84over sixty-one percent of the total vote. When the legislature reconvened in January 
1907, representatives introduced several bills that pertained to child labor, the reduction 
of working hours in the state’s mills, and compulsory education. The Alabama Child 
Labor Committee, the Alabama Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the Alabama State
82 Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabama, 244-248,256-287; Davidson, C hild Labor 
Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 216.
83 M ontgomery Advertiser, 29 June 1906, quoted in Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the 
Southern Textile States, 216, and in Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabama, 277; Labor 
Advocate, 20 January 1906. The Alabama State Federation o f  Labor called for the passage o f  anti-convict 
labor laws, more stringent child labor legislation, the appointment o f  a factory inspector, and “better 
protective laws for workers in mines” at its 1906 convention. See Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, 
Constitution and Proceedings o f  the Sixth Annual Convention, 1906, 20-21. Hereafter cited as Convention 
Proceedings.
84 Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabama, 284.
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Federation of Labor endorsed a child labor bill, introduced into the House by Alexander 
Pitts o f Dallas County. The Pitts bill proposed a minimum age of twelve years old for 
employment in mills and factories but, unless the child supported a widowed mother or 
dependant father, set the minimum age for employment at fourteen years. The bill also 
required all children ages twelve to sixteen years to attend school twelve weeks a year, 
set the maximum work week at fifty-four hours, outlawed night work for children under 
sixteen years old, and mandated that affidavits of age must be filed by parents or 
guardians for all mill and factory employees under eighteen years old, as well as school 
attendance affidavits to be supplied by county superintendents of schools. Most 
importantly, the Pitts bill included an enforcement clause, providing for a governor- 
appointed child labor inspector who would be required to make examinations of 
manufacturing establishments throughout the state at least four times a year. No action 
occurred, however, on the Pitts bill during the winter meeting of the 1907 legislature.85
As they had done during the 1903 session, between the winter and summer 
sessions o f the 1907 Alabama state legislature, child labor reformers worked to gain 
support for better child labor legislation from the public and state representatives. Edgar 
Gardner Murphy again took the lead in the publicity campaign, writing an open letter to 
the state representatives in which he attacked the loose regulations of the 1903 
compromise law and the arguments made by textile manufacturers that the passage of any 
further child labor regulations would serve to injure the prosperity of the state’s cotton 
manufacturing industry and Alabama’s economy overall. Attracting investments and 
underselling New England manufacturers in the marketplace were not, according to
85 Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Convention Proceedings, 1907, 24, 43; Journals o f. . . 
Alabama, 1907; Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 218-219.
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Murphy and his supporters, more important than the health and welfare of the state’s 
child textile operatives. “Is it an advantage to Alabama to have the lowest age-limit in 
the United States? Is that the kind of advertising that will help us?” he asked, in an 
implicit indictment of the process of drawing mobile capital to Alabama. “[AJffixing the 
stigmas o f low standards upon our industrial activity,” Murphy continued, “is
depreciating the moral credit of the prosperity which we have struggled so long and so
86proudly to achieve.”
When the Alabama legislature met again in July, debates began over the Pitts bill 
in both the House and Senate. Textile manufacturers throughout the state, as anti-child 
labor advocates expected, lobbied in Montgomery against the passage of the bill. 
Reporting that the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City Agent R. A.
Mitchell was “in Montgomery ostensibly for the purpose of getting a line on the child 
labor bill,” the Gadsden Daily Times-News added that “all of the managers of the big
87cotton mills in the state” were also “on hand.” Manufacturers’ resistance remained 
strong but after compromises and an amendment proposed by Governor Comer 
postponing enactment of the law until 1 January 1908, Alabama had a new child labor 
law that included both education and enforcement provisions.
The new regulatory statute, passed 9 August 1907, outlawed the employment of 
all children under the age of twelve in mills, factories, and manufacturing establishments 
and did away with all exemptions for children of widowed or dependent parents; required 
all children ages twelve to sixteen years to attend school for eight weeks, changed from
86 Edgar Gardner Murphy, The Child Labor Question in Alabama: A Plea fo r  Immediate Action  
(New York: National Child Labor Committee, 1907), 6. Italics original.
87 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 18 July 1907.
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twelve in the original bill, during every year of employment; set the maximum workweek 
for all employees under fourteen years old at sixty hours per week, instead of fifty-four 
hours as initially proposed; made illegal the working of anyone under sixteen years from 
7pm to 6am and limited the hours employees ages sixteen to eighteen years could work 
between 7pm and 6am to eight; and required all workers under eighteen years old to have 
an affidavit of age before beginning work. Employer violations of the law would result 
in fines of fifty to one hundred dollars for first time offenders and fines of one hundred to 
five hundred dollars for subsequent infractions, while the swearing out of false age 
affidavits made one guilty of perjury. Finally, the 1907 law provided for inspection of 
“factories and manufacturing establishments wherein women and children work” by the 
inspector of jails and almshouses, obliging the inspector to conduct investigations “at 
least four times a year i f  practical,” and making the inspector responsible for the 
initiation of prosecutions against mill owners, managers, and superintendents as deemed 
appropriate.88
After the passage of the 1907 child labor law, popular agitation in Alabama for 
more stringent regulations and enforcement waned. The Alabama State Federation of 
Labor decried the law as “a huge joke,” and lamented the fact that the organization “did
• • o n  , ,
not recognize the bill” in its final form. Additional child labor reform in Alabama, 
however, was effectively sidelined for another four years due to the fact that, except for a 
brief special session convened by Governor Comer in 1909 during which three minor 
amendments were added to the 1907 child labor law, the Alabama state legislature did
88 Acts o f  . .  . Alabama, 1907. Italics added.
89 Labor Advocate, 9 August 1907; Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Convention Proceedings, 
1908,24.
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not meet again until 1911.90 In these intervening years, public attention throughout the 
state focused on other issues, such as the funding of better roads, railroad regulation, and 
prohibition. Many of Alabama’s child labor reformers were only marginally satisfied 
with the provisions o f the 1907 child labor law and were conscious of the disparity of 
conditions from state to state. Realizing the need for national labor standards in industry, 
they focused their efforts on securing federal child labor legislation.91 Unionization in 
the Alabama textile industry, moreover, remained negligible and because of this, 
according to the Alabama State Federation of Labor, there was no organization within the 
textile industry to force compliance with existing laws or capable of cultivating the
92necessary support for the enactment of better regulatory provisions. When the Alabama 
state legislature reconvened in 1911, state representatives took no additional action to
QO
strengthen the existing child labor and education regulations.
Despite the inspection and education provisions of the 1907 Alabama child labor 
law, textile mill managers’ continued resistance coupled with slipshod enforcement of the
90 The amendments, applicable “only to manufacturing establishments engaged in manufacturing 
or working in cotton, wool, clothing, tobacco, printing and binding, glass, or other kind o f  work that is 
injurious to health when carried on in doors,” required a copy o f  the child labor law to be posed in every 
such manufacturing establishment, and included changes to the age affidavits for minors whereby they also 
had to include the date and place o f  birth, and were to be filed with the employer and factory inspector.
Acts of. . . Alabama, 1909 (special session).
91 Senator Albert J. Beveridge o f Indiana introduced the first national child labor bill in 1906, 
attempting to outlaw child labor by making illegal the interstate transportation and sale o f  mined or 
manufactured goods by companies that employed children under fourteen years old. The National Child 
Labor Committee endorsed this bill in 1907 and numerous New England textile manufacturers supported it, 
but it was not until 1 September 1916 that the Keating-Owen child labor bill, based on the earlier Beveridge 
proposal, became law. It was declared unconstitutional on 3 June 1918. Subsequent attempts to enact and 
enforce federal child labor restrictions failed, as did a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
designed to give Congress the right to regulate child labor. For a detailed discussion o f  the movements for 
and against federal child labor legislation see Trattner, Crusade fo r  the Children, especially 87-92, 95-98,
119-142, 165-185; Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 350-370; Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the 
Southern Textile States, 250-268.
92 Labor Advocate, 22 September 1911. On the political implications o f  a weak union base in the 
South, see Simon, “Rethinking Why There Are So Few Unions in the South,” 482.
93 Journals o f. . . Alabama, 1911.
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act yielded only small gains to reformers and unionists seeking to remove children from 
the factories and place them in schools. In 1910, Alabama manufactories still employed 
2,003 children ages ten to thirteen, compared to Massachusetts where manufacturing 
employees ages ten to thirteen years numbered 279.94 As late as 1912, Alabama factory 
inspector W. H. Oates found over 1,900 children employed illegally in the fifty-four 
textile mills he visited in the state during that year. Although the Gadsden Daily Times- 
News reported that deputy factory inspector, P.P.  Hudson called the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mills “the best regulated and arranged in the 
south,” in the 1912 annual report of the factory inspector, W. H. Oates noted that some of 
the most serious child labor violations found by his office occurred in Etowah County 
where the Dwight Manufacturing Company was located.95
Mrs. W. L. Murdoch, Chairperson of the Alabama Child Labor Committee in 
1913, likewise, noted that without an adequate system of birth registrations, age affidavits 
were nearly impossible to disprove, and that “great laxity” was shown regarding the eight 
weeks educational requirement for employees under the age of sixteen. “[W]here the 
mill owns the school,” she noted, “the report of the factory inspector shows that little 
attention has been paid to this requirement of the law.”96 C. S. Wilkinson, Agent of the
94 National Child Labor Committee, What State Laws and the Federal Census Say About Child  
Labor (New York: National Child Labor Committee, 1915), 4.
95 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 20 May 1912. Oates also singled out Madison County where many 
mills were located in and around Huntsville, and Chambers County, located across the Chattahoochee 
River from the West Point Manufacturing Company in West Point, Georgia. W. H. Oates, Children 
Eligible fo r  E m ploym ent. . . in 1912, cited in Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile 
States, 226-227.
96 National Child Labor Committee, Child Labor and Poverty (New York: National Child Labor 
Committee, 1913), 125, 128. Murdoch’s observations as well as the factory inspectors’ reports 
enumerating continued employment o f  children in violation o f  state child labor statutes supports the 
assertion made by historian Daniel Nelson that factory owners, especially those in small or company- 
dominated towns, often ignored labor laws and that state inspectors “had virtually no chance o f  obtaining 
convictions against the major employer.” See Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins o f  the Twentieth-
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Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill in 1914, regarded the state’s child 
labor laws as little more than an annoyance. “If I understand it correctly in Mass., minors 
can only work 48 hours per week,” Wilkinson wrote to Dwight’s Chicopee Agent L. A. 
Aumann. “The laws here in Alabama regarding child labor do not conflict with the 
number of hours children can work—that is they work the same number the others work, 
which is 60 hours,” he continued, “The greatest restriction they have is that they compel 
the mills to dispense with the services of the children for eight weeks of the year in which
Alabama City school students and their teacher (center with bowtie), ca. 1915. (Courtesy Gadsden Public 
Library, Gadsden, Alabama).
Century Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920, second edition (Madison: University o f  
Wisconsin Press, 1995), 146-147.
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Q7they must go to school.”
Effective child labor regulation resurfaced as a topic of interest during the 1915 
legislative session. Again, middle-class reformers and Alabama unionists worked in 
concert to lobby at the statehouse to secure the passage of a more comprehensive and 
detailed child labor statute. Although these reformers wanted legislation that would 
lower the working hours of minors to between forty-eight and fifty-five per week, 
manufacturers’ resistance led to another compromise statute. The 1915 Alabama child 
labor law raised the legal age for children in “all gainful employments,” except domestic 
service and agriculture, to fourteen years old; outlawed the employment of minors in 
manufactories under the age of sixteen for more than eleven hours a day, six days and 
sixty hours a week, and between the hours of 6pm and 6am; and established numerous 
regulations relating to the securing and filing o f working papers and proof o f fulfilling the 
eight-week educational requirement. In the same session, legislators passed a 
compulsory school attendance law requiring children ages eight to fifteen years to attend 
school at least sixty days a year, regardless of whether or not the child was to be 
employed in a manufacturing industry. Enforcement of the child labor and schooling 
provisions, however, were sketchy at best. It remained the responsibility of the state 
factory inspector and a small team of deputies to scrutinize all the workplaces located in 
Alabama and to initiate prosecutions of child labor regulation violators, as well as to 
enforce the requirements of the compulsory education law. This situation continued until
97 C. S. Wilkinson, Alabama City Agent to L. A. Aumann, Chicopee Agent, 10 December 1914, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MM-5.
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the creation of the Alabama Child Welfare Department by act of the state legislature in 
1919.98
“History is now busy repeating herself in the great Southland . . . .  She will be 
compelled to readjust her hours of labor and open her doors to the trade union,” argued 
Charles Pidgin, Chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, in 1905, 
“History delights in repeating herself, and the South will not prove an exception to the 
rule.”99 Indeed, by the end of World War I, numerous fledgling textile unions existed, 
the employment of children in the textile industry was on the wane, and educational 
standards and literacy rates of minors were on the rise throughout the Piedmont South. 
Gradual compliance with child labor regulations, technological advances in the 
production of textiles, and a shift toward the manufacture of finer goods in Piedmont 
mills during the first two decades of the twentieth century, helped to facilitate the 
reduction of children working in southern mills. A wide gap, however, remained 
between New England and the Piedmont South in numbers of unionized workers, wages 
paid, and hours worked by those employed in the cotton textile industry, regardless of 
age.100 By retreating from efforts to organize southern unionists and turning their backs 
on attempts to create a viable organization below the Mason-Dixon Line after the failed 
Augusta strike in 1902, New England textile locals, through their inaction, aided the
98 Acts of. . . Alabama, 1915 and 1919; Alabama Sate Federation o f  Labor, Report on Labor 
Legislation and Labor R ecord o f  Senators and Members o f  the House, Alabama Legislature (Birmingham: 
Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, 1919); Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile 
States, 231-237; Taft, Organizing Dixie, 28-41.
99 Massachusetts Bureau o f  Statistics and Labor, Cotton Manufactures in M assachusetts and the 
Southern States (Boston: Wright and Potter Printing Company, 1905), 101-102.
100 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 59-60. On southern educational standards and literacy rates, see 
Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 256-258. For a brief overview o f the reduction o f  children in southern 
textile mills by 1920 and a digest o f  child labor regulations enacted in Alabama, North and South Carolina, 
and Georgia beginning with 1903, see Davidson, Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States, 
273-278.
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efforts of southern manufacturers to maintain the region’s non-union, laissez-faire status 
quo. This proved to be a fatal error for northern unionists in their attempts to achieve an 
equalization of regional hours, age, and wage standards through organization and union 
pressure exerted at the workplace. Because southern textile workers remained wholly 
unorganized, moreover, they could not force manufacturer compliance with the limited 
regulatory legislation passed in their states during the first two decades of the century.
The disparity o f regional conditions would be aggravated further during the 1920s 
when a long-term depression, lasting nearly twenty years, began in the textile industry. 
The industry-wide economic downturn, and the labor unrest that it sparked, made many 
New England manufacturers reconsider the strategy, embraced decades earlier by 
corporations like the Dwight Manufacturing Company, of tapping into the lower 
production costs found in the southern textile states by building branch factories there. 
The Dwight Company, however, having already taken this first step in the process of 
capital mobility, took the next one by closing its Chicopee mill entirely.
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CHAPTER V
“WE HAVE SEEN THE ARMISTICE SIGNED AND WITNESSED A GENERAL 
DEMORALIZATION OF BUSINESS:” THE DWIGHT MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, LABOR, AND CAPITAL MOBILITY DURING THE TEXTILE
DEPRESSION OF THE 1920s
In January 1916, the managers and overseers of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company’s Alabama City textile mill gathered with prominent townspeople for a six- 
course banquet to celebrate the company’s recent record output of manufactured cotton 
goods. “The record made by the mill has been most remarkable during the past six 
months . . . .  The parent mills at Chicopee, Mass., are running on full time and the 
Alabama City mills are fully as prosperous,” boasted Alabama City’s mayor, W. T. 
McCord. “[I]t is said,” noted the local press, “to have been one of the most enjoyable 
affairs . . . ever held here.” 1 During the years of World War I, the textile industry saw 
production and profits soar as wartime orders kept mills running virtually non-stop. 
Cotton mill operatives, likewise, saw their earnings rise, joined labor unions in record 
numbers, and looked forward to better times ahead. With the armistice in 1918, however, 
government contracts ended, the demand for cotton goods plummeted, and warehouses 
overflowed with unsellable stock. Throughout the 1920s, textile mill owners waited, year 
after year, for increased consumer consumption, better profits, and an industry-wide 
recovery. Prosperity’s decade proved instead to be one of depression for the textile 
industry. Mill operatives, North and South, saw the gains of the war years slip away with
1 Textile Manufacturer, 14 January 1916; Gadsden D aily Times-News, 10 January 1916.
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rounds of wage cuts, unsuccessful strikes, and open-shop campaigns used by 
management to eradicate unions from their mills. As the textile depression deepened, the 
mistakes of New England textile unionists in their past approaches to “southern 
competition” caught up with them. Decades of focusing on local interests had 
undermined a wider solidarity and fundamentally spoiled any possibility of a strong 
national union that could impose common standards of wages, hours, and working 
conditions throughout the industry. Indeed, many of these New England unionists saw 
southern textile workers more as threats to their wages and working conditions, than as 
friends with whom they had a common cause and should form a united front. Through 
the 1920s, New England operatives often blamed southern workers themselves, not the 
conditions under which they labored, for the successive rounds of wage cuts and mill 
closures that plagued the industry in the North. As increasing numbers of textile 
companies throughout New England looked southward, hoping to save themselves from 
bankruptcy, the UTWA found itself without a membership base or strategy capable of 
halting the movement of textile capital to the states of the Piedmont South. Nowhere 
were the implications of the UTWA’s virtual powerlessness more evident than at the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company. Dwight management used the open shop branch mill it 
had operated in Alabama City since 1896 to extract concessions from the unions 
organized at the parent mill in Chicopee and ultimately, to make the Chicopee mill and its 
workers expendable as the company struggled to remain profitable in the midst of 
depression conditions.
Hints of the impending 1920s textile depression were evident in New England 
nearly a decade before, when cotton textile manufacturers experienced a series of slack
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years during the 1910s. “Conditions in cotton manufacturing during the past six months 
have been deplorable,” lamented Franklin Flobbs, President of the National Association 
o f Cotton Manufacturers in 1911, “Mills have been running short time and it is estimated 
that during the past month production, both north and south, has not been fifty per cent, 
of normal.”2 As was the case with most coarse goods producers, the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company felt the pinch of these slow years. During the summer o f 1914, 
the Dwight mill in Chicopee began operating on a four-day schedule, due, according to 
the local press, to the “present business depression.” Unlike many Massachusetts mills 
that were unable to make enough earnings to pay dividends to their stockholders, 
however, the Dwight Company, because of its Alabama City operations, remained 
profitable. For the eighteen months from December 1913 to May 1915, for example, the 
Dwight Company made a net profit of over sixty-two thousand dollars, even though the 
Chicopee mill registered a net loss of over seven thousand dollars.4 The lower wages 
paid to and longer hours worked by the operatives at the Alabama City mill translated 
into a lower production cost for Dwight’s southern-made goods and profits for the parent 
company in Massachusetts even during a downturn in the industry.
By 1916, despite shortages of labor, scarcities of supplies such as textile dyes and 
processing chemicals, and higher cotton prices due to increased demand and crop 
destruction by the boll weevil, World War I had breathed new life into the struggling 
cotton textile industry. To meet the growing need for wartime cotton goods, textile
2 Transactions o f  the National Association o f  Cotton Manufacturers, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1911, 
45. Hereafter cited as NACM  Transactions.
3 Springfield (MA) Republican, 25 July 1914.
4 The Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill made a net profit o f  $69,631.15 and 
the Chicopee mill registered a net loss o f  $7,503.67 for the eighteen months ending May 1915. The 
company’s total net profit was $62,127.48. Journals, June 1911-May 1919, Dwight Manufacturing 
Company Collection, D B -11. Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard University, Boston, MA.
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companies throughout the country expanded their productive capacities by building new 
mill facilities, installing the most modern spinning and weaving machinery, and adding 
shifts. Within nine months of announcing that it would decrease its production to a four- 
day schedule, the Dwight Manufacturing Company in Chicopee was operating on a full­
time basis with the addition of a night shift, and gave notice that its 2,000 employees 
would receive “the benefits of better business conditions and correspondingly large 
incomes” with departmental wage increases. The company also began a major overhaul 
of its mill complex that took until 1922 to complete.5 Dwight’s Alabama City operatives 
saw their share of wartime profits as well in the form of wage increases and in village and 
mill improvements. The company financed the construction of a company hospital, a 
new school and post office, dozens of new homes, and a “modern” sanitation system for 
the residential district, and installed a dust removal system and new machinery, including 
nearly three hundred automatic looms, in the mill.6 Both the Chicopee and Alabama City 
mills were working on filling government orders for tent cloth by the spring o f 1917, and 
throughout the course of the war, the company shipped more than 1.2 million yards of
n
“grey shelter” cloth for use by U.S. armed forces. Even with wage increases for 
operatives in Alabama City and Chicopee and the substantial changes made to the 
Chicopee complex and to the Alabama City mill and village, between December 1916
5 Springfield (MA) Republican, 14 April 1916. The Dwight Manufacturing Company razed three 
o f its seven mill buildings in Chicopee, rebuilding and retooling two o f  them. Dwight’s corporate officers 
financed the project through the House o f  Morgan.
6 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 10 January 1916, 9 June and 28 July 1917, 3 June 1918, 5 August 
1919, 14 June and 31 August 1920; Southern Textile Bulletin, 30 September 1920.
7 Contracts, QM Corps, U.S. Army, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, DO-3. For an 
overview o f  how World War I impacted production and profits in the textile industry, see Nancy Frances 
Kane, Textiles in Transition: Technology, Wages, and Industry Relocation in the U.S. Textile Industry, 
1880-1930  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 31-38; George Brown Tindall, The Emergence o f  the 
New South, 1913-1945  (1967; reprint Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 56-59;
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and May 1920, the Dwight Manufacturing Company recorded the highest profits in its 
history.8
World War I not only created the conditions in which textile companies could 
make record financial gains, but it also stimulated union organization throughout the 
industry. After an absence of a decade, in 1912 the leadership of the United Textile 
Workers of America again turned their attention to the possibility of organizing textile 
workers in the Piedmont South. But, facing chronic shortages of funds, virulent anti­
unionism throughout the industry, the apathy of New England locals toward organization 
below the Mason-Dixon Line, and an inability to bridge regional, ethnic, gender, and skill 
lines meant that the UTWA’s commitment to organize, especially among southern mill 
hands, remained limited at best. In 1913, the UTWA employed seven full-time and three 
part-time organizers to undertake the work of unionizing the workforce of the entire U.S. 
textile industry. Between 1915 and 1919, the number of UTWA organizers in the field 
never reached more than thirteen.9
Despite these limitations, however, during World War I the United Textile 
Workers of America did see a significant increase in its membership as part of the overall 
growth of unionized workers in U.S. industries. Workers’ demands for better wages and
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, et al., Like a Family: The Making o f  a Southern Cotton M ill World (1987; reprint 
Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 2000), 183-184, 195-196.
8 Profits for the Dwight Company’s mills between December 1916 and May 1920 at six month 
intervals were $43,954.86 in Chicopee and $124,046.84 in Alabama City (May 1916); $98,265.46 in 
Chicopee and $85,659.88 in Alabama City (November 1916); $185,315.51 in Chicopee and $119,083.65 in 
Alabama City (May 1917); $119,502.19 in Chicopee and $224,125.35 in Alabama City (November 1917), 
$265,695.48 in Chicopee and $126,227.45 in Alabama City (May 1918); $87,099.68 in Chicopee and 
$126,197.09 in Alabama City (November 1918); $70,661.36 in Chicopee and $239,298.88 in Alabama City 
(May 1919); $151,189.48 in Chicopee and $513,498.65 in Alabama City (November 1919); $124,632.01 
in Chicopee and $698,981.38 in Alabama City (May 1920). Journals, June 1911-May 1919 and June 1919- 
August 1927, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, D B -11 and DB-12.
9 Robert R. R. Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 
1935), 137-139; Joseph McCartin, L abor’s G reat War: The Struggle fo r  Industrial D em ocracy and the
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working conditions, coupled with labor shortages and government policies designed to 
ensure steady production and labor-capital peace during wartime, translated into growing 
membership rolls, union recognition by some employers, and the eight-hour day for 
workers in several major industries. Although the most significant gains were made 
among unions, such as those in coal and the railroads that were under federal control 
during wartime, mass industries like steel, meatpacking, and textiles realized membership 
increases as well. Union affiliations in industries nationwide increased by more than 
seventy percent from 1917-1920, and by 1920 the UTWA claimed jurisdiction over 
100,000 textile workers.10 The UTWA did not have the resources to sustain an all-out, 
nationwide unionization campaign, but it embraced a strategy whereby established 
unions, primarily those in New England, pushed for employer concessions through strike 
threats while organizers were sent to individual unorganized mills where a walkout 
loomed or had occurred to take charge the conflict, enroll members, and establish new 
locals. UTWA members in New England, likewise, continued to fight for industrial labor 
legislation, and under the auspices of the Massachusetts State Federation of Labor, 
unionists from the UTWA played a significant role in securing the passage of a forty- 
eight-hour law in Massachusetts.11 Between 1917 and 1919 an estimated 40,000 southern
Origins o f  Modern American Labor Relations, 1912-1921 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 
1997), 166-167.
10 The 100,000 members claimed by the UTWA represented only ten percent o f  the entire textile 
industry workforce. This was a substantial increase, however, as a marginal one to three percent o f  the 
U.S. textile workforce were members o f  the UTWA from the union’s establishment in 1901 through 1917. 
Cletus Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune: An Interpretive H istory o f  Textile Unionism in the United States 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 21; David Montgomery, The Fall o f  the House o f  Labor: The 
Workplace, the State and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (1987; reprint N ew  York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 330-369; Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern Am erica  (Chapel 
Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1994), 63-75.
11 The Commonwealth passed a fifty-eight-hour law in 1892 and a fifty-four-hour law in 1911.
The 1919 Massachusetts statute limited the workweek o f  women and minors employed in manufacturing 
establishments to forty-eight hours per week and outlawed the employment o f  women and minors between 
the hours o f  6pm and 6am. Because o f  the preponderance o f  women employed in the textile industry and
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textile mill workers joined the UTWA, comprising the majority of the nearly 70,000 men
i 'y
and women who became UTWA members between 1914 and 1920.
By the end of World War I, the Gadsden, Alabama area had a strong union 
presence. Labor unions existed among the city’s carmen, machinists, sheetmetal 
workers, iron workers, blacksmiths, carpenters, moulders, electricians, plumbers, 
bricklayers, telegraph operators, barbers, motion picture operators, and printers, painters 
and paper hangers.13 The wartime unionization drives of the United Textile Workers of 
America, however, did not reach the Dwight mill in adjacent Alabama City. The 
longstanding anti-union climate perpetuated by the Dwight Company’s management, 
steady production schedules, rising wages, mill village and workplace improvements, and 
the dearth of UTWA organizers in mill towns free of labor conflict, meant that the union
the fact that no mill could function without them, the 1919 act, as was the case with the previous hours laws 
passed in Massachusetts, effectively extended to all textile operatives and made the forty-eight-hour week 
standard throughout the state’s textile industry. Massachusetts State Federation o f  Labor, H istory o f  the 
M assachusetts State Federation o f  Labor (Boston: The Federation, 1935), 82-97.
12 Flail, et al., Like a Family, 186-187; Janet Irons, Testing the New Deal: The General Textile 
Strike o f  1934 in the American South (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2000), 19-20; George Sinclair 
Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the South (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1931), 32-42. 
Unlike the AFL, the Industrial Workers o f  the World did not cooperate with the government or support the 
war effort. Focusing on the unskilled immigrant operatives that the UTWA largely ignored, the IWW, 
despite attempts by employers and the government alike to destroy the union, engaged in organization 
campaigns through the war years in several textile centers o f  the Northeast. The 2 January 1919 edition o f  
the Springfield (MA) Republican  reported that the IWW had organized an estimated 250 workers in 
Springfield during the winter o f  1918. The presence o f  the IWW in the Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee area 
led local businesses to propose “a campaign to fight the I.W .W ’ism and Bolshevism, which they fear is 
getting a strong foothold in the neighborhood” through “semi-weekly advertisements to thwart [it]” in the 
pages o f  the Springfield (MA) Republican  and the Springfield D aily News. When asked to participate in the 
advertising campaign in February 1919, the Dwight Manufacturing Company declined, arguing that a 
public campaign against the IWW in the local papers would only serve to give the union more press. L. A. 
Aumann, Chicopee Agent to Ernest Lovering, Treasurer, 26 February 1919, Dwight Manufacturing 
Company Collection, MK-5. For an overview o f  the IWW and the organization’s activities during World 
War I see Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History o f  the Industrial Workers o f  the World (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1969), especially chapters 14-17, and The State and Labor in Modern America, 63-69; 
Stewart Bird, et al., Solidarity Forever: An Oral H istory o f  the IWW  (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1985); 
David Goldberg, A Tale o f  Three Cities: Labor Organization and Protest in Paterson, Passaic, and  
Lawrence, 1916-1921 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989); Steve Babson, The Unfinished 
Struggle: Turning Points in American Labor, 1877-Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 
32-34; Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune, 21-24.
13 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 3 September 1920.
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did not gain a foothold among Dwight’s Alabama City operatives. In the Dwight 
Company’s Chicopee mill, likewise, labor-management strife was almost non-existent. 
Disagreements occurred over increasing workloads and the entrance of Greek workers 
into the overwhelmingly French-Canadian ranks o f the loomfixers but, despite the 
presence of unionized loomfixers, nappers, carders, weavers, and spinners in the mill, 
these disputes were resolved at the departmental level and no strikes or lockouts took 
place.14
The flush times of the war years that mitigated the potential for labor trouble at 
the Dwight Manufacturing Company, nevertheless, gave way to a return o f sluggish 
conditions throughout the industry by the autumn of 1920. According to Paul Seabury, 
during World War I the textile industry was on “a kind of week-end economic 
debauchery, with its inevitable gloomy Monday when normal peacetime conditions 
returned.”15 Wartime orders put an end to speculations that arose among manufacturers 
by 1914 that the cotton textile industry had entered a period of prolonged depression.
But, with the cessation of government contracts, many textile companies watched the 
price o f and demand for cotton goods collapse, and saw their accounting books revealing 
shrinking profit margins. “We have seen the armistice signed and witnessed a general
14 John Golden, UTWA President to L. A. Aumann, Chicopee Agent, 10 March 1915; and 
Aumann to Golden, 16 September 1915, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MP-5, Folder 9. It 
was the policy o f  the UTWA and the AFL in general to avoid strikes as much as possible during the war. 
Samuel Gompers insisted on this “no strike” policy as the means through which labor could extract 
concessions from the government and employers with assurances that production would not be hampered 
by AFL-led work stoppages. Many organized workers, however, engaged in unauthorized, wildcat strikes 
during the war to gain better working conditions, higher wages, shorter working hours, and union 
recognition. See Dubofsky, The State and Labor in M odem  America, 59-77; Montgomery, The Fall o f  the 
House o f  Labor, 330-410; McCartin, L a b o r’s Great War, especially 38-172; James Weinstein, The 
Corporate Ideal in the L iberal State: 1900-1918  (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 214-254.
15 Paul Seabury, The Waning o f  Southern “Internationalism”, quoted in Tindall, The Emergence 
o f  the New South, 56.
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demoralization of business,” noted National Association of Cotton Manufacturers 
President W. Frank Shove, “War contracts were canceled in wholesale fashion and the 
general re su lt. . . was that the market for textiles dropped from the high points of 1918 
to— in some cases— half the value.”16
The underlying factors of the textile depression of the 1920s were myriad. Tariff 
restrictions and the growth of textile production in countries like India, Egypt, China, and 
Japan as they began developing their own industries, meant a decreased demand for 
American-made goods in numerous foreign markets and severely limited the ability of 
American manufacturers to dump surplus goods overseas. Domestically, the new fashion 
of rising hemlines meant falling demand for fabric, and the introduction of synthetic 
fabrics such as rayon and nylon, cut into cotton textile sales nationwide. The rapid 
expansion of the industry that had taken place during World War I and technological 
improvements, furthermore, spurred overproduction. No widespread consolidations 
occurred in textiles as they had in other major manufacturing industries and this meant 
that hundreds of small firms competed for dominance in a contracting marketplace. 
Throughout the decade, overproduction and glutted markets became more severe as 
individual mills attempted to capture a larger share of the shrinking market by producing 
more goods at a lower price than their competitors. Overproduction begat 
overproduction and mill managers throughout New England and the South constantly 
looked for ways to cut their manufacturing costs. What followed was a decade of
16 N ACM  Transactions, Annual Meeting, 1919, 195-196.
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sporadic production, increased workloads for operatives, and rollbacks o f the wage 
increases and bonuses paid to millhands during the labor-scarce war years.17
Good times continued at the Dwight Manufacturing Company through the spring 
and summer of 1920. In May, the Dwight directors announced that stockholders would 
receive a one hundred percent dividend and that the company’s capital stock would be 
increased so that it could, in addition to the ongoing overhaul at the Chicopee facility,
• ISadd “several departments” to the Alabama City mill. The high profits earned by the 
Dwight Company during the war years, however, quickly turned into losses. “[T]he 
situation today is the worst since the decline began,” David Clark of the Southern Textile 
Bulletin observed during the summer of 1920, “and it seems that severe curtailment of 
output is the only remedy.”19 The first sign of the textile depression came to Alabama 
City in mid-September when Dwight supervisors informed the operatives that the mill 
would be closed for one week. “The reasons given for the closing,” the local newspaper 
informed its readers, “are t ha t . . .  the stock of goods . . .  are piling up in the warehouses . 
. . and a little relief is necessary at this time to relieve the situation.” When the Alabama 
City mill reopened, it operated on a reduced schedule of three days a week.20 Within six
17 Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A H istory o f  the American Worker, 1920-1933  (1960: reprint 
Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), 1-3; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 184-190; William Hartford, Where Is 
Our Responsibility?: Unions and Economic Change in the New England Textile Industry, 1870-1960  
(Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1996), 51-53; Kane, Textiles in Transition, 37; Bryant 
Simon, A Fabric o f  Defeat: The Politics o f  South Carolina M ill Hands, 1910-1948  (Chapel Hill: University 
o f North Carolina Press, 1998), 44-45; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 56-57.
18 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 18 May 1920; Southern Textile Bulletin, 20 May 1920.
19 Southern Textile Bulletin, 12 August 1920.
20 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 13 September 1920. The local press did not make mention o f  the 
mill reopening on a three-day schedule. An article printed in the Gadsden D aily Times-News on 22 
December 1920, however, noted that the mill had been “running three days a week for the past eight 
weeks.”
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months, the Dwight Manufacturing Company had gone from making a net profit of over 
$800,000 to recording a net loss of over $1.5 million.21
The textile operatives at Alabama City received the welcome news that the 
company planned to increase production and begin operating four days a week for nine 
hours a day, effective 10 January 1921. Dwight management, however, also notified its 
Alabama City employees that a new wage schedule would be in effect whereby all 
operatives would face a reduction of twenty-five percent and the total elimination of the 
ten percent bonuses paid to full-time employees during the war years. Dwight’s
Chicopee employees, following a month-long mill closure, saw their wages lowered by
22twenty-two and one-half percent on 19 January 1921. “The popular cry o f the 
manufacturer is ‘wages must come down like everything else,’ and this sounds logical at 
the very first glance,” noted UTWA President John Golden about the wave of post-war 
wage cuts, “they fail to remember, however, that the cost of the bare necessities of life 
have come down so little that the workingman up to the present time has barely felt it.”23 
Indeed, operatives bore the brunt of the textile depression as mill managers throughout 
the industry shifted the expense of mill losses to their employees by making wage 
reductions the cornerstone of their cost-cutting strategies.
During the winter and spring of 1921, the Dwight Manufacturing Company did 
not reduce wages any further but the Chicopee and Alabama City mills operated on
21 The Dwight Manufacturing Company’s net profits for the six months ending May 1920, were 
$698,981.38 for the Alabama City mill and $124,632.01 for the Chicopee mill, for a total net profit o f  
$823,613.39. For the six months ending November 1920, however, the company’s net losses were 
$413,206.10 for the Alabama City mill and $1,095,543.57 for the mill in Chicopee. The total loss over the 
six-month period was $1,508,749.67. Journals, June 1919-August 1927, Dwight Manufacturing Company 
Collection, DB-12.
22 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 22 December 1920; Wage Schedules, 1910-1920, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MP-5, Folder 1.
23 Textile Worker, January 1921.
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sporadic schedules. “We have impressed everyone with the importance o f getting the 
greatest production possible in order to keep costs down,” Chicopee Agent L. A. Aumann 
reported to Dwight Treasurer Ernest Lovering on the operations there, “We are reducing 
help to the lowest possible limit, and also shutting down departments whenever we see an 
opportunity to save a dollar.”24 The Alabama City mill, meanwhile, closed every 
alternate week until the mill began operating on a steady schedule o f five-days and fifty- 
hours every week in June. “This is the first encouraging break in the present industrial 
depression since the steel plant resumed operations the first day of May,” the Gadsden
9 Spress noted, “Throughout the district there is a distinct undertone of encouragement.”
Upon the announcement that the Alabama City mill would begin operating on a six-day,
sixty-hour per week schedule in late July, the local press happily noted that the company
had received several large orders, praising the Dwight Company’s management for
keeping “the mills running as much as possible to take care o f the employes [sic]” during
26  •the recent downturn in business. Operatives at the company, however, felt differently.
The sting of short-time operations, wage reductions, and chronic mill closures 
sowed the seeds of discontent among the employees at the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company’s Alabama City mill. “[U]p to a few years ago the standard of wages 
prevailing in the textile industry was notoriously low and once these workers have 
enjoyed a fairly decent wage,” John Golden declared, “they don’t propose to go back to
24 L. A. Aumann, Chicopee Agent to Ernest Lovering, Treasurer, 31 January 1921, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MK-5.
25 The effect o f  closing the mill every alternate week until the fifty-hour week began in June was 
that Dwight’s Alabama City operatives averaged only twenty-two and one-half hours o f  work per week. 
Gadsden D aily Times-News, 11 June 1921. The Southern Textile Bulletin also announced Dwight’s move 
to a fifty-hour week noting that “the big plant has had a struggle keeping in operation” due to the amount o f  
goods already stocked in the warehouse. Southern Textile Bulletin, 23 June 1921.
26 Gadsden Daily-Times News, 20 July 1921.
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the former low standards.”27 Like textile operatives throughout the Piedmont South 
between 1919 and 1921, the Dwight Alabama City millhands looked to union 
organization and collective action against their employer as a means through which they
could prevent management from undermining the wage increases and relative economic
28stability realized during the war years. The Dwight workers initially organized, not 
under the auspices of the United Textile Workers of America or any other established 
textile union, but with the help of the Gadsden local of the Brotherhood of Railway 
Carmen.29 Over one thousand Dwight operatives officially organized the Alabama City 
textile union at a meeting on 9 October 1921. By the next meeting held later that week, 
the union had applied to become a local within the UTWA and over 1,450 of Dwight’s 
1,500 workers had joined. “There was a large delegation from the car workers present,” 
the Gadsden Times-News informed its readers about the gathering, “and they are standing 
squarely behind the new textile union . . . .  For some time the organizers have been at
27 Textile Worker, January 1921.
28 Historians o f  the textile South have noted that wartime wage increases gave textile operatives 
the ability to more fully participate in the burgeoning consumer culture o f  the early 1920s and generated 
rising standard o f  living expectations among millhands, especially those in their teens and early 20s who 
grew up in mill villages, had little or no direct connection to the land as their parents had, and who saw 
themselves as permanent wage-earners. In order to protect the gains made during World War I, southern 
operatives were more willing to challenge management through collective action when mill owners, during 
the economic downturn experienced in the textile industry by 1920, began to rollback the wage increases 
and workplace concessions made during wartime. See Hall, et al., Like a Family, 195-196; Simon, A 
Fabric o f  Defeat, 43-44; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 58-59; Irons, Testing the N ew Deal, 26- 
27. Between 1919 and 1921, major strikes took place in Charlotte, Kannapolis, Concord, Huntersville, and 
Rock Hill, North Carolina, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Columbus and the Horse Creek Valley o f  South 
Carolina. On the 1919-1921 strike wave, see Hall, et al., Like a Family, 187-195; Textile Worker, August 
1921.
29 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 13 October 1921. In L abor’s Great War, Joseph McCartin 
discussed the importance o f  unionized skilled workers acting as “spark plugs” during World War I, 
initiating the organization o f  unskilled workers who did not yet belong to unions. A similar “spark plug” 
effect seems to have been present as the Gadsden carmen aided the Dwight Alabama City textile workers in 
their attempt to form a union during the summer and fall o f  1921. See McCartin, L a b o r’s G reat War, 105.
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work on this organization and last night their dreams came true, even better than it was
orv
anticipated.”
The Alabama City textile union struck the Dwight mill on Monday, 31 October 
1921. “Only 18 employees remained in the mill,” the local press reported, “and they also 
came out a few minutes later” in response to the firing of Dwight employee W. J. Mann
o  1
“because he was talking unionism.” It was the first collective protest initiated by the 
Alabama City operatives since the opening of the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s 
southern branch in 1896. Spokespersons for the Dwight union stated that “their members 
were standing solid,” and vowed to remain on strike until they received “recognition of 
the union and an increase in wages.” C. S. Wilkinson, Agent of the Alabama City mill, 
simply stated in return that the company was “marking time” and felt no compunction to 
bargain with the union as there was “a large reserve stock of finished goods stored in the 
warehouses” and “a very small demand for cotton goods on the market.” By Friday, the 
strike appeared to be over, settled “in a satisfactory manner to all parties concerned,” with 
Agent Wilkinson agreeing to the union’s demands if  the workers would end the work
32stoppage and return to the mill on Monday.
As had been its practice since the 1870s during moments of labor strife at its 
Chicopee mill, however, the Dwight Manufacturing Company had no intention of
30 G adsden D aily Times-News, 10 and 13 October 1921. Gadsden delegates to the 1920 
convention o f  the Alabama State Federation o f  Labor requested “all the possible aid to organize the 
different industries o f  Gadsden, Ala., and the surrounding territory,” noting that the only well established 
union in the area was local #1047 o f  the Brotherhood o f  Railway Carmen. It is likely that the organization 
o f  Dwight textile workers, with the help o f  the Gadsden carmen, was part o f  a unionization drive initiated 
by the Alabama State Federation o f  Labor. See Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Constitution and  
Proceedings o f  the N ineteenth Annual Convention o f  the A labam a State Federation o f  Labor, May 1920, 
120. Hereafter cited as Convention Proceedings.
31 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 2 and 8 November 1921.
32 Ibid., 2 and 4 November 1921.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
206
negotiating with the Alabama City union. When the Alabama City operatives arrived for 
work on 7 November, they found the gates locked and the mill silent. Although three 
days earlier Agent Wilkinson “gave his word of honor that there would be no 
discrimination between union and non-union employes [s7c],” he notified the union that 
the mill would reopen only on the condition that members “lay down their [union] cards.” 
Even with the arrival of Henry Etaugh, Second Vice-President of the UTWA, Wilkinson 
would not negotiate with the local and had the aim, according to the local press, “to fight
O'!
the union organization here and try to starve them out.” By Wednesday, with public 
sentiment in the Gadsden area strongly supporting the locked-out operatives and UTWA 
strike-funds being distributed to the Dwight workers, Wilkinson, fearing a significant 
community-wide backlash against the company, announced that Dwight management 
wanted to avoid a protracted conflict and would resume operations on a fifty-five-hour 
per week schedule. Union members, according to Wilkinson, were not required to 
renounce their UTWA memberships as a condition for re-employment. “[T]he Dwight 
Company will manage the working of the mill just the same in the future as it has been 
managed in the past,” the company’s official statement declared, “All we ask is that 
employees that go back to work will do their whole duty and be loyal to the company . . .
. and the mill will treat every one square that will do the right thing.” The issues of union 
recognition and wage increases, Wilkinson added, would be “arranged between the 
workers and the management as soon as these problems can be taken up.”34
Upon resumption of mill operations, however, Alabama City employees quickly 
learned the expectation of being “loyal to the company” meant that management would
33 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 7 November 1921.
34 Ibid., 9 November 1921.
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not tolerate a union presence among its operatives, and Dwight’s union-busting 
continued. The company engaged the services of labor agents to hire new employees 
“and as fast as secured, the old employees [were] laid off and the new help put in.” 
Wilkinson fired all operatives who would not give up their union membership, informed 
them that they would never be rehired at the Dwight mill, and ordered all discharged 
workers and their families to vacate company houses within ten days. Those who refused 
to leave their homes were threatened with prosecution for unlawful detainer and removal 
by force, and the company fined workers “for calling a new employee the usual name 
applied to a non-union worker who is employed as a strikebreaker.” The local press 
characterized the situation in Alabama City as “open war on the Textile Workers,” adding 
that even employees who “have been with the company for ten and fifteen years and 
whose work has been satisfactory . . . have been discharged with some frivolous trumped
o  c
up excuse to get them out of the way.”
The firings and evictions continued through December 1921 and into January 
1922, but members of the Dwight textile local in Alabama City were “still standing
'1C
together.” In February, the Dwight Manufacturing Company found itself beset by labor 
troubles in both its Massachusetts and Alabama City mills, with unionized workers in 
Chicopee threatening to strike. In textile mills throughout New England, precipitated by 
the imposition of a round of twenty percent wage cuts, a series of region-wide strikes 
occurred involving roughly 85,000 textile operatives in mills from Maine to Rhode Island 
and lasting nearly the entire year. Although New England mill owners justified the wage
35 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 24 November, and 1 and 2 December 1921. Two examples o f  the 
eviction notices given to fired workers appeared in the 24 November edition.
36 Ibid., 4 January 1922.
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reductions saying that, “Wages and costs of production in the South . . . were so much 
lower than in the North that northern mills were facing destruction,” UTWA President 
John Golden countered that southern competition was simply “a device for justifying low 
wages in New England, in order to continue big profits.”37 The primary issue for the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company, however, was not simply how to lower costs and 
wages to match southern conditions, but how to cut the wages paid to its employees in 
Massachusetts and prevent its Chicopee employees from striking as it continued its
* • 38campaign to eradicate the Alabama City union.
The Dwight Company, in January 1922, announced its intention to cut wages at 
the Chicopee mill by twenty percent. The Dwight loomfixers’ union was the first to 
vocalize its displeasure with the plan. Hoping to avert a strike, Chicopee Agent L. A. 
Aumann informed the union that he would be willing to decrease the reduction to ten 
percent in exchange for an agreement that they would stay at work. Upon receipt o f the 
news, the loomfixers told Aumann that they “absolutely refuse any cut down at this 
time,” and would strike if an agreement with management about the wage issue could not 
be reached. Behind the scenes, meanwhile, Aumann “got busy at once with the 
Overseers, and told them to take up the 10 percent reduction with their operatives to find 
out their attitude,” informing the Dwight corporate officers that he thought “that the 
matter was taken up at exactly the right time.” The mill supervisors found that a majority 
of the employees, after having “impressed on them the fact [that the] mill had been
37 Textile Worker, April and May 1922.
38 On the 1922 New England textile strike, see Textile Worker, February-December 1922; 
Am erican Federationist, September 1922; Hall et al., Like a Family, 196-197; Tamara Hareven, Fam ily  
Time and  Industrial Time: The Relationship Between the Family and  Work in a New  E ngland  Comm unity  
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 310-337.
39 L. A. Aumann, Chicopee Agent to Ernest Lovering, Treasurer, 2 February 1922, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MP-5, Folder 1.
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running solely for their benefit, when it should have been closed,” would accept the ten 
percent cut and would not support any walkout by the loomfixers. Facing a no-win 
situation within the mill and the possibility that loomfixers who were out o f work because 
of strikes going on elsewhere in the region would fill the positions should they walk out, 
the Dwight loomfixers capitulated.40
With the strike threat in Chicopee safely put to rest, Dwight management returned 
its full attention to breaking the union in Alabama City. Within a week of settling with 
the Chicopee loomfixers, Alabama City Agent C. S. Wilkinson announced that the mill 
would effect a partial shutdown and operate only three days a week, leaving the local 
press to wonder “just why the mill officials are taking this course as nearly all o f the mills 
in the east are out on strike.” The Alabama City union immediately began deliberations 
on how to “counteract” the move by the company and UTWA official Henry Etaugh 
returned to Alabama City with “full authority to order a strike.”41 What the townspeople 
of the Gadsden area and Dwight’s southern operatives themselves failed to realize, 
however, was that Dwight management was capitalizing on the absence of 
communication and cooperation between the unionized workers in its Massachusetts and 
Alabama mills. The company made the concession of only cutting wages in the 
Chicopee mill by ten percent instead of by twenty percent to avoid a strike. By doing 
this, it ensured that production could continue in Chicopee even as the company took 
steps to precipitate a crisis in Alabama City to finally rid themselves of the southern
40 L. A. Aumann, Chicopee Agent to Ernest Lovering, Treasurer, 16 February 1922, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, MP-5, Folder 1.
41 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 25 February 1922.
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union and the potential for higher wages and limits on Dwight’s managerial prerogatives 
that came with i t 42
Upon his arrival in Alabama City, Henry Etaugh of the UTWA cautioned the 
Dwight union against an immediate walkout and, citing the troubled condition of the 
industry, urged them to attempt to “iron out” their differences with the company. But, 
after enduring relentless harassment by management and nearly six weeks of operating on 
the three-day per week schedule, members of the Dwight local had had enough and 
struck the Alabama City mill without UTWA approval. Agent Wilkinson declared 
himself “in the dark” as to the reasons for the walkout. Representatives of the Dwight 
local, however, stated, “that a large part of the machinery had been speeded up so as to 
make additional goods, which would amount to approximately 25 per cent cut in wages,” 
and when coupled with the shortened workweek, it created conditions that “the owners 
knew they would not stand for.”43
C. S. Wilkinson, like during the 1921 strike and lockout, refused to bargain with 
the union, “giving as his reason that he would be giving tacit recognition” by doing so. 
The striking workers quickly found themselves in a much more precarious situation than 
when they struck the mill in 1921 44 During the 1922 strike, only about half of the 
Alabama City operatives left the mill in support of the union protest. In the months 
between the two walkouts, many union members had been discharged, while others
42 The practice o f  operating branch factories independently o f each other and exploiting the ability 
to continue production in one plant while another was on strike to mitigate the impact o f  worker militancy 
is also discussed by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison in The D eindustrialization o f  Am erica: P lant 
Closings, Com m unity Abandonment, and the D ism antling o f  Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books,
1982), 166; and Bryant Simon, “Rethinking Why There Are So Few Unions in the South” G eorgia  
H istorical Q uarterly  81(Summer 1997): 477.
43 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 19 April 1922.
44 Ibid.
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abandoned the organization and did not join the walkout for fear of losing their jobs and 
their homes. The UTWA national leadership, moreover, would not authorize the walkout 
and rejected the Dwight workers’ requests for strike funds, leaving the Dwight local to 
fight the battle on its own. No outpouring of community support occurred either, as the 
local press publicized the fact that the strike was unauthorized, and characterized it as 
“trouble” initiated by outsiders and “parties with sinister motives.”45 Within two days of 
the walkout, although Dwight officials “did not say whether the additional machinery 
was operated by returning employes [sic] or [by] help that had been secured from other 
sources,” the mill had enough operatives to run at seventy percent capacity.46 Wilkinson 
simply ignored the strikers and hired non-union workers to replace them. By May, the 
union was broken and Wilkinson had achieved his goal of eradicating the UTWA from 
the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill.
The purge of the textile union at Dwight’s southern branch occurred writ large 
throughout the textile industry between 1919 and 1922. Wage cuts precipitated worker 
militancy and management turned the sluggish state of the industry into a union busting 
tool by closing their mills and selling surplus stocks of goods while waiting out the union 
and hiring non-union labor to fill positions left vacant by fired union workers. Mill 
owners throughout the country chipped away at the wartime gains that had been made 
throughout the textile industry and, by the beginning of 1923, UTWA membership had 
declined nearly seventy-five percent, hovering at its prewar level.47 “The cotton barons 
are drunk with power,” UTWA President Thomas McMahon declared, “they are wielding
45 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 25 April 1922.
46 Ibid., 20 April 1922.
47 Montgomery, The Fall o f  the House o f  Labor, 406.
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the ax on organization wherever it springs up. They destroy the offices of local unions by 
putting them on the blacklist, and many of our men and women have trudged from state
48to state without being able to get employment.” Lewis Bowen, Secretary-Treasurer of 
the Alabama State Federation of Labor, lamented that there had never been “such a 
strong gigantic drive against the Organized Labor Movement” as existed in Alabama by 
1921.49
The attitude in the greater Gadsden community toward unionized labor soured 
significantly in the wake of the failed Dwight strike in 1922 and after a successful strike 
in October 1923 of the Gadsden Brotherhood of Railway Carmen against the Southern 
Railway’s car works. After driving the union out of its mill, the Dwight Company 
announced that plans were being drafted for an expansion of the Alabama City facility 
and the addition of three hundred looms.50 Later the following year, the Southern 
Railway granted union recognition to the Gadsden carmen but shortly after the strike 
settlement, a fire destroyed the car works, and the Southern Railway announced that 
instead of rebuilding in unionized Gadsden, it would shift its operations to other 
facilities.51 The lesson Gadsden residents took from the actions of the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company and the Southern Railway, was that in a union-free atmosphere 
industries would invest and re-invest, as Dwight did with its mill expansion and
48 American Federation o f  Labor, Report o f  Proceedings o f  the F orty-Third A nnual Convention, 
1923, 345. Hereafter cited as Convention Proceedings.
49 Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Convention Proceedings, 1921, 21. On the postwar open 
shop drive in Alabama see Philip Taft, Organizing Dixie: A labam a Workers in the Industrial Era  
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 51-59. On the open shop drive nationwide during the 1920s, see 
Bernstein, The Lean Years, 84-97.
50 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 13 June 1922. The Gadsden Daily Times-News also announced 
that the Alabama City mill converted its operations from steam to electric, noting that “the decision to 
electrify the big plant was made some time ago,” and was finally coming to fruition. See G adsden Daily 
Times-News, 13 December 1924.
51 Ibid., 11-13, 18-19, and 25-26 October 1923.
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improvements, but that companies, like the car works, would avoid areas where 
organized labor was strong. “If the removal of the car works will bring a realization of 
what is needed in the way of a co-operative spirit, then it will be a blessing,” declared 
Gadsden resident O. R. Hood, “[A]s soon as word goes out that there is a wholesome 
spirit of protective interest for invested capital. .  . Gadsden will grow as it has never 
grown before and there will be no way to stop it.”52
In 1923, the communities of Gadsden and Alabama City, and the state of 
Alabama attempted to reinvigorate their campaigns to attract new investments and 
manufacturing industries that, during the 1890s, had been successful in inducing the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company to build its southern branch factory there. While the 
state established the Department of Commerce and Industries to promote the 
advancement of agriculture and industry statewide, in an effort to affirm the public image 
of the Gadsden area as industry-friendly, over one hundred of Gadsden’s “leading
o
business and professional people” signed an “Open Shop Resolution,” in November.
“The enemies of organized labor,” according to Lewis Bowen of the Alabama State 
Federation of Labor, seized on the relocation of the Southern Railway car works after the 
1923 fire as an “opportunity and began the slogan of advertising Gadsden as an open 
shop town.”54 Returning to a key selling point used at the turn o f the century, community 
promoters sought to advertise Gadsden as a growing industrial city that had an abundance
52 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 2 November 1923. The Dwight Manufacturing Company, Gulf 
States Steel, and the Southern Railway car works were the three biggest employers in the greater Gadsden 
area in the early 1920s. At the time o f  the 1923 fire and closure, the car works employed 700.
53 In 1927, the state o f  Alabama also created the Industrial Development Board as a vehicle 
through which the state would work to secure the establishment o f  new industries in the state. On the 
industrial boosterism o f  the 1920s throughout the South, see James Cobb, The Selling  o f  the South: The 
Southern Crusade fo r  Industrial Development, 1936-1990, second edition (Chicago: University o f  Illinois 
Press, 1993), 64-70.
54 Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Convention Proceedings, 1924, 18-19.
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of cheap, nonunion labor waiting to be hired. The 1923 resolution proclaimed that 
through the open shop, “every man and woman in the lawful exercise of his or her natural 
right to earn a livelihood [would] be protected” but that “the right o f outside parties to 
interfere in matters arising between employee and employer is denied.” Representatives 
o f community groups, including the Gadsden and Alabama City Chambers of Commerce, 
the Kiwanis Club, the Business and Professional Women’s Club, and the Rotary Club, 
pledged their support for the open shop movement and established a committee to secure 
the signatures of all businesspersons not in attendance at the meeting.55
The Gadsden Central Labor union held a public meeting a week after the passage 
o f the open shop resolution so that the city’s unions could voice their opposition to the 
open shop movement. At the meeting, the union members in attendance argued that 
organized labor was not a roadblock to Gadsden’s progress and development, but instead, 
would help to advance them as strong unions were the only assurance to potential 
investors that mutual cooperation, not antagonism, would be the foundation of labor- 
management relations. M. J. Williams of the bricklayers’ union also emphasized the 
stability that unions provided by noting that organizations set standards by which all 
members had to abide. Various businesses and professions had “their organizations,” he 
asserted, and so should labor. Despite protestations to the contrary from the business 
community, the open shop resolution, according to A. C. Colvin of the carpenters’ union 
meant “the destruction of organized labor” in Gadsden.56 The city’s unions did not
55 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 2 November 1923. Historian Charles Martin argued that 
Gadsden’s pro-industry, anti-union stance, as evidenced through the 1923 open shop resolution, was a key 
factor in the 1929 decision o f  Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company to build a branch factory in Gadsden 
which would employ 1,500. See Martin, “Southern Labor Relations in Transition: Gadsden, Alabama, 
1930-1943” Journal o f  Southern H istory  47(November 1981): 547.
56 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 9 November 1923.
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simply acquiesce to the business community’s open shop strategy. Yet, although 
commended by the Alabama State Federation of Labor for “the determination shown by 
them in resisting the onslaughts of the open shoppers and the advocates of the American 
plan of operation,” no new organizational drives were successful in the Gadsden area for 
nearly a decade. The remaining unions in the area, primarily those in the skilled trades, 
could not thwart the return of the city’s prewar, anti-union status quo.57
“The Solid South,” proclaimed Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers' Record in 
1924, “means security for every manufacturer trembling under the whiplash of the
r  o
anarchistic labor leaders.” Postwar open shop campaigns such as the one in Gadsden 
were ruinous for the fledgling industrial unions formed during World War I. Overall 
union membership declined twenty-five percent between 1920 and 1923, and dropped by 
nearly half within a decade. The industry depression of the 1920s compounded the 
troubles for textile unions throughout the country. UTWA treasuries were nearly empty 
by the end of the 1922 New England strikes, and membership in the United Textile 
Workers o f America dwindled from a World War I high of ten percent of all textile 
workers to less than three percent by 1929.59
Part-time production schedules and ongoing wage cuts made it difficult for textile 
workers to afford union dues and for locals to build up funds that could support
57 Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Proceedings o f  Executive Board and Report o f  Officers, 
and F inancial Statem ent, 1923, 21. Dwight Assistant Treasurer James Thompson mentioned an attempt to 
unionize labor in Gadsden in a 16 March 1926 letter to Alabama City Agent Allan Little, noting that he 
“sincerely” hoped “the attempt to stop this will be successful,” and urging Little to inform him self o f  “the 
story o f the attempt to unionize our Mill help that was made some time ago, and the strike that resulted 
therefrom, also the story about the strike due to unionism in the Car Works, which writer understands 
abandoned because o f  labor difficulties.” James Thompson, Assistant Treasurer to Allan Little, Alabama 
City Agent, 16 March 1926, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, ME-1.
58 M anufacturers ’ Record, quoted in Paul Blanshard, Labor in Southern Cotton M ills (New York: 
N ew  Republic, 1927), 74.
59 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 84; Montgomery, The Fall o f  the H ouse o f  Labor, 406.
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protracted strikes or widespread organizing campaigns. Collective action in the mills 
throughout the 1920s became primarily defensive in nature, with periodic bursts of 
activity to protest wage cuts or increased workloads. For many mill managers, it proved 
more economical to completely close a mill and wait out potential or actual strikes than 
to give in to union demands, especially those for higher pay. Mill slowdowns and 
periodic closures created a pool o f surplus labor from which mill managers in New 
England could easily hire operatives to replace striking workers, while these factors, in 
addition to the glut of southern farmers pushed off the land as wartime cotton prices fell, 
tempered labor-management conflicts in the Piedmont South. As industry conditions 
worsened through the decade, one’s job was often too valuable to risk by joining a union. 
Strikes during the 1920s, according to textile union historian Cletus Daniel, were 
“[Ujsually taken as a last resort” as expressions of protest against ongoing degradations 
of labor standards “with little or no hope of being won.”60
Organizing in the textile states of the Piedmont South came to a virtual standstill 
by 1923. The national leadership of the UTWA, however, was not ignorant o f the 
potential consequences of leaving the southern portion of the industry unorganized, 
where lower wage rates and longer working hours gave textile manufacturers in the 
region an advantage over producers operating in New England. “The day is at hand,” 
wrote UTWA President Thomas McMahon a year earlier, “when there must be no North, 
no South—these terms have been used by the employers to enslave the workers—there
60 Daniel, Culture o f  M isfortune, 25. See also Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New  South, 334-338; 
Hall, et al., Like a Family, 190-197, 266; Simon, A Fabric o f  Defeat, 50 and “Rethinking Why There Are 
So Few Unions in the South,” 476. On the movement o f  southern farmers o ff  the land during the 1920s, 
see Gilbert Fite, Cotton Fields No More: Southern Agriculture, 1865-1980 (Lexington: University Press o f  
Kentucky, 1984), Chapter 5.
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can only be one country with the same hours of labor prevailing everywhere.”61 The 
difficulty, still, was to convince the unionized mill workers in New England that they had 
a vested interest in helping to bring the unorganized workers in southern mills into the 
UTWA fold. The local-regional outlook of the majority of New England textile unions 
that had dominated the UTWA since its inception in 1901, deepened in the early 1920s. 
Likewise, the greater part of southern textile operatives also assessed their situations in 
light of local conditions. They did not compare their wages to those of millhands in 
Massachusetts, but instead, to the earnings made by tenant farmers and other industrial 
employees in their immediate vicinity, proving itself a significant factor in their
62indifference toward the UTWA except during moments of labor-management strife.
The possibility o f beginning a southern organizing campaign continued to be discussed at 
UTWA and AFL annual conventions but, with no massive grass-roots push from 
operatives in either the North or South, all plans were tabled until “better conditions”
63prevailed in the industry.
The textile industry depression, chronic shortages of funds and declining 
membership, implacable hostility of mill owners toward unions, and the unwillingness of 
New England locals, many of which were themselves struggling to survive, to support 
southern organizing initiatives meant that southern operatives remained outside the 
purview of the UTWA during the 1920s and the disparity of regional wage and hour
61 Textile Worker, July 1922.
62 Wayne Flynt, Poor But Proud: A labam a’s Poor Whites (Tuscaloosa: The University o f  
Alabama Press, 1989), 102; I. A. Newby, Plain Folk in the New  South: Social Change and Cultural 
Persistence, 1880-1915  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 221. Flynt noted that on 
average, in 1924 Alabama textile operatives earned half o f  what Massachusetts mill workers made.
63 Resolutions regarding the organization o f  southern textile workers appeared yearly beginning in 
1921. See American Federation o f  Labor Convention Proceedings, and United Textile Workers o f  
America, Proceedings o f  the . . . A nnual Convention.
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A spinning room at the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Chicopee mill, ca. 1915. By World War I, 
Dwight had replaced its mule spindles with ring spindles. (Courtesy Edward Bellamy Memorial 
Association, Chicopee, Massachusetts).
conditions continued. The relative strength of UTWA locals in New England, moreover, 
dwindled as technological changes and the implementation of new machinery in mills 
throughout the region during wartime eliminated skilled jobs and displaced many of the 
workers who constituted the foundation of the industry’s union strength.64 As the decade 
progressed, “southern competition” as a threat to the future of the Massachusetts textile 
industry became, as it had been during the 1893 depression, a topic of heated debate 
between mill owners, unionized workers, and the state.
During the 1920s, textile manufacturers throughout Massachusetts pinpointed 
three causes of the deterioration of the state’s cotton manufacturing industry: higher 
wages paid to Massachusetts millhands than to their counterparts in the South, shorter
64 Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America,” 145-146, 280; Daniel, Culture o f  
Misfortune, 21.
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hours of work for textile operatives mandated by Massachusetts state law, and the higher 
taxes paid on Massachusetts mill properties than those levied in southern states.55 In the 
wake of the 1922 New England textile strikes, the Massachusetts Department of Labor 
and Industries found that the average hourly wage for Massachusetts mill operatives was 
$.41 compared to $.29 in North Carolina, $.24 in Georgia, $.23 in South Carolina, and 
$.21 in Alabama. In the textile states of the Piedmont South, moreover, legislation 
regulating working hours in the textile industry was scarce. Compared to Massachusetts 
where the forty-eight-hour week had been in effect since 1919, fifty-five hours was the 
maximum workweek in South Carolina and sixty hours was the maximum in North 
Carolina and Georgia. Alabama had no hours limit beyond stipulations that children 
under fourteen years of age could not work at night. The result of the paucity of both 
hours regulations and effective enforcement of them was that Massachusetts spindles 
operated an average of 165 hours per month in 1922, while monthly spindle operation 
averaged 273 hours in North Carolina, 271 hours in South Carolina, 254 hours in 
Georgia, and 249 hours in Alabama. According to the Massachusetts Department of 
Labor and Industries, the overall result of the wage and hours differentials, in addition to 
tax rates estimated to be over forty percent lower in the four leading southern textile 
states than in Massachusetts, was a production cost for standard print cloth in
65 Irwin Feller cited figures showing that eighty-five percent o f the difference in production costs 
between cotton textile mills in New England and those in the Piedmont South in 1923 were attributable to 
lower southern wages. See Irwin Feller, “The Diffusion and Location o f  Technological Change in the 
American Cotton-Textile Industry” Technology and Culture 15(October 1974): 581. Gavin Wright argues 
that the increases in textile wages that occurred during World War I were the key factor in the collapse o f  
the New  England cotton textile industry through the 1920s. Because employers could not take back these 
wage increases totally at war’s end, higher wage costs at a time when surplus production continued to drive 
profits down created the conditions in which many New England mills could no longer compete with 
southern made goods. See Gavin Wright, “Cheap Labor and Southern Textiles, 1880-1930” Quarterly 
Journal o f  Economics 96(November 1981): 619-627.
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Massachusetts of slightly less than $.29 per pound compared to just over $.19 per pound 
in mills of the Piedmont South.66
A crisis mentality, not seen since the depression years of the 1890s, swept the 
Massachusetts cotton textile industry in the 1920s. “The past year and a half has been a 
period almost of panic in our New England cotton mills,” noted Robert Amory, President 
of the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers, “Mill managements, stockholders, 
and a growing and thoughtful part of our general public have been deeply concerned over 
their future. . . . there has been practically no new construction. There has not even been
sn
sufficient replacement o f new machinery to take care of that worn-out.” Between 1920 
and 1923, as the building of new mills and expansions of old mills in Massachusetts 
stagnated, construction in the Piedmont South continued with 221 new mills and 
expansions in 1921, 480 in 1922, and 469 during the first nine months of 1923.68 The 
southern industry press, meanwhile, trumpeted the news of investments made by 
Massachusetts textile firms and the movement of spindles to the South, with an estimated 
$100 million of New England money spent between the summer of 1923 and the summer 
of 1924 on the purchase of existing southern mills or on the construction of new ones.69
66 In Massachusetts mills, the cost was $.2893 per pound compared to $.1925 per pound in 
southern mills. Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts, Department o f  Labor and Industries, Report o f  a Special 
Investigation into Conditions in the Textile Industry in M assachusetts and the Southern States  (n.p., 1923), 
2, 11; Massachusetts Industrial Commission, Report o f  an Investigation by the M assachusetts Industrial 
Commissions o f  the Conditions A ffecting the Textile Industry and the Problem o f  Unemployment in That 
and Other Industries (Boston: J. L. Fairbanks and Company, 1930), 14, Irving Bernstein referred to the 
protective legislation on the books in the southern textile states by the 1920s as “a hollow shell.” See 
Bernstein, The Lean Years, 10.
67 N A C M  Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1923, 204-205.
68 Tindall, The Em ergence o f  the New  South, 75.
69 Ibid., 76. The Southern Textile Bulletin  ran numerous articles on the movement o f  spindles 
from New England into the southern states between the fall o f  1922 and 1923. Among these were notices 
o f  the construction o f  a southern branch by the Appleton Mills o f  Lowell, Massachusetts, the movement o f  
the Lowell Bleachery, and the removal o f  30,000 o f  184,000 spindles to the South by the Pacific M ills o f  
Lawrence, Massachusetts. See Southern Textile Bulletin, 14 December 1922, 11 January 1923, and 6 
September 1923.
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“Some New England cotton mill men are hanging on by their teeth to what they 
have,” Richard Edmonds, editor of the Manufacturers’ Record, observed in 1925, . .
others have given up the unequal struggle and either moves South or liquidates.”70 Not 
all Massachusetts mill owners, however, were willing to relinquish their New England 
mills without a fight. But, unlike during the 1893 depression, the strategy o f switching 
from coarse to fine goods production as a means of escaping southern competition was no 
longer an option. The mainstay o f southern mills continued to be the manufacture of 
coarse cotton goods while limited numbers of New England textile companies converted 
their production solely to finer goods at the turn of the century. Yet, over time, the 
making of finer goods expanded in both regions until, by the 1920s, the South mirrored
7 1New England in its production of both coarse and fine grades of materials. Now in 
direct competition with the South in virtually all cotton textile markets, owners of 
Massachusetts textile companies not only cut wages, increased workloads, and began 
operating branch factories in the South in attempts to remain profitable, but, as had been 
done during the depression years of the 1890s, also looked to the Massachusetts state 
legislature to repeal existing regulatory legislation as the remedy for their problems.
“One of the principal reasons for this rapid growth [in the southern industry] is the 
assistance our Massachusetts laws have given . . .  by restricting our hours of work way 
below theirs,” remarked Robert Amory to a 1922 gathering of New England textile
70 Richard Edmonds, Cotton M ill Labor Conditions in the South and  N ew  England: Why Cotton 
M ills H ave Been M oving South  (Baltimore: Manufacturers’ Record Publishing Company, 1925), 6.
71 Kane, Textiles in Transition , 31-33; John Cumbler cited the switch made by a large proportion 
o f Fall River, Massachusetts textile manufacturers from fine to coarse goods in 1904 as a significant factor 
in the decline o f  the textile industry in that city between the 1920s and the 1950s. After a 1904 
mulespinners strike, many Fall River manufacturers replaced their mule spindles with ring spindles and 
switched to coarse goods production as a way to eradicate the mulespinners’ union from their mills. See 
Cumbler, W orking-Class Com m unity in Industrial America: Work, Leisure, and  Struggle in Two Industrial 
Cities, 1880-1930  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 138-139.
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manufacturers. “These laws are fostered by some workers who believe they can get 
something for nothing,” he claimed, “ It cannot be.”72 After World War I, Massachusetts 
House Representative Edith Nourse Rogers and Senators John Weeks and Henry Cabot 
Lodge introduced bills into Congress meant to establish a federal forty-eight-hour law 
applicable to workers in the textile industry but were unsuccessful in getting the bills 
passed.73 The UTWA had also made an attempt to establish the forty-eight-hour week as 
standard throughout the industry in 1919. Beginning on 3 February 1919, northern and 
southern textile operatives participated in walkouts to secure the forty-eight-hour week, 
but the campaign, which had been sidelined for the duration of the war, was ill-timed.
The sudden end of hostilities in Europe, the cancellation of government contracts, and the 
elimination of extra production shifts weakened the position of the UTWA. Some hours 
reductions did occur, but they often came as a result of sluggish demand and without 
corresponding wage increases. The 1919 goal of lowering the hours worked in southern 
mills where, according to UTWA President John Golden, “the hours o f labor are the 
longest and the conditions are the worst,” to forty-eight per week ended in failure.74
A key objective of Massachusetts textile mill owners in the face of intensifying 
southern competition and depression conditions throughout the industry, therefore, 
remained the repeal of the Bay State’s forty-eight-hour law. Paid representatives of 
individual companies and lobbyists for the Arkwright Club, began a concerted effort to 
convince the state legislature that revoking the forty-eight-hour law was the only way to
72 NACM  Transactions, Annual Meeting, 1922, 289-290, 292.
73 David Koistinen, “Dealing With Deindustrialization: Economics, Politics, and Policy During the 
Decline o f  the N ew  England Textile Industry, 1920-1960” (Ph.D. d iss.,Y ale University 1999), 136-137.
74 In 1919, the average workweek in the southern textile states was sixty hours compared to forty- 
eight in Massachusetts and fifty-four in New Hampshire and Rhode Island. John Golden, UTW A President 
to Frank Morrison, UTWA Treasurer, 26 February 1919, American Federation o f  Labor, Samuel Gompers
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save the Massachusetts industry from ruin.75 “[B]y the action of its own Legislature, 
cotton manufacturing in Massachusetts is doomed to fold up unless its labor laws are 
changed,” the American Wool and Cotton Reporter asserted, “Under the 48 hour law the 
cotton mills of the State are bleeding to death.” Continuance of the law, editors of the 
Commercial Bulletin argued, would be a “very regrettable step and likely to cause a
• 7 ftfurther exodus of New England’s manufacturing facilities.” The Arkwright Club 
succeeded in having bills introduced into the Massachusetts legislature to repeal the 
forty-eight-hour law throughout the 1920s, trying to persuade representatives that without 
a change in the law, mills throughout the state would be forced to move their operations 
to the South or go out of business completely.
Characterizing the threatened mill closures as “a smoke screen to hide the real 
facts,” and members of the Arkwright Club as “members of the most soulless, un- 
American, plutocratic combination in existence today in these United States,” UTWA 
President Thomas McMahon and textile unionists throughout Massachusetts rallied to 
confront the industry lobbyists and the wage cuts they threatened if more was not done to
77change the Massachusetts hours law. While state representatives agreed with the 
manufacturers that southern competition was a serious issue confronting the 
Massachusetts textile industry, they deemed that the solution was not to be found by 
rescinding the forty-eight-hour law. Seemingly taking their cue from the unionists, the
Papers, Reel 42 (microfilm); Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America,” 139-140; Goldberg, A 
Tale o f  Three Cities, 15-18; Tindall, The Em ergence o f  the New  South, 333.
75 For a complete listing o f  paid lobbyists to the Massachusetts legislature, see Commonwealth o f  
Massachusetts, Lobbyist Section, Dockets o f  Legislative Agents, 1891-1986. Massachusetts State 
Archives, Boston, MA.
76 Am erican Cotton and Wool Reporter, quoted in Textile Worker, August 1922; C om m ercial 
Bulletin, 6 January 1923. The article blamed the hours legislation for “killing the goose” that laid the 
golden egg o f  N ew  England’s textile manufacturing supremacy.
77 Textile Worker, January 1923; Am erican Federationist, vol. 30, no. 1.
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majority o f legislators took the position that the standards for Massachusetts should not 
be lowered but, instead, all interested parties should work toward the goal o f raising the 
hours norms that prevailed in mills throughout the South. The forty-eight-hour law thus
78remained in place.
As Bay State textile industry lobbyists continued their fight on Beacon Hill to 
repeal the forty-eight-hour law and to secure tax-relief legislation but with little success, 
mill managers throughout Massachusetts embraced wage cuts as the most immediate and 
viable solution open to them in their struggle to effectively meet southern competition. A 
new round of cuts swept the mills of the state in January 1925. The Dwight 
Manufacturing Company announced a ten percent reduction for its Chicopee employees 
that would take effect on 27 January. Unionized weavers at the Chicopee mill threatened 
to strike if management carried out the wage cut which came on the heels of a reduction 
during the summer of 1924 that averaged between nineteen and twenty-five percent. 
Confident that there would be no union trouble from the workers in Alabama City, 
Chicopee Superintendent J. F. Batchelor ignored the weavers’ strike threat. As was the 
case with the 1922 Alabama City strike, company officials instituted plans to wait out 
any collective protest by closing the affected mill, selling the buildup of stock in the
78 The Massachusetts legislature revisited the issue o f  repealing the forty-eight-hour law during the 
1923, 1924, 1927, and 1928 legislative sessions, but no action was taken on the subject. In 1930, the 
Massachusetts Industrial Commission suggested that “the Legislature establish the policy that no new laws 
shall be enacted that will impose burdens upon the textile industry until the laws o f  competing states attain 
the standards o f  Massachusetts,” and that the legislature “take such action as will be conducive in securing 
the standardization o f  labor laws in all states and especially to bring about the adoption by all states o f  a 48- 
hour law similar to the law in effect in Massachusetts.” See Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts, H ouse and  
Senate Journals, 1923, 1924, 1927, 1928; Massachusetts Industrial Commission, Report o f  an Investigation  
by the M assachusetts Industrial Commissions o f  the Conditions A ffecting the Textile Industry and  the 
Problem  o f  U nemployment in That and Other Industries, 69. For an extended discussion o f  the 1928 
hearings on the forty-eight-hour matter and on the issue o f  reducing state and local taxes assessed on cotton 
m ills during the late 1920s and 1930s, see Koistinen, “Dealing with Deindustrialization,” 104-108, 116- 
130.
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A weave room at the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Chicopee mill, ca. 1915. (Courtesy Edward 
Bellamy Memorial Association, Chicopee, Massachusetts).
company’s warehouses, and, if necessary shifting production to the uninvolved Dwight 
branch. The wage concessions made to the Dwight Chicopee operatives in 1922 created 
the circumstances in which the company could avoid a strike there and break the 
Alabama City union. In 1925, Dwight management exploited the open shop status quo 
established at the Alabama City branch three years earlier to challenge its unionized
7Q
workers in Chicopee.
On the day the Dwight wage cut was scheduled to go into effect, “before the 
looms were started . . .  the weavers received word [from their union leaders] to leave 
their places in protest,” and 150 weavers left the Dwight mill in Chicopee, declaring a 
strike in effect. Soon after the Dwight weavers left their looms, the company announced
79 The average wage at the Chicopee mill before the January wage cut averaged between twenty- 
eight and thirty dollars a week. The ten percent reduction would, therefore, affect a weekly wage decrease 
o f about three dollars. Springfield (MA) Republican, 28 January 1925. Communications between Chicopee 
Superintendent J. F. Batchelor and Alabama City Agent C. S. Wilkinson, were ongoing throughout the 
strike. See Alabama Agent to Treasurer Letter Book, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2.
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a total mill shutdown and began a lockout the remaining workers employed at the 
Chicopee mill.80 The Chicopee weavers, in spite of the lockout, initially found little 
support among these operatives. The divisions between the workers of different 
departments were exacerbated by the fact that the organized workers themselves were 
members o f two competing national bodies. The unionized weavers and loomfixers at 
Dwight’s Chicopee mill belonged to the American Federation of Textile Operatives, 
while the organized carders, spinners, and pickers claimed affiliation with the United 
Textile Workers of America. According to UTWA historian Robert Brooks, the two 
unions viewed each other as “obstructionist” and were unwilling to forego craft and
union rivalries to unite, even for the larger purpose of effective organization in individual
81 • •mills and throughout the textile industry. When the Chicopee weavers began their
walkout, none of the UTWA affiliated Dwight locals declared sympathy strikes in 
support of them.
Four days after the Dwight lockout began, UTWA officials met in Boston to 
discuss whether or not to take strike action against the wage cuts made in mills 
throughout New England. UTWA President Thomas McMahon announced that the 
union “decided to resist the wage cuts now being made,” and that he had “been instructed 
to get in touch with the officials of all the districts . . .  for the purpose of making proper
80 Springfield (MA) Republican, 28 January 1925.
81 Several craft unions seceded from the United Textile Workers o f  America in 1915 and formed 
the rival American Federation o f  Textile Operatives. Most o f  these locals eventually transferred their 
affiliations back to the UTWA between 1923 and 1926. The National Union o f  Mulespinners remained 
largely independent even after its amalgamation with the UTWA in 1901. The mulespinners’ union did not 
surrender its AFL charter or its treasury to the UTWA in 1901 and the union formally withdrew in 1914. ft 
remained independent as late as 1929. See Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America,” 182-214, 
especially 184-196.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
227
arrangements for carrying on this struggle.” Yet no strike authorizations appeared for the 
UTWA-affiliated Dwight locals who were already locked out of the Chicopee mill.82
The weavers faced the prospect of receiving no help from the UTWA unions for 
the duration of their protest, and their fight became even more challenging because of 
rifts that existed among the Dwight craft unions affiliated with the American Federation 
of Textile Operatives. Despite their common membership in the AFTO, the Dwight 
loomfixers declared themselves “not sympathetic with the striking weavers” because the 
weavers did not support the fixers when they protested against a 1924 summer wage cut 
with a short-lived walkout in September. Although locked out of the mill with the rest of 
the workforce in January 1925, the loomfixers said they were “not interested” in aiding
OT
the weavers. The lack of cooperation continued as the weavers’ strike and lockout 
dragged into its fourth week without any sign that the company was willing to change its 
policy regarding the wage cut.
Within a week of the initial walkout and shutdown at the Chicopee mill, meetings 
had occurred between the striking weavers, Dwight mill officials, and two vice-presidents 
of the AFTO. Superintendent Batchelor stated that the position of the company was that 
the weavers would “be allowed to return to work . . . under the same conditions as those 
existing when they went out on strike.” If they chose not to, the mill would remain 
closed. The weavers refused, the lockout continued, and non-striking Dwight operatives
• 84were “obliged to go home again.” Twenty-seven days into the strike, the company 
partially reopened the mills with the workers who were willing to return. Spurred on by
82 Springfield (MA) Republican, 1 February 1925.
83 Ibid., 28 January 1925.
84 Ibid., 31 January and 2 February 1925.
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the mill starting again and the likelihood that the company would, therefore, operate 
indefinitely on the reduced pay scale if they let the weavers continue the fight alone, the 
following day the Dwight locals of the UTWA and the AFTO began cooperating. The 
UTWA union members and the AFTO loomfixers declared sympathy strikes in support 
of the weavers. Together, they organized a general strike committee “to represent the 
employes [sic] of the Dwight mills regardless of union affiliation,” and coordinated 
pickets for the mill gates. The strike committee also submitted the dispute to the 
Massachusetts State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration for settlement, demanding 
from the company recognition of the unions, the end of fines levied on flawed goods, and 
the reversal of the ten percent wage cut. The day the joint UTWA-AFTO pickets began, 
the Dwight Chicopee mill operated for the first full day since the weavers’ walkout.85
The Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Chicopee mill ran intermittently as the 
strike and the picketing continued through March 1925. “We still have the strike with us, 
but,” Superintendent Batchelor wrote to Alabama City Agent C. S. Wilkinson on his
strategy to restart the mill with non-union Dwight operatives and newly hired workers,
86  •“are in hopes to see it broken.” Union workers, meanwhile, stood at the gates daily to 
heckle anyone who crossed the union line. “Two women practically threw the makings 
of an omelet at other women who had gone back to work,” the local press reported of an 
incident at the end of one shift, “Eggs o f a vintage not too recent and pepper and salt
87were hurled upon the women who had gone back into the mill.” Still, the possibility of 
being permanently replaced by recently hired strikebreakers, the prospect o f having to
85 Springfield (MA) Republican, 25 February 1925.
86 J. F. Batchelor, Chicopee Superintendent to C. S. Wilkinson, Alabama City Agent, 4 March 
1925, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MFI-2.
87 Springfield (MA) Republican, 11 March 1925.
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vacate company housing should their jobs be filled by others, and the economic realities 
of having been out of work for over a month, compelled more and more Dwight workers 
to enter the mills. By the end of the March, Superintendent Batchelor informed C. S. 
Wilkinson in Alabama City that the “situation is much brighter—have 321 looms running 
today, with the prospects of settlement very bright,” to which Wilkinson replied, “T ru st.
. . that soon they will see the error of their ways and flock to the mill for work.”88
The nine-week strike at the Dwight Company’s Chicopee mill officially ended on 
1 April 1925 with a decision from the Massachusetts State Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration. “Under the terms of the agreement accepted by the strikers’ committee,” 
announced State Board member Fred Knight, “no discrimination will be shown against 
the strikers when they return to the mills.” The unions agreed to return to work on good 
faith that they would “be given recognition by the officials of the mills after they have 
gone back to their looms.” Overall, however, the Dwight strikers realized few tangible 
results from the strike. The State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration gave tacit 
support for union recognition of the Dwight locals but without establishing a mechanism 
to ensure that the company would comply with the no-discrimination, union-recognition 
terms of the agreement. Furthermore, the company system of fining continued, the ten 
percent wage cut remained in effect, and in any future disputes with management, the 
agreement required the Dwight unions “before taking a strike vote, to submit any 
demands for adjustment of working conditions to the mill officials for settlement and
88 J. F. Batchelor, Chicopee Superintendent to C. S. Wilkinson, Alabama City Agent, 31 March 
1925; and Wilkinson to Batchelor, 2 April 1925, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MH-2.
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investigation.”89 The following day, J. F. Batchelor noted, “We are running about 1600 
looms . . . .  the atmosphere has changed.”90
As was the case with the 1893 strike at the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s 
Chicopee mill, the 1925 strike proved to be an event that would forever change the 
company. “To be sure, large mills cannot be moved overnight from one locality to 
another and there is very considerable expense involved in moving these plants but there 
is a limit beyond which the managements will refuse to operate in New England,” the 
Commercial Bulletin editorialized in 1923, “and that limit appears to be very near at 
hand.”91 In 1893, the Chicopee strike was an integral factor in the decision made by 
Dwight’s corporate officers to open a southern branch mill so that Dwight-made goods 
could remain competitive in the marketplace in the face of growing inter-regional 
competition and increasingly strict age and hours restrictions passed by the 
Massachusetts legislature. Thirty years after construction on Dwight’s Alabama City mill 
began, the strike at the Chicopee mill marked the “limit” for the company. After nearly 
five years of struggling to make profits at the Chicopee mill, the strike was the catalyst 
for Dwight’s corporate officers to “take action necessary to carry out a plan for the 
readjustment of the capital and to raise new money in order to relieve the Company from
89 Springfield (MA) Republican, 1 April 1925. The Commonwealth established the 
Massachusetts State Board o f  Conciliation and Arbitration in 1886 with the power to intervene in labor 
disputes in Massachusetts businesses employing over twenty-five persons. The decisions o f  the board were 
binding for six months and thereafter either party involved could file its intention to not follow  the terms o f  
the agreement and then do so after sixty-days. N o official records o f  the 1925 Dwight strike remain in the 
papers o f  the State Board. For applications, dockets, minutes, and decisions o f  other Massachusetts strikes 
submitted for arbitration, see Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts, Board o f  Conciliation and Arbitration, 
Dockets, Hearings, Minutes, and Decisions. Massachusetts State Archives, Boston, MA.
90 J. F. Batchelor, Chicopee Superintendent to C. S. Wilkinson, Alabama City Agent, 2 April 
1925, Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection.
91 Com mercial Bulletin, 6 January 1923.
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0?its . .  . strained financial condition.” Unable to make payments to the House of Morgan 
for the 1915-1922 mill overhaul and unwilling to risk the possibility of additional worker 
militancy with a new round of wage cuts, the corporate officers of the Dwight Company 
sought a new, more effective way to slash operating costs and maintain the company’s 
liquidity. The result was the decision give up on its investment in mills, manpower, and 
machinery in Massachusetts, relocate all Dwight operations to its southern facility, and 
close the parent mill in Chicopee completely.
The permanent shutdown of the Chicopee mill did not happen immediately, but 
Dwight Company officials began the process of shifting production from its operations in 
Massachusetts to its Alabama City mill in the spring of 1925. Citing the “extensive 
rebuilding program, followed by large losses sustained . . . during the violent period of 
liquidation in 1921, from the fact that business since that time has been below normal,” in 
addition to the shortfalls due “to strikes and partial operation,” the corporate officers 
submitted a plan whereby the company would increase its operating capital by floating 
new stock “to improve the current condition” of the company. During Dwight’s financial 
retooling, the Alabama City mill continued to be a safety-valve and the company 
depended almost exclusively for its earnings on the sales of the cloth produced there 
more cheaply than that made in Chicopee. Noting figures which showed that the 
Chicopee mill registered a net loss of over twenty-seven thousand dollars from 1917 to 
1924, while over the course of the same eight year period, the Alabama City mill made a 
net profit o f over two million dollars, Dwight Clerk of Corporation George Nutting, 
informed company stockholders that “It will be observed th a t. . . [the] Chicopee Mill has
92 Notice o f  Special Stockholders Meeting, 10 April 1925, Miscellaneous Prospectus, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company, Industrial #4. Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard University, Boston,
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not been a source of profit to the Company” but “the earnings of the Alabama Mill have 
averaged . . . 9.9%.”93 The Chicopee mill continued operations through 1925 and 1926 
but the Alabama City mill increased its share of Dwight’s overall production. By 
November 1925, Dwight officials announced its intention to begin running the Alabama 
City mill on a day and night basis, requiring the hiring of up to 1,700 more employees 
there.94
“The earnings of your Company’s plant at Chicopee, Mass. have been, and still 
are unsatisfactory,” Treasurer George Nichols informed Dwight stockholders, “but the 
Plant at Alabama City has consistently made money and it is in hope of still further 
increasing these earnings that the present plan has been adopted.”95 The process of 
closing the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Chicopee mill gained momentum through 
1926 and the company began shipping machinery from Chicopee to Alabama City. “At 
Chicopee . . .  we have considerable machinery in excess of operating requirements,” 
Treasurer George Nichols informed Alabama City Agent Allan Little, “I recommend that 
when you have definitely decided what machinery should be replaced in Alabama City 
that you advise and we would . . . help you out by sending you some machinery in good 
condition from Chicopee.”96 In October, the Dwight Manufacturing Company bought the
MA.
93 George Nutting, Clerk o f  Corporation to “the Stockholders o f  Dwight Manufacturing 
Company,” 16 June 1925, Miscellaneous Prospectus, Dwight Manufacturing Company, Industrial #4. The 
net loss o f  the Chicopee mill 1917-1924 was $27,506.43 and the Alabama City profit over the same period 
was $2,382,589.53. The last year in which the Chicopee mill registered an annual profit was 1919.
94 Gadsden D aily Times-News, 19 November 1925. Dwight Treasurer George Nichols informed 
Alabama City Agent Allan Little that “We believe that [Dwight selling agent] Minot, Hooper & Co. could 
sell an increased product without material price disadvantage” with the addition o f  a night run in Alabama 
City. George Nichols, Treasurer to Allan Little, Alabama City Agent, 16 February 1926, M E-1.
95 George Nichols, Treasurer to “the Stockholders o f  Dwight Manufacturing Company,” 16 June 
1925, Miscellaneous Prospectus, Dwight Manufacturing Company, Industrial #4. Chicopee losses from 
December 1925 through November 1926 amounted to $306,749.35.
96 George Nichols, Treasurer to Allan Little, Alabama City Agent, 8 January 1926, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Collection, M E-1.
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Essex Cotton Mills in Newburyport, Massachusetts, with the money secured through the 
issuance of additional stock in 1925, in order to transfer the equipment from that facility 
to the Alabama City mill as well. The company shipped machinery and carded cotton 
from Newburyport and Chicopee “in carload lots as fast as ready” to Alabama City 
through 1927.97 During the summer of that year, the Dwight Company began selling its 
real estate holdings. The first buildings to be sold were the company-owned tenements 
and boarding houses in Chicopee Center. Described as “one of the largest transfers of 
central real estate in the history of Hampden County,” on 31 June 1927, the Dwight 
Company relinquished the titles of all of its real estate holdings, except for the mill 
buildings themselves, to the Walnut Realty Trust of Chicopee.98
By the start of the new year, the Dwight Manufacturing Company had completely 
ceased operations at its Chicopee mill. In 1929, Dwight sold the mill buildings to 
Raphael Sagalyn of Springfield, a member of the Walnut Trust Realty group. Sagalyn 
formed the Industrial Buildings Corporation with the intention of persuading small 
industries to locate their production in the old Dwight mills. He was initially 
unsuccessful in his efforts, and the buildings stood vacant until 1931 when the Berkshire 
Upholstered Furniture Company opened a small facility in one of the Dwight mill 
buildings. Through the 1930s, several small manufacturers and needlecraft businesses,
97 James Thompson, Assistant Treasurer to J. F. Batchelor, Chicopee Superintendent, 2 June 1927, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection, MG-34. Numerous letters and railroad shipping receipts 
documenting the movement o f  machinery from the Massachusetts mills to Alabama City are located in the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Collection. The bulk are located in Treasurer to Agent, Agent’s Copies 
1924-1927, MG-34; Agent to Treasurer, Treasurer’s Copies, 1924-1925, 1927, MK-6; and M iscellany to 
Agent, Second Series, 1927-1928, MM-12.
98 Springfield (MA) Republican, 1 July 1927. This sale transferred ownership o f  over one hundred 
buildings.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
234
seeking to tap into the skilled textile labor force already in Chicopee and the non-union, 
low wage workforce there, moved into the Dwight complex."
Despite the eventual establishment of small industrial concerns within Dwight’s 
Chicopee mill, the closure of the Dwight Manufacturing Company was, according to 
Chicopee historian Vera Shlakman, “disastrous.”100 The Dwight Company, one of the 
city’s four original mills, absorbed two of the others, the Cabot Manufacturing and the 
Perkins Manufacturing Companies, in 1856. The Chicopee Manufacturing Company, the 
fourth o f the original mills, sold its facilities to Johnson and Johnson for the manufacture 
of surgical supplies in 1916. The Dwight closure marked the loss of the last of 
Chicopee’s cotton textile mills.101
The mill shutdown had very real consequences not only for the 2,000 employees 
of the company who lost their jobs but also for their families, the overwhelming majority 
of whom depended entirely on earnings from the Dwight mills for their livelihoods. 
Finding work proved extremely difficult for the out-of-work Dwight operatives. Because 
of the ongoing industry-wide depression, few positions were available in other textile
99 The Dwight Manufacturing Company retained a small pool o f approximately 180 employees at 
the mill who were responsible for the upkeep o f  the buildings and for processing shipments o f  machinery 
and supplies to Alabama City until the ownership o f  the mills formally transferred to Sagalyn in early 1930. 
In the 1931 edition o f  The “Blue B ook” Textile D irectory o f  the United States and Canada , the Dwight 
Chicopee mill was officially listed as “discontinued.” See also, Massachusetts Department o f  Labor and 
Industries, Division o f  Statistics, Record o f  Cotton Mills in Massachusetts Which Went Out o f  Existence 
During 1921-1934 Exclusive (n.p., 1935), 1 1. In addition to the Berkshire Upholstered Furniture 
Company, the Patricia Undergarment Company, Millinery Manufacturing Company, Young Broom 
Company, Federal Paper Company, Universal Jewelry Case Company, and Cutler and Schermerhorn 
Company moved into the Dwight mill complex. Thaddeus Szetela, History o f  Chicopee (Chicopee: Szetela 
and Rich Publishing Company, 1948), 131-134; Michele Plourde-Barker, Chicopee (Charleston, SC: 
Arcadia Publishers, 1998), 51. In Lowell, Mary Blewett found the same phenomena o f  light industries 
moving into the mill town, attracted by the low-wage, non-union workforce there. See Blewett, The Last 
Generation: Work and Life in the Textile Mills o f  Lowell, Massachusetts, 1910-1960  (Amherst: University 
o f  Massachusetts Press, 1990), 8.
100 Vera Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory Town: A Study o f  Chicopee, Massachusetts,” 
in Smith College Studies in History, vol. 20 (Northampton, MA: Department o f  History o f  Smith College, 
1935), 229.
101 Szetela, H istory o f  Chicopee, 131-132.
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mills in the Chicopee-Springfield-Holyoke area. After spending their entire lives 
working in the textile industry, many Dwight operatives struggled to learn the skills 
necessary to find work elsewhere. For those who did find work, their lack of seniority 
often made them the first to be laid-off as businesses and industries throughout the region 
curtailed their operations during the Great Depression. Historian Katherine Du Pre 
Lumpkin noted that fifty-eight percent o f the “displaced” textile workers in the 
Connecticut Valley of Massachusetts in 1934 were former employees of three companies, 
including Dwight, that were “active outside the State,” or were “themselves operating 
plants elsewhere,” while their Massachusetts mills were “dismantled and for sale.”102 
The city o f Chicopee also lost its largest employer and taxpayer, and businesses 
throughout the city saw a substantial loss of income because of the large number of 
unemployed textile workers. As an absentee owner, however, the implications of the mill 
shutdown for the city of Chicopee was an insignificant factor in the Dwight Company’s 
decision to move all of its operations to Alabama City. For many years, a vocal minority 
of Chicopee citizens criticized the Boston-based Dwight Company for its lack of interest 
in the well being of the city. “If those absentee capitalists could be compelled to live on .
. . any o f the streets between Front and Exchange streets,” a local Methodist minister 
blasted from his pulpit in 1917, “we would be assured that that entire section of our city 
would change appearance . . . .  No local person is responsible for conditions at the
102 Szetela, H istory o f  Chicopee, 131-132; Katherine Du Pre Lumpkin, “Shutdowns in the 
Connecticut Valley: A Study o f  Worker Displacement in the Small Industrial Community,” in Smith 
College Studies in History, vol. 19 (Northampton, MA: Department o f  History o f  Smith College, 1934), 
160. Lumpkin’s study provides an excellent contemporary analysis o f  the effect o f  the shutdowns o f  
Chicopee-area industries during the Great Depression. Vera Shlakman noted that “when the depression 
came the weight o f  the unemployed textile workers constituted a serious problem.” See Shlakman, 
“Economic History o f  a Factory Town,” 229.
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. . .   —
Exchange Street, Chicopee, Massachusetts, ca. 1915. (Courtesy Edward Bellamy Memorial Association, 
Chicopee, Massachusetts).
Dwight manufacturing company.”103 Indeed, profits, not community welfare, drove the 
decision-making process of the Dwight officers in Boston. Corporate responsibility 
extended to Dwight shareholders and creditors but not to its employees or to the 
community of Chicopee. The closure of the Dwight Manufacturing Company caused a 
“general economic demoralization” of the city that only deepened with the beginning of 
the Great Depression in 1929. It would be thirteen years before the small industries 
which moved into the old Dwight buildings could replace the 2,000 jobs lost when the 
mill ceased production.104
The suspension of the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Chicopee operations in 
1927 was one of a growing number of textile mill closures that occurred throughout
103 Springfield (MA) Republican, 12 March 1917.
104 Vera Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory Town,” 229. Barry Bluestone and Bennett 
Harrison referred to the impact o f  a company closure on an entire town, not just the workers who were 
directly affected by the loss o f  a job, as a “ripple effect.” See, Bluestone and Harrison, The
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Massachusetts by the end of the decade. The 1920s were difficult years throughout the 
textile industry, but lower production costs in the South meant that most Piedmont mills, 
while not always able to pay regular dividends to their stockholders, survived. Increasing 
numbers o f their counterparts in New England, at the same time however, slipped into 
bankruptcy. In spite of the industry-wide depression, textile mills in the Piedmont South 
continued to expand, increasing their share of total textile workers in the nation from 
forty-six percent to sixty-eight percent between 1923 and 1933. Within the same time 
period, forty percent of all New England textile manufactories closed, resulting in the 
unemployment of over half of the region’s textile industry workforce. The southern 
textile states supplanted New England as the leading textile manufacturing region in the 
U.S., topping the number of wage earners and value of products manufactured in 1923, 
the number of active spindles in 1925, the number of total spindles in place in 1927, and 
the number of looms by 1931.105
“In Massachusetts many cotton mills have definitely gone out of business, others 
are discontinuing operations, and still others are in the process of liquidation,” the 
Massachusetts Industrial Commission noted in 1930, “Most of the coarse goods business 
has gone from Massachusetts; only a greatly reduced proportion of the medium weight 
cotton goods business remains; and the fine cotton goods business is increasingly being 
taken over by other states.”106 Over twenty-two thousand Massachusetts textile
Deindustrialization o f  America, 80. For discussions on the impact o f  the Dwight closure in Chicopee, see 
Shlakman, “Economic History o f  a Factory Town,” 229-231; and Szetela, History o f  Chicopee, 131-134.
105 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 197; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 75; James Hodges, 
New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 1933-1941 (Knoxville: University o f  
Tennessee Press, 1986), 12, 18. Hodges noted that between 1926 and 1932 less than half o f  southern mills 
paid regular dividends.
106 Massachusetts Industrial Commission, Report o f  an Investigation by the Massachusetts 
Industrial Commission o f  the Conditions Affecting the Textile Industry, 68 (irregular pagination).
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employees lost their jobs between 1920 and 1933, as ninety-three Massachusetts mills 
permanently closed their doors in the Bay State, of which eleven mills, including the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company, were owned by textile corporations with southern 
branches. At the peak of the state’s 1920-1933 wave of mill closures between 1926 and 
1931, seventy-one Massachusetts mills suspended operations. Throughout the 1920s, 
an estimated 3.8 million spindles ceased to operate in the mills of New England as fifty- 
one textile factories, containing more than 1.3 million spindles moved south, with an 
additional 2.5 million spindles stopped by mill owners who shut down their operations 
completely. In 1923, Massachusetts had 191 cotton textile mills, employing 114,000 
workers, but by 1929, the Bay State’s leading industry had shrunk to 135 mills, 
employing 71,000.108
The southern textile industry press described the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company’s permanent closure of its Chicopee operations as “an industrial tragedy” 
brought about by labor legislation and unions which kept the Dwight mills in “constant
107 Massachusetts Department o f  Labor and Industries, Division o f  Statistics, R ecord o f  Cotton 
M ills in M assachusetts Which Went Out o f  Existence During 1921-1934 Exclusive, 1. The closed mills 
with southern branches include the Dwight Manufacturing Company and its subsidiary the Essex Cotton 
Mills, Bay State Cotton Mills, N ew  England Southern Mills (Lowell Division), International Cotton Mills, 
American Tire Fabric Company, Firestone Mills, Massachusetts Cotton Mills, Beaver Mills, Beacon 
Manufacturing Company, and Gagner Manufacturing Company. The report does not indicate whether or 
not the owners o f  the closed mills without southern branches reinvested in the South or got out o f  the textile 
industry all together. The largest o f the mills without southern branches that closed included the Lancaster 
M ills (101,000 spindles), Lyman Mills (123,000 spindles), Manomet Mills (318,000 spindles), Fairhaven 
M ills (155,000 spindles), Sharp Manufacturing Company (200,000 spindles), Everett M ills (143,000  
spindles), and Hamilton Manufacturing Company (160,000 spindles). The Tremont and Suffolk M ills o f  
Lowell was acquired by the Nashua Manufacturing Company and downsized from 223,000 to 40,000  
spindles during the same time period.
108 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 197; Patrick Hearden, Independence and Empire: The New South's 
Cotton M ill Campaign, 1865-1901 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), 147; Gavin Wright, 
O ld South New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1986), 147. For averages o f  idle spindles by state, 1921-1935, see Mary Oates, The 
Role o f  the Cotton Textile Industry in the Economic Development o f  the American Southeast, 1900-1940  
(New York: Arno Press, 1975), 200.
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turmoil and made operations irregular.”109 In reality, however, Massachusetts laws and 
the presence of organized labor in mills throughout the state were not the primary 
problems leading the Dwight Company to build a southern branch factory in the 1890s or 
to the decision to move all of its production to Alabama in the 1920s. The root of the 
troubles for Massachusetts textile mills, which became evident during the depression 
years of the 1890s and facilitated increasing numbers of New England mill owners to 
relocate their operations to the Piedmont South in the 1920s, was the widespread entrance 
of southern-made cotton textile goods in the marketplace during the 1880s. As southern 
competition intensified through the turn of the century, labor standards established at the 
behest of unionized workers in Massachusetts through collective action at the statehouse 
and their workplaces had a significant impact on the wage and hour differentials between 
mills in the North and South, aggravating the underlying challenges presented by 
southern competition.
By the 1920s, southern competition had been an issue with which New England 
mill owners and unionists alike had been grappling for over thirty years, and neither state 
or federal labor legislation nor a strong inter-regional textile union had developed to 
equalize the regional disparities in working hours and wages. The textile depression of 
the 1920s created the conditions within which New England mill owners could no longer 
make profits because of the lack of parity in production costs between North and South, 
and the reality of southern competition and its bearing on the possibility of a long-term 
future for the New England cotton textile industry truly made itself known. Within the 
context o f the industry-wide depression, the wage and hour differentials that existed 
between the regions, and the higher numbers of unions in the New England mills
109 Southern Textile Bulletin, 10 November 1932.
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compared to those in the South, exerted a push on mill owners there to relocate South 
while the combination of “advantages” in the form of cheap and unorganized labor, low 
taxes, and the pro-business climate created by state and local governments pulled them 
southward.
The reality of this situation by the 1920s was that new construction and 
expansions of mills in Massachusetts became “more or less a curiosity,” and the 
acceleration of the decline of the region’s textile industry began.110 “We find the South 
rapidly developing . . . .  New England is only standing still, if  we are even maintaining 
our own,” Norman Case, Governor o f Rhode Island, pointed out to the members o f the 
National Association of Cotton Manufacturers.111 The leadership of the UTWA, 
meanwhile, chastised mill managers for their greed, arguing that they could still make 
money in the Bay State but chose to close their mills and relocate so that they could make 
higher profits on the backs of poorly paid, unorganized southern operatives. “It will do 
the New England section no harm,” goaded UTWA President Thomas McMahon in his 
ongoing war-of-words with mill owners, “if these jelly fish backboned incompetents
moved to some other part of our country where they can carry on the exploitation of
• • 112women and children for the sake of dividends.” Industry spokesmen responded that 
textile unionists were to blame for driving them out of business through strikes and the 
passage of restrictive labor legislation. Yet, as Massachusetts textile mill owners and the 
UTWA continued to exchange mutual recriminations about the sorry condition of the 
state’s textile industry, the Great Depression began, and textile workers North and South
110 NACM  Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1926, 46.
111 Ibid, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1928, 148.
112 Textile Worker, November 1927.
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once again embraced the possibility of bringing about change through collective action 
and inter-regional cooperation.
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CHAPTER VI
“THERE IS MORE DISSATISFACTION AMONG LABOR NOW THAN I HAVE 
EVER SEEN:” THE 1934 GENERAL TEXTILE STRIKE AND THE DWIGHT
MANUFACTURING COMPANY
“The conditions in many parts of New England are nothing short o f tragic, not 
only from the textile workers’ point of view . . . but also from the point of view of entire 
cities and towns where textile mills exist,” UTWA President Thomas McMahon told 
journalist Louis Adamic in 1931. “[Mjost of the mill towns,” McMahon continued, “are 
sad, sad places.” As the textile industry depression of the 1920s gave way to a 
nationwide depression by 1929, textile workers throughout New England, still reeling 
from the mill closures and movements to the South that occurred throughout the decade, 
saw their working and living conditions go from bad to worse, as short-time production, 
shutdowns, and layoffs ravaged the region. By the winter of 1931, an estimated forty 
percent of the 280,000 textile operatives in New England were unemployed, while the 
majority of those who still had jobs worked only one or two days a week.1 Mill 
operatives in the Piedmont South also felt the pinch of the Great Depression as 
management, seeking to cut production costs to the bone, slashed wages and the numbers 
of workers on company payrolls, pushing those employees who remained in the mills to 
the breaking point by speeding-up machinery and increasing workloads. As conditions 
throughout the textile industry worsened, southern mill operatives sought redress for their 
grievances through collective action and the mandate for change they saw as implicit in
1 Louis Adamic, “Tragic Towns o fN ew  England” H arper’s 162(May 1931): 748.
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New Deal legislation, ushering in an unprecedented period of worker militancy in the 
industry and the possibility for the creation of a viable national textile union. Mill hands’ 
hopes and frustrations climaxed in 1934, resulting in the largest general strike in the 
history of American labor. Yet, no fundamental alteration of the low-wage, non-union, 
management-dominated status quo occurred in the southern textile industry, and New 
England mill closures and removals to the Piedmont South continued apace. Within the 
context of the ongoing regional relocation of the American textile industry, the 1934 
General Textile Strike would prove itself remarkably unremarkable.
Throughout the 1920s, the United Textile Workers of America experienced a 
serious erosion of its membership base. Open shop drives in mills nationwide, coupled 
with the depressed condition of the industry, did away with the organizational gains that 
the union made during World War I. In New England but especially in Massachusetts, 
the UTWA watched its largest center of unionized operatives deteriorate as owners 
liquidated the holdings of mill after mill, and invested their monies instead in 
manufactories located below the Mason Dixon Line. Seeking to shore-up its northeastern 
union base in the face of mill closures, wage cuts, and union busting, as early as 1923, the 
UTWA’s national leadership proposed a strategy whereby it would join in a partnership 
with management, and in exchange for union recognition, would work toward a common 
goal o f achieving lower labor costs and increased output so the mills could more 
efficiently meet southern competition. “[T]he greatest future source of increased 
efficiency, higher production and lower cost lies through a new and better relationship 
between employer and employee,” maintained one textile unionist, “To replace distrust 
and antagonism by mutual confidence and co-operation would . . .  do more to place the
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New England textile industry in a position of advantage in relation to the South than any 
other occurrence.”2 Selling itself as an organization that could allay potentially costly 
labor-capital disputes, the UTWA hoped that it would not only buttress its locals 
throughout New England but help save a rapidly declining regional industry as well.
The UTWA had little success with its union-management cooperation strategy. 
The overwhelming majority ofN ew  England mill owners rejected any notion of union 
recognition, let alone allowing organized labor a say in the day-to-day management of 
mills or in a company’s overall corporate strategy.4 Thus for textile unionists in New 
England, the issues of southern competition, the cost-cutting measures owners 
implemented to combat it, and runaway mills remained. With no organizational base to 
speak of in the leading southern textile states, the UTWA found itself powerless to bring 
southern wages and hours standards into line with those dominant in New England.
The UTWA, however, recoiled from the prospect of a southern organizing 
campaign. Depression conditions, limited funds, a vast reserve of labor wanting work in 
the southern mills, and the hostility of employers and the local and regional press to 
unions of any kind, made the odds against the UTWA and the successful organization of 
the southern workforce seem too high. But, by the end of the 1920s, textile mill 
operatives throughout the Piedmont South began challenging management in a series of 
uncoordinated strikes undertaken by “homegrown” unions to protest the degradation of
2 Textile Worker, April 1923.
3 Robert R. R. Brooks, “The United Textile Workers o f  America” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 
1935), 140-143; Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A H istory o f  the American Worker, 1920-1933  (1960; 
reprint Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), 10-11.
4 The national leadership o f  the AFL and the UTWA praised the Naumkeag M ills o f  Salem, 
Massachusetts for their participation in a union-management cooperative agreement and used this company 
as an example o f  how the plan could work effectively. Textile Worker, March 1930; Jean Carol Trepp, 
“Union-Management Cooperation and the Southern Organizing Campaign” Journal o f  Political Economy 
41(1933): 616-617; American Federation o f  Labor, Report o f  Proceedings o f  the Fiftieth Annual 
Convention, 1930, 86-87.
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labor standards they experienced through the stretching-out of their workloads and years 
of wage reductions.5 This outburst of union militancy in the mills throughout Tennessee 
and North and South Carolina offered the UTWA a chance to put the failures o f all its 
previous attempts to unionize the Piedmont South behind and look forward to the 
possibility of establishing a union beachhead in the region. “The advantage which the 
South has had in its freedom from labor disputes is beginning to decline,” the 
Massachusetts Industrial Commission announced, citing figures for 1929 showing that in 
the “cotton-growing states” there were 16,331 workers involved in thirty-four strikes 
while in New England there were 4,366 affected in thirty strikes.6 The moment was right 
for the UTWA to tap into the anger and frustrations felt by southern operatives, and to 
begin the concerted organizing campaign that had been put on the backburner since 1922. 
The union hoped to equalize regional conditions by its presence in mills throughout the 
region. “The Southern workers are now ready for organization,” UTWA President 
Thomas McMahon noted after a 1927 strike at the Harriet Mill in Henderson, North 
Carolina, “Many localities are clamoring for organizers. A new era in the South is about 
to dawn.”7
5 Mill workers used the term “stretch-out” to describe the managerial practice o f  increasing the 
number o f  looms or spindles assigned to an individual operative, usually with no increase in pay. Textile 
m ill management used the stretch-out through the 1920s and 1930s to cut labor costs by increasing 
production output without having to augment the workforce. In numerous mills, the stretch-out was also 
used as a way to downsize a workforce without slowing production. In 1925, UTW A President Thomas 
McMahon noted that within two decades, the number o f  looms a weaver tended increased “from six and 
eight to an individual to thirty-six and forty-eight, and in some instances to seventy-two with an increase in 
the speed o f  the loom.” Textile Worker, September 1925.
6 Massachusetts Industrial Commission, Report o f  an Investigation by the Massachusetts 
Industrial Commissions o f  the Conditions Affecting the Textile Industry and the Problem o f  Unemployment 
in That and Other Industries (Boston: J. L. Fairbanks and Co., 1930), 148.
7 Textile Worker, February 1928. The largest and most publicized o f  these strikes occurred in 
Henderson, Gastonia, and Marion, North Carolina, and Elizabethton, Tennessee. For detailed information 
on the 1927-1929 strikes, see Tom Tippett, When Southern Labor Stirs (New York: Jonathan Cape and 
Harrison Smith, 1931); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, et al., Like a Family: The Making o f  a Southern Cotton M ill 
World (1987; reprint Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2000), 201-217; Bernstein, The Lean
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By 1928, the fever of organizing spread to unionists in Alabama as well. 
“Considering the number of employees in the mills of this district and the conditions 
under which they work,” Earle Parkhurst, organizer for the Alabama State Federation of 
Labor, noted, “the most need for organization of any craft in Anniston and Gadsden . . .  is
o
for the organization of these people.” The UTWA, however, initially limited its 
attention to the locales where spontaneous walkouts occurred, seeking to assume 
leadership before other unions, like the communist-led National Textile Workers Union, 
could. Places such as the Dwight mill in Alabama City where the union had been broken 
at the beginning o f the decade and the workers did not reorganize, therefore, remained 
open-shop bastions. A year after his initial call for organization among the mill workers 
of the Gadsden area, Parkhurst declared that “conditions there are fast becoming 
unbearable and right under our very noses in our own state we are allowing a menace to 
survive which will soon class along with Elizabethton, Herrin, and other hell-holes of the 
past.”9
It would not be until the AFL’s 1929 annual convention that UTWA delegates 
introduced a resolution to authorize the national leadership of the AFL to raise funds for 
an all-out southern organizing drive. Arguing that the time was right to address the long­
standing grievances of long hours, low wages, the stretch-out, and poor living and
Years, 12-32; George Brown Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 1913-1945  (1967; reprint Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 339-343; Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “Disorderly Women: 
Gender and Labor Militancy in the Appalachian South” Journal o f  American H istory 73(1986): 354-382; 
James Hodges, “Challenge to the N ew  South: The Great Textile Strike in Elizabethton, Tennessee, 1929” 
Tennessee H istorical Quarterly 23(December 1964): 343-357; Cletus Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune: An 
Interpretive H istory o f  Textile Unionism in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 30- 
35; Janet Irons, Testing the New Deal: The General Textile Strike o f  1934 in the American South (Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 2000), 29-30.
8 Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Proceedings o f  the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention o f  the 
Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, 1928, 61. Hereafter cited as Convention Proceedings.
9 Ibid., 1929, 119.
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working conditions in mill villages thought the South, the AFL would spearhead the 
regional unionization campaign and, because it was the South’s largest industry, would 
focus its efforts on helping the UTWA organize the textile workforce there. The AFL’s 
Executive Council called for a strategizing conference to be held in November, and at 
this meeting, delegates set January 1930 as the start date for the southern organizing 
drive. The planning committee called on each AFL-affiliated union to supply at least one 
organizer for the drive and to give financial contributions from their union treasuries to 
aid the cash-poor UTWA. The planners also decided to direct the campaign through a 
coordinating committee headquarters to be located in one southern city. AFL President 
William Green announced at the two-day opening convention of the southern organizing 
drive held in Charlotte, North Carolina on 6 and 7 January 1930 that, because of the 
strong union presence in the city’s skilled trades and in the surrounding coal mining 
areas, the coordinating committee would be located in Birmingham, Alabama. Green 
named AFL organizer Paul Smith, UTWA Vice-President Francis Gorman, and W. C. 
Birthright of the Tennessee State Federation of Labor as leaders of the Birmingham- 
based Southern Organizing Committee.10
From the outset, differences of opinion about the most effective means for 
organizing the textile industry’s workforce infected the southern drive and threatened to 
undermine the entire campaign. Southern UTWA delegates at the Charlotte kick-off 
convention urged a militant organizing strategy, arguing that any other tactic would be 
doomed to failure because of the fervently anti-union attitudes held by the region’s textile 
mill owners. AFL President William Green, however, urged a more conservative
10 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 33-34; Trepp, “Union-Management Cooperation in the Southern 
Organizing Campaign,” 612-613.
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approach, championing a union-management cooperation strategy and a campaign based 
not on directly challenging employers through strike actions but, instead, on trying to win 
over employers and the public by couching the AFL-affiliated unions as conservative, 
respectable, and concerned with helping management meet its goals of efficient, 
profitable production. The 1920s history of failed strikes and the empty treasuries that 
resulted remained fresh in the minds of many, especially among New Englanders, 
mitigating support for an aggressive approach to the campaign. These factors, when 
coupled with Green’s argument that southern textile mill owners would accept the 
UTWA as a common sense alternative to more radical groups like the communist-led 
NTWU, meant that the conservative strategy won the day.11 Green toured the South 
through 1930 to acquaint managers, workers, and the public alike with his message of 
cooperation, and AFL consulting engineer, Geoffrey Brown, approached individual 
textile mill owners with detailed information on how to establish workable systems of 
union-management cooperation in their manufactories.12
“In Alabama and Georgia our locals are growing in leaps and bounds,” reported 
UTWA organizer W. A. Livingston from Huntsville, Alabama, “The people are flocking 
to the union in droves where we have our organization started . . . .  Never before in the
11 The National Textile Workers Union took charge o f  the locally initiated 1929 strike at the Loray 
Mill in Gastonia, North Carolina, and Green tried to use this example o f the communist NTW U stepping 
into the non-union vacuum to secure UTW A recognition in mills throughout the region. On the Gastonia 
strike, see Hall, et al., Like a Family, 214-15; Dorothy Myra Page, Southern Cotton Mills and Labor (New  
York: Workers Library Publishers, 1929).
12 Trepp, “Union-Management Cooperation in the Southern Organizing Campaign,” 613-619; 
Bernstein, The Lean Years, 34; Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune, 35. Geoffrey Brown based his proposals on 
information obtained by him through a survey o f the operations o f cotton, silk, rayon, woolen, jute, 
mattress felt, knitting, and braiding mills, and bleacheries and finishing plants throughout the South. See 
Geoffrey Brown, Industrial Survey o f  Southern Textile Area: Comprising States o f  Alabama, Georgia, 
Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia (Birmingham: Birmingham 
Printing Company, 1930). For an example o f  the types o f  addresses given by Green and members o f  the 
Southern Organizing Committee see “Address o f  Francis J. Gorman, VP o f  the UTWA, Member o f  
Southern Organizing Committee at Chapel Hill Institute on Human Relations, in Textile Worker, April
1931.
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history of the South have the textile employees shown such determination to form an 
organization.”13 During the spring of 1930, the southern organizing drive reached the 
open shop haven of Gadsden and the UTWA successfully organized the 375 employees 
of the Sauquoit Spinning Company located there.14 By September, the AFL claimed that 
the southern drive had succeeded in establishing thirty-one new UTWA affiliated unions 
out of the 112 total new AFL locals formed in the region. But, while the unionization 
drive was able to organize locals in a handful of southern textile mills, it did not meet the 
ambitious expectations of many in the UTWA. Southern mill owners rejected the AFL’s 
union-management cooperation message outright, and the UTWA failed to rouse to 
action more than a small minority of the potential rank-and-file throughout the region.15 
Indeed, David Clark, editor of the Southern Textile Bulletin, immediately characterized 
the AFL effort as “nothing more or less than a grandstand play,” adding that “before it 
attempts to organize southern textile mills,” the UTWA “should be forced to speak of 
their record in New England . . . .  one of failure from every standpoint except the 
collection of dues.”16
The Birmingham coordinating office, likewise, found its resources quickly 
strained, as the financial and manpower support pledged by delegates of AFL unions 
nationwide at the opening of the southern campaign failed to materialize. An average of 
only forty organizers, five working directly for the UTWA, were in the field between 
January 1930 and September 1931, even though union leaders proposed the use of over
13 Textile Worker, November 1930.
14 The UTW A also organized locals in Huntsville and Anniston, Alabama and across the state 
boarder in Columbus, Georgia. Textile Worker, June-November 1930; Irons, Testing the New Deal, 32.
15 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 35.
16 Southern Textile Bulletin, 9 January 1930.
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one hundred at the November 1929 planning session.17 Organizers also made few 
inroads in the region’s textile industry as mill owners, refusing to surrender any 
advantages they had by virtue of being able to work their employees longer and pay them 
less than their counterparts in New England, did not willingly accept any form of 
organization in their mills that they did not directly control, no matter how conservative. 
The deepening of the nationwide depression, moreover, only strengthened management’s 
determination to maintain complete control over decisions concerning wages, hours, and 
workloads. Southern mill owners refused to recognize or negotiate with the newly 
organized UTWA locals, and thus, the union had no real bargaining power. Mill 
supervisors stymied additional membership gains by regularly discharging the leaders of 
local unions and evicting them from company housing, making them examples of what 
would happen to anyone who joined or would not renounce their union membership. As 
1931 began, the organizing campaign was short of money and organizers, and worsening 
economic conditions fueled new rounds of production cuts and mill closures throughout 
the country. The January 1931 failure of a highly publicized strike, which resulted in a 
staggering UTWA defeat at the Dan River Mills in Danville, Virginia, marked the 
unofficial end of the AFL’s 1930 organizing campaign in the textile mills of the 
Piedmont South.18
17 The number o f  organizers working for the southern campaign varied from month to month. 
Irving Bernstein placed the total number o f  organizers at twenty-one, while George Tindall stated “the 
organizing committee usually had about forty, never more than eighty organizers.” The initial number o f  
organizers proposed at the November 1929 planning meeting was 105. Bernstein, The Lean Years, 35; 
Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 376.
18 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 36-41; Trepp, “Union-Management Cooperation in the Southern 
Organizing Campaign,” 620-624; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 217-219, 235-236; Daniel, Culture o f  
Misfortune, 37; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 377; George Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the 
South (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1931), 81-82. Irving Bernstein blamed the failure 
o f the southern organizing campaign in large part on the fact that southern mill owners were 
“pathologically opposed to collective bargaining.”
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“The textile workers’ situation at the moment is due not only or even mainly to 
the current business depression,” UTWA President Thomas McMahon lamented in 1931, 
“but is for the most part a result of immensely complicated and chaotic forces within the 
textile industry itself, which have worked against them in a cruel conspiracy, and over 
which they as individuals or even we as a union have no control.”19 McMahon admitted 
that in the face of employer resistance and depressed economic conditions, the AFL’s 
campaign to organize southern mill hands and to raise their working standards through 
widespread unionization had failed. The UTWA’s New England base, meanwhile, 
continued to dwindle, and the union struggled to maintain its core there. By 1930, one of 
every five textile workers in the country, because of ongoing mill closures and layoffs 
due to the stretch-out and the depression, was unemployed. Prices and demand for textile 
goods continued to fall and profits in the industry nearly ceased to exist between 1930 
and 1931, even in the South, as mills throughout the country ran at a fraction of their 
productive capacities. Within two years of the 1931 Danville defeat, the UTW A’s 
national membership had dropped below 32,000, the lowest in the union’s history.20
As textile operatives embraced organization as the means through which they 
could combat the worst effects of the depression, so too did northern and southern 
manufacturers as they sought ways to bring health back to the trade. Many textile 
manufacturers had realized by the early 1920s that the standard practice o f cutting costs 
and increasing production in an attempt to undersell competitors did little more than 
create a condition where supply outpaced demand, resulting in flooded markets, even 
lower prices, and a viscous cycle of overproduction. “In an industry such as ours,
19 Adamic, “Tragic Towns o f  N ew  England,” 748.
20 Irons, Testing the New Deal, 45; James Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern 
Cotton Textile Industry, 1933-1941 (Knoxville: University o f  Tennessee Press, 1986), 18.
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cooperation through an association is absolutely vital. We must realize that the cotton 
manufacturing industry is . . . divided into many units, no one mill or group of mills 
controls over five percent of the production of cotton goods,” noted National Association 
of Cotton Manufacturers President Robert Amory. “With such intense competition,” he 
implored, “it is important that some of its bitterness be avoided . . . .  for the general good 
of the industry.”21 The fundamental problem, however, was that no workable system was 
in place to regulate the output of the hundreds of individual mills scattered throughout the 
country. While condemning the prevailing system of cutthroat competition, mill owners, 
risking the loss of their place in the market, would not voluntarily curtail production 
unless all other mills did the same. Until some way of coordinating output could be 
developed and enforced industry-wide, the inherently destructive price wars would 
continue to the detriment of textile mill owners and workers alike.22
Seeking to find possible solutions to the industry’s troubles, in 1926, mill owners 
created the Cotton Textile Institute. Described as “a cooperative effort to obtain an 
intelligent grasp of the market problems of cotton manufacturers,” the goal of the CTI 
was to control the production and pricing of manufactured textile goods. By the end of 
its first year, the trade association represented an estimated fifteen million spindles 
nationwide.23 Hoping that it could mitigate the effects of southern competition on the
21 Transactions o f  the National Association o f  Cotton Manufacturers, Annual Meeting, 1923, 76- 
77. Hereafter cited as NACM  Transactions.
22 On the causes o f  overproduction that existed within the textile industry throughout the 1920s, 
see Bernstein, The Lean Years, 1-3; Hall, et ah, Like a Family, 184-190; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the 
New South, 56-57; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 18; William  
Hartford, Where Is Our Responsibility?: Unions and Economic Change in the New England Textile 
Industry, 1870-1960  (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1996), 51-53; Nancy Frances Kane, 
Textiles in Transition: Technology, Wages, and Industry Relocation in the U.S. Textile Industry, 1880-1930  
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 37; Bryant Simon, A Fabric o f  Defeat: The Politics o f  South 
Carolina M ill Hands, 1910-1948  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1998), 44-45.
23 Com mercial Bulletin, 17 July 1926.
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northern portion of the industry, New England manufacturers praised the CTI for the 
“closer cooperation between manufacturers” that the organization facilitated, noting that 
it had “become generally recognized that our problems are no longer sectional, but are 
national.”24 In 1930, the CTI focused its efforts on setting production standards through 
the establishment of ceilings for hours of mill operation, proposing in January that mills 
limit their operation to day shifts of no more than fifty-five hours per week, and night 
shifts of no more than fifty hours a week. Nine months later, the association also called 
for the elimination of night work for women and all workers under eighteen years old. 
Owners of cotton textile mills representing over eighty percent of the industry’s spindles 
nationwide claimed they participated in the CTI’s hours limitation initiatives by 1932.25
The Cotton Textile Institute succeeded in getting many of the cotton textile mills 
in the United States to observe their hours restrictions, but the production standards did 
little to alleviate the distress felt throughout the industry and fundamentally fix the 
problems that plagued it. As participation in the CTI’s programs was voluntary, 
individual mills could ignore the association’s standards and often did. Some mill 
owners did not cooperate with the Institute at all, while others only complied 
intermittently, setting their own production standards when periodic changes in market 
conditions made it favorable to do so. For New England’s textile manufacturers, the 
CTI’s recommendations did little to alter their mill operations. Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and New Hampshire already had laws that set age and hour standards that were at
24 NACM  Transactions, Semi-Annual Meeting, 1927, 131-132.
25 Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 362-363; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the 
Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 18; Irons, Testing the New Deal, 56. Tindall cited figures showing that 
by June 1931, about eighty-five percent o f  the spindles in the industry cooperated with the night work ban 
and that about eighty-two percent o f  the spindles in the industry complied with the 55-50 hour limitations 
by January 1932.
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or below the fifty-five-hour day-work recommendation made by the CTI, and age and 
hours laws had significantly curtailed night work throughout New England years before. 
Southern compliance with CTI proposals did marginally decrease overall output, but for 
New Englanders, the fact remained that textiles made in southern mills continued to be 
able to undersell theirs because of the higher wages paid and shorter hours worked in the 
northern mills. “If, as is expected, these voluntary limitations of working hours will be 
largely adopted,” the Massachusetts Industrial Commission commented on the CTI’s 
hours recommendations, “they represent excellent moves in the right direction though it 
will still leave Massachusetts as the only state with a limit of forty-eight hours per
9 f\week.” The CTI’s restrictions, moreover, were not severe enough, even if there had 
been one hundred percent participation, to stop the perpetual glut of supply and to raise 
prices. Because of its limited successes, after Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s inauguration 
in 1933, the CTI embraced the possibility of using federal legislation to help them effect 
the changes in production standards that had been an impossibility under a system of
9 7voluntary, self-regulation.
The goal of some of the first legislation drafted as part of the New Deal was to 
stem the tide of the Great Depression by stabilizing industrial production and putting 
people back to work in an attempt to increase purchasing power nationwide. On 16 June 
1933, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act to meet these objectives. 
The National Recovery Administration, established to oversee the implementation of the 
NIRA, would give government backing to and force compliance with the types of
26 Massachusetts Industrial Commission, Report o f  an Investigation by the M assachusetts 
Industrial Commissions o f  the Conditions Affecting the Textile Industry and the Problem o f  Unemployment 
in That and Other Industries, 22.
27 Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 362; Irons, New D eal Labor Policy, 49.
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restrictions recommended by the Cotton Textile Institute since 1926. Title I of the NIRA 
authorized the establishment of trade associations and mandated them to establish codes 
of fair competition for each individual industry throughout the country. In effect, the 
NIRA sanctioned by federal law the restriction of trade and competition through the 
fixing o f prices, wages, and production schedules. As a tradeoff for this relaxation of 
anti-trust laws for the benefit of the business community, the NIRA, however, also 
included Section 7(a) which stipulated that each code should contain provisions ensuring 
the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively through unions of their own 
choosing. Representatives of the cotton textile industry, working under the supervision 
of NRA director Hugh Johnson, drafted the first code.
The Cotton Textile Code, scheduled to go into effect by 1 August 1933, set the 
maximum hours a mill could run weekly to two shifts of no more than forty hours each, 
established a minimum weekly wage for a forty-hour week of twelve dollars in the South 
and thirteen dollars in the Northeast, outlawed the employment of anyone under sixteen 
years o f age, placed limits on mill expansions and the installation of new machinery, 
allowed for further production restrictions with approval from the NRA director, and in 
Article VIII of the code, included the provisions for employee representation as stipulated
29in Section 7(a) of the NIRA. It was evident from the start, however, that organized 
labor would have virtually no voice in the process of writing or administering the Cotton 
Textile Code. Mill owners who had been leaders of the now defunct Cotton Textile
28 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 289-292; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 433-434; Irons, 
Testing the N ew Deal, 56-62; Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and 
the O rganized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); 
Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1994), 111-113. For a detailed analysis o f  N ew  Deal legislation, including the NIRA, passed during 
FDR’s first hundred days, see William Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940  
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), especially 41-142.
29 The Cotton Textile Code actually went into effect on 17 July 1933.
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Institute, in effect, became the members of Cotton Textile Industrial Committee that 
drafted the code, as well as of the Code Authority, chaired by former CTI head George 
Sloan and established to oversee its provisions within the NRA. The national leadership 
of the UTWA, nonetheless, embraced the industry code as they assumed that the union 
would see long-term membership gains from Section 7(a) and would achieve 
organizational stability through its support of the Roosevelt administration and New Deal 
initiatives. The union also hoped that mill operatives would be put back to work and 
benefit from the code’s wage and hour provisions, and that the new standards would help 
realize the union’s goal of equalizing conditions between New England and the South.30
The Cotton Textile Code did help bring North-South wage and hour standards 
closer than they had ever been before. Between October 1933 and March 1934, the code 
reduced the average hours worked throughout the industry by twenty-five percent, as 
southern mills significantly curtailed operations from previous operating schedules of up 
to 110 hours per week. The minimum wage stipulations of the code also worked to bring 
regional wages into line with one another. Southern mill owners often attacked the wage 
provisions, which hit them much harder than their New England counterparts, as 
potentially damaging to the region’s recently established dominance in the industry. 
“Operation of existing codes . . .  are in favor of the New England mills and against 
Southern mills,” opined one southerner, “This shifting in the tide of textile development 
is o f intense concern to the South . . . .  This tide flowed strong for a good many years 
with the result that the South finally wrested supremacy from New England . . . .  To
30 Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 435; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the 
Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 54; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 289.
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• • 31surrender this supremacy to New England would be to work a colossal injustice.”
Despite the one dollar per week regional wage differential, the Cotton Textile Code 
increased the average hourly earnings throughout the industry by sixty-seven percent and 
decreased the North-South wage differential to its lowest point. Immediately before the 
code went into effect, wages earned by cotton textile operatives in the North were nearly 
thirty-nine percent higher than those in the South. The code reduced this disparity to
32eighteen percent by early 1934.
While the Cotton Textile Code briefly succeeded in raising wages for many cotton 
mill operatives and helped to increase demand and raise prices for cotton textile goods, as 
early as October 1933, demand stagnated, prices dropped below the cost of production, 
and mill warehouses throughout the country quickly accumulated inventories of surplus 
stock.33 Overproduction continued even though southern mills had significantly curtailed 
operations according to the eighty hour per week maximum set in the code, as many 
textile mills in New England began operating on increased production schedules in a bid 
to replace the goods that would have been on the market had mills in the South continued 
to run on a day-night basis for over one hundred hours a week. The Code Authority, with 
the approval of Hugh Johnson, attempted to fix the situation by curtailing production 
further. The new operating schedule of a maximum sixty hours per week went into effect 
in November 1933 and was scheduled to last ninety days. By the beginning o f 1934 
though, the Cotton Textile Code had not been able to stabilize the industry. The code
31 Gadsden Times, 3 April 1934.
32 Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 56-57; Tindall, The 
Emergence o f  the New South, 436.
33 George Tindall noted that the combination o f  higher cotton prices created by N ew  Deal 
programs under the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), the addition o f AAA cotton processing taxes, and 
the increased wages mandated by the Cotton Textile Code all contributed to driving up the costs o f  cotton 
textile production between 1933 and 1934. See Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 438.
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restrictions were still not severe enough to bring production into line with demand. In 
practice, the code failed to meet the expectations of NRA officials, the Cotton Code 
Authority, and o f individual mill owners throughout the country. It also failed to measure 
up to the hopes of the nation’s textile operatives, especially the thousands who poured 
into the ranks of the United Textile Workers of America under its collective bargaining 
provisions.34
The Cotton Textile Code did not put people back to work at wages higher than 
those earned before, and in fact, often had the opposite effect. The standardization of 
production schedules initially translated into jobs for many, especially for New England 
operatives who had been laid-off and for those who had jobs but worked in mills that 
were open only one or two days a week. Nevertheless, as prices stagnated and the Code 
Authority curtailed maximum weekly production hours to sixty during the autumn of 
1933, large numbers of New England’s cotton textile workforce who had been put back 
to work lost their jobs once again. The impact of the minimum wage stipulations, 
likewise, was not always positive. Mill owners throughout New England interpreted the 
minimum of thirteen dollars per week for forty hours of work as the maximum they had 
to pay as well. Semi-skilled and skilled mill hands throughout the region, therefore, saw
• 35their incomes decline significantly.
So too did the Cotton Textile Code have negative effects for southern operatives, 
as individual mill owners in the region devised practices of circumventing the rules 
established by it. In spite of the code’s hours stipulations, many southern mill managers
34 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 298; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton  
Textile Industry, 56-57; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New South, 436.
35 Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 57; Irons, Testing the 
New Deal, 64.
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used the stretch-out to ensure that their output of goods would continue to be higher than 
mills in New England operating on the same schedules so that they would not lose their 
market share. Operatives throughout the Piedmont South found themselves doing the 
same amount o f work, and sometimes more, in an eight-hour shift than in ten or eleven 
hour shifts before the code production curtailments began. “The Dwight Manufacturing 
Company o f Alabama City, Alabama is going to the greatest possible extremes on the 
‘Stretch-out’ system,” wrote Dwight operative H. S. Busy to NRA head Hugh Johnson. 
“This stretch out system in textile mill’s are killing people,” H. C. Bell echoed, “In 1929, 
I Run 10 looms Now I Run 50 looms.”36 The Cotton Textile Code was supposed to be a 
means through which the industry would not only be revitalized but would also provide 
gainful employment for the thousands of mill hands who had been victims of the 
depression mill closures. In actuality, between August 1933 and August 1934, an 
additional 50,000 cotton textile workers nationwide lost their jobs.37
Southern textile mill owners also found ways around paying the Cotton Textile 
Code’s twelve-dollar minimum wage. The most effective means of doing this was to
36 H. S. Busy to Hugh Johnson, 1 August 1933, National Recovery Administration, Dwight 
Manufacturing Company Folder, E398, Records o f  the National Recovery Administration, RG9. National 
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as Dwight Manufacturing 
Company Folder, NRA Records. All spelling and punctuation in the cited passages are as they are in the 
original letters. As shown in detail by the authors o f  Like a Family, the writing o f  NRA-related letters by 
mill hands to N ew  Deal bureaucrats, FDR, and Eleanor Roosevelt was a political act. See, Hall, et al., 293- 
294. For excerpts o f  similar letters written by textile mill workers in North and South Carolina in response 
to failures o f  the NRA, see Hall, et ah, Like a Family, 293-327; Simon, A Fabric o f  D efeat, 90-96.
37 Irons, Testing the New Deal, 65, 69. The Dwight Manufacturing Company, as was the case with 
mills throughout the country, sped-up its operations so that it could produce as many goods as possible 
before the Cotton Textile Code, which mill owners correctly assumed would drive production costs up, 
went into effect. In May 1933, the company hired an additional 650 operatives and began running on a 
twenty-four-hour, day-night basis. Dwight management restricted its operating hours to eighty as 
mandated by the code as o f  17 July but also laid o ff these 650 workers. Dwight em ployees complained that 
many o f  those staying on the job were friends and family o f  the “bosses,” and that supervisors began 
increasing their workloads to keep production levels high. Gadsden Times, 11 May 1933; Southern Textile 
Bulletin, 18 May 1933; Lena Clayton to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 19 July 1933; H. S. Busy to Hugh 
Johnson, 1 August 1933; and Margaret Pearson to Hugh Johnson, 6 August 1933, Dwight Manufacturing 
Company Folder, NRA Records.
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reclassify the jobs that operatives held so that, according to the exemptions from the 
minimum wage provisions enumerated in sections two and three o f the code, they could 
pay them less. Management began designating their operatives as “yard help,” listing 
white workers as “negro help,” and designating employees who had been working for the
o o
company for years as “helpers” or as “apprentices.” W. A. Pepper, an elevator operator 
in the cardroom of the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill, for 
example, earned $9.22 a week before the recovery plan began but, within a week of the 
code going into effect, management reclassified him as yard help. Even though Pepper 
held the same position in the card room, by reclassifying him, the company could pay 
Pepper $8.40 for forty hours of work instead of the twelve dollars he should have 
received under the code’s minimum wage provision. “I know of many others,” Pepper 
declared, “that they transferred that way to get out of paying the 12.00.” Georgia 
Thurman complained to code officials that the Dwight Company “is not paying code 
wages at all and nearly all the Hands even those that was raised in this mill are put on 
apprentice Pay Roll.” Thurman added that there were “Lots of other ways they are 
violating the code, Take a week to tell it all.”40
One of the “lots of other ways” the management of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company and textile mills throughout the country broke the Cotton Textile Code was by 
ignoring the protections afforded to workers who wanted to join a union. When Congress 
passed the NIRA in July 1933, thousands of textile workers, especially those employed in 
the mills of the Piedmont South, embraced the organizing possibilities of Section 7(a) and
38 Affidavits and Sworn Statements, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA Records.
39 W. A. Pepper to Hugh Johnson, 25 July 1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA
Records.
40 Georgia Thurman to L. R. Gilbert, Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board Secretary, 
5 September 1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA Records.
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its embodiment in Article VIII of the Cotton Textile Code. The national leadership of the 
UTWA was optimistic that the NIRA gave them the backing necessary to establish a 
robust national union with a substantial southern membership. Even in the absence of a 
structured southern organizing campaign, mill workers formed unions at their workplaces 
and flooded the UTWA with requests for local charters.41 UTWA affiliations 
skyrocketed as the union issued over 600 charters to new locals in twelve months, and 
membership jumped from an estimated 40,000 in September 1933 to more than 300,000 
within a year. Over a decade after management at the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s 
Alabama City mill successfully broke the textile union there, Dwight employees 
reestablished a UTWA local in July 1933. It was one of twenty-five textile unions 
chartered in Alabama by the summer of 1934. The belief that they had the power of the 
federal government behind them gave many Dwight employees, as was the case with 
textile workers throughout the region, the confidence to organize. Despite the staunch 
opposition they had received from employers in the past, they sought redress to their 
grievances over the conditions in which they lived and labored through collective
42action.
41 N ew  England textile historian William Hartford noted that “In N ew  England, workers watched 
these activities approvingly.” See Hartford, Where is Our Responsibility?, 60.
42 Hall, et ah, Like a Family, 304; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton 
Textile Industry, 61; Irons, Testing the New Deal, 100. Janet Irons argued that an important component o f  
southern union building under the Cotton Textile Code was the connection workers in different mills had 
with union organization between 1930 and 1932. She uses the mills o f  the Huntsville, Alabama area as an 
example o f  how the unions organized there between 1933 and 1934 were rooted in the strong union 
presence established in the area during the UTWA southern organizing campaign o f  1930-1931. See Irons, 
Testing the New Deal, 69-70. It is important to note, however, that workers in southern mills where no 
unions had ever been established or, like at the Dwight Manufacturing Company in Alabama City, were 
broken during the 1920s and did not reconstitute during the 1930-1931 southern organizing drive, also 
joined unions in record numbers under the NRA code. This stands as evidence o f  the faith that mill hands 
had in the power o f  the federal government, working through the NRA, to fundamentally alter the anti­
union status quo that prevailed in individual mills and throughout the industry.
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“In the Gadsden territory [organizing] has been much harder on account of 
antagonistic influences and the work has been slower,” L. W. Parnell reported to the 
delegates of the Alabama State Federation of Labor in 1934, “We have however some 
good local unions in the textile and steel industries, and our growth in other unions have 
been gradual and consistent.”43 Throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, Gadsden had 
been one of the toughest anti-union cities in the South. Residents of the community 
overwhelmingly supported the open shop movement initiated by Gadsden business 
groups in 1923. Hostility toward labor organizations also prevailed because o f the 
virulent anti-union sentiments of the Dwight Manufacturing Company, the Gulf States 
Steel Company, and the Goodyear Rubber and Tire Company which, with nearly 7,000 
employees combined, were the three largest employers in the area. According to 
historian Wayne Flynt, these three companies “Aided by a community eager to attract 
industry and keep out unions . . . made Gadsden a major battleground.”44 The owners of 
the Dwight Manufacturing Company contended that the existence of organized labor in 
its mills was unacceptable because of the limitations it could place on management’s 
prerogatives to run the mill as it pleased. The company railed against the prospect of
43 Alabama State Federation o f  Labor, Convention Proceedings, 1934, 20.
44 Wayne Flynt, Poor But Proud: A labam a’s Poor Whites (Tuscaloosa: University o f  Alabama 
Press, 1989), 331. In 1932, the city o f  Gadsden annexed Alabama City because the depression had plunged 
Alabama City into such financial difficulties that it would not meet its debt obligations and also provide the 
services “necessary to the health, safety, protection and education o f  the people.” Although Alabama City 
ceased to be an independent entity, it took on the character o f  a city within a city. The Dwight 
Manufacturing Company continued to dominate the day-to-day management o f  the locale’s affairs and 
remained the owner o f  hundreds o f  residential properties within the mill village. Gadsden Times, 13 July
1932.
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increasing wages and decreasing workloads, which would drive-up costs and hamper the 
company’s competitiveness in the marketplace, to meet a union’s demands.45
Using the closed mills in Chicopee, Massachusetts, as evidence of what a union 
presence could do to undermine a company’s ability to remain profitable, Dwight’s 
owners vowed to keep its Alabama operations union-free and surreptitiously violated the 
collective bargaining provisions of the Cotton Textile Code. The attitude of a majority of 
southern textile mill owners mirrored that of the management at the Dwight Company 
and they paid no heed to the rights of workers to engage in union organizing. Dwight 
management employed union-busting tactics that had been successful in the past and 
refused to recognize any “third party” bargaining agent, fired the leaders and organizers 
of the Dwight UTWA local, hired non-union workers as their replacements, and evicted 
the terminated operatives from company housing. Employees began reporting Dwight’s 
intransigence toward the UTWA local in Alabama City to the administrators of the 
Cotton Textile Code almost immediately after the code went into effect. “I have at 
various times talked to other employees regarding the union and some of them gave me 
applications for membership in the union at Alabama City, Alabama,” noted Dwight 
employee Denton Taylor in September 1933, “my foreman told me they could not use me 
any longer. After they laid me off they put a boy in my place and gave him my job. This 
boy . .  . did not belong to the union.”46 A month later, A. A. Sewall, Secretary-Treasurer 
of the Alabama City UTWA local, reported that a request the local made to the Dwight 
Company’s management to meet “and try to settle some of the grievances” of the union’s
45 For information on the attempts to organize unions at Goodyear and G ulf States Steel under 
Section 7(a), see Charles Martin, “Southern Labor Relations in Transition: Gadsden, Alabama, 1930-1943,” 
Journal o f  Southern History 47(November 1981): 548-549.
46 Sworn Statement by Denton Taylor to Thomas Callan, Notary Public, Gadsden, AL, 15 
September 1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA Records.
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members was refused by the mill superintendent who said “they was not going to have 
any thing to do with it.”47 Three weeks after the union’s request for a meeting was 
rebuffed, Dwight operative Emory Smith received treatment from management similar to 
that documented by organizer Denton Taylor. “About ten days before I was laid off I 
was elected vice president of our local Union,” he stated, “On Saturday afternoon after 
my election I gave a short talk or address on the Square in Alabama City, in favor of the 
Union.”48
Because it wanted to create a perception of compliance with the Cotton Textile 
Code’s provisions, however, the Dwight Company could not simply fire every member of 
the Alabama City UTWA local. Dwight management, therefore, took steps to make it 
appear that the firings of union workers happened not because of their UTWA 
membership but because of workplace incompetence. A twenty-year employee of the 
Dwight Company told of how her boss “had my work checked for two days” and “after 
finding a mistake he layed me off for good,” presumably because a mill manager saw her 
marching in Gadsden’s Labor Day parade.49 Dwight mill overseers also used 
intimidation tactics to keep workers from joining the union and to get those who were 
already members to renounce their association with the local. After eleven years of 
working for the Dwight Manufacturing Company “without trouble or complaint about my 
work,” Will McCain joined the Alabama City union, and when asked by his overseer, S.
L. Long, if  had become a union member, McCain responded that “it was no more than
47 A. A. Sewall, UTWA Local 1878 Secretary-Treasurer to L. R. Gilbert, National Cotton Textile 
Industrial Committee Secretary, 28 October 1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA Records.
48 Sworn Statement by Emory Smith to Ann Clark, Notary Public, Gadsden, AL, 20 November 
1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA Records.
49 Sworn Statement by Susie Reed to Ann Clark, Notary Public, Gadsden, AL, 20 November 1933, 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA Records.
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my right, an no more than many others had done and would do.” Long told McCain in 
return that McCain “knew what it meant to join.” Though not officially fired, McCain 
was laid off by Long the next day. A month later, J. W. Carter was fired for careless on 
the job by his supervisor Walter Enterkin who thought that the union was “nothing but 
peacebreakers.” Carter noted that he later received word from another mill hand that if 
he “would stay away from those Union meetings Walter . . .  would give me a better 
job.”50
The Dwight mill hands and their counterparts throughout the country lodged their 
complaints with various NRA officials, assuming that their written protests would be 
taken seriously and that the abuses of the code that they labored under daily would be 
corrected. What these men and women encountered, however, was a bureaucracy 
dominated by the mill men who wrote the Cotton Textile Code and oversaw its 
administration, men completely unsympathetic to the workers’ grievances and who 
ignored even the most blatant violations of the code’s provisions. Textile workers’ letters 
and sworn statements cataloging the ways their employers and immediate supervisors 
broke the Cotton Textile Code traveled through a maze of local, state, and district 
committees before reaching the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board, also 
referred to as the Bruere Board, which had been established to investigate code violations 
and to oversee and appoint state oversight committees. Mill operatives usually received 
form letters that included a copy of the articles of the Cotton Textile Code applicable to
50 Sworn Statement by William McCain to Thomas Callan, Notary Public, Gadsden, AL, 16 
September 1933; and Sworn Statement by J. W. Carter to Ann Clark, Notary Public, Gadsden, AL, 21 
November 1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA Records. For examples o f  code violations 
in North and South Carolina mills, see Hall, et al., Like a Family, 293-307.
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the complaint and told that “if, after reading the enclosed .. . you are in doubt as to 
procedure, the committee would be glad to have you write again.”51
Members of the Cotton Textile Code bureaucracy, moreover, usually took the 
word of mill managers at face value, despite overwhelming evidence of what came to be 
known as “code chiseling.” Responding to letters and affidavits from employees of the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company that overseers fired workers because of their union 
membership, for example, code complaint investigator E. O. Fitzsimmons stated, “The 
management assured me that they had not discriminated against the union or its members 
in any way, and that they were familiar with the provisions of article VIII of the Code and 
were living up to it.”52 Between 8 August 1933 and 8 August 1934, the Bruere Board 
received 3,920 complaints, but authorized only ninety-six investigations and resolved one
53dispute over wages and hours in an operative’s favor. In the rare instances where 
workers’ complaints were determined to be true, “The correct interpretation [of the 
Cotton Textile Code articles] was explained to the management” and the matter was 
usually settled after assurances “that future application would be made . . .  in accordance 
with the code.”54
51 The board took its name from its chairman, Robert Bruere. The Bruere Board determined 
whether or not complaints warranted further investigation. For detailed information on the Cotton Textile 
Code bureaucracy, see Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 64-70; 
Irons, Testing the New Deal, 79-84; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 307-308.
52 Report Regarding Complaint Against Dwight Manufacturing Company, Filed 28 October 1933, 
Investigated by E. O. Fitzsimmons, 11 January 1934, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA 
Records. Sworn statements made by overseers from the Dwight Company denying that they had ever 
“discharged or caused to be discharged any employee” because o f  union affiliation are also located in the 
Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder o f  the NRA Records.
53 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 325.
54 See, for example, Reports Regarding Complaint Against Dwight Manufacturing Company, 
Investigated by E. O. Fitzsimmons, 20 October 1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, NRA  
Records. James Hodges noted that investigations done under the direction o f  the Bruere Board were short 
in duration, virtually ignored the issue o f  discrimination against union members, and reported “almost no 
stretch out, only misunderstandings o f  new scientific work assignments or substandard workers being 
dismissed.” Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 70-72.
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The bureaucratic nightmare set up to administer the Cotton Textile Code and the 
ongoing degradations experienced by the workers not only at the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company but in mills throughout the Piedmont South, engendered deep feelings of 
resentment against their employers. “There is more dissatisfaction among labor now than 
I have ever seen,” vented Dwight boilerman W. L. Hilton in a letter to Hugh Johnson, “If 
the administration isnt going to see that Industry and Business live to these Code an 
N.R.A. why they might as well throw up hands and quit for Employers in the South are 
sure as-not going to do untill they are forced to it.”55 This sense of aggravation was only 
compounded by a disconnect that existed between the rank-and-file and the national 
leadership of the UTWA. While organizers continued to establish UTWA locals in 
previously unorganized mills throughout the country, UTWA President Thomas 
McMahon appeared to the rank-and-file as unconcerned with addressing their immediate 
needs. McMahon urged cooperating with and working to settle grievances through the 
administrative bureaucracy of the Cotton Textile Code. As early as the fall of 1933, 
sporadic strikes occurred in individual mills in the Piedmont South and the UTWA 
national leadership began receiving requests from locals throughout the country that they 
be allowed to strike. McMahon, nevertheless, hoping to prevent a rift between the 
Roosevelt administration and the union, maintained that the best approach to the situation 
of code chiseling was to allow him to continue to try to use the union’s influence to 
extract concessions and secure better enforcement of the code’s provisions through the 
machinery set up by the Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board. Protests 
lodged by McMahon to Bruere Board officials over abuses o f the code’s wage
55 W. L. Hilton to Hugh Johnson, 23 September 1933, Dwight Manufacturing Company Folder, 
NRA Records.
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exemptions, continued use of the stretch-out, and discrimination against union workers, 
however, were ignored as readily as those from the mill hands themselves.56
Discontent at the grassroots level reached a boiling point in the spring o f 1934 
when Hugh Johnson approved the Cotton Textile Code Authority’s request for another 
round of production cuts which would again reduce the maximum hours a mill could run 
per week from eighty to sixty for up to ninety days. As was the case with the changes in 
operating hours made in November 1933, the hourly wage rate for workers remained the 
same but their weekly shift dropped from forty to thirty hours. This meant that the code’s 
minimum wage of twelve dollars per week became nine dollars per week, and that 
earnings would be even lower for mill hands who had been reclassified by management
cn
or who worked in mills that chose not to operate on a full schedule. On May 28,
UTWA Vice-President Francis Gorman, responding to the disgruntlement rampant in 
mills throughout the country, threatened a general strike to begin on Monday, 4 June if 
the reductions went into effect as scheduled. The UTWA local at the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company prepared to participate in the threatened walkout but James 
Holland, President of the local, noted that he hoped “that a satisfactory settlement could 
be reached.”58 The mounting tensions were momentarily diffused, however, when Hugh 
Johnson negotiated an agreement between UTWA President Thomas McMahon,
CTNIRB Chairman Robert Bruere, and Code Authority Chairman George Sloan. Under 
the terms of the settlement, the UTWA would not go forward with the general strike, the
56 Hall, et al., Like a Family, 307-308; Simon, A Fabric o f  Defeat, 98-108; Irons, Testing the New  
Deal, 85-88; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 73-78.
57 The Dwight Company, for example, announced a planned shutdown for one full week in July 
and for another full week in August to make needed repairs to the mill and machinery. The announcement 
o f  the scheduled closures appeared in the Gadsden Times, 6 June 1934.
58 Gadsden Times, 2 June 1934.
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Bruere Board would add a representative of the union, and an investigation would be 
done to see if the production cuts were really necessary and to determine the feasibility of 
raising wages. The curtailment went forward on 1 June and the UTWA remained, at best, 
a junior partner in the administration of the Cotton Textile Code, and at worst, a 
supplicant to the mill owners who dominated it.59
Thomas McMahon’s settlement with Johnson, Bruere, and Sloan did nothing to 
alleviate the distress of mill hands throughout the country. On top of the twenty-five 
percent weekly wage reduction caused by the production cut, the stretch-out, job 
reclassifications, and layoffs of and discrimination against union members continued.
The UTWA rank-and-file, therefore, took matters into their own hands. During the 
spring and summer of 1934, textile workers in mills throughout the Piedmont South 
engaged in unauthorized strikes against recalcitrant owners and management. In 
Alabama, union members in several mills, including the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company, went on strike during the first week o f July. Within days of the walkouts, all 
o f Alabama’s UTWA locals met to discuss whether or not to declare a statewide general 
strike and to take a strike vote. In spite of Thomas McMahon’s advice, forty of the forty- 
two locals voted in favor of the statewide walkout, demanding payment of the twelve 
dollar minimum wage for a thirty-hour week, abolition of the stretchout, the 
reemployment of workers who had lost jobs because of union affiliations, and recognition 
of the UTWA as the chosen bargaining agent for the workers. A week later, as many as
59 Reports o f  the settlement appeared in the 3 June and 6 June 1934 editions o f  the Gadsden Times. 
Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 87-88; Irons, Testing the New 
D eal, 107-108.
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23,000 mill hands in over thirty mills in the textile district of northern Alabama were on 
strike.60
The immediate cause of the 1934 walkout at the Dwight Manufacturing Company 
was the firing of union members. “Fifteen hundred employees of the Dwight Cotton 
Mills here walked out on strike this morning,” the local press reported, “James Holland, 
president o f the local, said that the employes [s/c] were discharged yesterday because 
they voted last week to join in the general textile strike in Alabama.” Protesting not only 
the firings o f five unionists but also the accumulated grievances of the stretch-out, union 
discrimination, job reclassifications, wage cuts, and being ignored by Thomas McMahon 
as well as by the members of the Cotton Textile Code bureaucracy, the union vowed to 
stay out of the mill until all its demands were met. Dwight Agent Allan Little denied all 
charges o f discrimination and code breaking made by the union, contending that the 
Dwight local had not presented him directly with any formal list of complaints. “We are 
operating under the code of the National Recovery Act,” Little stated, “and expect to 
continue to do so.”61 The striking Dwight workers immediately began picketing at all 
entrances to the mill, “preventing any shipment of goods or freight of any sor t . . .  to enter 
the yards” and were “active in seeing that nobody goes into the plant.” Agent Little 
announced his intention of not bargaining in any way with the union by posting a sign at
60 Gadsden Times, 10 July 1934. Throughout the South, there were eight walkouts in May, five in 
June and nine in July. The strike wave in Alabama included workers in Alabama City, Gadsden, Huntsville, 
Florence, Anniston, Cordova, Jasper, Guntersville, Albertville, and at the Avondale Mills on the outskirts 
o f  Birmingham. Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 96-97; Philip 
Taft, Organizing Dixie: Alabama Workers in the Industrial Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 
78-79 .
61 Gadsden Times, 12 July 1934; P. O. Davis, Alabama Cotton Textile Industrial Relations Board 
Chairman to Robert Bruere, Cotton Textile National Industrial Relations Board Chairman, 14 July 1934; 
and Robert Bruere to Thomas McMahon, UTW A President, 14 July 1934, Dwight Manufacturing 
Company Folder, NRA Records.
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the mill gates stating, “this mill will be closed indefinitely.” And, in classic Dwight
62Company form, Little responded to the workers’ action with a lockout.
The walkout of Alabama’s textile workers and threats made by North Carolina’s 
UTWA locals that they would begin a statewide strike of their own, forced the national 
leadership o f the UTWA to take a more aggressive stance against the Cotton Textile 
Code Authority. UTWA President Thomas McMahon announced that the union’s 
national convention, originally scheduled to take place in late September, would be 
moved to August so that the issues of the Alabama strike and the possibility o f calling a 
nationwide general strike could be discussed. McMahon, while assuming a more militant 
tone, was also very careful to distance himself from the mill hands already on strike in 
Alabama whose actions were characterized by Scott Roberts, President o f the Alabama 
Cotton Textile Association, as a “strike against the NRA.”63 McMahon walked a fine 
line between placating restless southern mill hands and not undermining the union’s 
tenuous position within the Cotton Textile Code bureaucracy. McMahon publicly stated 
that the Alabama operatives were showing “an utter disregard for the principles of the 
NRA,” but that unless employers “show some inclination to cooperate with labor” the 
“United Textile Workers special convention . . . will vote in favor of the strike.”64
At the August special convention of the UTWA, southern unionists articulated 
their grievances over the stretch-out, miserable working conditions, and the flouting of 
the Cotton Textile Code by mill owners throughout the region to the over 500 delegates 
present. James Holland, President of the Dwight UTWA local, argued that if  wages were
62 Gadsden Times, 14 July 1934.
63 Ibid., 18 July 1934.
64 Ibid., 28 July 1934; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 
96; Irons, Testing the New Deal, 114.
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not raised “thousands of textile workers would be starved to death,” noting that “whole 
families had been discharged from mills for no other reason than that they belonged to 
the union.” A. W. Cox of Huntsville, Alabama told of how he had been “shot at and 
blackjacked by employers’ henchmen” because of his affiliation with the UTWA.65 
Unionists from mills in the Northeast agreed to act in support of their southern 
counterparts and, after the introduction of over fifty resolutions calling for a general 
strike, the UTWA passed a general strike motion, authorized for all branches of the 
industry, with only ten dissenting votes. The UTWA convention delegates issued the 
same set of demands made in July by the Alabama locals and named Vice-President 
Francis Gorman as director of the strike which was set to begin on 1 September.66
On Monday, 3 September, UTWA members initiated strikes in textile mills 
throughout the South. Support for the general strike gained momentum over the next 
several days, with unionists in the textile centers of the Northeast commencing walkouts 
on 4 September, protesting, in the first display of nationwide solidarity of its kind in the 
UTWA’s history, not only their grievances but also walking out in support of those in the
cn
South whose plight was measurably worse. Over the next three weeks, “flying 
squadrons” o f UTWA members traveled in cars and trucks to help start strikes in 
unorganized, isolated textile manufactories throughout the Piedmont South, and textile 
operatives went on strike in every major textile town throughout New England. At its 
peak, the general strike involved as many as 400,000 mill hands nationwide. Reaction to
65 Gadsden Times, 16 August 1934.
66 Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 98-100; Irons,
Testing the N ew Deal, 118-119; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 328-329; Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune, 48.
67 3 September was Labor Day but it was not a recognized holiday in southern mills. As Labor 
Day was recognized in the mills throughout the Northeast, walkouts did not start there until the following  
day.
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the strike varied from location to location and ranged from peaceful to violent. Many 
mill mangers, like Agent Allan Little at the Dwight Manufacturing Company, simply 
closed their facilities to wait out the strikers. Other manufacturers, in response to the 
flying squadrons and tensions between union and non-union workers hired to replace 
them, employed armed guards and were permitted by southern governors to use the 
National Guard to protect mill properties, prevent additional walkouts from happening, 
and to safeguard strikebreakers who crossed the picket lines. Four New England 
governors also called up the National Guard and in numerous northern and southern 
locales, violent clashes occurred between strikers, scabs, local sheriffs, guardsmen, and 
private police forces.68
In textile mills throughout the country, however, production continued for the 
duration of the strike. In Alabama, only thirty-one mills out of eighty-three, employing 
only about one-third of the operatives in the state, participated in the strike. Management 
control remained tight in the non-striking towns, and only one Alabama mill joined the 
walkout after the UTWA approved the national strike.69 With the UTWA unable to 
completely shutdown the industry nationwide and critically short of funds, the strike
68 The most serious bloodshed o f the strike occurred in Honea Path, South Carolina, Trion, 
Georgia, and Salyesville, Rhode Island. On the progression o f  the strike in various locales see Irving 
Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A H istory o f  the American Worker, 1933-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1970), 307-312; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 105-112; Irons, 
Testing the New Deal, 120-139; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 328-350; Simon, A Fabric o f  Defeat, 109-122; 
Hartford, Where Is Our Responsibility? , 61-62; Douglas Flamming, Creating the Modern South: Millhands 
and Managers in Dalton, Georgia, 1884-1984  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1992), 
199-204; John Salmond, The General Textile Strike o f  1934: From Maine to Alabama  (Columbia: 
University o f  Missouri Press, 2002), especially 83-197.
69 Taft, Organizing Dixie, 81; James Hoffman, “A Study o f  the United Textile Workers o f  
America in a Cotton Mill in a Medium-Sized Southern Industrial City: Labor Revolt in Alabama, 1934” 
(Ed.D. diss., University o f  Alabama, 1986), 264-289. Historians have estimated that over half o f  the mills 
in the country remained open throughout the strike. John Salmond points out that nearly one million 
workers from all branches o f  the textile industry could have been involved in the strike. For numbers o f  
mill hands participating in the strike in the South and N ew  England, see Salmond, The General Textile 
Strike o f  1934, 72, 83, 120; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 108- 
1 1 1 .
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began to fail within three weeks of its start. Not wanting to sour his relationship with 
Roosevelt administration officials and feeling that, given the economic conditions that 
prevailed throughout the country, the strike was ill timed, William Green rejected the 
UTWA’s request for AFL funds to be used for the general strike even before it had 
commenced. Without the AFL’s financial backing, the UTWA quickly realized that it 
was unable on its own to raise the money and furnish relief supplies needed to sustain the 
hundreds of thousands of mill hands on strike. Operatives throughout the industry, 
especially those in Alabama who had been out of work for over six weeks, were, 
according to UTWA spokesmen, being driven back to work by “force and hunger.”
Public opinion, likewise, did not favor the strikers. Pronouncements by the Cotton 
Textile Code Authority and individual manufacturers continued to characterize the strike 
as one that was a violation of the agreement made between the UTWA and NRA officials 
and that it was not a protest against unyielding, union-hostile employers but against the 
law established under the NRA.70
With the likelihood of mill managers accepting the demands of the UTWA 
diminishing with each passing day, Francis Gorman worked behind the scenes to secure a 
quick settlement of the conflict. Within days of the start of the strike, President 
Roosevelt appointed a special board to investigate the causes of the walkout, naming 
John Winant, a former governor of New Hampshire, to chair the inquiry. The Winant 
Board, as it came to be called, issued its report on 21 September. The Winant Report’s 
recommendations called for the abolishment of the Bruere Board, the creation of a new 
board to hear workers’ grievances, and for inquiries into the matters of the stretch-out and
70 Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 111-112; Irons, 
Testing the New Deal, 142-147; Hall, et al., Like a Family, 349-350; Tindall, The Emergence o f  the New  
South, 512-513.
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the possibility of raising wages. The board’s members suggested that President 
Roosevelt ask workers to end the strike based on their proposals, and to call on mill 
owners to resume operations without discrimination. When Roosevelt made this request, 
Gorman had the out he had been looking for and, declaring the strike a success, the
71UTWA officially called off the walkout on 22 September. Gorman announced, “We 
have now gained every substantial thing that we can gain in this strike. Our strike has 
torn apart the whole unjust structure of the NRA, lifting a load from all labor as well as
79from ourselves.”
But in reality, the UTWA had suffered a terrible defeat. Textile mill owners were 
not in any way compelled to honor the recommendations of the Winant Board and 
blatantly ignored FDR’s request that they refrain from taking punitive measures against 
the strikers. Nowhere was this loss more palpable than at the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company’s Alabama City mill. After Gorman announced the official end of the conflict, 
the leaders o f the Dwight local voted to continue their strike, insisting that “the 
employers first guarantee unconditionally, the reinstatement, without discrimination of all 
who quit the mills.” In response, Dwight management announced that the mill would 
reopen. On the following day, however, it took aggressive steps to break the union.73
When looking at the 1934 General Textile Strike—the largest and one o f the most 
geographically dispersed walkouts in the history of American labor— from a local 
perspective, it resembled strikes that had occurred before. The path the conflict took at
71 Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 112-116; Irons, 
Testing the N ew Deal, 152-153. UTWA historian Robert Brooks argued that if  Gorman would have waited 
to end the strike it would have become “a disorganized rout,” and by calling it o ff  when he did, the union 
was at least able to send workers back to the mills “in a well disciplined retreat.” See Brooks, “The United 
Textile Workers o f  America,” 389-390.
72 Gadsden Times, 22 September 1934.
73 Ibid., 23 September 1934.
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the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s Alabama City mill paralleled the strikes that 
happened there in 1921 and 1922, as well as strikes that occurred in Dwight’s Chicopee 
mill starting in the 1870s. After the workers struck, Dwight management simply closed 
the mill and instituted a lockout, threatening the workers with the possibility of being 
fired and evicted from their homes, until the majority of the strikers yielded to 
management. New, non-union employees replaced those who did not abandon the union.
The 1934 Dwight strike officially collapsed on 24 September when the company 
secured injunctions against sixty strikers, “enjoining them from interfering in any way 
with the operation” of the mill. The local sheriff served only twenty-four of the 
injunctions that went to the officials of the UTWA local, their family members, and close 
associates. Agent Allan Little assumed that making an example of the strike leaders and 
threatening others with legal action would be enough to destroy the local, and stated that 
the other thirty-six named in the injunction would not be formally served unless they 
caused “further interference with the operation of the mills.”74 In all, Dwight 
management fired 115 of the strikers who refused to renounce their membership in the 
union. The UTWA filed charges of discrimination and harassment with the Cotton 
Textile National Labor Relations Board but to no avail. Dwight management used the 
prevailing economic conditions to its benefit, as it easily found eager, non-union
74 The injunctions served to the Dwight workers threatened legal action against those who “in any 
way or manner whatsoever by use o f  threats o f  personal injury, intimidation, suggestion o f  danger, or 
threats o f  violence o f  any kind, interfering with, hindering any person engaged in the employ or willing to 
accept any employment o f  complainant in connection with its business in manufacturing cotton goods for 
interstate or intrastate commerce, or from inducing or attempting to compel or induce by threats, 
intimidation, force, violence, or putting in fear or suggestion o f  danger any o f  the employes [s/c] or the 
complainant o f  persons seeking employment with it so as to cause them to refuse to perform their duties.” 
Gadsden Times, 24 September 1934; Flynt, Poor But Proud, 331. Bryant Simon emphasized the 
importance o f  southern poverty as a factor in undermining the possibility o f  successful strikes and the 
establishment o f  a union base in southern textiles during the Great Depression. See Simon, “Rethinking 
Why There Are So Few Unions in the South” G eorgia Historical Quarterly 81 (Summer 1997): 478-481.
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replacements for ousted workers from the pool of surplus labor made up of unemployed 
industrial workers and small farmers in the immediate Gadsden area. The company was 
able to secure a workforce to reopen its mills without the operatives who remained loyal 
to the UTWA local. When the Dwight Company began production again, “Observers . . . 
said that the sight of those working people streaming along Kyle Avenue and other main 
thoroughfares to the mill gates was as welcome as almost anything could be right now . . . 
because o f the spirit that seemed to dominate them.” According to the local press, “They 
simply stepped back into normal habits as if nothing had ever happened.”75
The aftermath of the general strike in textile towns throughout the country, in 
varying degrees of severity, mirrored what happened in Alabama City. Northern and 
southern manufacturers called for a greater “solidarity of purpose on the part of cotton 
manufacturers” to prevent another strike from happening. Members of the National 
Association of Cotton Manufacturers created a “Platform of Principles of Industrial 
Relations,” in which mill owners agreed that they would take all necessary steps to see 
that “the duty of management to conduct business for which it is responsible” would not 
be “obstructed by forcing a surrender of its proper functions to the government or to 
employee organizations.” David Clark, likewise, urged readers of the Southern Textile 
Bulletin to “entirely ignore the so-called ‘impartial investigators’ of the National Textile 
Labor Relations Board,” reminding them that, “the only penalty for the application of 
boots to the seat of pants is through a local indictment and possibly a small fine.”76 
Working conditions continued to erode as old patterns of code evasions resurfaced. As of 
January 1935, the Textile Labor Relations Board that had been established in the wake of
75 Gadsden Times, 26 September 1934.
76 NACM  Transactions, Annual Meeting, 1934, 101, 115; Southern Textile Bulletin, 11 October
1934.
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the strike to hear and settle code disputes, had received from strikers more than 1,600 
discrimination complaints against 579 mills. Thomas McMahon, over a year later, 
lamented that “thousands are still unemployed” because of the 1934 strike.77 By April 
1937, the UTWA’s nationwide membership had dwindled to fewer than 38,000, with
78only about 5,500 paid-up members in Alabama, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. 
Mill owners’ retaliations against workers who participated in the strike, their open 
hostility toward taking any action on the Winant Board proposals, and their flouting of 
the Cotton Textile Code’s stipulations protecting workers’ rights to organize, made the 
end of the strike a bitter pill to swallow for mill hands who had trusted both their union
70and the federal government to see that the conflict ended in their favor.
Attempts to organize southern textile mills, however, did not completely end with 
the 1934 strike debacle or with the Supreme Court’s ruling in May 1935 that the NIRA, 
including Section 7(a), was unconstitutional. Between 1935 and 1939 textile unionists 
began abandoning the largely defunct AFL-affiliated UTWA for membership within the 
Congress o f Industrial Organizations’ Textile Workers Union of America. In 1936, 
textile unionists organized the Textile Workers’ Organizing Committee and developed 
plans for a CIO-led southern organizing campaign. The passage of the Wagner Act in 
1935 that established the National Labor Relations Board, a permanent agency intended 
to prevent employers from engaging in unfair labor practices and discrimination against 
bargaining units chosen by employees to represent them, bolstered the TWOC’s
77 Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 124; United Textile 
Workers o f  America, Proceedings o f  the Thirty-Fifth Annual Convention, 1936, 8.
78 The UTWA membership was 37,588 nationwide, and 5,472 in the leading southern textile 
states. Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 130.
79 Ibid., 122-125; Irons, Testing the New Deal, 154-158; Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune, 52-53;
Hall, et al., Like a Family, 350-353; Flamming, Creating the Modern South, 203-208.
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optimism. Textile unionists hoped that they could capitalize on the momentum created 
by the CIO’s successes in organizing mass industries like steel, autos, rubber, and 
electrical goods, and finally make headway in the South’s largest and most union-hostile 
industry.80
The TWOC organizing drive, which began in April 1937, unlike UTWA 
campaigns o f the past, had ample financial resources for its endeavor supplied from other 
CIO-affiliated unions nationwide. Still, by 1938, the campaign was struggling to 
overcome the challenges presented by wage reductions, layoffs, production cuts, and mill 
closures that occurred during the Roosevelt Recession. The TWOC, moreover, faced the 
opposition of mill owners, the hesitancy of many southern operatives to join another 
union until it had proved to them it was strong enough to force management to bargain 
with it, and the complexities of organizing a highly decentralized industry. TWOC 
organizing efforts in northern mills brought significant successes as mill owners 
grudgingly accepted the establishment of collective bargaining under the provisions of 
the Wagner Act. The result was the unionization of nearly all of the textile manufactories 
there. Southern mill owners, however, openly defied the law and fought the TWOC tooth 
and nail. The TWOC’s 1937-1938 organizing campaign ended with the CIO being able 
to negotiate contracts in only nine mills, representing slightly more than 5,200 operatives 
in the Piedmont South.
80 The TW UA grew out o f  the Textile Workers’ Organizing Committee, created to spearhead the 
1937 southern organizing drive. On the founding o f  the TWUA, see Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune, 55-67, 
125-129; Barbara Griffith, The Crisis o f  American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat o f  the CIO  
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 3-11; Hartford, Where Is Our Responsibility? , 64-67. On 
the Wagner Act see Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America, 114-133; Tomlins, The State and 
the Unions, 120-189.
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Southern membership in the TWUA grew marginally during World War II, but 
the center of textile unionism remained firmly entrenched in New England. By the end of 
the war, only 80,000 of the TWUA’s estimated 200,000 members worked in mills south 
of the Mason-Dixon Line. The CIO’s post-war southern organizing drive, dubbed 
“Operation Dixie,” also failed to establish a significant union presence in the region’s 
textile mills. The TWUA lost nearly sixty percent of the NLRB elections called during 
Operation Dixie, and by 1952 acted as bargaining agent in only two percent of the 
region’s mills.81 The failure of the CIO to make inroads not only in textiles but also in 
the majority of southern industries, meant that during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the 
South became for manufacturers throughout the Northeast what it had long been for New 
England textile mill owners: a low-wage, non-union haven for runaway producers.
81 At its peak strength in the 1940s, the TWUA represented only twenty percent o f  the textile 
workforce nationwide. Robert Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1995), 66-211; Daniel, Culture o f  Misfortune, 71-152; Hartford, Where Is Our Responsibility? , 67- 
86; Hodges, New D eal Labor Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 147-179. On Operation 
Dixie, see Griffith, The Crisis o f  American Labor, Zieger, The CIO, 227-241; Daniel, Culture o f  
Misfortune, 154-183; Tindall, Emergence o f  the New South, 521-523; Michael Goldfield, “The Failure o f  
Operation Dixie: A Critical Turning Point in American Political Development?,” in Gary Fink and Merl 
Reed, eds., Race, Class, and Community in Southern Labor H istory (Tuscaloosa: University o f  Alabama 
Press, 1994), 166-189.
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CHAPTER VII
“ECONOMIC LAW WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE ITS WAY:” THE DEMISE OF 
THE DWIGHT MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
Since Reconstruction, the industrial economy of the South had been based on low 
wage, low skill labor. By the 1920s, the regional wage differential between North and 
South and the absence of unionized labor had become a selling point not only for New 
England textile manufacturers but also for entrepreneurs undertaking a wide array of 
industrial pursuits. “The pushing of textile production in the South while New England 
mills get wage cuts and slack time is a conspicuous bit of current history,” UTWA 
President Thomas McMahon observed in 1928, “ . . . .sawmill and planning mill products, 
furniture factories, railroad car repair shops, the building of automobile bodies, the 
making of stoves and cast-iron pipe and other iron work, and the manufacture of men’s 
clothing has also contributed to the increase . . .  in the factory workers of the low-wage 
states.”1 In industries, like textiles, where labor constituted the majority o f production 
costs, the savings a company could realize by the South’s lower wage rates and taxes, and 
from industry-friendly state and local governments offering subsidies by way o f land 
grants and low-cost loans, often made the difference between profits and losses. As more 
and more mass industries in the North and West organized during the 1930s and 1940s, 
ensuring that the South would remain a haven for companies seeking to escape high 
production costs elsewhere became a modus operandi for state and local government
1 Textile Worker, January 1928.
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officials and communities throughout the region. The link tying southern prosperity to a 
union-free environment that had been part of the New South’s mantra since the 1880s, 
only strengthened after World War II.
Effective unionization and an equalization of standards throughout the U.S. textile 
industry that organization could have helped to bring about, therefore, eluded New 
England operatives and mill owners alike who, through the late 1950s and 1960s, were 
trying to save the region’s cotton manufacturing industry from total collapse.3 The 
minimum wage and forty-hour workweek standards passed as part of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in 1938 lessened the gap between production costs that existed between 
mills in the North and South, but did not do away with it completely.4 Forty-four percent 
of southern textile operatives saw their wages rise as a result of FLSA minimum wage 
provisions in the fall of 1939, but only six percent of northern mill hands were affected. 
The regional allowances built into the FLSA and the success of the Textile Workers 
Union of America in negotiating contracts, which included higher wages and benefits that 
ultimately drove up costs further in many New England mills but not southern ones, 
meant that the regional disparities would continue. At the end of World War II, the wage 
differential between northern and southern mills hovered around fifteen percent, the same
2 James Cobb, Selling the South: The Southern Crusade fo r  Industrial Development, 1936-1990, 
second edition (Chicago: University o f  Illinois Press, 1993), especially 35-63, 97-110; Gavin Wright, Old  
South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1986), 249-264; Bryant Simon, “Rethinking Why There Are So Few Unions in the 
South” Georgia H istorical Quarterly 81(Summer 1997): 475-477; Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: R C A ’s 
Seventy-Year Quest fo r  Cheap Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 73-98.
3 Tom Juravich, William Hartford, and James Green noted that only “a handful” o f  textile 
manufacturers were “genuinely committed to doing business in New England” and cooperated with TWUA  
strategies to save the industry in the region. See Juravich, Hartford, and Green, Commonwealth o f  Toil: 
Chapters in the H istory o f  Massachusetts Workers and Their Unions (Amherst: University o f  
Massachusetts Press, 1996), 128.
4 David Koistinen discussed several attempts made in the 1930s to equalize North-South textile 
industry standards through federal legislation before the passage o f  the FLSA in 1938. See Koistinen, 
“Dealing With Deindustrialization: Economics, Politics, and Policy During the Decline o f  the N ew  England 
Textile Industry, 1920-1960” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1999), 159-165, 172-180.
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degree o f difference that existed in 1907. Between 1947 and 1954, the incomes of all 
southern industrial workers remained twenty to twenty-five percent below the national 
average.5
The capital flight and mill closures that had become standard in the New England 
textile industry by the end of the 1920s accelerated through the 1950s and 1960s. 
Suffering from the ill effects of outdated production facilities and from both southern and 
international competition, by 1970, nearly 300,000 textile industry jobs in the region had 
been lost due to bankruptcies or relocation to the South. What happened in Chicopee, 
Massachusetts with the closure of the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s mills there in 
1927, became the norm in textile mill towns throughout the region over the next four 
decades. Displaced workers struggled to obtain work and when they did, their standard 
of living was often lowered as the new positions they found were often in unorganized 
light industries, or were in the service sector where pay scales were lower than in the 
unionized mills.6
5 Wright, O ld South, New South, 219; Cobb, Selling the South, 115; Hodges, New D eal Labor 
Policy and the Southern Cotton Textile Industry, 1933-1934  (Knoxville: University o f  Tennessee Press, 
1986), 182-189.
6 John Gaventa and Barbara Ellen Smith, “The Deindustrialization o f  the Textile South: A Case 
Study,” in Jeffrey Leiter, Michael Schulman, and Rhonda Zingraff, eds., Hanging by a Thread: Social 
Change in Southern Textiles (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1991), 182; Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The 
Deindustrialization o f  America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling o f  Basic 
Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 25-27, 84-104. Bluestone and Harrison found that only about 
three percent o f  the textile mill employees displaced by mill closures were able to find work in the high- 
technology sector that fueled Massachusetts’ economic recovery during the late 1970s and early 1980s. On 
post-World War II New England mill closures; management, union, and government strategies to stop them 
and mitigate the impact o f  deindustrialization on the region; and local, state, and regional economic 
redevelopment programs, see Hartford, Where Is Our Responsibility?, 87-202; Daniel, Culture o f  
Misfortune, 205-281; Laurence Gross, The Course o f  Industrial Decline: The Boot Cotton M ills o f  Lowell, 
Massachusetts, 1835-1955  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), chapters 11-12; Bruce 
Saxon, “Fall River and the Decline o f  the N ew  England Textile Industry, 1949-1954” The H istorical 
Journal o f  Massachusetts 16(1988): 54-74; Juravich, Hartford, and Green, Commonwealth o f  Toil, 127- 
129; Koistinen, “Dealing with Deindustrialization,” 201-338.
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Just as the Dwight Manufacturing Company’s construction of a southern branch 
mill during the depression of 1893 and its decision to completely shut down its 
Massachusetts operations in 1927 foreshadowed mill relocations and closures that would 
become normative throughout New England, events at the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company’s Alabama City mill between 1935 and 1959 also pointed toward wider trends 
that would exist in the southern textile industry by the 1970s. Throughout the late 1930s, 
the Dwight Company vigorously fought attempts made by former members of the Dwight 
UTWA local and the TWUA to organize an independent union in the Alabama City mill. 
After the resumption of operations in the wake of the 1934 strike, management urged the 
formation of a company union, the Dwight Employees Association. The company hoped 
the DEA would be an effective means through which they could mitigate the possibility a 
resurrected independent union local among those employees who still had pro-union 
leanings by giving these workers an institutional outlet for their grievances, but through
n
one which the company could directly control. In 1935, former Dwight UTWA 
unionists filed a complaint with the NLRB that the Dwight Employees Association was 
dominated by the company and was not a legitimate bargaining unit for the Alabama City 
employees because all of the DEA members who “negotiated” with management on 
behalf of the association’s rank-and-file were mill supervisors. In March 1936, after 
concurring that the Dwight Employees Association was a tool of management, the NLRB 
ordered that the company hold a collective bargaining election. But, Dwight
7 Janet Irons quoted a former member o f  the Dwight UTWA local as saying, “Well, everybody, 
you see, they dropped that union, they left that union, on account o f  they thought they got b i t . . .  . They 
were still union in the heart. They still wanted the union because they were being pressured so hard, like I 
told you, by the bosses, about, you do this, or you do that, or I’ll get your job, ’til they wanted a union.”
See Irons, Testing the New Deal: The General Textile Strike o f  1934 in the American South (Urbana: 
University o f  Illinois Press, 2000), 162.
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management refused to obey the order and stonewalled NLRB investigators for years.
An NLRB election would not take place at the Dwight Manufacturing Company until 
1943 when, after a nearly year long TWUA organizing campaign there and bowing to 
pressure from the War Labor Board so that the company could avoid a costly strike 
during wartime, management capitulated. Dwight employees chose the TWUA as their 
union of choice in September 1943.9
The TWUA acted as bargaining agent for the workers of the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company into the 1950s. In 1951, the Dwight Company merged with 
Cone Mills, Inc. of Greensboro, North Carolina as the only unionized mill of the twenty- 
one owned by Cone. The merger changed little in Dwight’s day-to-day operations. By 
1958 the Alabama City mill contained over 100,000 spindles and the employees there 
produced an estimated twenty percent of the textile goods made by the entire Cone 
organization.10 The status quo at the Dwight mill was radically altered, however, when 
Dwight’s TWUA contract expired in 1959. Cone management, looking to cut costs in the 
face of increasingly tight foreign competition, used the contract negotiations as an 
opening wedge to rid themselves of the Dwight union and the wages, benefits, and 
workload standards it was able to negotiate for its members. “Even if the committee and
8 In a 1937 article published in The Nation, Maxwell Stewart noted that “Gadsden may lay claim 
as being the toughest [anti-union] city in the United States. Other cities have had riots, occasional 
shootings, and periodic vigilante activity. But the reign o f  terror which has been maintained in the 
employers’ interest in this small Southern town has not been spontaneous or sporadic. It has been well 
organized, coolly carried out, and incomparably efficient— so effective, according to local newspapermen, 
that it probably cannot be overcome.” Maxwell Stewart, The Nation, 17 July 1937, 69, quoted in Hoffman, 
“A Study o f  the United Textile Workers o f  America in a Cotton Mill in a Medium-Sized Southern 
Industrial City: Labor Revolt in Alabama, 1934” (Ed.D. diss., University o f  Alabama, 1986), 3, fn. 3.
9 Charles Martin, “Southern Labor Relations in Transition: Gadsden, Alabama, 1930-1943” 
Journal o f  Southern History 47(November 1981): 550, 562; “Report on Industrial Relations in the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company, 1946,” Cone Mills Papers, quoted in Hoffman, “A Study o f  the United Textile 
Workers o f  America in a Cotton Mill in a Medium-Sized Southern Industrial City,” 161-162.
10 Gadsden Times, 30 May 1958.
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Aerial view o f  the Dwight Manufacturing Company mill complex in Gadsden, Alabama at the time o f  the 
merger with Cone M ills, Inc. o f  Greensboro, North Carolina in 1951. (Courtesy Gadsden Public Library, 
Gadsden, Alabama).
the terms o f our proposed new contract, this in itself is no guarantee that the future of the 
Dwight plant is assured,” warned Caesar Cone in a thinly veiled threat, published in the 
local press, that if  the union did not yield to management, the mill would be closed. “The 
company is going to have a difficult time getting Dwight costs in line with its 
competition,” Cone added, “. . . .  We are battling to keep this house in good order, rather 
than have it tumble.”11
Refusing to accept the company’s proposal o f a nine cent per hour decrease in the 
minimum wage paid to Dwight workers, TWUA local 576 began a strike on 17 March 
1959, seeking to force management to agree to a better contract. Cone management, as
11 Gadsden Times, 6 March 1959.
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Dwight’s management had done before in its 1920s union-busting attempts in Alabama 
City and Chicopee, simply shifted production from the Dwight facility to its other, non­
union mills. The Dwight mill hands suffered from the fact that the TWUA had only been 
able to make inroads in a handful of the southern mills in the highly decentralized textile 
industry. In large multi-unit organizations like Cone, the union could not affect 
simultaneous work stoppages in all of the company’s mills that would likely have forced 
management to negotiate with it.
Three weeks into the strike, with the TWUA local showing no signs of weakness, 
Cone Mills, Inc. announced the permanent closure of the Dwight mill. “The industrial 
base of this city was shaken today,” the local press bemoaned, “The Dwight plant would 
be the second textile mill to close here in recent years. In 1954 the Sauquoit Mills closed 
its doors in the face of union demands.”12 The Dwight mill in Alabama City never 
reopened and 2,100 unionized mill operatives lost their jobs. “Etowah county was 
suddenly cut off from the influx of more than $7 million in payrolls annually,” one 
Gadsden resident recalled over fifteen years after the mill closure, “More than 10,000 
persons were affected directly, people who were fed, clothed and sheltered with mill 
money.” 13
12 Gadsden Times, 3, 17, 31 March and 10 April 1959. In a 1982 letter from Caesar Cone, former 
president o f  the Cone Mills, to James Hoffman, Cone noted, “I feel [the Dwight local] had an inflated value 
o f  its strength due to its neighboring locals at Republic [Steel] and Goodyear. Both these industries had 
industry-wide bargaining when strikes took place in Gadsden they were industry wide. And after a period 
o f  shut down the whole industry went back to work. But in textiles it was different.” See Hoffman, “A 
Study o f  the United Textile Workers o f  America in a Cotton Mill in a Medium-Sized Southern Industrial 
City,” 163-164.
13 Gadsden Times, 6 July 1975. Cone M ills began selling the company-owned houses in Dwight 
City to its em ployees in 1957, and when the mills closed in 1959, these operatives struggled to find 
employment in the area and to keep their homes. The company converted the Dwight facility into a 
warehouse that stored over 40,000 bales o f  cotton but it employed only twenty-five people. In September 
1978 the Dwight warehouse was also closed, and the buildings were torn down between 1979 and 1980. 
The demolition o f  the old m ill’s smokestack, the last o f  the plant to be tom down, occurred on 20
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
288
Concessionary bargaining with the TWUA, coupled with threats of mill closures, 
had dominated labor-management relations in the New England textile industry as early 
as the late 1940s, and became standard fare in the southern portion of the industry as 
well. The scenario played out at the Dwight mills during the 1950s was repeated in mill 
after mill throughout the region during the 1970s and 1980s. Southern mill owners found 
themselves facing the same effects of competition from lower-wage, non-union areas as 
their New England counterparts did before them. As noted by historian James Cobb, the 
South had become a high-wage region in comparison to many labor markets around the 
globe. The development of the textile industry internationally, especially in Southeast 
Asia, which began in the 1920s, meant that textiles made abroad undersold southern- 
made goods in the marketplace. This competition increased, and so too did its negative 
impact on the profits of textile mills located in the U.S. South.
During the 1970s and 1980s therefore, southern manufacturers began embracing 
strategies to maintain company profitability similar to those that the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company had used as early as the 1890s and that became normative 
throughout the New England industry during its years of decline from the 1920s through 
the 1960s. Global competition forced southern mill owners to make their operations 
more efficient and cost-effective. Management did this by extracting concessions from 
the small number of union locals that did exist in the region on matters of wages and 
workload standards, by lowering its labor costs through the installation of labor-saving 
machinery and completely automating numerous aspects of the production process, by 
specializing output, by lobbying for industry-friendly legislation, and by establishing
September 1980. Gadsden Times, 21 September 1980; Dwight Manufacturing Company Chronology, 
Gadsden Industries (Textiles) Vertical File, Gadsden Public Library, Gadsden, AL.
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branch factories abroad and merging with other companies. Between 1979 and 1985, 
nevertheless, over 300,000 textile operatives in the Piedmont South’s textile industry lost 
their jobs because o f downsizings and mill closures.14
“This present, bitter contest over the north and south contains certain similarities 
to the controversies that brewed when New England in the earliest days of its textile 
development was feared as a competitor of the British Isles,” observed AFL President 
William Green in 1929, “South America, China, India and Japan are stirring with 
industrial life that is entirely new to them . . . .  Economic law will undoubtedly have its 
way . . . .  Just as below the Mason Dixon line activity is going on that must be reckoned 
with so will those densely populated countries beyond the Pacific come into the arena.”15 
William Green was correct in his remarks, but in the end, the migration of textile mills 
from Massachusetts, and eventually the rest of New England, to the New South, was not 
the fault of unions, of state legislators who passed protective legislation, or of reform 
groups that influenced public policy. Instead, one must look for explanations in the 
nature of the cotton manufacturing industry itself. Indeed, the process of relocation in the 
cotton textile industry that occurred from region to region in the United States between 
the 1890s and the 1930s continues to happen from nation to nation within the context of 
economic globalization. Modern-day entrepreneurs, like many late nineteenth and early
14 This was roughly the same number as that o f  N ew  Englanders who lost jobs by the 1970s due to 
textile corporation bankruptcies or relocations to the South. Cobb, Selling the South, 267-268; Gaventa and 
Smith, “The Deindustrialization o f  the Textile South,” 181-196; Nancy Frances Kane, Textiles in 
Transition: Technology, Wages, and Industry Relocation in the U.S. Textile Industry, 1880-1930  (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 139-144; Douglas Flamming, Creating the Modern South: Millhands and  
M anagers in Dalton, Georgia, 1884-1984 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1992), 308- 
311.  For global comparisons o f  hourly wages paid in the textile manufacturing industry between 1975 and 
1993, see International Labor Organization, Globalization o f  the Footwear, Textiles, and Clothing 
Industries: Report fo r  Discussion at the Tripartite M eeting on the G lobalization o f  the Footwear, Textiles, 
and Clothing Industries (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1996), Table 2.1.
15 Textile Worker, February 1929.
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twentieth-century Massachusetts textile mill owners, recognize that profits and, therefore, 
the likelihood of long-term company viability, are highest in underdeveloped, rural 
regions o f the world where surplus labor is abundant, opportunities for gainful 
employment are few, and labor is cheap and unorganized. It is nearly impossible to halt 
the constant search for such areas by owners of industries. It is possible, nevertheless, to 
mitigate the potentially devastating impact of capital flight. But, in the words of William 
Green, it is first necessary “to recognize it in operation and to act upon it accordingly.”16
There are lessons, therefore, that can be learned from the story of the Dwight 
Manufacturing Company’s move from Chicopee, Massachusetts to Alabama City, 
Alabama, and its part in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century migration of the 
New England textile industry to the South. The Dwight Company was always about 
thirty years ahead of the U.S. textile industry’s deindustrialization curve. It built its first 
southern branch plant in the 1890s when most New England mill owners waited until the 
1920s, it completely liquidated its Massachusetts mills in the late 1920s when the 
majority o f permanent regional closures did not occur until the 1950s and 1960s, and, like 
many southern mills that had been unionized but were unable to remain profitable in the 
face of international competition by the 1970s and 1980s, Cone management closed the 
Dwight mill in the late 1950s. The Dwight Manufacturing Company stands as one of the 
earliest examples of what happened in the New England textile industry, and eventually 
throughout the industrial Northeast in general during the rustbelt to sunbelt transitions of 
the late 1970s and 1980s.17 Seeing the process of industrial relocation through the
16 Textile Worker, February 1929.
17 On the rustbelt to sunbelt transitions, see Cobb, Selling the South, 151-253; Bluestone and 
Harrison, The Deindustrialization o f  America', David Bensman and Roberta Lynch, Rusted Dreams: H ard  
Times in a Steel Community (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987); Charles Craypo and Bruce
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specific lens of the Dwight Company, and the parts played by labor, management, and 
state governments in this process, provides a historic reference point for and helps inform 
on-going discussions about capital mobility, corporate responsibility, and the 
globalization of labor.
A fundamental problem for Massachusetts textile unionists between the 1880s and 
the 1920s was that they were unable to look past their craft orientation and become 
proactively involved in the process of change, related to technologies and skills, that was 
going on within the industry as southern textile production increased. Because of their 
local-state-regional outlook, moreover, there were significant moments of lost 
opportunity for these textile unionists in their quest to mitigate the impact o f southern 
competition on the textile industry o f Massachusetts. A fundamental turning point for 
Bay State textile unionists came between 1901 and 1902. When the southern-based 
National Union of Textile Workers and the northern, craft-focused American Federation 
of Textile Operatives officially amalgamated into the United Textile Workers o f America 
in 1901, an organizational structure was in place for the first time through which a truly 
national textile union could have been established and managed. New England craft 
unions had the leaders and the treasuries that made the organization of not only southern 
operatives, but also the vast numbers of unorganized mill hands in the North, if  not a sure 
thing, at least a distinct possibility. Textile industry historians have often pointed to the 
lack of funds as a fundamental problem hindering the ability of the UTWA to spearhead 
large organizational campaigns. But, union treasuries, although limited at the start, could 
have been augmented by the dues of newly organized workers, which would then have
Nissen, eds., Grand Designs: The Impact o f  Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions and Communities 
(Ithaca: ILR Press, 1993).
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created larger treasuries and the ability to provide ample strike funds for its locals and the 
potential for unionization drives in the future.
Southern operatives organized within the NUTW, for their part, embraced an 
industrial approach to unionizing that had the best potential for bridging the divides of 
skill, gender, and ethnicity pervasive throughout the textile industry. At the time of the 
1901 NUTW-AFTO merger, the insular craft focus that northern mulespinners and 
loomfixers, the most well-endowed textile unions, embraced meant that their experience 
in organizing, operating, and funding a viable union would not be extended to the semi­
skilled and unskilled operatives who constituted the largest portion of the textile 
workforce in the mills nationwide. Instead, their resources would be used to shore up 
existing unions and bargaining mechanisms that were locally entrenched. The inability 
and unwillingness to assume an industrial rather than craft organizational structure 
fundamentally undermined the UTWA’s strength, capacity for long-term viability, and 
the union’s ability to prevent the erosion of its New England membership base, especially 
during the 1920s and early 1930s. The craft unions that existed in textile centers like 
Chicopee, Fall River, Lowell, and New Bedford could establish standards of work that 
may have had an impact on non-union workers in their particular mills and locales, but 
the union-management bargaining that went on there had little bearing on the regulation 
of standards for the entire industry. Within the Dwight Manufacturing Company alone, 
the wages and workplace standards unionized workers at the Chicopee mill secured did 
not extend to the operatives in Alabama City.
The decade-long abandonment of UTWA attempts to unionize southern mills 
after the failed Augusta, Georgia strike in 1902, likewise, proved crucial, as the most
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dynamic growth of the industry at the turn of the century occurred in the South. The 
UTWA lost the opportunity to establish a foothold there until World War I, when the 
conditions for New England’s decline were already in place. As the craft unions 
abandoned both their financial and moral support, for the organization of southern locals 
in the wake of the Augusta defeat, their local-regional perspective and the unionists’ 
conservatism became even more entrenched; so too did the disparity of conditions 
between the mills of Massachusetts and of those in the Piedmont South and the likelihood 
that future southern organizing campaigns would end in failure. Southern mill owners 
used their arsenal of union-busting techniques successfully time and again through the 
1910s, 1920s, 1930s, and beyond. With each defeat, the challenge of establishing a union 
base in the region for the UTWA and later, for the TWUA, became increasingly difficult.
The absence of unions in the textile mills of the Piedmont South was an important 
factor in decisions made by mill owners, like those of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company, to build branch plants there. “Southern competition” from these unorganized 
mills was real, but, in lieu of formulating corporate strategies that were responsible to 
shareholders and employees, New England mill owners all too often used it as an excuse, 
especially in the 1920s, to break unions, lower wages, increase workloads, and 
eventually, to abandon operations in the North altogether. When the UTWA finally 
began a concerted effort to organize southern mills in 1929, it was too little, too late. The 
reality for the UTWA in the late 1920s and through the 1934 general strike, as well as for 
the TWUA by the 1940s and 1950s, was that the unions found themselves trying to save 
a declining industry in one region by combating the low-wage, non-union conditions that 
were the foundation for industrial growth in the other. The time for a concerted effort
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and firm commitment to organize the South was not when the most unionized portion of 
the industry had started its decline, but before.
New England textile unionists should have placed organizing southern workers at 
the top of their agenda from the very start of southern competition in the industry but did 
not. The failure o f Massachusetts textile unionists to connect their conditions to those 
elsewhere also extended into the realm of legislation. These unionists facilitated the 
creation and passage o f some of the best regulatory labor legislation in the United States 
by the turn-of-the-century, but the laws collectively would become an albatross in the 
ongoing battle for supremacy in the industry between textile mills in New England and
those in the Piedmont South. “Imaginary state lines,” one textile manufacturer warned in
• • • * • 18 *1904, “are not observed in industrial competition.” Just as textile unionists found in the
1920s that without a significant presence in the South, their ability to effectively bargain 
with management rested on a sandy foundation, they also realized that because southern 
workers remained unorganized, they had difficulty securing from the state the enactment 
of basic workplace regulations and could not force compliance with the limited state 
mandated ages, hours, and safety standards that were eventually established in the region. 
As regulatory legislation in New England became more stringent, so to did the effects of 
competition from southern mills where hours remained significantly longer, enforcement 
of child labor and education laws were lax, and where statehouses continued to be 
dominated by adherents to the region’s low-wage, laissez-faire, anti-union, pro-business 
industrial boosterism. By the time that federal legislation was enacted as part of the New 
Deal, the deindustrialization of New England’s textile industry was already well on its 
way, and it had little success staving off what had become the unavoidable.
18 Transactions o f  the National Association o f  Cotton Manufacturers, Annual Meeting, 1904, 109.
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While Massachusetts textile unions were shortsighted with regard to the 
implications of southern competition, so too were the majority of Bay State mill owners. 
At the times when southern competition was its most severe, particularly during the 
depressions of 1893 and the 1920s, these New England industrialists spent their time 
complaining about the ill-effects of the low wages paid and the longer hours worked in 
southern mills and concentrated their energies on trying to equalize regional conditions 
by undoing state legislation and ridding their mills of unionized workers. Textile 
companies throughout New England spent thousands upon thousands of dollars to pay for 
statehouse lobbyists and to employ agents who secured non-union labor to replace 
striking workers. These strategies, time and again however, failed to achieve 
management's goals. It seems clear that cooperation with the unions in their mills and 
with pro-labor lobbyists and special interest groups in their efforts to secure better 
regulatory legislation outside of the region would have been a more prudent path to take. 
Massachusetts mill owners’ resources would, perhaps, have been better utilized to fund 
union drives in the southern states and to pay for lobbyists working to secure higher 
standards there and at the federal level as the way to equalize the disparity of conditions 
that existed between northern and southern mills. The myopic focus on annual profits 
and complete corporate control over the production process meant that potential 
alternative solutions that might have corrected the conditions that would ultimately lead 
to the demise of the New England textile industry were largely ignored even as 
deindustrialization was already well on its way. By working for the lowest common 
dominator, capital flight to the South and fighting against the passage o f regulatory 
legislation and the establishment of unions there became the strategy of choice for many
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Massachusetts manufacturers, as it had for the owners of the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company, and made the region’s industrial decline more precipitous.
To be fair, however, in their efforts to build an effective organization and to 
secure regulatory legislation, textile unionists focused on the places where they would 
have the most success. The hostility of southern mill owners toward labor unions was a 
barrier to the establishment of a viable national organization that, for many unionists, 
seemed insurmountable. Individual preservation trumped the movement for inter­
regional solidarity. Shoring up existing craft locals throughout New England and 
securing the passage of pro-labor laws at the state level appeared to textile unionists at 
the time and from their individual, local, and regional perspectives to be the most 
effective use of human, financial, and political resources. Few northern textile 
manufacturers, likewise, were willing or able to make the ideological leap necessary for 
them to have seen unionists as partners, to have aided in the organizing of their mills and 
of southern ones, and to have worked for the passage of regulatory legislation. It is only 
with the aid of hindsight that one is able to look back and point to moments and strategies 
where mistakes were made. But, herein lies the importance of understanding the process 
of capital flight through analyses of corporations like the Dwight Manufacturing 
Company.
Many of the dynamics that were at work in the movement of capital from 
Chicopee to Alabama City, from Massachusetts to Alabama, and from New England to 
the Piedmont South between the 1880s and the 1920s are still at work between the United 
States and nations around the world where industrial production facilities are being built 
by multi-unit, global corporations. The failure of New England textile locals to focus
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
297
their organization and legislative lobbying efforts nationally, instead of locally and 
regionally, was a fundamental problem for their members and for the entire industry as 
early as the 1890s. But, even through the “Buy American” campaigns of the 1970s and 
1980s, and current efforts of U.S. unions to fight foreign competition through tariff 
protections and anti-sweatshop campaigns, the primary focus has not been on raising the 
standards of labor elsewhere to equalize conditions, but largely on protecting jobs where 
wages and benefits are high by establishing barriers to the marketplace success of 
products made more cheaply in industrializing nations. This type of parochial outlook 
proved a fatal flaw for textile unionists, mill owners, and mill towns at the turn of the 
previous century as they attempted to combat the relocation of their industry from a high- 
wage region with an established union base to a low-wage, open-shop one. The lesson to 
learn from these strategies is that they do not work over the long term, and, at the very 
most, only act to slow capital mobility. Retreating to such an approach will undoubtedly 
have a similar outcome for corporations, unions, and communities in migrations of 
capital from nation to nation.
An ongoing challenge presented by industrial globalization is to find a middle 
ground between job loss and deindustrialization in highly developed nations and job 
creation and economic growth in lesser developed nations that is responsible, just, and 
beneficial not only to corporations seeking profits but to workers and the communities in 
which they live. Many of the roadblocks that late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
textile industry management and unions ran into with state regulations, in that they could 
only be enforced in one state and not nationwide, are similar to those that exist currently 
with national governments in the global economy. Child labor laws, hours limitations,
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and workplace safety standards that regulate businesses and industries in the United 
States, for example, are not enforced outside of the nation’s boarders even for U.S. 
companies operating elsewhere. Part of successfully meeting these problems is the 
creation of an effective means to bring about change and establish labor standards beyond 
national boarders through organizations, whether they be governmental or non­
governmental, with an international membership base that has a voice and impact on 
global standards equal to that of the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund.
Implicit in the development of this voice is the ability of labor organizations in 
industrialized nations to embrace an international outlook and, as was necessary for New 
England textile unionists to do with southern mill hands during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, to see foreign workers in their industry not as competitors per 
se, but as co-workers with whom they have a shared cause. As the chain is only as strong 
as its weakest link, so are the best workplace standards in the most economically 
advanced nations inexorably tied to the worst that prevail in any industry, and unionists 
in countries like the United States need to be willing to use their political, financial, and 
human resources so that the equalization of standards that will undoubtedly occur will 
raise everyone up rather than push all down. As the labor market of corporations has 
shifted over time from local to regional, and from regional to national and international, 
so have the difficulties that workers within the global workforce face in understanding 
and finding common ground with one another. Whether and how this can be done remain 
open questions, but a better awareness of processes of capital mobility that have occurred
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in the past offer invaluable clues to the pitfalls to avoid, and to strategies that 
promise success in the future.
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